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Sylpheed/docker/decoder/entrypoint.sh
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agents: they never spoke, the decoder lost the disc, and both shared one state dir
Three defects, all mine, found by checking instead of assuming.

**They never exchanged a word.** SendMessage=0, ListAgents=0 across both new
sessions. PROTOCOL.md specified in detail what a message MAY and MAY NOT do and
never said how to send one or that the other agent was addressable -- they knew
that last time only because the human told them directly, and rebuilding with
fresh volumes wiped it. Policy without mechanism is prose. Now documented with
the two addresses, a worked example, and an instruction to introduce themselves
on the first iteration rather than waiting to have a question.

**The decoder lost the disc and the ISO.** They used to arrive inside the project
mount and silently stopped when /work became a clone. Silently is the word: the
disc-gated tests SELF-SKIP without SYLPHEED_DISC and report green, so a whole
test suite would have passed while measuring nothing. Both are now mounted
explicitly, the ISO at a stable path so run-canary does not depend on host
directory names.

**Both agents shared one Claude state directory.** They share the host's
~/.claude, and once both working directories became /work they resolved to the
same projects/-work/ -- two supposedly independent agents writing to one place,
which undoes the point of separate checkouts. Each now has its own volume, seeded
once from the host with credentials only, so a token refresh writes locally and
neither can corrupt the host's auth.

Also widened the pacing rule. It banned ScheduleWakeup by name; the decoder then
scheduled itself an hourly cron job -- not harmful, but the same instinct that
ended a run yesterday, through a door I had left open. Now: no self-scheduling by
any route.

Mount audit after the changes: shared and intentional are the exchange volume and
the read-only credential seed. Everything else -- repo, Claude state, cargo,
target, canary, disc, ISO -- is per agent or one-sided.
2026-08-29 13:05:41 +02:00

193 lines
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Bash
Executable File

