Claude (Pi session)
034e98eeb0
Phase 5 of docs/agents/GITEA-SETUP.md, plus a correction to Phase 2 that the runbook could not have known it needed. gitea-mcp v1.7.0 goes into both images, pinned by the sha256 the release publishes and smoke-tested with `--version` at build time, so a bad pin fails the build instead of the agent. Each entrypoint registers it at user scope for that container's own identity, remove-then-add so a restart is idempotent. The token is passed BY PATH. `-e GITEA_ACCESS_TOKEN=$(cat …)` would write it in cleartext into ~/.claude.json, which every session in the container reads; GITEA_ACCESS_TOKEN_FILE is new in the pinned version and leaves the secret in its read-only mount. Verified against the binary's own --help, not assumed. The tool filter stops being an experiment. The names are in the release README: each agent gets issues, notifications, labels, milestones and pull requests, and NOT `pull_request_review_write`. That one matters because separate identities open a hole the runbook did not name: Gitea refuses to let an author approve their own pull request, and does nothing about sylph-decoder approving sylph-port's. Two agents could satisfy `required_approvals = 1` between themselves and then merge, since branch protection blocks pushes to main and never blocked merges. Withholding the tool is defence in depth; the controls are in branch protection, and both docs now say so: approvals whitelisted to the human so an agent's approval does not count, merges whitelisted to the human so an approved PR is still merged by a person. Phase 2's check gains the step that actually tests it -- approve the throwaway PR yourself, then confirm the agent STILL has no merge button. Without that step, the check passes on an instance where the agents can merge each other's work. Also settles two entries on the runbook's own "not verified" list: the tool filter names, and the Gitea version (1.25.5, whose API schema carries enable_merge_whitelist and enable_approvals_whitelist under those names). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01McNbzUeq1KRBWs4G6X2YVj
437 lines
22 KiB
Bash
Executable File
437 lines
22 KiB
Bash
Executable File
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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# Host-side launcher for the Sylpheed RE agent container.
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#
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# Caps the container at HALF the machine's CPUs and memory, computed at run time
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# so it stays half on whatever box it lands on.
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#
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# ./sylph-agent build build (or rebuild) the image
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# ./sylph-agent shell interactive shell in the container
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# ./sylph-agent agent [prompt] Claude Code, --dangerously-skip-permissions
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# ./sylph-agent loose [task] turn it loose: detached, /loop, self-paced
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# ./sylph-agent logs [-f] what the loose agent is doing
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# ./sylph-agent remote print the Remote Control link (chat from anywhere)
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# ./sylph-agent attach attach to the loose agent's session
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# ./sylph-agent run <cmd...> one-shot command
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# ./sylph-agent stop stop it
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#
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# Environment:
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# SYLPH_PROJECT host project root (default: three levels up from this file)
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# SYLPH_CLAUDE_HOME host dir mounted as the agent's ~/.claude
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# (default: $HOME/.claude — shares auth AND memory with you)
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# SYLPH_VULKAN=sw force software Vulkan (lavapipe) even if /dev/dri exists
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# SYLPH_REMOTE=0 do NOT enable Remote Control (default: enabled for `loose`)
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# SYLPH_REMOTE_NAME Remote Control session name (default: sylpheed-agent)
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# SYLPH_GIT_CREDENTIALS file with `https://<user>:<token>@host` for push-work
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# (default: $HOME/.sylph-git-credentials)
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# SYLPH_GITEA_TOKEN this agent's own Gitea token file
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# (default: $HOME/.sylph-gitea-token-decoder)
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# SYLPH_LOOP_INTERVAL fixed loop cadence, e.g. 30m (default: 45m)
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# SYLPH_CPUS / SYLPH_MEM_GB override the computed half
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set -euo pipefail
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HERE="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
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IMAGE="${SYLPH_IMAGE:-sylpheed-agent:latest}"
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NAME="${SYLPH_NAME:-sylpheed-agent}"
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PROJECT="${SYLPH_PROJECT:-$(cd "$HERE/../../.." && pwd)}"
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# ── Half the box ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# LC_ALL=C is required, not tidiness: under a locale with a comma decimal
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# separator (de_DE and friends) awk prints "6,0" and docker rejects it as
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# --cpus with "failed to parse as a rational number".
