0cceaaf4a9
Credentials were seeded only when the container's copy was MISSING. So when a session expired, the file still existed, the copy was skipped, and restarting changed nothing -- the one recovery path a human has, re-logging in on the host, could not reach the containers at all. Now re-seeds whenever the host's copy is newer. Newer-wins rather than always-copy, because a container refreshes its own token mid-run and that copy may legitimately be the fresher of the two. Found when both sessions expired: host credentials at 16:30, containers holding 14:20 and 14:24.
129 lines
6.7 KiB
Bash
Executable File
129 lines
6.7 KiB
Bash
Executable File
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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# Bring up the headless display, then hand over.
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#
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# Xvfb and openbox are started as children of PID 1 (tini), NOT of the agent's
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# shell, so they outlive any single command. The RE container learned this the
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# hard way: a display owned by a shell gets reaped when that shell exits, which
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# reads as "Xvfb dies on its own every few minutes".
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set -euo pipefail
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: "${DISPLAY:=:97}"
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: "${SCREEN_GEOMETRY:=1280x720x24}"
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if ! xdpyinfo -display "$DISPLAY" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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Xvfb "$DISPLAY" -screen 0 "$SCREEN_GEOMETRY" -nolisten tcp &
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for _ in $(seq 50); do
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xdpyinfo -display "$DISPLAY" >/dev/null 2>&1 && break
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sleep 0.1
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done
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openbox >/dev/null 2>&1 &
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fi
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echo "[entrypoint] display $DISPLAY ready ($SCREEN_GEOMETRY)"
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# ── Claude state: this agent's own, seeded once from the host ───────────────
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# Isolated per agent. Both working directories are /work, and Claude Code keys
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# its per-project state off the working directory -- so a SHARED ~/.claude put
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# two independent agents in the same projects/-work/ directory, which undoes the
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# point of giving them separate checkouts.
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#
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# Seeded rather than shared because credentials live in .credentials.json and a
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# token refresh must be able to write. Copying once means each agent refreshes
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# its own token and neither can corrupt the host's.
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# Re-seed whenever the HOST's credentials are newer than ours, not only when
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# ours are missing. The missing-only guard meant an expired token could never be
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# replaced: the file existed, so the copy was skipped, and restarting the
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# container changed nothing. A human re-logging in on the host is exactly the
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# recovery path, and it has to reach here.
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#
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# Newer-wins rather than always-copy, because the container refreshes its own
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# token during a run and that copy may legitimately be the fresher one.
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if [ -d "$HOME/.claude.seed" ] && \
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{ [ ! -s "$HOME/.claude/.credentials.json" ] || \
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[ "$HOME/.claude.seed/.credentials.json" -nt "$HOME/.claude/.credentials.json" ]; }; then
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mkdir -p "$HOME/.claude"
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cp -a "$HOME/.claude.seed/.credentials.json" "$HOME/.claude/" 2>/dev/null || true
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for f in settings.json CLAUDE.md; do
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[ -e "$HOME/.claude.seed/$f" ] && cp -a "$HOME/.claude.seed/$f" "$HOME/.claude/" 2>/dev/null || true
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done
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echo "[entrypoint] refreshed ~/.claude credentials from the host"
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fi
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# Seed ~/.claude.json from the host's read-only copy, then stamp onboarding as
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# complete. Claude Code re-runs its first-run wizard whenever
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# lastOnboardingVersion differs from the installed version, so a container with a
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# newer Claude than the host stops on the theme picker -- no error, no log line,
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# and an unattended agent sits there forever.
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if [ -f "$HOME/.claude.host.json" ] && [ ! -s "$HOME/.claude.json" ]; then
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cp "$HOME/.claude.host.json" "$HOME/.claude.json" 2>/dev/null || true
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fi
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# Same reason as .claude.json above: `credential.helper=store` rewrites this
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# file by rename-over-target, which fails with EBUSY on a bind mount. Copy it to
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# a writable path; nothing is ever written back to the host's file.
