A token lasts 30 days and only a browser login yields one — the account is
federated, so the server cannot mint it. Replacing it meant editing .env and
recreating the container, every month.
`schulcloud token set` (a hidden prompt, or piped input) and a /token page
both send it to PUT /api/token. The server checks it with Schulcloud first —
well-formed, unexpired, still logged in, the same account — then swaps it
into the config every request reads, restarts the keepalive and saves it in
STATE_DIR, a new volume, with mode 0600. At startup the newer of the saved
token and TSC_JWT_COOKIE wins, unless they belong to different accounts. A
refused paste changes nothing, and the token is never logged.
The keepalive's pings carry a generation, so a 401 for the old token that
arrives after a swap cannot stop the new cycle. `schulcloud token`, whoami
and the log report the expiry and warn a week ahead.
Found on the way: a host that is off for more than two hours loses the
session however long the token has left — this machine lost it overnight —
which is what the always-on Pi is for.
174 tests. Smoke 72/72 on the local instance, and a real swap verified end to
end there.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Read-only MCP server exposing a Schulcloud account to Claude: courses,
column boards, lessons, tasks, and file downloads with text extraction.
The API surface was verified against the live instance rather than
inferred from upstream source, which changed several design decisions:
- The `jwt` cookie works verbatim as `Authorization: Bearer` and lasts 30
days, so there is no cookie jar and no refresh-session timer.
- Course contents live at /api/v3/course-rooms/{courseId}/board; there is
no GET /api/v3/courses/{id}.
- Files are a separate service (/api/v3/file/*) with its own OpenAPI doc.
- Board file elements carry no file id; attachments are resolved by
listing files-storage with parentType=boardnodes and the element id.
Read-only by construction: every client method is a GET, including the
api_get escape hatch. The endpoint is internet-facing by necessity, so a
leaked token being unable to act as the user is the key safety property.
Deploys as a container behind the Pi's existing Caddy, guarded by a
constant-time bearer check. Stateless — no database.
Verified: 28 unit tests, plus a 30-check end-to-end run driving a real
MCP client over Streamable HTTP against the live account.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