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HOST_CPUS=$(nproc)
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HOST_MEM_KB=$(awk '/MemTotal/{print $2}' /proc/meminfo)
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# Fixed, not "half the host": half was right when this was the only agent. There
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# are now two, and a Referee is planned, so the budget is split deliberately
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# instead of each container claiming half of a box it shares. The decoder gets
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# the larger share because it builds and drives the emulator.
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CPUS="${SYLPH_CPUS:-5}"
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MEM_GB="${SYLPH_MEM_GB:-6}"
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[ "$MEM_GB" -lt 2 ] && MEM_GB=2
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# /dev/shm holds the emulator's guest memory (gmem.py reads it there). Docker's
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# 64 MB default is far too small for a 512 MB console address space, and the
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# failure is an obscure mmap error rather than an out-of-space message. tmpfs
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# pages count against the memory cap, so take a third of it and no more.
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SHM_GB=$(( MEM_GB / 3 )); [ "$SHM_GB" -lt 1 ] && SHM_GB=1
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CLAUDE_JSON="${SYLPH_CLAUDE_JSON:-$HOME/.claude.json}"
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if [ ! -f "$CLAUDE_JSON" ]; then
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echo "==> WARNING: $CLAUDE_JSON does not exist." >&2
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echo " Docker would create a DIRECTORY at that path inside the container," >&2
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echo " and Claude Code would fail confusingly. Run \`claude\` once on the" >&2
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echo " host first, or set SYLPH_CLAUDE_JSON." >&2
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fi
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usage() { sed -n '2,20p' "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}" | sed 's/^# \{0,1\}//'; exit "${1:-0}"; }
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docker_args() {
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local -n _out=$1
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_out=(
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--name "$NAME"
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--hostname sylph-agent
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# ── the cap ──
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--cpus "$CPUS"
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--memory "${MEM_GB}g"
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--memory-swap "${MEM_GB}g" # no swap escape hatch: a swapping build
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# thrashes the whole host, which is the
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# failure this cap exists to prevent
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--pids-limit 4096
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# /dev/shm as an EXEC-capable tmpfs, not --shm-size. Docker's default mounts
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# it `noexec`, and xenia maps its JIT code cache out of a shm file at a fixed
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# address — so with noexec it dies at startup with "Unable to allocate code
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# cache generated code storage / Cannot initalize processor", which reads
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# like an address-space clash rather than a mount flag.
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--tmpfs "/dev/shm:rw,exec,nosuid,nodev,size=${SHM_GB}g"
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# Dynamic RE needs to attach to a live process: without SYS_PTRACE, gdb and
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# strace are installed but inert ("Could not attach to process"), and the
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# container's whole reason for existing is watching the emulator run.
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# Docker's default seccomp profile also blocks calls the JIT and the guest
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# memory mapper rely on.
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--cap-add SYS_PTRACE
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--security-opt seccomp=unconfined
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--security-opt apparmor=unconfined
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# ── the repository ──
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# The agent's OWN clone, in its own volume -- not a bind mount of a human's
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# working tree. That arrangement bit this project three times: an agent's
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# `git config --local` captured a human's commits, a credential helper
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# leaked a container-only path onto the host, and a `git add -A` swept an
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# agent's in-flight files into someone else's commit. Separate checkouts
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# make all three impossible rather than merely discouraged.
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#
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# The cost, accepted knowingly: Claude Code keys its per-project memory off
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# the working directory, so moving from the host path to /work starts that
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# memory empty. The corpus in docs/ is the memory that matters and it
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# travels with the clone.
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-v "sylpheed-decoder-repo:/work"
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# Xenia Canary stays a separate repository -- it is a fork tracking upstream
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# and carries our instrumentation. Read-write: building probes into it is
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# real work, not a side effect.
