# Pressing Ⓐ on the title faults the guest — SOLVED, and it is the emulator swallowing input

**Classification: measured** (the mechanism, from the run's own retained log) on a
**decoded** code path (the three functions, read out of the image). Xenia Canary,
2026-08-29. This is the blocker that gated every menu-side dynamic question in this
container, and it is not a mystery any more.

## The one-line answer

Xenia's `XamInputGetKeystrokeEx` returns **`X_ERROR_SUCCESS` with a zeroed
keystroke, on every call, for as long as a XAM dialog is up**. The game's
keystroke pump is `while (GetKeystrokeEx(...) == SUCCESS) queue.push_back(ks);`
with **no bound**. Something raised a XAM dialog immediately after the third Ⓐ was
delivered, and the pump then queued **8 388 608** empty keystrokes, grew its vector
to 64 MB, asked for 128 MB, got a failed allocation back **unchecked**, and copied
off the end of the guest thread stack.

So the fault is a *symptom two levels down* from an emulator-side input blackout.
Nothing is wrong with the disc, the title screen, or the Ⓐ button.

## 🔴 Retraction — "`r9` is a wild pointer, above 4 GB, never a guest address"

That is this page's own claim, written 2026-08-29 at `72e45a7`, and it is **wrong**.

`Access Violation: write at 0x00000001701D0000` prints `ex->fault_address()`, which
`exception_handler_posix.cc:154` fills from **`signal_info->si_addr`** — a *host*
address. Xenia maps the guest at `mapping_base_`, chosen in `memory.cc:193` as the
first `1ull << n` from n=32 that maps, i.e. **`0x100000000`**.

The register file proves the translation rather than assuming it: the faulting
instruction is `sth r6, 0(r9)` and the dump shows

```
 r9   = 00000000701D0000      Access Violation: write at 0x00000001701D0000
```

`0x1701D0000 − 0x100000000 = 0x701D0000 = r9`. So `r9` **is** a guest address, in
the `v40000000` heap (`0x40000000 … 0x7EFFFFFF`), and the page is simply not
committed. The distinction matters: "garbage pointer" pointed the next probe at
memory corruption; the truth points it at an allocation that failed.

⚠️ **Generalise this.** Every `Access Violation: … at 0x1________` in a Canary log
from this container is a guest address plus `0x100000000`. Subtract before reading.

## The code path, read out of the image (0 mismatches against `sylpheed.db`)

All three functions were disassembled from `/image/sylpheed.pe` and cross-checked
word-for-word against the database: **466 + 120 instructions, zero disagreements**
across `sub_82457038`, `sub_82457780` and their callees.

| | what it is | how that is known |
|---|---|---|
| `sub_824574C0` | lazy singleton getter for the **input manager** at guest `0x828F3888`, guarded by a bit-0 "constructed" flag at `0x828F3A70` | `lis r11,0x828F; addi r30,r11,14472` = `0x828F3888`; classic guard-variable shape |
| `sub_82457038` | the **keystroke pump**: drains `XamInputGetKeystrokeEx` into a vector at `this+68` = `0x828F38CC` | calls `sub_824AA870`, which is `b 0x8284DBDC` = the **`XamInputGetKeystrokeEx`** import thunk (`imports`, ordinal 408) |
| `sub_82457780` | that vector's **insert-with-grow** | `{ptr@+0, size@+4, capacity@+8}`; doubles capacity, clamps at `0x1FFFFFFF`, `slwi r3,r27,3` for the byte count |

The element is **8 bytes copied as four halfwords** at offsets 0/2/4/6 — which is
exactly `X_INPUT_KEYSTROKE` `{u16 VirtualKey; u16 Unicode; u16 Flags; u8 UserIndex;
u8 HidCode}`. That is what makes the vector identifiable as a keystroke queue and
not some other 8-byte record.

The pump, in C:

```c
// sub_82457038, 0x82457174 … 0x824571C8
while (XamInputGetKeystrokeEx(&user, 3, &ks) == X_ERROR_SUCCESS) {
    if (v->size < v->capacity) v->data[v->size++] = ks;   // 0x8245718C
    else                       insert_slow(v, end, &ks);  // 0x824571B0 → sub_82457780
}
```

There is no iteration cap and no check on the allocator's return.

## The emulator half — `xam_input.cc:197`

```cpp
if (kernel_state()->xam_state()->IsUIActive()) {
    ...
    return X_ERROR_SUCCESS;      // keystroke was zeroed above
}
```

`IsUIActive()` is `is_xam_dialog_present_`, set to true by every non-headless
`XamShow*UI` path in `xam_ui.cc` and cleared only by a dialog's close handler. While
it is set, the guest's `== SUCCESS` loop can never terminate.

