claude.ai's connector dialog takes a name and a URL. Sending a bearer token
needs a "Request headers" beta most accounts lack, and OAuth is not built
yet, so with MCP_PATH_SECRET set the endpoint is also served at
/<secret>/mcp without the bearer token — a trial until OAuth replaces it.
The path is the credential there. It is compared in constant time, and a
wrong one answers 404 like any unknown path. The config refuses fewer than 32
URL-safe characters and never echoes the value, nothing in the server logs
request paths, and the Caddy snippet rewrites the segment before an access
log entry is written (verified against Caddy 2.11). Claude Code and the CLI
keep the bearer token; DEPLOYMENT.md says what the path trades away.
178 tests. Smoke 76/76 and 74/74 on the local instance.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The CLI talks only to the Pi's /api surface and holds no Schulcloud
credential — only the same bearer token the Claude connector uses. That
is not layering for its own sake: a Schulcloud session dies after two
hours idle and a CLI process lives for seconds, so a CLI with its own
token would be dead most times you reached for it. Routing through the
Pi means one session, one keepalive, one monthly cookie paste.
sync is a one-way mirror, which follows from the data rather than from
scope-cutting: file records are immutable upstream, so there is no
versioning, no conflict resolution and no merge. State is keyed by file
record id with the path as derived output, so an upstream rename moves
the local file instead of duplicating it — verified against the live
server. Verification is size-only because the download endpoint exposes
no ETag and Schulcloud publishes no hash; size still catches the failure
that happens, a truncated download. Downloads land on a .part neighbour
and are renamed, so an interrupted run leaves no half-file that a later
run mistakes for complete. Deletions are reported but not propagated —
a teacher removing a worksheet is no reason to destroy the student's
copy — with --prune to opt in.
what_changed now clamps to the oldest stored generation instead of
refusing, and says it did: "what's new this week" is a reasonable
question to ask a two-day-old index.
Two build bugs caught by the checks rather than by luck: the smoke
harness constructed the app without services, so the index-backed tools
were never exercised; and the Docker build could not see
scripts/copy-assets.mjs, so the image would have shipped without
migrations and silently degraded to live-only.
67 unit tests (9 needing Postgres), smoke green both ways — 34 checks
with an index, 32 without, because graceful degradation is a supported
mode and not a fallback nobody runs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Read-only MCP server exposing a Schulcloud account to Claude: courses,
column boards, lessons, tasks, and file downloads with text extraction.
The API surface was verified against the live instance rather than
inferred from upstream source, which changed several design decisions:
- The `jwt` cookie works verbatim as `Authorization: Bearer` and lasts 30
days, so there is no cookie jar and no refresh-session timer.
- Course contents live at /api/v3/course-rooms/{courseId}/board; there is
no GET /api/v3/courses/{id}.
- Files are a separate service (/api/v3/file/*) with its own OpenAPI doc.
- Board file elements carry no file id; attachments are resolved by
listing files-storage with parentType=boardnodes and the element id.
Read-only by construction: every client method is a GET, including the
api_get escape hatch. The endpoint is internet-facing by necessity, so a
leaked token being unable to act as the user is the key safety property.
Deploys as a container behind the Pi's existing Caddy, guarded by a
constant-time bearer check. Stateless — no database.
Verified: 28 unit tests, plus a 30-check end-to-end run driving a real
MCP client over Streamable HTTP against the live account.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
