Files
Schulcloud-MCP/CLAUDE.md
MechaCat02 5ae2210459 Close the gaps an audit of courses, tasks, files and grades turned up
Every area — courses, rooms, boards, topics, tasks, files, quizzes, teams,
groups, submissions, grades — was checked for data the instance has and the
tools did not show.

Grades and feedback. A teacher's /homework page is a different page from a
student's: grade and comment live in the grading form, one block per
submission, so a teacher account reported every graded submission as having
neither. parseTeacherGrading reads the form, and list_submissions can now
include the written feedback and who handed the work in.

Names. /api/v1 is partly served: courses, users and classes survive in the
deployment's ingress table, and users/{id} is the only route from an id to a
name. Submitters, file creators and course teachers resolve through it, and
degrade to "not visible to this account" where a student may not read them.

Courses, rooms and classes. get_course adds the description, teachers,
member count and weekly timetable from /api/v1/courses. list_classes is new.
get_room reports what the account may do — allowedOperations is an object of
booleans, not the list it was typed as — and applicants and invitation links
where it may manage them.

Board and topic content. Link descriptions, image alt text, drawing and
video-conference titles, the ids behind external tools and H5P content (the
only thing resembling a quiz), and what a deleted element used to be. Topic
Etherpad pads are read like board pads, and htmlToText keeps table columns
apart and drops template indentation.

Files. A scan with no text layer falls back to the preview endpoint, whose
width and outputFormat are undocumented enums, so Claude gets a picture of
the page; list_files reports counts and sizes. Teams stay documented as
unreadable at any API version; their files come later.

What the crawl missed. Tasks attached to topics (18 of 60 on the live
account), each course's own file area, and — behind INDEX_PERSONAL_FILES —
personal files and submissions with their grade comments, so search and
what_changed cover grading. A submission hit points at get_task.

The local instance's preview profile gets an ImageMagick policy that allows
the coders its 7.1.2 build needs; the image's own denies them all.

110 tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-16 20:19:16 +02:00

15 KiB

CLAUDE.md

Guidance for Claude Code when working in this repository.

What this is

Read-only access to a Schulcloud (HPI Schul-Cloud / Schulcloud-Verbund-Software) account: courses, column boards, lessons, tasks, files with text extraction, and a Postgres-backed full-text index. TypeScript, Node 22+, @modelcontextprotocol/sdk.

Three entry points over one core:

  • src/bin/http.ts — Streamable HTTP + /api, the deployed form, behind Caddy on a Pi.
  • src/bin/stdio.ts — stdio, for local Claude Code / Desktop use.
  • src/bin/cli.ts — the schulcloud CLI, which talks to the HTTP server, never to Schulcloud.

Commands

npm run build       # tsc → dist/ (also copies store/migrations/*.sql)
npm run dev         # watch mode, runs src/ directly via type stripping
npm test            # unit tests (node:test), no network
npm run typecheck
npm run probe       # verify token + API assumptions against the LIVE instance
npm run smoke       # full end-to-end: real server + real MCP client + real data
npm run keepalive-status   # is the deployed container holding its session?
npm run session-diagnose   # ~2.5h: measure what actually ends the session

docker-compose.override.yml is local-only and publishes the server on 127.0.0.1:8080 and Postgres on 127.0.0.1:55432; see docs/LOCAL.md.

probe and smoke hit the live Schulcloud and need a valid .env. Both are read-only with respect to Schulcloud. Run smoke after touching src/core/, src/mcp/ or src/http/ — the unit tests cover only pure functions.

Run smoke both ways: with DATABASE_URL set (34 checks, index-backed) and without (32 checks, live-only). The degradation path is a supported mode, not a fallback nobody exercises.

Store tests need a database and skip without one: TEST_DATABASE_URL=postgresql://… npm test. They use a real Postgres on purpose — the generation/diff semantics are entirely SQL, so a mock would test nothing. They TRUNCATE, and refuse to run unless the database name contains "test"; that guard exists because pointing them at the dev database once put fixtures into real data.

Architecture

bin/{http,stdio}.ts ─┬─ mcp/server.ts ── mcp/tools/*
                     └─ http/{server,api,auth}.ts        /mcp and /api
                          │
bin/cli.ts ──HTTP──────────┘   cli/{config,client,sync}.ts

           services.ts  (process-wide: client, Store, Indexer)
                │
   indexer/indexer.ts ── store/store.ts ── Postgres
                │
            core/{client,board,crawl,extract,text,paths,types}
  • core/ knows nothing of MCP, HTTP or the CLI.
    • client.ts — every upstream call; GET-only except extendSession.
    • board.ts — a column board needs three kinds of call to reconstruct.
    • crawl.ts — the one traversal. Search, the indexer, the what-changed diff and the file mirror all need it; keep it here, not in a tool.
    • paths.ts — the security boundary for mirrored filenames. See Invariants.
  • store/ — crawl generations, identity diffs, german + pg_trgm FTS. Store.open returns undefined when Postgres is down; callers degrade.
  • indexer/ — crawl → persist → mirror bytes → extract text → index. Coalesces concurrent refreshes; enforces a minimum interval. The crawl walks topic-attached tasks too, which the course page does not list: without that they are unsearchable and their grades invisible. INDEX_PERSONAL_FILES additionally indexes personal files and submitted/returned work, including grade comments — that is what makes "what got graded this week" answerable, at roughly three extra requests per task.
  • mcp/tools/*.ts — tool descriptions are prompts: they are how Claude picks a tool, so they carry the German domain terms (Kurse, Themen, Aufgaben) and say when not to use the tool.
  • context.ts — per-session state. Only /me is cached, because the school id is on every files-storage path and cannot change for a token.

