scaffold the Godot port, as its own repo with its own agent

The port is deliberately separate from the reverse-engineering project: its own
repository, its own clone, its own container. Two writers in one working tree
means files change under whoever is mid-edit and a `git add -A` by one sweeps up
the other's work -- which happened today in the Reborn tree, so this is set up
not to repeat it.

The wall: Godot never reads a disc format. An offline Rust exporter converts the
user's disc into JSON + PNG + Ogg, and the Godot project reads only that. No
GDExtension, no Rust in port/. Beyond the practical reason -- Godot cannot read
IPFB, RATC, T8aD, XMA or WMV -- there is the design one: modding is a goal, and
if the runtime reads the original formats then modding means reverse
engineering, whereas if it reads JSON it means opening a file.

The decoders come from sylpheed-formats PINNED BY REVISION (8b6dbcf), not
vendored and not reimplemented. `sylpheed_formats::media` in particular already
owns every case where one playable thing is not one archive entry: entries that
span segment files, banks with several sub-waves, and the cutscene voices, which
are one continuous XMA stream chunked into VOICE_*.slb entries whose boundaries
do NOT match the cues. That last one is the easiest thing in this project to get
subtly wrong, so the mission says outright not to re-derive it.

docs/MISSION.md is the objective (P0-P7, each gated by an artifact rather than
by compiling). docs/BLOCKED.md lists what cannot proceed until the RE agent
answers Q1-Q10, and says plainly that none of it may be guessed -- this agent
has no emulator and no oracle, so a value it invents is indistinguishable from a
decoded one a month later.

The container is deliberately small: 3 cpus / 4 GB against the RE container's
6 / 7, and an image with no C++ toolchain, no Vulkan stack and no emulator. Two
full-size containers do not fit on this box beside a desktop.

Its launcher sets the git identity through GIT_AUTHOR_*/GIT_COMMITTER_* rather
than writing [user] into .git/config -- the config route captures every commit
made in that tree, including a human's, which is how six of today's commits
ended up attributed to the RE agent.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

docker/bin/build-export

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Build and run the exporter against the disc.
+#
+#   build-export              build only
+#   build-export --run        build, then export to ./export
+#
+# Jobs are capped: this box runs two agent containers and a desktop, and an
+# unbounded parallel build has crashed it. Do not raise this to "use all cores".
+set -euo pipefail
+cd "${PROJECT_DIR:-/work}"
+export CARGO_BUILD_JOBS="${CARGO_BUILD_JOBS:-3}"
+cargo build --release -p sylpheed-export
+if [ "${1:-}" = "--run" ]; then
+  shift
+  disc="${SYLPHEED_DISC:?set SYLPHEED_DISC to the extracted disc root}"
+  exec "$CARGO_TARGET_DIR/release/sylpheed-export" --disc "$disc" --out export "$@"
+fi