#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Bring up the headless display, then hand over to the command.
#
# Xvfb and openbox are started HERE, as children of PID 1 (tini), rather than by
# the toolkit scripts. That is the fix for the long-standing "Xvfb and the
# emulator die on their own every few minutes" note: nothing owned those
# processes, so nothing kept them alive, and a run could sit for 300 s in front
# of a visible MAIN MENU reporting "no main menu" because the display had gone.
# A container-lifetime display makes that failure mode impossible.
set -euo pipefail
log() { printf '[entrypoint] %s\n' "$*" >&2; }
DISPLAY="${DISPLAY:-:98}"
GEOM="${SCREEN_GEOMETRY:-1280x720x24}"
export DISPLAY
# ── Display ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
if ! xdpyinfo -display "$DISPLAY" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
rm -f "/tmp/.X${DISPLAY#:}-lock" "/tmp/.X11-unix/X${DISPLAY#:}" 2>/dev/null || true
# GLX and RANDR are both required: Canary's window is GTK+OpenGL even when the
# graphics backend is Vulkan, and xwininfo-based screen oracles need RANDR.
Xvfb "$DISPLAY" -screen 0 "$GEOM" -ac -nolisten tcp \
+extension GLX +extension RANDR >/tmp/xvfb.log 2>&1 &
for _ in $(seq 1 50); do
xdpyinfo -display "$DISPLAY" >/dev/null 2>&1 && break
sleep 0.2
done
fi
if ! xdpyinfo -display "$DISPLAY" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
log "FATAL: no display on $DISPLAY — see /tmp/xvfb.log"
exit 1
fi
# A window manager is not cosmetic here: without one the emulator window is
# never mapped at a known position, and every pixel oracle reads the wrong rows.
if ! pgrep -x openbox >/dev/null 2>&1; then
openbox >/tmp/openbox.log 2>&1 &
sleep 0.5
fi
log "display $DISPLAY ready ($GEOM)"
# ── Vulkan ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Prefer the real GPU when /dev/dri was passed through; fall back to lavapipe,
# which is slow but correct and needs no host device.
LVP=$(ls /usr/share/vulkan/icd.d/lvp_icd*.json 2>/dev/null | head -1)
if [ "${SYLPH_VULKAN:-auto}" = "sw" ] || [ ! -e /dev/dri/renderD128 ]; then
[ -n "$LVP" ] && export VK_ICD_FILENAMES="$LVP"
else
unset LIBGL_ALWAYS_SOFTWARE
fi
# Report what Vulkan ACTUALLY enumerated, not what we asked for. Announcing
# "host GPU via /dev/dri" because the device node exists is how an agent ends up
# believing it has hardware while running llvmpipe — an NVIDIA card needs the
# NVIDIA Container Toolkit, and /dev/dri alone does nothing for it.
if command -v vulkaninfo >/dev/null 2>&1; then
vkdev=$(vulkaninfo --summary 2>/dev/null | awk -F= '/deviceName/{gsub(/^ +| +$/,"",$2); print $2; exit}')
case "${vkdev:-}" in
"") log "Vulkan: NO DEVICE — vulkaninfo enumerated nothing" ;;
llvmpipe*|lavapipe*) log "Vulkan: $vkdev (SOFTWARE — correct but slow)" ;;
*) log "Vulkan: $vkdev (hardware)" ;;
esac
fi
# ── Build parallelism ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Bounded by MEMORY, not just cores. A full-parallel build of this tree has
# OOM-killed the host outright, and inside a half-the-box container the ceiling
# is lower still. ~1.5 GiB per C++ TU is the rule of thumb that has held.
# nproc reports the HOST's core count: --cpus is a CFS quota, not a mask. Using
# it would oversubscribe a half-the-box container by exactly 2x, so read the
# quota the cgroup actually grants.
cpus=$(nproc)
if [ -r /sys/fs/cgroup/cpu.max ]; then
read -r _q _p < /sys/fs/cgroup/cpu.max || true
if [ "${_q:-max}" != max ] && [ "${_p:-0}" -gt 0 ]; then
cpus=$(( (_q + _p - 1) / _p ))
[ "$cpus" -lt 1 ] && cpus=1
fi
fi
mem_gib=$(awk '/MemAvailable/{printf "%d", $2/1048576}' /proc/meminfo)
# MemAvailable is the HOST's too under cgroup v2; prefer the container's cap.
if [ -r /sys/fs/cgroup/memory.max ]; then
_m=$(cat /sys/fs/cgroup/memory.max)
[ "$_m" != max ] && mem_gib=$(( _m / 1073741824 ))
fi
[ "${mem_gib:-0}" -lt 1 ] && mem_gib=1
by_mem=$(( mem_gib * 2 / 3 ))
[ "$by_mem" -lt 1 ] && by_mem=1
jobs=$(( cpus < by_mem ? cpus : by_mem ))
export SYLPH_JOBS="$jobs" CARGO_BUILD_JOBS="$jobs" CMAKE_BUILD_PARALLEL_LEVEL="$jobs"
log "build parallelism: $jobs (cpus=$cpus, mem=${mem_gib}GiB avail)"
mkdir -p "$HOME/shots" "$HOME/logs"
# ── The repository, cloned into THIS AGENT'S OWN volume ─────────────────────
# Not a bind mount of a human's working tree. That arrangement bit this project
# three times: an agent's `git config --local` captured a human's commits, a
# credential helper leaked a container-only path onto the host, and a `git add
# -A` swept an agent's in-flight files into somebody else's commit. Separate
# checkouts make all three impossible rather than discouraged.
#
# Cloned ONCE. Never auto-pulled: pulling under a running agent moves files out
# from under whatever it is mid-edit, which is the same class of bug again.
if ! git -C /work rev-parse --verify HEAD >/dev/null 2>&1; then
