The notes existed but there was nowhere to write them: a CLI command on a laptop, a tool call through Claude, or a file in a Docker volume. None of those is reachable from a phone in a lesson, which is where notes are actually taken. So: `/app`, served only when WEB_PASSWORD is set. A login, the day's notes, and a settings page for the Schulcloud token — the one surface here meant for a person rather than a program. The shape follows how the notes are written: one note per school day, one `##` heading per lesson, prose and lists and tables beneath. That turns out to be the design decision that matters, twice over. First, it is what lets WebUntis earn its keep. Opening a day with no note fills in that day's lessons — numbered, with times, teacher and room, cancellations dropped and substitutions marked. Retyping the timetable is exactly the work the second upstream exists to avoid, and "Stunden ergänzen" tops up a note started before the day ended without touching what is already written. Second, it changes how notes are indexed. A day note is indexed per lesson, not whole: search answers "my own note, Deutsch, 18.09.2026" rather than "my own note, Friday", and `list_notes subject=Deutsch` finds a day whose frontmatter names no subject at all. Indexed whole, every hit would read as a weekday and "what did we do in Deutsch" would match notes whose other five lessons were something else. `lessonHeading` and `subjectFromHeading` are a loop — the app writes the heading, the indexer reads the subject back out — and a test holds them to it. Notes taken in a lesson cannot be retaken, so the editor is built around not losing them: autosave, every keystroke mirrored to local storage, a save when the phone locks, and a fallback to the local copy when the request never arrives. A save that would overwrite a version the editor never saw is refused and the choice handed back — the notes folder is synced and open in more than one place, and a phone must not silently win over a laptop. `replaceNote` is separate from `writeNote` for that reason: never-overwrite is right for `add_note` and exactly wrong for an editor. WEB_PASSWORD is the first credential here a human types, so it is the first that can be guessed: scrypt at startup, never stored or compared in the clear, per-address rate limiting — which is not decoration, since the scrypt cost is itself a denial-of-service vector without it. The session is a signed HttpOnly SameSite=Strict cookie whose key is derived from the password, so changing it logs everyone out and there is no second secret to keep. It opens /api, because a session is the user, and never /mcp, because nothing in a browser speaks MCP. Also here, because the app made them matter: frontmatter now reads the indented `- item` list form editors write, so an Obsidian vault round-trips its tags; and a four-digit folder is a filing scheme, not a subject, so `2026/` does not file a school year under one. 357 tests; 106/107 smoke against the local instance, the one failure being the H5P service that instance does not run. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
148 lines
5.4 KiB
TypeScript
148 lines
5.4 KiB
TypeScript
import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
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import { describe, it } from 'node:test';
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import { createWebAuth, isSecureRequest, readCookie, SESSION_COOKIE } from '../src/http/web-auth.ts';
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/**
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* The app's login. scrypt is deliberately slow, so these share one authenticator
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* rather than building one per test.
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*/
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const PASSWORD = 'ein-sehr-langes-testpasswort';
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const auth = createWebAuth(PASSWORD);
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function cookieHeader(value: string): string {
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return `${SESSION_COOKIE}=${value}`;
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}
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describe('createWebAuth without a password', () => {
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it('is disabled, and nothing it returns opens anything', () => {
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// The app is not served at all in this case; the object exists so callers
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// need no branch, and every answer it gives is "no".
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const off = createWebAuth(undefined);
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assert.equal(off.enabled, false);
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assert.equal(off.check(PASSWORD, '::1').ok, false);
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assert.equal(off.verify(cookieHeader('anything')), false);
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});
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});
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describe('password check', () => {
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it('accepts the password and rejects everything else', () => {
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assert.equal(auth.check(PASSWORD, 'a').ok, true);
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assert.equal(auth.check(PASSWORD + 'x', 'a').ok, false);
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assert.equal(auth.check('', 'a').ok, false);
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});
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it('locks an address out after repeated failures', () => {
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const from = 'brute-force';
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let blocked;
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for (let attempt = 0; attempt < 12; attempt++) {
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blocked = auth.check('wrong', from);
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if (blocked.retryAfterSeconds !== undefined) break;
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}
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assert.ok(blocked?.retryAfterSeconds, 'expected a lockout with a retry hint');
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// And the lockout holds even for the *right* password, or it would be no
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// lockout at all — the attacker only has to guess it once.
