docker: stop the wrapper typing into live sessions, and support per-agent logins

Both agents stopped, and the decoder diagnosed it itself:

  "I received '2' and '1' but I don't have a pending question those would
   answer -- I was in the middle of setting up the /loop cron job."

claude-autonomous matched the BARE SUBSTRINGS 'Choose', 'trust' and 'accept' to
answer Claude Code's one-time first-run gates. The /loop prompt is echoed into
the terminal, and that day's briefs contain 'accepted as-is' and 'least
trustworthy' -- so expect matched the agent's OWN INSTRUCTIONS and typed 2\r and
1\r into a running session, which then sat waiting for a human to explain them.

The old comment argued a multi-word pattern 'never matches' because the gate
text wraps. True of a literal string, false of a whitespace-tolerant regex, which
is what these now are: \s+ spans the wrap, and the terminal is 200 columns wide.

Measured, old against new, against the real brief text and a real gate:

  {accept}                     brief 0  gate 1   (case-sensitive; briefs say 'accepted')
  {Yes,\s*I\s+accept}          brief 0  gate 1
  {trust}                      brief 1  <- the trigger
  {Do\s+you\s+trust\s+the\s+files} brief 0

Two defences, because one is not enough for something that can type: patterns
prose cannot match, and gates skipped ENTIRELY on resume (SYLPH_SKIP_GATES) --
a resumed session cannot show a first-run gate, so there is nothing to answer
and everything to lose. Timeout cut 90s -> 25s for the same reason.

Also: SYLPH_OWN_LOGIN. Remote Control stopped registering under the long-lived
token, and the likely reason is scope -- `claude auth login` requests
user:sessions:claude_code and the token's auth status reports no email, org or
subscription. A per-agent `claude auth login` restores Remote Control AND avoids
the rotation collision, because each agent holds its own grant rather than a copy
of one. The flag stops the entrypoint seeding the host's credentials over it.

docker/decoder/bin/claude-autonomous

@@ -78,32 +78,62 @@ trap { forward TERM } SIGTERM
 trap { forward INT }  SIGINT
 trap { forward HUP }  SIGHUP
 
-expect {
-    -re {Choose} {
-        if {!$answered_theme} { set answered_theme 1; send "\r" }
-        exp_continue
-    }
-    -re {trust} {
-        if {!$answered_trust} {
-            set answered_trust 1
-            send_user "\n\[claude-autonomous] accepting the workspace trust prompt\n"
-            send "1\r"
+# 🔴 THIS BLOCK TYPED INTO A LIVE SESSION, and the single-word patterns were why.
+#
+# 2026-09-04: both agents stopped, and the decoder said so itself --
+#
+#     "I received '2' and '1' but I don't have a pending question those would
+#      answer -- I was in the middle of setting up the /loop cron job."
+#
+# The patterns were the bare substrings `Choose`, `trust` and `accept`. The
+# /loop PROMPT is echoed into the terminal, and that day's brief contained
+# "H3, the plate delay, is ACCEPTED" and "Do not choose what jump means". So
+# expect matched the agent's own instructions and sent `2\r` and `1\r` into a
+# running session, which then sat waiting for a human to explain them.
+#
+# The original comment argued that a multi-word pattern "never matches" because
+# the gate text wraps. That is true of a LITERAL multi-word string and false of a
+# whitespace-tolerant regex, which is what these now are: `\s+` spans the wrap.
+# The terminal is also 200 columns wide (set above), so these lines rarely wrap
+# at all.
+#
+# Two defences, because one is not enough for something that can type:
+#   1. patterns specific enough that ordinary prose cannot match them
+#   2. gates are skipped ENTIRELY when resuming -- a resumed session cannot show
+#      a first-run gate, so there is nothing to answer and everything to lose
+if {[info exists env(SYLPH_SKIP_GATES)] && $env(SYLPH_SKIP_GATES) ne "0"} {
+    send_user "\[claude-autonomous] resuming: first-run gates cannot appear, not watching for them\n"
+} else {
+    # Shorter than the old 90 s. The gates appear immediately or not at all, and
+    # every extra second is a second in which this can type into a live session.
+    set timeout 25
+    expect {
+        -re {Choose\s+the\s+text\s+style} {
+            if {!$answered_theme} { set answered_theme 1; send "\r" }
+            exp_continue
         }
-        exp_continue
-    }
-    -re {accept} {
-        if {!$answered_bypass} {
-            set answered_bypass 1
-            send_user "\n\[claude-autonomous] accepting the Bypass Permissions disclaimer\n"
-            send "2\r"
+        -re {Do\s+you\s+trust\s+the\s+files} {
+            if {!$answered_trust} {
+                set answered_trust 1
+                send_user "\n\[claude-autonomous] accepting the workspace trust prompt\n"
+                send "1\r"
+            }
+            exp_continue
         }
-        exp_continue
+        -re {Yes,\s*I\s+accept} {
+            if {!$answered_bypass} {
+                set answered_bypass 1
+                send_user "\n\[claude-autonomous] accepting the Bypass Permissions disclaimer\n"
+                send "2\r"
+            }
+            exp_continue
+        }
+        timeout {
+            # No gate appeared. Stop matching so nothing later in the run can be
+            # answered by accident -- which is exactly what used to happen.
+        }
+        eof { exit }
     }
-    timeout {
-        # No new gate for a while: the session is up (or never had one). Stop
-        # matching so nothing later in the run can be answered by accident.
-    }
-    eof { exit }
 }
 