# Checks for a usable HEAD, not merely a .git directory. A clone interrupted
# partway -- the container stopped while it ran, which has happened -- leaves
# a .git with no commits, and a presence check would then skip the retry
# forever and hand the agent an empty repository.
echo "[entrypoint] cloning ${SYLPH_REPO_URL:-https://git.mc02.dev/fabi/Sylpheed.git} into /work"
_tmp=$(mktemp -d)
if git clone --quiet "${SYLPH_REPO_URL:-https://git.mc02.dev/fabi/Sylpheed.git}" "$_tmp/r"; then
find /work -mindepth 1 -maxdepth 1 -exec rm -rf {} + 2>/dev/null || true
mv "$_tmp/r"/.[!.]* "$_tmp/r"/* /work/ 2>/dev/null || true
echo "[entrypoint] /work at $(git -C /work rev-parse --short HEAD) on $(git -C /work rev-parse --abbrev-ref HEAD)"
else
echo "[entrypoint] clone FAILED -- the agent has no repository" >&2
fi
rm -rf "$_tmp"
else
echo "[entrypoint] /work at $(git -C /work rev-parse --short HEAD) on $(git -C /work rev-parse --abbrev-ref HEAD)"
fi
# The shared exchange, for transient files that must not enter git history.
mkdir -p /exchange/files 2>/dev/null || true
# ── Claude Code config ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# ── Claude state: this agent's own, seeded once from the host ───────────────
# Isolated per agent. Both working directories are /work, and Claude Code keys
# its per-project state off the working directory -- so a SHARED ~/.claude put
# two independent agents in the same projects/-work/ directory, which undoes the
# point of giving them separate checkouts.
#
# Seeded rather than shared because credentials live in .credentials.json and a
# token refresh must be able to write. Copying once means each agent refreshes
# its own token and neither can corrupt the host's.
if [ -d "$HOME/.claude.seed" ] && [ ! -s "$HOME/.claude/.credentials.json" ]; then
mkdir -p "$HOME/.claude"
cp -a "$HOME/.claude.seed/.credentials.json" "$HOME/.claude/" 2>/dev/null || true
for f in settings.json CLAUDE.md; do
[ -e "$HOME/.claude.seed/$f" ] && cp -a "$HOME/.claude.seed/$f" "$HOME/.claude/" 2>/dev/null || true
done
echo "[entrypoint] seeded ~/.claude from the host (credentials only)"
fi
# Seed ~/.claude.json from the host's read-only copy, then stamp onboarding as
# complete. Claude Code re-runs its first-run wizard whenever
# lastOnboardingVersion differs from the installed version — so a container with
# a newer Claude than the host stops on the theme picker, with no error and no
# log line, and an unattended agent sits there forever.
if [ -f "$HOME/.claude.host.json" ] && [ ! -s "$HOME/.claude.json" ]; then
cp "$HOME/.claude.host.json" "$HOME/.claude.json" 2>/dev/null || true
fi
# `credential.helper=store` rewrites this file by rename-over-target, which
# fails with EBUSY on a bind mount -- reported as `fatal: unable to write
# credential store`, while the push itself succeeds. A fatal line that is
# routinely wrong teaches the reader to ignore the one that is real.
if [ -f "$HOME/.git-credentials.host" ]; then
cp "$HOME/.git-credentials.host" "$HOME/.git-credentials" 2>/dev/null || true
chmod 600 "$HOME/.git-credentials" 2>/dev/null || true
fi
CLAUDE_VER=$(claude --version 2>/dev/null | grep -oE '^[0-9][0-9.]*' || echo 0.0.0)
python3 /usr/local/bin/seed-claude-config.py "$HOME/.claude.json" "$CLAUDE_VER" \
"$PWD" "${PROJECT_DIR:-/work}" "$HOME" || true
chmod 600 "$HOME/.claude.json" 2>/dev/null || true
# ── Claude Code ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
if [ "${SYLPH_AUTONOMOUS:-0}" = "1" ]; then
# Drop the image's default CMD first, or `claude` is handed the literal string
# "bash" as its prompt and answers a question nobody asked.
if [ "$#" -eq 1 ] && [ "$1" = "bash" ]; then
set --
fi
# The flag the user asked for. It is refused under root, which is why this
# image runs as `agent`.
# Remote Control registers the session with your account so you can chat with
# the agent from claude.ai or your phone — the point of a detached run being
# that you are not sitting in front of it. The name is passed EXPLICITLY: the
# flag's value is optional, so a bare `--remote-control` would swallow the
# /loop prompt that follows as the session name.
if [ "${SYLPH_REMOTE:-1}" != "0" ]; then
set -- --remote-control "${SYLPH_REMOTE_NAME:-sylpheed-agent}" "$@"
log "Remote Control enabled as '${SYLPH_REMOTE_NAME:-sylpheed-agent}'"
fi
# claude-autonomous wraps `claude --dangerously-skip-permissions` in a pty and
# answers the one-time first-run gates. The Bypass Permissions disclaimer in
# particular has no config key that skips it, so unattended it hangs forever.
set -- claude-autonomous "$@"
log "starting Claude Code with --dangerously-skip-permissions in $(pwd)"
fi
exec "$@"