Two end-to-end journeys via `pic` against a real server: * `group_secret_is_injected_then_app_value_overrides` — a group-owned secret is injected into a descendant app's script through `secrets::get` (decrypted under the group AAD), then an app-owned secret of the same name shadows it (decrypted under the app AAD). Drives the resolver + both owner-AAD open paths against Postgres. * `group_secret_value_is_masked_from_app_devs` — the §5.3 boundary: an app dev (editor on the app, no group role) is denied the secret VALUE (403) yet still sees it EXISTS, masked, in `config/effective` (status set, owner group, no value); a group_admin reads the value. Proves an app runs with config its own devs cannot read. Also updates the existing app-secrets `ls` journey for the new `env` column (group secrets are env-scoped). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
188 lines
6.5 KiB
Rust
188 lines
6.5 KiB
Rust
//! Phase-3 group secrets, end to end via `pic`:
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//!
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//! 1. **Inheritance + proximity** — a group-owned secret is injected into a
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//! descendant app's script via `secrets::get` (decrypted under the
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//! group AAD), and an app-owned secret of the same name shadows it
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//! (decrypted under the app AAD). Exercises the resolver + the dual
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//! owner-AAD open path against real Postgres.
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//! 2. **Masked-read boundary** — a `group_admin` reads the secret VALUE,
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//! an app-only dev is denied the value (403) yet still sees the secret
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//! EXISTS (masked) in `config/effective`. That is the headline §5.3
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//! property: an app runs with config its own devs cannot read.
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use predicates::prelude::*;
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use crate::common;
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use crate::common::cleanup::{AppGuard, GroupGuard};
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use crate::common::member;
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#[ignore = "needs DATABASE_URL pointing at a running Postgres"]
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#[test]
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fn group_secret_is_injected_then_app_value_overrides() {
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let Some(fx) = common::fixture_or_skip() else {
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return;
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};
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let env = common::admin_env(fx);
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let acme = common::unique_slug("gs-acme");
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let app = common::unique_slug("gs-app");
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// Group `acme` with a `stripe-key` group secret (value via stdin).
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let _g_acme = GroupGuard::new(&env.url, &env.token, &acme);
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common::pic_as(&env)
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.args(["groups", "create", &acme])
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.assert()
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.success();
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common::pic_as(&env)
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.args(["secrets", "set", "--group", &acme, "stripe-key"])
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.write_stdin("sk_group")
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.assert()
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.success();
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// App under acme with a script that reads + returns the resolved secret.
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let _app = AppGuard::new(&env.url, &env.token, &app);
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common::pic_as(&env)
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.args(["apps", "create", &app, "--group", &acme])
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.assert()
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.success();
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let fixture = common::fixture_path("read-secret.rhai");
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common::pic_as(&env)
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.args([
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"scripts",
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"deploy",
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fixture.to_str().unwrap(),
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"--app",
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&app,
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])
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.assert()
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.success();
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let ls = common::pic_as(&env)
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.args(["scripts", "ls", "--app", &app])
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.output()
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.expect("scripts ls");
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let id = common::parse_first_id(std::str::from_utf8(&ls.stdout).unwrap())
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.expect("scripts ls should produce one row");
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// Inherited: the app has no own `stripe-key`, so the group's value is
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// injected (decrypted under the GROUP AAD).
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assert_eq!(
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invoke_body(&env, &id),
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serde_json::json!("sk_group"),
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"inherited group secret"
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);
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// Proximity override: an app-owned `stripe-key` shadows the group value
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// (decrypted under the APP AAD — proving both AAD namespaces open).
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common::pic_as(&env)
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.args(["secrets", "set", "--app", &app, "stripe-key"])
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.write_stdin("sk_app")
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.assert()
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.success();
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assert_eq!(
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invoke_body(&env, &id),
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serde_json::json!("sk_app"),
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"app override"
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);
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}
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#[ignore = "needs DATABASE_URL pointing at a running Postgres"]
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#[test]
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fn group_secret_value_is_masked_from_app_devs() {
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let Some(fx) = common::fixture_or_skip() else {
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return;
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};
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let env = common::admin_env(fx);
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let acme = common::unique_slug("gsm-acme");
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let app = common::unique_slug("gsm-app");
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let _g_acme = GroupGuard::new(&env.url, &env.token, &acme);
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common::pic_as(&env)
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.args(["groups", "create", &acme])
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.assert()
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.success();
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common::pic_as(&env)
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.args(["secrets", "set", "--group", &acme, "stripe-key"])
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.write_stdin("sk_live_masked")
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.assert()
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.success();
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let _app = AppGuard::new(&env.url, &env.token, &app);
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common::pic_as(&env)
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.args(["apps", "create", &app, "--group", &acme])
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.assert()
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.success();
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// An app dev: a Member granted `editor` on the app, but NO group role.
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let dev = member::member_user(fx, &common::unique_username("appdev"));
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let dev_env = common::custom_env(&fx.url, &dev.token);
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common::seed_credentials(&dev_env, &dev.username);
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member::grant_membership(fx, &app, &dev.id, "editor");
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// Denied the VALUE: the value endpoint is gated GroupSecretsRead at the
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// owning group, which the app dev does not hold.
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common::pic_as(&dev_env)
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.args(["secrets", "read", "--group", &acme, "stripe-key"])
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.assert()
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.failure()
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.stderr(predicate::str::contains("HTTP 403"));
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// But the dev DOES see it EXISTS (masked) in the app's effective config —
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// status `set`, owner group, never the value. Asserted directly against
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// the endpoint to avoid the CLI's manifest requirement.
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let effective = reqwest::blocking::Client::new()
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.get(format!(
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"{}/api/v1/admin/apps/{}/config/effective",
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fx.url, app
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))
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.bearer_auth(&dev.token)
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.send()
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.expect("config effective");
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assert!(
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effective.status().is_success(),
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"dev can read effective config"
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);
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let body: serde_json::Value = effective.json().expect("effective json");
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let masked = &body["secrets"]["stripe-key"];
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assert_eq!(masked["status"], "set", "secret shown as set");
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assert_eq!(masked["owner"]["kind"], "group", "owned by the group");
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assert!(
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masked.get("value").is_none(),
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"value must never appear in effective config: {masked}"
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);
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// A group_admin CAN read the value.
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let gadmin = member::member_user(fx, &common::unique_username("gadmin"));
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let gadmin_env = common::custom_env(&fx.url, &gadmin.token);
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common::seed_credentials(&gadmin_env, &gadmin.username);
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common::pic_as(&env)
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.args([
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"groups",
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"members",
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"add",
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&acme,
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&gadmin.id,
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"--role",
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"app_admin",
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])
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.assert()
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.success();
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common::pic_as(&gadmin_env)
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.args(["secrets", "read", "--group", &acme, "stripe-key"])
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.assert()
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.success()
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.stdout(predicate::str::contains("sk_live_masked"));
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}
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/// Invoke a script via `pic scripts invoke <id>` (→ `/api/v1/execute/{id}`)
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/// and parse its JSON body.
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fn invoke_body(env: &common::TestEnv, id: &str) -> serde_json::Value {
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let out = common::pic_as(env)
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.args(["scripts", "invoke", id])
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.output()
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.expect("scripts invoke");
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assert!(
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out.status.success(),
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"invoke failed: {}",
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String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)
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);
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serde_json::from_slice(&out.stdout).expect("invoke body is JSON")
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}
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