Commit Graph

4 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
034e98eeb0 docker: give each agent its own Gitea hands, and close the cross-approval hole
Phase 5 of docs/agents/GITEA-SETUP.md, plus a correction to Phase 2 that the
runbook could not have known it needed.

gitea-mcp v1.7.0 goes into both images, pinned by the sha256 the release
publishes and smoke-tested with `--version` at build time, so a bad pin fails
the build instead of the agent. Each entrypoint registers it at user scope for
that container's own identity, remove-then-add so a restart is idempotent.

The token is passed BY PATH. `-e GITEA_ACCESS_TOKEN=$(cat …)` would write it in
cleartext into ~/.claude.json, which every session in the container reads;
GITEA_ACCESS_TOKEN_FILE is new in the pinned version and leaves the secret in
its read-only mount. Verified against the binary's own --help, not assumed.

The tool filter stops being an experiment. The names are in the release README:
each agent gets issues, notifications, labels, milestones and pull requests, and
NOT `pull_request_review_write`. That one matters because separate identities
open a hole the runbook did not name: Gitea refuses to let an author approve
their own pull request, and does nothing about sylph-decoder approving
sylph-port's. Two agents could satisfy `required_approvals = 1` between
themselves and then merge, since branch protection blocks pushes to main and
never blocked merges.

Withholding the tool is defence in depth; the controls are in branch protection,
and both docs now say so: approvals whitelisted to the human so an agent's
approval does not count, merges whitelisted to the human so an approved PR is
still merged by a person. Phase 2's check gains the step that actually tests it
-- approve the throwaway PR yourself, then confirm the agent STILL has no merge
button. Without that step, the check passes on an instance where the agents can
merge each other's work.

Also settles two entries on the runbook's own "not verified" list: the tool
filter names, and the Gitea version (1.25.5, whose API schema carries
enable_merge_whitelist and enable_approvals_whitelist under those names).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01McNbzUeq1KRBWs4G6X2YVj
2026-09-04 16:39:12 +02:00
MechaCat02
a8d2491366 audio: actually install the capture path I kept deferring
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The audio work was three parts and I shipped two. The transcode-fidelity method
and the pinned 5.1 downmix landed; the null sink -- the only one that answers
"what does the GAME play" -- I deferred to "the next natural rebuild window" and
then rebuilt both images four times without doing it.

pulseaudio-utils is now in both, with tools/audio-capture wrapping it: a null
sink is a real device as far as an application is concerned, so Canary and Godot
open it normally and parec records what they emit.

This unblocks the decoder's Q8. The cue-to-event bindings are currently a name
match against the authors' own identifiers -- a plausible guess, not a
measurement -- and capturing what the game plays on a menu move converts them.

`audio-capture run` reports the peak level and warns when the capture is silent,
because silence is the failure that looks like success: a WAV of exactly the
right duration, full of zeroes, because the application opened a different sink.
A duration check alone passes it, which is how a confident wrong number gets
made.
2026-08-29 13:41:02 +02:00
MechaCat02
01a3505b1e containers: fix volume ownership and make the clone guard survive interruption
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Two bugs, both mine, both found by starting the thing.

**Volume mount points must exist AND be owned by the agent before USER agent.**
Docker seeds a named volume from whatever the image has at that path, ownership
included, and creates a ROOT-OWNED directory when the path is absent. Either way
the agent cannot write, and the failure surfaced far from its cause: "clone
FAILED", with no permission error anywhere in sight. The port's own Dockerfile
already carried a comment explaining this trap, which I then walked into for
/work and /exchange.

**The clone guard checked for a .git directory, not a usable HEAD.** A clone
interrupted partway -- the container was removed while one ran -- leaves a .git
with no commits, and a presence check then skips the retry forever and hands the
agent an empty repository that looks like a checkout. It now verifies HEAD, and
clones via a temp directory so a partial result never lands in /work at all.

Also: the port launcher's path defaults still assumed the old repo root, so it
mounted no disc; and the stale /reborn notice is gone now that there is one
repository.

Verified running: both agents cloned 06676d3, `share` on PATH from /work/tools,
/exchange agent-owned, canary at /canary for the decoder, disc at /disc for the
port.
2026-08-29 12:52:13 +02:00
MechaCat02
06676d3dc0 containers: each agent clones the monorepo into its own volume
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The last structural fix for the collision class that has bitten three times. Both
containers now clone the repository into their OWN named volume instead of
bind-mounting a human's working tree, so an agent's local git config cannot
capture a human's commits, a credential helper cannot leak a container-only path
onto the host, and a `git add -A` cannot sweep another party's in-flight files.

Cloned once at startup and never auto-pulled: pulling under a running agent
moves files out from under whatever it is mid-edit, which is the same bug again.

Accepted knowingly: Claude Code keys per-project memory off the working
directory, so moving off the host path starts that memory empty. The corpus in
docs/ is the memory that matters and it travels with the clone.

Other changes:
* docker/agent -> docker/decoder; the launcher is sylph-decoder. Roles, not
  "the agent", now that there is more than one.
* /reborn is gone -- one repository now, so the port reads HANDOFF from its own
  checkout rather than through a live read-only mount of someone else's tree.
* Canary mounts separately at /canary; it stays a fork tracking upstream.
* A shared `sylpheed-exchange` volume at /exchange, with tools/ on PATH so
  `share` is available in both.
* The decoder's credential file gets the .host-copy treatment the port already
  had -- `credential.helper=store` rewrites by rename-over-target, which is
  EBUSY on a bind mount and reports a fatal that is not one.
* Budget split deliberately: decoder 5 cpu / 6 GB, port 3 / 4, leaving room for
  the planned Referee. "Half the host" was right when there was one agent.

Prompts move to docs/agents/ and are rewritten around the protocol: the oracle
is the running game, dynamic RE stays with the decoder, each iteration must
attempt to refute one claim of the other, and neither may verify its way out of
its own role.
2026-08-29 11:48:30 +02:00