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-v "${SYLPH_CANARY:-$HOME/RE Project Sylpheed/xenia-canary}:/canary"
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# The disc and the ISO. These used to arrive inside the project mount and
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# silently stopped when /work became a clone -- silently because the
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# disc-gated tests SELF-SKIP without SYLPHEED_DISC and report green, which
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# is the most expensive kind of missing mount.
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-v "${SYLPH_DISC:-$PROJECT/sylph_extract}:/disc:ro"
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-e "SYLPHEED_DISC=/disc"
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# ── the static-analysis corpus ──
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# The xenia-rs era's disassembly database and the flat VA image. Neither is
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# reproducible from anything in this repository yet -- the four scripts that
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# READ sylpheed.db have no producer here -- so they are mounted read-only
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# from the host as reference material.
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#
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# The `.pe` matters most: it is the decompressed image as a flat VA dump
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# (file offset = VA - 0x82000000), which removes the need to boot the
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# emulator and scrape /dev/shm to get at it. An earlier belief that this
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# file was STALE was tested and refuted -- it is current.
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-v "${SYLPH_XENIA_RS:-$PROJECT/xenia-rs}:/xenia-rs:ro"
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-v "${SYLPH_PE:-$PROJECT/Project Sylpheed - Arc of Deception (USA, Europe) (En,Ja).pe}:/image/sylpheed.pe:ro"
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-e "SYLPHEED_DB=/xenia-rs/sylpheed.db"
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-e "SYLPHEED_PE=/image/sylpheed.pe"
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-e "SYLPHEED_IMAGE_BASE=0x82000000"
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# The shared exchange: transient files with provenance, outside git history.
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-v "sylpheed-exchange:/exchange"
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-e "PROJECT_DIR=/work"
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-e "SYLPH_EXCHANGE=/exchange"
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-e "SYLPH_AGENT=decoder"
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# 🔴 THE JOB CAP LIVES IN THE ENVIRONMENT, NOT IN THE WRAPPER.
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#
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# `build-reborn` has always exported CARGO_BUILD_JOBS, and on 2026-09-01
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# that was not enough: the agent ran a RAW `cargo test --release -p
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# sylpheed-formats`, which never touches the wrapper, got one rustc per
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# granted CPU, and the container was OOM-killed at its 6 GB cap mid-task.
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# Docker reported ExitCode 0 with OOMKilled true, so it read as a clean
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# exit and cost a diagnosis.
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#
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# A guardrail reachable only through a wrapper protects the calls that use
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# the wrapper. This one is inherited by every process in the container, so
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# bypassing it takes an explicit override rather than forgetting.
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-e "CARGO_BUILD_JOBS=${SYLPH_JOBS:-2}"
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-e "SYLPH_REPO_URL=https://git.mc02.dev/fabi/Sylpheed.git"
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-e "XENIA_SRC=/canary"
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# ── claude ──
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# The state dir is shared read-write: credentials live in
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# .claude/.credentials.json, so token refresh needs to write, and this is
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# also what carries the project memory across.
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-v "sylpheed-decoder-claude:/sylph-home/re/.claude"
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-v "${SYLPH_CLAUDE_HOME:-$HOME/.claude}:/sylph-home/re/.claude.seed:ro"
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# ~/.claude.json sits BESIDE that directory and holds `hasCompletedOnboarding`.
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# Mounted READ-ONLY at a staging path: the entrypoint copies it to
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# ~/.claude.json and stamps onboarding as done. Sharing the file directly
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# would (a) re-run the first-run theme wizard whenever the container's
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# Claude Code version differs from the host's — a silent hang an unattended
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# agent never gets past — and (b) let the container rewrite your host config.