⚠️ This is **upstream Canary behaviour**, not one of this container's RE patches.
The RE patch is only the `[RE-INPUT]` logging around it — and that logging is what
made the diagnosis possible, so it earned its keep.

## The number that closes it

The instrumentation reports one line per 600 swallowed calls. Immediately before the
first crash dump:

```
[RE-INPUT] XamInputGetKeystrokeEx swallowed by IsUIActive (ui_active=true, 8388601 so far)
```

and the crash dump's own registers say how many records the vector held:

```
 r29 = 0000000000800000     = 8 388 608  elements to copy
 r26 = 0000000000800001     = new size
 r27 = 0000000001000000     = new capacity (doubled)
 r30 = FFFFFFFF828F38CC     = the vector object — the pump's queue
 r31 = 00000000A7AC0000     r7 = 00000000A3AC0000   → 0x04000000 = 64 MB of live data
```

**8 388 601 swallowed calls against 8 388 608 queued records — a gap of 7, inside
the 600-call reporting granularity.** One push per swallowed poll. The two numbers
are independent instruments (a Canary log counter and a guest register file) and
they agree; that is the whole argument, and it needs no further run.

## Why `r3` looked like a stack pointer

`slwi r3, r27, 3` = `0x8000000` = **128 MB** requested from `sub_824F7240`
(`b 0x82150000`, the game's `heap_alloc(*0x828E2B14, size, &out)` wrapper). It came
back as `0x701CF5F0` — **below** the pump thread's own `r1 = 0x701CF7B0`, i.e. a
pointer into a stack frame that had already been popped. The copy then walked
`+0xA18` and hit the top of the thread's 64 KB stack at `0x701D0000`.

So: the allocation failed, the failure path left a stale `&local` in `r3`, and the
caller never checked. A 128 MB request on top of a live 64 MB one, in a guest with
512 MB total, is not a surprising failure.

## The timeline, from the log

| log line | event |
|---|---|
| 1149 | first `XamInputGetKeystrokeEx` reaches a driver |
| 1185–1252 | **three** Ⓐ press/release pairs delivered — `vk=5800`, flags `0001` down / `0002` up |
| 1253 | the third Ⓐ **up** is handed to the guest |
| **1254** | `swallowed by IsUIActive (ui_active=true, 1 so far)` — the blackout starts |
| 1254–15242 | 13 982 swallow reports = ~8.39 M swallowed calls |
| 15243 | first `==== CRASH DUMP ====`, `PC 0x824578A0` |

Evidence: [`../data/a-press-fault-log-extract.txt`](../data/a-press-fault-log-extract.txt).

⚠️ Note the feedback loop that produces **32 356** dumps rather than one: a guest
crash makes Xenia call `ImGuiDialog::ShowMessageBox` (`emulator.cc:1487`), which is
itself a UI — so the swallow can only get worse after the first fault.

## ✅ ANSWERED — it is the **sign-in** dialog, and the run had no profile signed in

Not a new measurement: **the corpus already had this**, and this page failed to
connect to it. [`canary-scripted-input-traps.md`](../canary-scripted-input-traps.md)
§3 says it outright — *"With no profile, Ⓐ **is** handled: the guest calls
`XamShowSigninUI` and Xenia pops its Sign In dialog"* — with a committed capture,
[`title-signin-dialog.png`](../captures/title-signin-dialog.png). And
`tools/re-capture/boot_menu.sh`'s own header has carried the mechanism, **including
the 8.4 million figure**, since before this page was written.

### 🔴 RETRACTED — "the run's config dump says the profile was not signed in"

This section read the faulting run's `[Profiles]` block —
`logged_profile_slot_0_xuid = ""` — as evidence that nobody was signed in.
**That inference is wrong, and I refuted it with a direct test.**

Xenia prints its config dump **before applying command-line overrides**. In a run
launched with `--apu=sdl --hid=file --mute=true --log_mask=13`, the dump says:

| dumped | actually passed |
|---|---|
| `apu = "any"` | `--apu=sdl` |
| `hid = "any"` | `--hid=file` |
| `mute = false` | `--mute=true` |
| `log_mask = 0` | `--log_mask=13` |

Four for four. **The dump is the config *file*, not the run.** So
`logged_profile_slot_0_xuid = ""` says only that the file is empty; the faulting
run may well have had the flag on its command line, and this page cannot tell.

⚠️ **Anything in this corpus that cites a Canary config dump as evidence of what a
run did is making the same mistake.** The dump is a statement about
`xenia-canary.config.toml`. To know a run's settings, record its **argv**.

What survives untouched: the *mechanism* (swallow → unbounded pump → failed
allocation → fault), which rests on the `[RE-INPUT]` log counter and the crash
dump's register file, neither of which is a config dump; and
[`canary-scripted-input-traps.md`](../canary-scripted-input-traps.md) §3's measured
claim that a profile-less Ⓐ pops the sign-in dialog, which is somebody else's
observation with a capture behind it.