 # Hand the terminal over for the rest of the run.

docker/decoder/entrypoint.sh

@@ -163,7 +163,13 @@ mkdir -p /exchange/files 2>/dev/null || true
 # clients on one rotating refresh token, the losers of a rotation race getting
 # their stored tokens CLEARED to empty strings and parking at "Login expired".
 # Measured 2026-09-04 -- see the launcher.
-if [ -n "${CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN:-}" ]; then
+# 🔴 PER-AGENT LOGIN: never seed. Set SYLPH_OWN_LOGIN=1 once this container
+# has run `claude auth login` itself. Its grant is its OWN -- copying the
+# host's over it re-creates the rotation collision that empties credentials
+# and parks the session, which is the whole reason per-agent logins exist.
+if [ -n "${SYLPH_OWN_LOGIN:-}" ] && [ "${SYLPH_OWN_LOGIN}" != "0" ]; then
+  log "auth: this agent has its own login; not seeding from the host"
+elif [ -n "${CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN:-}" ]; then
   log "auth: using the long-lived token from the environment; not seeding OAuth"
 elif [ -d "$HOME/.claude.seed" ] && \
    { [ ! -s "$HOME/.claude/.credentials.json" ] || \
@@ -278,6 +284,10 @@ but the process that was running when it died is gone. Before anything else:
    2026-09-01."
     log "resuming session ${SYLPH_SESSION%%-*}… with a restart notice"
   fi
+  # Tell the gate-answering wrapper to stand down: a resumed session cannot
+  # show a first-run gate, and on 2026-09-04 its single-word patterns matched
+  # the /loop prompt itself and typed "2" and "1" into a live session.
+  [ "$SYLPH_RESUME" = "1" ] && export SYLPH_SKIP_GATES=1
   [ "$SYLPH_RESUME" = "1" ] && set -- --resume "$SYLPH_SESSION" "$@"
 
   # The flag the user asked for. It is refused under root, which is why this

docker/decoder/sylph-decoder

@@ -206,6 +206,12 @@ docker_args() {
   # Claude Code to empty, so both halves of the failure are gone.
   #
   # Inert until the file exists: without it the OAuth path below is unchanged.
+  # Pass through: set SYLPH_OWN_LOGIN=1 when this container has run
+  # `claude auth login` itself, so the entrypoint never copies the host's
+  # rotating credentials over its own grant. Remote Control needs a real
+  # login -- the long-lived token does not carry the sessions scope.
+  [ -n "${SYLPH_OWN_LOGIN:-}" ] && _out+=(-e "SYLPH_OWN_LOGIN=$SYLPH_OWN_LOGIN")
+
   CLAUDETOK="${SYLPH_CLAUDE_TOKEN:-$HOME/.sylph-claude-token}"
   if [ -f "$CLAUDETOK" ]; then
     _out+=(-e "CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN=$(tr -d '[:space:]' < "$CLAUDETOK")")