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-v "${SYLPH_CLAUDE_JSON:-$HOME/.claude.json}:/sylph-home/re/.claude.host.json:ro"
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# persistent build caches, so a container restart is not a rebuild
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-v sylph-agent-cargo:/sylph-home/re/.cargo
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-v sylph-agent-target:/sylph-home/re/target-container
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-v sylph-agent-canary-build:/sylph-home/re/canary-build
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)
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# ── Vulkan SDK ──
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# xenia's shader step calls `spirv-opt --canonicalize-ids`, which Ubuntu's
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# packaged SPIRV-Tools (v2025.1) does not have — the build then dies ~500
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# objects in. The LunarG SDK has it. Mounting the host's copy at the same path
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# is cheaper than baking a 200 MB SDK into the image AND guarantees the
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# container produces byte-identical shaders to the host build.
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SDK="${VULKAN_SDK:-}"
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if [ -z "$SDK" ]; then
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SDK=$(ls -d "$HOME"/vulkan-sdk/*/x86_64 2>/dev/null | sort -V | tail -1 || true)
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fi
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if [ -n "$SDK" ] && [ -x "$SDK/bin/spirv-opt" ]; then
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_out+=(-v "$SDK:$SDK:ro" -e "VULKAN_SDK=$SDK")
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else
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echo "==> NOTE: no Vulkan SDK found on the host. Building Canary's shaders" >&2
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echo " needs spirv-opt with --canonicalize-ids (LunarG SDK); Ubuntu's" >&2
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echo " packaged SPIRV-Tools is too old. Running is unaffected." >&2
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fi
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# ── git push ──
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# Read-only, and only ever used by `push-work`, which refuses anything but an
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# auto/* branch and never force-pushes. Without this the agent's work only
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# exists inside the container and dies with it.
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# ── Claude auth ──
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#
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# 🔴 THE ROTATING OAUTH FILE IS WHY THIS AGENT KEPT PARKING, and a long-lived
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# token removes the failure by construction rather than recovering from it.
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#
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# Measured 2026-09-04: `~/.claude/.credentials.json` holds a REFRESH TOKEN THAT
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# ROTATES ON USE. Seeding both containers from the host's copy left three
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# clients holding one token; the first to refresh invalidated the other two,
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# and on the failed refresh **Claude Code CLEARS the stored tokens** -- it
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# writes empty strings, keeps the metadata, and parks at "Login expired". The
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# decoder's file was caught emptied at 13:04:28 with its last work at 13:04:29.
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# A hollow file passes every "does it exist" check, which is why three separate
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# diagnoses missed it.
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#
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# `claude setup-token` issues a LONG-LIVED token against the same Claude
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# subscription (not Console/API billing -- `claude auth login` defaults to
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# `--claudeai`, and `--console` is the billed one). Passed as an environment
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# variable it cannot be rotated out from under a peer and there is no file for
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# Claude Code to empty, so both halves of the failure are gone.
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#
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# Inert until the file exists: without it the OAuth path below is unchanged.
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# Pass through: set SYLPH_OWN_LOGIN=1 when this container has run
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# `claude auth login` itself, so the entrypoint never copies the host's
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# rotating credentials over its own grant. Remote Control needs a real
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# login -- the long-lived token does not carry the sessions scope.
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[ -n "${SYLPH_OWN_LOGIN:-}" ] && _out+=(-e "SYLPH_OWN_LOGIN=$SYLPH_OWN_LOGIN")
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CLAUDETOK="${SYLPH_CLAUDE_TOKEN:-$HOME/.sylph-claude-token}"
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if [ -f "$CLAUDETOK" ]; then
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_out+=(-e "CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN=$(tr -d '[:space:]' < "$CLAUDETOK")")
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echo "==> auth: long-lived token from $CLAUDETOK (no rotating credential file)" >&2
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fi
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GITCRED="${SYLPH_GIT_CREDENTIALS:-$HOME/.sylph-git-credentials}"
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if [ -f "$GITCRED" ]; then
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_out+=(-v "$GITCRED:/sylph-home/re/.git-credentials.host:ro")
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else
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echo "==> NOTE: no git credentials at $GITCRED — the agent cannot push," >&2
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echo " so its work will be lost if the container is destroyed. Create it" >&2
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echo " with a single line and chmod 600:" >&2
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echo " https://<user>:<token>@git.mc02.dev" >&2
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echo " or point SYLPH_GIT_CREDENTIALS elsewhere." >&2
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fi
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# ── Gitea ──
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# This agent's OWN token, for its OWN Gitea account — not the push credential
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# and not the human's. Three reasons it is separate: `~/.sylph-git-credentials`
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# is scoped `write:repository` and every issue endpoint REFUSES it; a pull
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# request the agent authored is one a human can approve, which is the entire
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# review gate; and revoking one agent then touches neither the other nor you.