What does **not** survive: this page's claim to know the faulting run's profile
state. It does not.

### And the call site is now located in the image, not only observed

`sub_821D03A0` is the state machine that raises it, verified byte-for-byte
(**85 instructions, 0 mismatches**):

| state at `[[r31+8]+4]` | branch | call |
|---|---|---|
| **0** | `0x821D04CC` | `li r4,1; li r3,1; bl 0x824A9068` → thunk `0x8284DA8C` = **`XamShowSigninUI(1, 1)`** |
| **3** | `0x821D04A4` | `bl 0x824A9080` → `0x8284DABC` = `XamShowDeviceSelectorUI` |
| other | — | nothing |

So the two candidates this page listed are both real branches of one function, and
the run took the **state-0** one. The device selector was already ruled out by
`storage_selection_dialog = false`; this identifies the other by address rather
than by elimination.

Canary's `xeXamShowSigninUI` then sets the flag and dispatches `ui::SigninUI`
**asynchronously with a no-op close handler** — so in an unattended run nothing
ever dismisses it, and the swallow is permanent.

### The correlation runs through the tooling, not just this one log

| launcher | passes `--logged_profile_slot_0_xuid` | Ⓐ outcome |
|---|---|---|
| `boot_menu.sh` | **yes** | Q4/Q5 pressed all five menu buttons |
| `frame_clock.sh` (this run) | **no** | faulted, 4/4 |

### 🔴 The process failure, which is the part worth keeping

This page said *"it does not explain how Q4/Q5 pressed Ⓐ successfully; what differs
is unfound."* **It was found, twice, and written down in two places this page did
not read** — a sibling `docs/re/` page and a tool header. The corpus knew the
swallow and knew the profile requirement; nobody had joined either to the crash.

What this session actually adds is the **join**: that the known input blackout is
what drives an unbounded guest queue into a failed 128 MB allocation, with the
counter and the register file agreeing to 7. Recorded in
[`METHOD.md`](../METHOD.md).

## What this unblocks, and how

The blocked list — main-menu sweeps, whether a `.tbm` draws pixels, `pbafc.prm`'s
blend — needs a screen behind an Ⓐ press.

✅ **There is no blocker. Boot with `tools/re-capture/boot_menu.sh`**, which signs
the existing profile in, and the state-0 branch never fires. That is the launcher
Q4 and Q5 used, and it has been in the tree the whole time.

⚠️ **This is a prediction retrodicted, not an A/B I ran.** The mechanism is measured
and the launcher difference is documented, and Q4/Q5 are the oracle evidence that
Ⓐ works under `boot_menu.sh` — but I have not myself booted both ways and pressed Ⓐ.
Until someone does, treat "signing the profile in prevents the fault" as strongly
supported rather than demonstrated.

If it ever needs a belt-and-braces second route, patching `xam_input.cc:217` to
return `X_ERROR_EMPTY` instead of `X_ERROR_SUCCESS` terminates the pump immediately
and is closer to hardware — a real Xbox does not hand a game an infinite run of
empty keystrokes. That is an emulator change and must be recorded as one wherever
it is used.

⚠️ **Whichever route is taken, keep `tools/re-capture/frame_clock.sh`'s size guard.**
It killed this run at its 300 MB cap and worked exactly as designed; without it the
next fault fills a filesystem that was already at 91 %.

## It was never the same failure as the other two

| | PC | crash dumps | cause |
|---|---|---|---|
| cache-flush crash ([`../title-crash-stl-tree.md`](../title-crash-stl-tree.md)) | `0x82307128` | yes | different |
| loader stall ([`../canary-scripted-input-traps.md`](../canary-scripted-input-traps.md)) | — | **zero** | different |
| **this** | `0x824578A0` | 32 356 | **emulator input blackout → unbounded guest queue** |

And it explains the thing the old page could not: **why Q4 and Q5 pressed Ⓐ
successfully and these runs did not.** Nothing about the game differs. What differs
is whether a XAM dialog happened to be up, which is emulator state, not guest state
— so "it reproduced 4/4" and "it worked before" are both true and always were.

## 🔴 Also refuted: the earlier "unimplemented instruction" hypothesis

Kept from the previous version of this page because the negative still stands.
`break_on_unimplemented_instructions = true` looked like a one-flag fix; booting with
it false faults identically, and **no `Unimplemented instr` line is ever logged**.
That path emits its `XELOGE` *before* the guarded break, so its absence rules the
mechanism out. The dump comes from `Emulator::ExceptionCallback`, which fires on a
genuine guest exception.