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if [ -f "$HOME/.git-credentials.host" ]; then
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cp "$HOME/.git-credentials.host" "$HOME/.git-credentials" 2>/dev/null || true
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chmod 600 "$HOME/.git-credentials" 2>/dev/null || true
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fi
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CLAUDE_VER=$(claude --version 2>/dev/null | grep -oE '^[0-9][0-9.]*' || echo 0.0.0)
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python3 /usr/local/bin/seed-claude-config.py "$HOME/.claude.json" "$CLAUDE_VER" \
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"$PWD" "${PROJECT_DIR:-/work}" "$HOME" || true
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chmod 600 "$HOME/.claude.json" 2>/dev/null || true
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# ── The repository, cloned into THIS AGENT'S OWN volume ─────────────────────
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# Not a bind mount of a human's working tree. That arrangement bit this project
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# three times: an agent's `git config --local` captured a human's commits, a
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# credential helper leaked a container-only path onto the host, and a `git add
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# -A` swept an agent's in-flight files into somebody else's commit. Separate
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# checkouts make all three impossible rather than discouraged.
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#
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# Cloned ONCE. Never auto-pulled: pulling under a running agent moves files out
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# from under whatever it is mid-edit, which is the same class of bug again.
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if ! git -C /work rev-parse --verify HEAD >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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# Checks for a usable HEAD, not merely a .git directory. A clone interrupted
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# partway -- the container stopped while it ran, which has happened -- leaves
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# a .git with no commits, and a presence check would then skip the retry
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# forever and hand the agent an empty repository.
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echo "[entrypoint] cloning ${SYLPH_REPO_URL:-https://git.mc02.dev/fabi/Sylpheed.git} into /work"
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_tmp=$(mktemp -d)
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if git clone --quiet "${SYLPH_REPO_URL:-https://git.mc02.dev/fabi/Sylpheed.git}" "$_tmp/r"; then
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find /work -mindepth 1 -maxdepth 1 -exec rm -rf {} + 2>/dev/null || true
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mv "$_tmp/r"/.[!.]* "$_tmp/r"/* /work/ 2>/dev/null || true
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echo "[entrypoint] /work at $(git -C /work rev-parse --short HEAD) on $(git -C /work rev-parse --abbrev-ref HEAD)"
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else
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echo "[entrypoint] clone FAILED -- the agent has no repository" >&2
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fi
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rm -rf "$_tmp"
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else
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echo "[entrypoint] /work at $(git -C /work rev-parse --short HEAD) on $(git -C /work rev-parse --abbrev-ref HEAD)"
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fi
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# The shared exchange, for transient files that must not enter git history.
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mkdir -p /exchange/files 2>/dev/null || true
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# ── Claude Code ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# Without this the loop prompt is handed to `exec` as a command, and the whole
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# markdown file is tried as a filename: exit 126, "File name too long".
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if [ "${SYLPH_AUTONOMOUS:-0}" = "1" ]; then
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# Drop the image's default CMD first, or `claude` is handed the literal string
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# "bash" as its prompt and answers a question nobody asked.
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if [ "$#" -eq 1 ] && [ "$1" = "bash" ]; then
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set --
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fi
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# Remote Control registers the session with the account so the agent can be
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# reached from claude.ai -- the point of a detached run being that nobody is
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# sitting in front of it. The name is passed EXPLICITLY: the flag's value is
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# optional, so a bare --remote-control swallows the /loop prompt after it.
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if [ "${SYLPH_REMOTE:-1}" != "0" ]; then
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set -- --remote-control "${SYLPH_REMOTE_NAME:-sylpheed-port}" "$@"
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echo "[entrypoint] Remote Control as '${SYLPH_REMOTE_NAME:-sylpheed-port}'"
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fi
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# claude-autonomous wraps `claude --dangerously-skip-permissions` in a pty and
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# answers the one-time first-run gates. The Bypass Permissions disclaimer has
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# no config key that skips it, so unattended it hangs forever.
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set -- claude-autonomous "$@"
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echo "[entrypoint] starting Claude Code in $(pwd)"
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fi
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exec "$@"
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