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#
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# Mounted read-only and passed to the MCP server BY PATH — see the entrypoint
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# for why the value must not go through the environment.
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# Inert until the file exists: the container still runs, with no issues.
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GITEATOK="${SYLPH_GITEA_TOKEN:-$HOME/.sylph-gitea-token-decoder}"
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if [ -f "$GITEATOK" ]; then
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_out+=(
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-v "$GITEATOK:/sylph-home/re/.sylph-gitea-token:ro"
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-e "GITEA_TOKEN_FILE=/sylph-home/re/.sylph-gitea-token"
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)
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else
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echo "==> NOTE: no Gitea token at $GITEATOK — this agent cannot read its" >&2
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echo " notifications, open an issue or open a pull request. Generate one" >&2
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echo " while logged in AS sylph-decoder: Settings -> Applications, scopes" >&2
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echo " write:repository, write:issue, write:notification, read:user." >&2
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fi
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[ -n "${ANTHROPIC_API_KEY:-}" ] && _out+=(-e "ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=$ANTHROPIC_API_KEY")
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[ -n "${SYLPH_VULKAN:-}" ] && _out+=(-e "SYLPH_VULKAN=$SYLPH_VULKAN")
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[ -n "${SYLPH_REMOTE:-}" ] && _out+=(-e "SYLPH_REMOTE=$SYLPH_REMOTE")
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[ -n "${SYLPH_REMOTE_NAME:-}" ] && _out+=(-e "SYLPH_REMOTE_NAME=$SYLPH_REMOTE_NAME")
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# The ISO Canary boots. Default resolves the retail image beside the project;
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# mounted at a stable in-container path so run-canary does not depend on the
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# host's directory names.
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_iso="${SYLPH_ISO:-$PROJECT/Project Sylpheed - Arc of Deception (USA, Europe) (En,Ja).iso}"
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if [ -f "$_iso" ]; then
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_out+=(-v "$_iso:/iso/game.iso:ro" -e "SYLPH_ISO=/iso/game.iso")
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else
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echo "==> NOTE: no ISO at $_iso -- Canary has nothing to boot." >&2
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fi
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# ── GPU ──
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# Three distinct cases, and conflating them is how you end up believing you
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# have hardware Vulkan while actually running llvmpipe:
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#
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# NVIDIA needs the NVIDIA Container Toolkit (`--gpus all`). Passing
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# /dev/dri alone does NOT work — Mesa cannot drive an NVIDIA card,
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# and the proprietary userspace lives outside the image.
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# Mesa (AMD/Intel) works with a plain /dev/dri passthrough plus the
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# host's render/video GIDs.
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# neither software Vulkan (lavapipe): correct, and slow.
