9d96be609e
The port is deliberately separate from the reverse-engineering project: its own repository, its own clone, its own container. Two writers in one working tree means files change under whoever is mid-edit and a `git add -A` by one sweeps up the other's work -- which happened today in the Reborn tree, so this is set up not to repeat it. The wall: Godot never reads a disc format. An offline Rust exporter converts the user's disc into JSON + PNG + Ogg, and the Godot project reads only that. No GDExtension, no Rust in port/. Beyond the practical reason -- Godot cannot read IPFB, RATC, T8aD, XMA or WMV -- there is the design one: modding is a goal, and if the runtime reads the original formats then modding means reverse engineering, whereas if it reads JSON it means opening a file. The decoders come from sylpheed-formats PINNED BY REVISION (8b6dbcf), not vendored and not reimplemented. `sylpheed_formats::media` in particular already owns every case where one playable thing is not one archive entry: entries that span segment files, banks with several sub-waves, and the cutscene voices, which are one continuous XMA stream chunked into VOICE_*.slb entries whose boundaries do NOT match the cues. That last one is the easiest thing in this project to get subtly wrong, so the mission says outright not to re-derive it. docs/MISSION.md is the objective (P0-P7, each gated by an artifact rather than by compiling). docs/BLOCKED.md lists what cannot proceed until the RE agent answers Q1-Q10, and says plainly that none of it may be guessed -- this agent has no emulator and no oracle, so a value it invents is indistinguishable from a decoded one a month later. The container is deliberately small: 3 cpus / 4 GB against the RE container's 6 / 7, and an image with no C++ toolchain, no Vulkan stack and no emulator. Two full-size containers do not fit on this box beside a desktop. Its launcher sets the git identity through GIT_AUTHOR_*/GIT_COMMITTER_* rather than writing [user] into .git/config -- the config route captures every commit made in that tree, including a human's, which is how six of today's commits ended up attributed to the RE agent. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
86 lines
3.5 KiB
Python
Executable File
86 lines
3.5 KiB
Python
Executable File
#!/usr/bin/env python3
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"""Mark Claude Code's onboarding as complete in ~/.claude.json.
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Claude Code re-runs its first-run wizard whenever `lastOnboardingVersion` does
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not match the installed version. In a terminal that is a one-key prompt; for an
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unattended agent it is a silent, permanent hang on the theme picker — no error,
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no log line, and the container looks like it started fine.
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It also pre-accepts the workspace's trust prompt. That is a SECOND, separate
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first-run gate: even past onboarding, Claude Code asks "is this a project you
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trust?" per directory, and this repo's settings pre-approve 442 tool permissions
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so the prompt is emphatic about it. Unattended, it is another silent hang.
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Pre-accepting is safe here precisely because the trust question is being
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answered by the person who built and launched the container, for their own
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repository — it is not a judgement being made on their behalf about someone
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else's code.
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Usage: seed-claude-config.py <path to .claude.json> <installed version> [workspace...]
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"""
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import json
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import os
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import sys
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def main() -> int:
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if len(sys.argv) < 3:
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print(f"usage: {sys.argv[0]} <config.json> <version> [workspace...]",
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file=sys.stderr)
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return 2
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path, version = sys.argv[1], sys.argv[2]
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workspaces = sys.argv[3:]
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cfg = {}
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if os.path.exists(path) and os.path.getsize(path):
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try:
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with open(path) as f:
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cfg = json.load(f)
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except (OSError, ValueError):
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# A corrupt or partial config is not worth failing the container
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# over — start from empty rather than block the run.
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cfg = {}
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if not isinstance(cfg, dict):
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cfg = {}
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cfg["hasCompletedOnboarding"] = True
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cfg["lastOnboardingVersion"] = version
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cfg.setdefault("theme", "dark")
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# The THIRD interactive gate: --dangerously-skip-permissions shows a
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# "Bypass Permissions mode / you accept all responsibility" confirmation on
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# first use. Key name taken from the shipped binary's own strings, not
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# guessed. Accepting it here is the whole point of `sylph-agent loose` —
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# the container is the sandbox that warning asks you to provide.
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cfg["bypassPermissionsModeAccepted"] = True
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# A FOURTH gate, and this one fires mid-session rather than at startup, so
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# the pty wrapper has already handed over by then: an upsell asking whether
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# to try the fullscreen renderer. It is shown while
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# `fullscreenUpsellSeenCount` is below an internal threshold, so park it far
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# above. Found by reading the shipped binary's strings, same as the others.
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cfg["fullscreenUpsellSeenCount"] = 9999
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# An auto-update mid-run would restart the process and lose the loop's
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# scheduled wake-up, so pin the version the container was built with.
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cfg["autoUpdates"] = False
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projects = cfg.setdefault("projects", {})
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if not isinstance(projects, dict):
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projects = cfg["projects"] = {}
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for ws in workspaces:
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entry = projects.setdefault(ws, {})
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if not isinstance(entry, dict):
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entry = projects[ws] = {}
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entry["hasTrustDialogAccepted"] = True
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entry.setdefault("projectOnboardingSeenCount", 1)
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entry["hasClaudeMdExternalIncludesApproved"] = True
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entry["hasClaudeMdExternalIncludesWarningShown"] = True
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tmp = path + ".tmp"
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with open(tmp, "w") as f:
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json.dump(cfg, f, indent=2)
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os.replace(tmp, path)
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return 0
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if __name__ == "__main__":
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sys.exit(main())
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