docker/bin/claude-autonomous

@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+#!/usr/bin/expect -f
+# Start Claude Code for an unattended run, answering the first-run gates.
+#
+# Claude Code has three one-time interactive prompts, and every one of them is a
+# silent, permanent hang for an agent with nobody at the keyboard — no error, no
+# log line, just a container that looks healthy and does nothing:
+#
+#   1. the theme picker        (first run, or whenever the installed version is
+#                               newer than lastOnboardingVersion)
+#   2. "do you trust this folder?"  (per workspace)
+#   3. the Bypass Permissions disclaimer  (for --dangerously-skip-permissions)
+#
+# `seed-claude-config.py` pre-sets the config keys for 1 and 2. The disclaimer
+# has no such key — it is meant to be accepted by a person once — so it is
+# answered here instead. That is the honest reading of `sylph-agent loose`: the
+# operator accepted it by choosing to run this, and the container is exactly the
+# sandbox the warning asks for.
+#
+# ── Why the patterns are single words ──
+# Claude Code draws its UI with ABSOLUTE COLUMN escapes between words, so the
+# prompt arrives on the wire as
+#
+#     2.\x1b[8GYes,\x1b[13GI\x1b[15Gaccept
+#
+# A multi-word pattern like {Yes, I accept} therefore never matches, and the
+# wrapper sits there looking like it is not running at all. Match one word.
+
+set timeout 90
+log_user 1
+
+# Give the pty a wide, tall geometry. A detached `docker run -t` defaults to
+# 80x24, and Claude Code hard-wraps to the terminal width — which truncates the
+# Remote Control URL to "https://claude.ai/code/session_01…" in the one place
+# you need to read it, and makes `docker logs` nearly unusable generally.
+set stty_init "rows 50 cols 200"
+
+set answered_theme 0
+set answered_trust 0
+set answered_bypass 0
+
+spawn -noecho claude --dangerously-skip-permissions {*}$argv
+
+expect {
+    -re {Choose} {
+        if {!$answered_theme} { set answered_theme 1; send "\r" }
+        exp_continue
+    }
+    -re {trust} {
+        if {!$answered_trust} {
+            set answered_trust 1
+            send_user "\n\[claude-autonomous] accepting the workspace trust prompt\n"
+            send "1\r"
+        }
+        exp_continue
+    }
+    -re {accept} {
+        if {!$answered_bypass} {
+            set answered_bypass 1
+            send_user "\n\[claude-autonomous] accepting the Bypass Permissions disclaimer\n"
+            send "2\r"
+        }
+        exp_continue
+    }
+    timeout {
+        # No new gate for a while: the session is up (or never had one). Stop
+        # matching so nothing later in the run can be answered by accident.
+    }
+    eof { exit }
+}
+
+# Hand the terminal over for the rest of the run.
+interact

docker/bin/push-work

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Push the current topic branch to origin — the ONLY sanctioned way out of the
+# container.
+#
+# Why a wrapper instead of plain `git push`:
+#
+#   * **`main` and shared branches are refused.** The agent commits to
+#     `auto/<topic>`; a human merges. A token that can push anywhere is one
+#     confused iteration away from rewriting the consolidated line.
+#   * **Force-push is refused**, always. Nothing here needs it, and history
+#     rewriting is the one mistake that cannot be undone by merging.
+#   * It pushes the CURRENT branch only, by name, so a stray `--all` cannot
+#     publish another agent's worktree branch mid-experiment.
+#
+# Credentials come from a file mounted read-only at ~/.git-credentials (see
+# `sylph-agent`). They are never printed, never logged, and never passed on a
+# command line.
+#
+#   push-work            push the current branch
+#   push-work --dry-run  say what it would do
+set -euo pipefail
+
+DRY=0
+[ "${1:-}" = "--dry-run" ] && DRY=1
+
+repo_root=$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel 2>/dev/null) || {
+  echo "push-work: not inside a git repository" >&2; exit 1; }
+cd "$repo_root"
+
+branch=$(git rev-parse --abbrev-ref HEAD)
+if [ "$branch" = "HEAD" ]; then
+  echo "push-work: detached HEAD — check out a branch first" >&2; exit 1
+fi
+
+case "$branch" in
+  auto/*) ;;
+  *)
+    echo "push-work: refusing to push '$branch'." >&2
+    echo "  Only auto/* topic branches may leave the container; a human merges" >&2
+    echo "  them into main. Move your work:  git switch -c auto/<topic>" >&2
+    exit 1 ;;
+esac
+
+if [ ! -s "$HOME/.git-credentials" ]; then
+  echo "push-work: no credentials mounted at ~/.git-credentials." >&2
+  echo "  The host must start the container with SYLPH_GIT_CREDENTIALS pointing" >&2
+  echo "  at a file containing one line:" >&2
+  echo "    https://<user>:<token>@git.mc02.dev" >&2
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+# `store` reads the file we mounted; nothing is written back (it is read-only).
+git config --local credential.helper "store --file=$HOME/.git-credentials"
+
+ahead=$(git rev-list --count "origin/$branch..$branch" 2>/dev/null || git rev-list --count HEAD)
+echo "push-work: $branch — $ahead commit(s) to publish"
+
+if [ "$DRY" = 1 ]; then
+  echo "push-work: --dry-run, stopping here"
+  exit 0
+fi
+
+# --force-with-lease is deliberately NOT offered. If this is rejected as
+# non-fast-forward, someone else moved the branch: fetch and merge, do not
+# overwrite.
+git push --set-upstream origin "$branch"
+echo "push-work: pushed $branch"