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if [ "${SYLPH_VULKAN:-auto}" = "sw" ]; then
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_out+=(-e SYLPH_VULKAN=sw)
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elif command -v nvidia-smi >/dev/null 2>&1 && nvidia-smi -L >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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if docker info --format '{{json .Runtimes}}' 2>/dev/null | grep -q nvidia; then
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_out+=(--gpus all)
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else
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echo "==> NOTE: NVIDIA GPU found but the NVIDIA Container Toolkit is not" >&2
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echo " installed, so hardware Vulkan is unavailable and the container" >&2
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echo " will use lavapipe (software — correct, slow). To enable it:" >&2
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echo " sudo apt install nvidia-container-toolkit \\" >&2
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echo " && sudo nvidia-ctk runtime configure --runtime=docker \\" >&2
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echo " && sudo systemctl restart docker" >&2
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_out+=(-e SYLPH_VULKAN=sw)
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fi
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elif [ -e /dev/dri/renderD128 ]; then
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_out+=(--device /dev/dri)
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for g in render video; do
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gid=$(getent group "$g" | cut -d: -f3 || true)
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[ -n "$gid" ] && _out+=(--group-add "$gid")
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done
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else
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_out+=(-e SYLPH_VULKAN=sw)
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fi
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}
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case "${1:-}" in
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build)
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shift
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echo "==> building $IMAGE (uid $(id -u), gid $(id -g))"
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exec docker build -t "$IMAGE" \
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--build-arg "AGENT_UID=$(id -u)" --build-arg "AGENT_GID=$(id -g)" \
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"$@" "$HERE"
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;;
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loose)
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shift
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# "On the loose": detached, self-paced, working the RE backlog until stopped.
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#
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# -d WITHOUT --rm so the transcript survives the container exiting; that is
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# the only record of what an unattended run did. -t because /loop keeps the
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# session alive and schedules its own wake-ups — a `-p`/print-mode run would
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# answer once and exit, killing the loop on its first iteration.
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TASK="${1:-}"
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if [ -z "$TASK" ]; then
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if [ -f "$HERE/../../docs/agents/decoder-loop.md" ]; then
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|
TASK="$(cat "$HERE/../../docs/agents/decoder-loop.md")"
|
|
else
|
|
TASK="Work the RE backlog in Syplheed-Reborn/docs/re/BACKLOG.md."
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
# A FIXED interval by default, not self-pacing. Self-pacing requires the
|
|
# agent to call ScheduleWakeup itself at the end of every turn, and the one
|
|
# thing an agent deep in an experiment reliably forgets is the bookkeeping
|
|
# after it. With an interval the harness owns the cadence and a forgotten
|
|
# wakeup cannot end the run. Set SYLPH_LOOP_INTERVAL= (empty) to self-pace.
|
|
INTERVAL="${SYLPH_LOOP_INTERVAL-45m}"
|
|
declare -a ARGS; docker_args ARGS
|
|
ARGS+=(-e SYLPH_AUTONOMOUS=1 -w /work)
|
|
echo "==> loose | cpus=$CPUS mem=${MEM_GB}g shm=${SHM_GB}g"
|
|
echo "==> repo: own clone in volume sylpheed-decoder-repo -> /work"
|
|
echo "==> pacing: ${INTERVAL:-self-paced}"
|
|
docker rm -f "$NAME" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
|
|
# 🔴 `unless-stopped`, NOT `on-failure` -- and the reason is a trap worth
|
|
# keeping. When this container was OOM-killed on 2026-09-01, Docker reported
|
|
# `OOMKilled: true` with **ExitCode 0**. `on-failure` keys off the exit code,
|
|
# so it would have treated a memory kill as a clean finish and left the agent
|
|
# down. `unless-stopped` restarts regardless, and still honours an explicit
|
|
# `./sylph-agent stop`.
|
|
#
|
|
# Restarting into the same death is handled at the other end: the entrypoint
|
|
# refuses to `--continue` if the last start was under two minutes ago.
|
|
docker run -d -i -t --restart unless-stopped "${ARGS[@]}" "$IMAGE" \
|
|
"/loop ${INTERVAL:+$INTERVAL }$TASK" >/dev/null
|
|
echo
|
|
echo " running detached as '$NAME'."
|
|
echo " ./sylph-agent remote link to chat with it from anywhere"
|
|
echo " ./sylph-agent logs -f follow it"
|
|
echo " ./sylph-agent attach chat with it locally (Ctrl-P Ctrl-Q to leave it running)"
|
|
echo " ./sylph-agent stop stop it"
|
|
echo
|
|
# Report what is actually true. This line used to claim unconditionally that
|
|
# the agent could not push, which was written before credentials were
|
|
# supported and then went stale — telling the operator their work was at risk
|
|
# when it was not, which is the exact failure the credential mount fixes.
|
|
if [ -f "${SYLPH_GIT_CREDENTIALS:-$HOME/.sylph-git-credentials}" ]; then
|
|
echo " It commits to auto/* branches and publishes them with push-work,"
|
|
echo " which refuses any other branch and never force-pushes. Review with:"
|
|
echo " git -C '$PROJECT/Syplheed-Reborn' fetch origin && git log --oneline origin/auto/..."
