Commit Graph

3 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
MechaCat02
237395e4f4 Run the tests on Node 22.16, and fix what a fresh setup tripped over
Node 22.16 runs TypeScript only behind --experimental-strip-types (on by
default from 22.18), so `npm test` failed on every file with
ERR_UNKNOWN_FILE_EXTENSION. The flag is harmless on newer versions.

probe and session-diagnose still imported dist/schulcloud/client.js, which
the move to core/ renamed, so both scripts died at import.

A relative MIRROR_DIR broke file serving: res.sendFile refuses a relative
path, and resolveWithin returns an absolute path only when its root is one.
The config resolves it once, at load.

package-lock.json is what `npm install` records today: the `schulcloud`
bin, and no stale peer flags. 101 tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-16 20:19:15 +02:00
9ce869f3fb Root cause: an open Schulportal tab revokes the shared token
Neither of my two hypotheses was right, and the upstream source was
correct all along. The jwt cookie copied from the browser IS the
browser's session token — same jti — so this server and the tab share
one session, and the tab ends it:

  1. nuxt-client sets a purely client-side timer, sessionTimeoutTimestamp
     = now + JWT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS, reset only on route change
     (watch(router.currentRoute, startTimer)) — never by API activity and
     never read back from the server's TTL.
  2. AutoLogoutWarning.vue warns at JWT_SHOW_TIMEOUT_WARNING_SECONDS.
  3. At zero, autoLogout() -> location.replace('/logout?auto-logout=true').
  4. schulcloud-client controllers/login.js:439 -> POST /api/v3/logout
     -> removeJwtFromWhitelist(jwt) -> the shared key is deleted.

That explains the endurance failure exactly: the GET pings at t+0/30/60/90
were sliding the Valkey TTL correctly, and then the tab deleted the key.
It also explains the ~1h warning dialog appearing in a tab the user
considers in use — the timer only resets on navigation.

So the sliding TTL is real and a keepalive does hold a session to the
30-day ceiling. The operational fix is not to ping harder but to close
the Schulportal window after copying the cookie; a private window is the
tidy way. This is now the loudest caveat in the token-copying steps,
because it is the single easiest way to break the setup.

Keeping refresh-session rather than reverting to GET, now for a reason
that stands on its own: it states the intent contractually instead of
relying on extend-on-check as a side effect of an unrelated read (that
whitelist has been refactored twice in 2026, and a GET keepalive would
fail silently if it went away), and its budget readout makes session
health visible in the log.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-12 16:32:42 +02:00
60ca4d3eba Keepalive via refresh-session; GET pings measured insufficient
The endurance test refuted the sliding-window model I committed earlier.
A keepalive doing only GET /api/v3/me succeeded at t+0/30/60/90 and was
still rejected by t+120 — consistent with the session ending ~2h after
LOGIN (t+107), and inconsistent with 2h after the last request, which
would have been t+210.

This is a live-vs-source divergence, not a misreading: both the current
JwtWhitelistAdapter and the legacy Feathers ensureTokenIsWhitelisted
re-set the Valkey TTL on every authenticated request, so the source
reads as a sliding window. The instance does not behave that way.

So the keepalive now calls POST /authentication/refresh-session, the
endpoint behind the UI's "Sitzung verlängern" button, which a separate
100s test showed does hold the reported budget at 7200s. It is the only
non-GET request in the server: no body, touches only our own session,
cannot read or modify user data, and is not exposed as a tool, so no
model-driven call can ever be a POST. It logs the returned budget, which
makes a failing extension visible before the session is lost.

Whether this is sufficient is NOT established. Two mechanisms still fit:
an idle TTL that reads fail to refresh (keepalive works), or an absolute
cap/revocation anchored at login — e.g. the IDP's back-channel logout,
which clears every token for the account rather than one. Added
scripts/session-diagnose.mjs to settle it: it logs the budget every 10
min, so a decaying series indicates the former and an abrupt 401 at
7200s the latter. Docs state the open question rather than asserting a
mechanism.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-12 15:46:54 +02:00