Commit Graph

2 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
60ca4d3eba Keepalive via refresh-session; GET pings measured insufficient
The endurance test refuted the sliding-window model I committed earlier.
A keepalive doing only GET /api/v3/me succeeded at t+0/30/60/90 and was
still rejected by t+120 — consistent with the session ending ~2h after
LOGIN (t+107), and inconsistent with 2h after the last request, which
would have been t+210.

This is a live-vs-source divergence, not a misreading: both the current
JwtWhitelistAdapter and the legacy Feathers ensureTokenIsWhitelisted
re-set the Valkey TTL on every authenticated request, so the source
reads as a sliding window. The instance does not behave that way.

So the keepalive now calls POST /authentication/refresh-session, the
endpoint behind the UI's "Sitzung verlängern" button, which a separate
100s test showed does hold the reported budget at 7200s. It is the only
non-GET request in the server: no body, touches only our own session,
cannot read or modify user data, and is not exposed as a tool, so no
model-driven call can ever be a POST. It logs the returned budget, which
makes a failing extension visible before the session is lost.

Whether this is sufficient is NOT established. Two mechanisms still fit:
an idle TTL that reads fail to refresh (keepalive works), or an absolute
cap/revocation anchored at login — e.g. the IDP's back-channel logout,
which clears every token for the account rather than one. Added
scripts/session-diagnose.mjs to settle it: it logs the budget every 10
min, so a decaying series indicates the former and an abrupt 401 at
7200s the latter. Docs state the open question rather than asserting a
mechanism.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-12 15:46:54 +02:00
35125b7683 Initial schulcloud-mcp server
Read-only MCP server exposing a Schulcloud account to Claude: courses,
column boards, lessons, tasks, and file downloads with text extraction.

The API surface was verified against the live instance rather than
inferred from upstream source, which changed several design decisions:

- The `jwt` cookie works verbatim as `Authorization: Bearer` and lasts 30
  days, so there is no cookie jar and no refresh-session timer.
- Course contents live at /api/v3/course-rooms/{courseId}/board; there is
  no GET /api/v3/courses/{id}.
- Files are a separate service (/api/v3/file/*) with its own OpenAPI doc.
- Board file elements carry no file id; attachments are resolved by
  listing files-storage with parentType=boardnodes and the element id.

Read-only by construction: every client method is a GET, including the
api_get escape hatch. The endpoint is internet-facing by necessity, so a
leaked token being unable to act as the user is the key safety property.

Deploys as a container behind the Pi's existing Caddy, guarded by a
constant-time bearer check. Stateless — no database.

Verified: 28 unit tests, plus a 30-check end-to-end run driving a real
MCP client over Streamable HTTP against the live account.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 23:52:12 +02:00