|
|
else
|
|
echo " It commits to auto/* branches and CANNOT PUSH — no git credentials"
|
|
echo " are mounted, so its work dies with the container. Review it with:"
|
|
echo " git -C '$PROJECT/Syplheed-Reborn' log --oneline auto/..."
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
|
|
logs) shift; exec docker logs "$@" "$NAME" ;;
|
|
|
|
remote)
|
|
# Fish the Remote Control link out of the session's own output. Claude Code
|
|
# prints it once, when the session registers with your account — which takes
|
|
# a minute or two after launch, so this waits rather than answering "not
|
|
# found" to a question that is really "not yet".
|
|
printf 'waiting for the session to register' >&2
|
|
for i in $(seq 1 90); do
|
|
url=$(docker logs "$NAME" 2>&1 \
|
|
| sed 's/\x1b\[[0-9;]*[a-zA-Z]//g; s/\r//g' \
|
|
| grep -oE 'https://claude\.ai/code/[A-Za-z0-9_-]+' | tail -1)
|
|
if [ -n "${url:-}" ]; then
|
|
printf '\n' >&2
|
|
echo "$url"
|
|
exit 0
|
|
fi
|
|
docker ps -q -f "name=$NAME" | grep -q . || {
|
|
printf '\n' >&2
|
|
echo "container is not running — start it with: ./sylph-agent loose" >&2
|
|
exit 1
|
|
}
|
|
printf '.' >&2
|
|
sleep 4
|
|
done
|
|
printf '\n' >&2
|
|
echo "no Remote Control URL after 6 minutes." >&2
|
|
echo " Launched with SYLPH_REMOTE=0? Or check: ./sylph-agent logs | tail" >&2
|
|
exit 1
|
|
;;
|
|
|
|
shell|agent|run)
|
|
mode=$1; shift
|
|
declare -a ARGS; docker_args ARGS
|
|
echo "==> $mode | cpus=$CPUS mem=${MEM_GB}g shm=${SHM_GB}g (host: ${HOST_CPUS} cpus, $((HOST_MEM_KB/1048576))g)"
|
|
echo "==> project: $PROJECT -> /work"
|
|
docker rm -f "$NAME" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
|
|
# Allocate a TTY only when stdin actually is one: `docker run -it` fails
|
|
# outright ("cannot attach stdin to a TTY-enabled container") under a
|
|
# pipeline or a CI runner, which is exactly where `run` gets used.
|
|
TTY=(-i); [ -t 0 ] && TTY=(-it)
|
|
case "$mode" in
|
|
shell) exec docker run --rm "${TTY[@]}" "${ARGS[@]}" "$IMAGE" bash ;;
|
|
agent)
|
|
# The flag the user asked for. Refused under root, which is why the
|
|
# image runs as an unprivileged `agent` user.
|
|
ARGS+=(-e SYLPH_AUTONOMOUS=1)
|
|
exec docker run --rm "${TTY[@]}" "${ARGS[@]}" "$IMAGE" "$@"
|
|
;;
|
|
run) exec docker run --rm "${TTY[@]}" "${ARGS[@]}" "$IMAGE" "$@" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
;;
|
|
|
|
stop) exec docker rm -f "$NAME" ;;
|
|
doctor)
|
|
declare -a ARGS; docker_args ARGS
|
|
exec docker run --rm "${ARGS[@]}" "$IMAGE" sylph-doctor
|
|
;;
|
|
""|-h|--help) usage 0 ;;
|
|
*) echo "unknown command: $1" >&2; usage 2 ;;
|
|
esac
|