Invariants

Everything that touches Schulcloud is read-only. Every client method is a GET except extendSession (the keepalive's refresh-session call, which touches only our own session and is not exposed as a tool, so no model-driven call can be a POST). api_get rejects non-/api/ paths and anything carrying a scheme or host. refresh_index and POST /api/refresh write only to the Pi's own index and mirror — every upstream call they make is still a GET.

Filenames from Schulcloud are untrusted paths. Course titles, card titles and filenames are all user-supplied upstream, and both the server's mirror and the CLI's sync turn them into filesystem paths. Everything goes through core/paths.ts: safeComponent reduces one string to one safe component, and resolveWithin refuses anything that escapes the root. Do not bypass them with path.join, and keep the property that no .. survives anywhere in a component — it is what makes the invariant checkable. The endpoint is internet-facing by necessity, so "a leaked token cannot act as the user" is the property that makes that acceptable. Do not add a write tool without the user explicitly asking for one and understanding this.

Never log or echo secrets. TSC_JWT_COOKIE grants full read access to the account; MCP_AUTH_TOKEN guards the endpoint. Neither belongs in logs, error messages, or tool output. .env is git-ignored — keep it that way.

Live behaviour beats upstream source. The clones in vendor/ track main and may be ahead of what is deployed. When they disagree with the instance, the instance is right. docs/API.md records which is which.

API gotchas

These cost real time to discover; docs/API.md has the full list with evidence.

