82a80e4063
`./sylph-agent loose [task]` starts Claude Code detached with
--dangerously-skip-permissions, running /loop on loop-task.md: work the RE
backlog one item at a time, commit to auto/* branches, never push, record
withdrawn results rather than deleting them. `logs`/`attach`/`stop` to watch and
end it. Runs -d WITHOUT --rm so the transcript survives the container exiting —
for an unattended run that is the only record of what happened.
Two things had to be fixed for an agent to survive being left alone.
MEMORY CONTINUITY. The project is now bind-mounted twice: at /work, and at its
own host path. Claude Code derives its per-project state key from the working
directory, so running at /work handed the agent an empty project instead of the
accumulated one. Verified: a loose run now reports MEMORY=yes and reads back the
same branch and backlog as the host.
FOUR INTERACTIVE GATES, each a silent permanent hang with nobody at the keyboard
-- no error, no log line, just a container that looks healthy and does nothing:
theme picker hasCompletedOnboarding + lastOnboardingVersion. Re-fires
whenever the container's Claude Code is a different version
to the host's, which is the normal case.
folder trust projects.<path>.hasTrustDialogAccepted
bypass disclaimer answered in a pty by bin/claude-autonomous. It has no config
key by design -- it wants a person to accept once, and the
person did so by launching this.
fullscreen upsell fullscreenUpsellSeenCount. This one fires MID-SESSION, after
the pty wrapper has already handed over, so it cannot be
answered the same way.
Config key names were read out of the shipped binary's own strings, not guessed.
The pty wrapper matches SINGLE WORDS. Claude Code draws its UI with
absolute-column escapes between words, so the prompt arrives as
`Yes,\x1b[13GI\x1b[15Gaccept` and a multi-word pattern never matches -- failing
in a way indistinguishable from the wrapper not running at all. It stops
matching once the session is live so nothing later is answered by accident.
~/.claude.json is now mounted read-only at a staging path and copied in, so the
container cannot rewrite the host config. Credentials stay shared read-write in
~/.claude, which is what token refresh and memory continuity need.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
86 lines
3.5 KiB
Python
Executable File
86 lines
3.5 KiB
Python
Executable File
#!/usr/bin/env python3
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"""Mark Claude Code's onboarding as complete in ~/.claude.json.
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Claude Code re-runs its first-run wizard whenever `lastOnboardingVersion` does
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not match the installed version. In a terminal that is a one-key prompt; for an
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unattended agent it is a silent, permanent hang on the theme picker — no error,
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no log line, and the container looks like it started fine.
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It also pre-accepts the workspace's trust prompt. That is a SECOND, separate
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first-run gate: even past onboarding, Claude Code asks "is this a project you
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trust?" per directory, and this repo's settings pre-approve 442 tool permissions
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so the prompt is emphatic about it. Unattended, it is another silent hang.
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Pre-accepting is safe here precisely because the trust question is being
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answered by the person who built and launched the container, for their own
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repository — it is not a judgement being made on their behalf about someone
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else's code.
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Usage: seed-claude-config.py <path to .claude.json> <installed version> [workspace...]
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"""
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import json
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import os
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import sys
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def main() -> int:
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if len(sys.argv) < 3:
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print(f"usage: {sys.argv[0]} <config.json> <version> [workspace...]",
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file=sys.stderr)
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return 2
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path, version = sys.argv[1], sys.argv[2]
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workspaces = sys.argv[3:]
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cfg = {}
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if os.path.exists(path) and os.path.getsize(path):
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try:
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with open(path) as f:
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cfg = json.load(f)
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except (OSError, ValueError):
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# A corrupt or partial config is not worth failing the container
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# over — start from empty rather than block the run.
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cfg = {}
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if not isinstance(cfg, dict):
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cfg = {}
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cfg["hasCompletedOnboarding"] = True
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cfg["lastOnboardingVersion"] = version
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cfg.setdefault("theme", "dark")
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# The THIRD interactive gate: --dangerously-skip-permissions shows a
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# "Bypass Permissions mode / you accept all responsibility" confirmation on
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# first use. Key name taken from the shipped binary's own strings, not
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# guessed. Accepting it here is the whole point of `sylph-agent loose` —
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# the container is the sandbox that warning asks you to provide.
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cfg["bypassPermissionsModeAccepted"] = True
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# A FOURTH gate, and this one fires mid-session rather than at startup, so
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# the pty wrapper has already handed over by then: an upsell asking whether
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# to try the fullscreen renderer. It is shown while
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# `fullscreenUpsellSeenCount` is below an internal threshold, so park it far
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# above. Found by reading the shipped binary's strings, same as the others.
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cfg["fullscreenUpsellSeenCount"] = 9999
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# An auto-update mid-run would restart the process and lose the loop's
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# scheduled wake-up, so pin the version the container was built with.
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cfg["autoUpdates"] = False
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projects = cfg.setdefault("projects", {})
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if not isinstance(projects, dict):
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projects = cfg["projects"] = {}
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for ws in workspaces:
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entry = projects.setdefault(ws, {})
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if not isinstance(entry, dict):
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entry = projects[ws] = {}
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entry["hasTrustDialogAccepted"] = True
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entry.setdefault("projectOnboardingSeenCount", 1)
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entry["hasClaudeMdExternalIncludesApproved"] = True
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entry["hasClaudeMdExternalIncludesWarningShown"] = True
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tmp = path + ".tmp"
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with open(tmp, "w") as f:
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json.dump(cfg, f, indent=2)
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os.replace(tmp, path)
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return 0
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if __name__ == "__main__":
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sys.exit(main())
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