docker/bin/screenshot

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Capture the current display to a PNG.
+#
+#   screenshot out.png
+#
+# Used to diff Godot's rendering against `sylpheed-cli screen render`. Captures
+# the whole 1280x720 root window, which is exactly the design space the screens
+# are authored in, so a capture and a composite are directly comparable without
+# cropping or scaling.
+set -euo pipefail
+out="${1:?usage: screenshot OUT.png}"
+import -display "${DISPLAY:-:97}" -window root "$out"
+identify -format 'captured %wx%h -> %f\n' "$out"

docker/bin/seed-claude-config.py

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Mark Claude Code's onboarding as complete in ~/.claude.json.
+
+Claude Code re-runs its first-run wizard whenever `lastOnboardingVersion` does
+not match the installed version. In a terminal that is a one-key prompt; for an
+unattended agent it is a silent, permanent hang on the theme picker — no error,
+no log line, and the container looks like it started fine.
+
+It also pre-accepts the workspace's trust prompt. That is a SECOND, separate
+first-run gate: even past onboarding, Claude Code asks "is this a project you
+trust?" per directory, and this repo's settings pre-approve 442 tool permissions
+so the prompt is emphatic about it. Unattended, it is another silent hang.
+
+Pre-accepting is safe here precisely because the trust question is being
+answered by the person who built and launched the container, for their own
+repository — it is not a judgement being made on their behalf about someone
+else's code.
+
+Usage: seed-claude-config.py <path to .claude.json> <installed version> [workspace...]
+"""
+import json
+import os
+import sys
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    if len(sys.argv) < 3:
+        print(f"usage: {sys.argv[0]} <config.json> <version> [workspace...]",
+              file=sys.stderr)
+        return 2
+    path, version = sys.argv[1], sys.argv[2]
+    workspaces = sys.argv[3:]
+
+    cfg = {}
+    if os.path.exists(path) and os.path.getsize(path):
+        try:
+            with open(path) as f:
+                cfg = json.load(f)
+        except (OSError, ValueError):
+            # A corrupt or partial config is not worth failing the container
+            # over — start from empty rather than block the run.
+            cfg = {}
+    if not isinstance(cfg, dict):
+        cfg = {}
+
+    cfg["hasCompletedOnboarding"] = True
+    cfg["lastOnboardingVersion"] = version
+    cfg.setdefault("theme", "dark")
+    # The THIRD interactive gate: --dangerously-skip-permissions shows a
+    # "Bypass Permissions mode / you accept all responsibility" confirmation on
+    # first use. Key name taken from the shipped binary's own strings, not
+    # guessed. Accepting it here is the whole point of `sylph-agent loose` —
+    # the container is the sandbox that warning asks you to provide.
+    cfg["bypassPermissionsModeAccepted"] = True
+    # A FOURTH gate, and this one fires mid-session rather than at startup, so
+    # the pty wrapper has already handed over by then: an upsell asking whether
+    # to try the fullscreen renderer. It is shown while
+    # `fullscreenUpsellSeenCount` is below an internal threshold, so park it far
+    # above. Found by reading the shipped binary's strings, same as the others.
+    cfg["fullscreenUpsellSeenCount"] = 9999
+    # An auto-update mid-run would restart the process and lose the loop's
+    # scheduled wake-up, so pin the version the container was built with.
+    cfg["autoUpdates"] = False
+
+    projects = cfg.setdefault("projects", {})
+    if not isinstance(projects, dict):
+        projects = cfg["projects"] = {}
+    for ws in workspaces:
+        entry = projects.setdefault(ws, {})
+        if not isinstance(entry, dict):
+            entry = projects[ws] = {}
+        entry["hasTrustDialogAccepted"] = True
+        entry.setdefault("projectOnboardingSeenCount", 1)
+        entry["hasClaudeMdExternalIncludesApproved"] = True
+        entry["hasClaudeMdExternalIncludesWarningShown"] = True
+
+    tmp = path + ".tmp"
+    with open(tmp, "w") as f:
+        json.dump(cfg, f, indent=2)
+    os.replace(tmp, path)
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    sys.exit(main())