  • Course contents are at GET /api/v3/course-rooms/{courseId}/board. There is no GET /api/v3/courses/{id}, and :roomId there is the course id.
  • Rooms ("Räume") are a separate space from courses, and the UI's naming is a trap: the sidebar's Kurse entry links to /rooms/courses-overview and lists courses; Räume links to /rooms and lists rooms. A /rooms/... url says nothing about which. list_rooms/get_room cover the latter; a room holds boards only — no lessons, no tasks. Empty is normal and is also what a revoked membership looks like.
  • Room boards report isVisible, which the course-page projection does not, so a room's drafts can be named as drafts instead of being tried and 403ing.
  • limit is rejected above 100 though the spec says 99. Page at 99; the client clamps and listAllCourses pages for you.
  • There is no GET /tasks/{id}, and the task lists omit description — it only exists on the course page's task element. get_task does that join.
  • GET /cards?ids= takes at most 20 ids (the qs arrayLimit default), and fails above that with a validation error that blames the ids rather than their number. MAX_IDS_PER_QUERY in core/client.ts. Any board over 20 cards is affected, which is common.
  • Never swallow a per-item crawl error. Board failures used to be caught and dropped, so the index lost whole boards while the crawl reported success — which is how the 20-id limit went unnoticed. They go into Snapshot.failures.
  • GET /lessons/{id}/tasks is a bare array whose items carry no id. Not the {data,total} envelope, and LessonLinkedTaskResponse has no id field at all. A topic-attached task is thus unidentifiable from the API and invisible in both task lists once past due — 18 of 60 tasks on the real account. core/lesson-page.ts scrapes the ids off the legacy topic page.
  • Collaborative text editor (Etherpad) contents are reachable, in two hops. GET /api/v3/collaborative-text-editor/content-element/{id} returns the pad url and sets an Etherpad sessionID cookie; /etherpad/p/{id}/export/txt then returns the text. No Etherpad API key needed. core/etherpad.ts checks the url's host before sending the cookie to it.
  • A draft board is listed on the course page but 403s when opened. Say "not published yet", not "no access".
  • File records are mutable: PATCH /file/rename/{id} keeps the id and size, so the store's digest has to include the name.
  • Submissions: only GET /submissions/status/task/{taskId} exists. No list, no fetch-by-id, and the payload has no submitted text, grade comment or graded-at. Don't imply absent feedback means none was given.
  • /api/v1 is partly served, and it is production surface. Exactly three legacy routes survive in the deployment's own ingress table (dof_app_deploy/ansible/group_vars/all/x_ingress.yml): /api/v1/courses, /api/v1/users, /api/v1/classes. Everything else under /api/v1 is unrouted and 404s. They matter because v3 dropped things they still carry: courses has the description, teacherIds, userIds and times (the weekly timetable), and users/{id} is the only way to turn a user id into a name — submission submitters, file creatorId and course teacherIds are otherwise unreadable. Permission is per-account: a teacher may read their students, a student may read only themselves, so name resolution must degrade to "not visible to this account" rather than printing a bare id.
  • The teacher's homework page is a different page from the student's. Its tabs are extended and submissions, not submission and feedback, and the grade lives in the grading form (name="grade", name="gradeComment", one block per submissionId) rather than in rendered prose. The student parser finds nothing on it, which is why a teacher account reported every graded submission as "neither a percentage nor feedback was found" while the data was plainly there. parseTeacherGrading handles that side.
  • A grade is a percentage (Number 0-100) or absent; there is no text grade. Teachers commonly grade with gradeComment alone, so "graded by feedback" is a complete answer. formatGradeState in mcp/tools/submissions.ts owns that wording — don't reintroduce "no numeric grade recorded", which reads as a fault.
  • Submitted text and grade comments are scraped, not fetched. No API exposes them; the legacy page GET /homework/{taskId} renders them, and it authenticates by jwt cookie, not bearer. core/homework-page.ts parses it on data-testid hooks and every field is optional — a markup change must degrade to "not found", never break get_task.
  • files-storage listing ignores the parentType path segment — filter on each record's own parentType, or submission files get reported as grading files.
  • Board file elements carry no file id. Files are found by listing files-storage with parentType: 'boardnodes' and the element id as parentId. Same for fileFolder and drawing.
  • Files live in a separate service (/api/v3/file/*, repo file-storage) with its own OpenAPI document. It is not in the main docs-json.
  • Legacy lesson responses return ids as {buffer:{data:[...]}}; use normalizeObjectId.
  • updatedAt on the course-board projection is the request time, not a modification time — two reads seconds apart differ. Never build change detection on it; the store diffs crawl generations by identity instead. The dedicated endpoints (/boards/{id}, /cards, file records) are stable.
  • Many course PDFs are image-only scans with no text layer (3 of 4 sampled), so extraction legitimately yields nothing. extract.ts detects this and says so; do not "fix" it by retrying. download_file then falls back to GET /file/preview/..., which renders the page as a picture Claude can read — the answer for a scan, though it still leaves the file unsearchable.
  • The preview endpoint has two enums, and both 400 without saying so. width accepts only 50, 150 or 500 — a number outside that set is a validation error naming the value but not the permitted set. outputFormat accepts only image/webp; omitting it is worse than wrong, because the preview is then rendered in the source format and a PDF comes back as a PDF. The response also labels itself webp rather than image/webp, so the content type has to be normalised before anything will treat it as an image.
  • A room's allowedOperations is an object, not a list. Every operation is present with a boolean; false means denied. Typing it as string[] type-checks and throws .some is not a function the moment anything reads it.
  • Schulcloud has no quiz of its own. There is no quiz module or endpoint upstream: interactive exercises are H5P elements, whose contentId is the only handle onto the content, or external (LTI) tools behind contextExternalToolId. Say that rather than looking for a quiz API.
  • Teams cannot be read at any version. v3 exposes only GET /team/{teamId}/news; upstream main's teams controller is write-only (POST :teamId/create-room). /teams is the legacy client's HTML page, not an API. This one is genuinely unavailable, not merely uncovered.
  • exp (30 days) is not the session lifetime. The binding limit is a Valkey whitelist entry with a JWT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS TTL (7200s; live value at GET /api/v3/config/public) that every authenticated request re-sets. src/keepalive.ts holds it open — don't remove it.
  • A Schulportal tab left open revokes our token. The jwt cookie is the browser's session token, same jti. The front end runs a client-side timer (reset only on route change, never from the server TTL) and calls /logout?auto-logout=true ~2h after login, which issues POST /api/v3/logout and deletes the shared key. No keepalive can prevent it; the fix is to close the tab. This produced two false conclusions before being found — if a token dies ~2h after login, suspect an open tab first. docs/AUTH.md has the chain.

Conventions

  • Imports use .ts extensions; rewriteRelativeImportExtensions makes tsc emit .js. This lets node --watch src/bin/http.ts run the tree directly.
  • No TypeScript parameter properties (constructor(private readonly x: T)). Node's type stripping rejects them, which breaks npm run dev and npm test. Declare the field and assign it in the constructor body instead.
  • Tabs for indentation, single quotes, trailing commas.
  • Comments explain why — an API quirk, a security property, a trade-off — not what the line does. Several such comments encode findings that are expensive to rediscover; do not strip them.
  • Tool failures return isError: true with an actionable message via mcp/tools/result.ts. toToolError separates 401 (token expired — the user must act) from 403 (no access) from 404 (bad id) deliberately; keep that split.

Adding a tool

  1. Add the client method in core/client.ts (GET only).
  2. Register the tool in the relevant mcp/tools/*.ts, with a description that says when to use it and when not to.
  3. Format output as Markdown, keeping ids visible for follow-up calls.
  4. If it reads the index, handle context.store === undefined with a message saying what is unavailable and what still works.
  5. Add a check to scripts/smoke.mjs and run npm run smoke both ways.

Environment

.env holds TSC_URL, TSC_JWT_COOKIE, MCP_AUTH_TOKEN. See .env.example for the full set and docs/AUTH.md for refreshing the JWT. npm run probe reports both clocks: days until hard expiry and seconds of idle budget left.