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assert.equal(auth.check(PASSWORD, from).ok, false);
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});
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it('counts per address, so one attacker cannot lock the user out', () => {
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assert.equal(auth.check(PASSWORD, 'somebody-else').ok, true);
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});
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it('forgets the failures once a login succeeds', () => {
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const from = 'recovers';
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auth.check('wrong', from);
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auth.check('wrong', from);
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assert.equal(auth.check(PASSWORD, from).ok, true);
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assert.equal(auth.check(PASSWORD, from).ok, true);
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});
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});
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describe('session cookies', () => {
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it('mints a cookie it accepts back', () => {
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assert.equal(auth.verify(cookieHeader(auth.mint())), true);
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});
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it('mints a different value every time', () => {
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assert.notEqual(auth.mint(), auth.mint());
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});
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it('refuses a tampered signature', () => {
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const value = auth.mint();
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assert.equal(auth.verify(cookieHeader(`${value.slice(0, -1)}${value.at(-1) === 'A' ? 'B' : 'A'}`)), false);
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});
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it('refuses an extended expiry, which is the point of signing it', () => {
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const value = auth.mint();
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const signature = value.slice(value.lastIndexOf('.') + 1);
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assert.equal(auth.verify(cookieHeader(`${Date.now() + 10 ** 12}.nonce.${signature}`)), false);
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});
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it('refuses an expired cookie even with a good signature', () => {
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// Signed by this key, but for a moment that has passed.
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const body = `${Date.now() - 1000}.nonce`;
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const fresh = auth.mint();
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const shape = `${body}.${fresh.slice(fresh.lastIndexOf('.') + 1)}`;
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assert.equal(auth.verify(cookieHeader(shape)), false);
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});
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it('refuses nonsense and an absent cookie', () => {
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for (const value of ['', 'x', 'a.b', '...']) assert.equal(auth.verify(cookieHeader(value)), false, value);
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assert.equal(auth.verify(undefined), false);
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assert.equal(auth.verify('other=1'), false);
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});
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it('is not accepted by an authenticator built from a different password', () => {
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// Changing the password logs everyone out, because the signing key is
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// derived from it.
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const other = createWebAuth('ein-ganz-anderes-passwort');
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assert.equal(other.verify(cookieHeader(auth.mint())), false);
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});
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it('is HttpOnly and SameSite=Strict, and Secure only over TLS', () => {
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const secure = auth.cookie('v', { secure: true });
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assert.match(secure, /HttpOnly/);
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assert.match(secure, /SameSite=Strict/);
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assert.match(secure, /Secure/);
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// Marking it Secure on a plain connection makes it vanish, which looks
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// exactly like a broken login.
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assert.doesNotMatch(auth.cookie('v', { secure: false }), /Secure/);
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});
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it('clears with an immediate expiry', () => {
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assert.match(auth.clearCookie({ secure: true }), /Max-Age=0/);
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});
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});
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describe('readCookie', () => {
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it('finds one cookie among several', () => {
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assert.equal(readCookie('a=1; sc_app=wanted; b=2', 'sc_app'), 'wanted');
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});
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it('does not match a name that merely ends the same way', () => {
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assert.equal(readCookie('not_sc_app=no', 'sc_app'), undefined);
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});
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it('is undefined for no header', () => {
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assert.equal(readCookie(undefined, 'sc_app'), undefined);
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});
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});
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describe('isSecureRequest', () => {
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const request = (headers: Record<string, string>, protocol = 'http') =>
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({ get: (name: string) => headers[name.toLowerCase()], protocol }) as never;
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it('trusts the forwarded protocol, which is all there is behind a proxy', () => {
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assert.equal(isSecureRequest(request({ 'x-forwarded-proto': 'https' })), true);
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assert.equal(isSecureRequest(request({ 'x-forwarded-proto': 'http' })), false);
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});
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it('reads only the first hop of a chain', () => {
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assert.equal(isSecureRequest(request({ 'x-forwarded-proto': 'https, http' })), true);
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});
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it('falls back to the connection when nothing forwarded it', () => {
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assert.equal(isSecureRequest(request({}, 'https')), true);
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assert.equal(isSecureRequest(request({})), false);
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});
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});
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