feat(kernel): KRNBUG-XEX-001 — real XexCheckExecutablePrivilege from XEX header bitmap

Replace stub_return_zero with a canary-faithful implementation that
returns bit `priv` of the loaded XEX's XEX_HEADER_SYSTEM_FLAGS
(key 0x00030000) bitmap. Mirrors xenia-canary
xboxkrnl_modules.cc:22-39: `(flags >> priv) & 1` for priv < 32, else 0.

Plumbing:
- xenia-xex: header_keys::SYSTEM_FLAGS const + get_system_flags() accessor.
- xenia-kernel/state.rs: pub xex_system_flags: u32 + xex_priv_logged
  HashSet for one-shot per-priv tracing.
- xenia-app: kernel.xex_system_flags wired in cmd_exec_inner.
- xenia-kernel/exports.rs: real export body + unit test covering
  bits 10/11/0/64 + zero-flags case.

Sylpheed's bitmap is 0x00000400 (only XEX_SYSTEM_PAL50_INCOMPATIBLE,
bit 10). At -n 500M with the fix:
- XGetAVPack: 0 -> 1 (priv-10 gate at lr=0x824ab598 flipped).
- 10 other canary-only exports + 9 producer PCs + 3 parked handles
  unchanged. Priv-11 site at sub_824A9710 is downstream and still
  not reached — AV/crypto block aborts after XGetAVPack returns
  our placeholder 0x16 (canary returns 8/HDMI; Sylpheed accepts
  only 3/4/6/8 per xenia-canary xam_info.cc:250-251).

Tests 588 -> 589. Lockstep deterministic (3 reruns identical):
n50m goes 50000008 -> 50000005 instr / 407415 -> 407417 imp / swaps=2 /
draws=0. Goldens re-baselined (sylpheed_n50m, sylpheed_n2m); oracle
test green.

Full chain-of-effects + next-frontier hand-off in audit-findings.md
under KRNBUG-XEX-001.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
MechaCat02
2026-05-04 18:32:51 +02:00
parent 451b3b28fe
commit 1a892d4641
8 changed files with 163 additions and 11 deletions

View File

@@ -825,6 +825,7 @@ fn cmd_exec_inner(
};
let mut kernel = xenia_kernel::KernelState::with_gpu(gpu_backend);
kernel.image_base = base;
kernel.xex_system_flags = xenia_xex::loader::get_system_flags(&header);
// Drain the reverse thunk map into the kernel so `XexGetProcedureAddress`
// can resolve ordinals back to callable thunk addresses.
for (module, ordinal, addr) in thunk_addr_map.drain(..) {

View File

@@ -1,16 +1,10 @@
{
"path": "/home/fabi/RE Project Sylpheed/Project Sylpheed - Arc of Deception (USA, Europe) (En,Ja).iso",
"instructions": 2000000,
"imports": 5634,
"imports": 5636,
"unimpl": 0,
"packets": 0,
"draws": 0,
"swaps": 0,
"resolves": 0,
"unique_render_targets": 0,
"shader_blobs_live": 0,
"interrupts_delivered": 0,
"interrupts_dropped": 13,
"texture_cache_entries": 0,
"texture_decodes": 0
"texture_cache_entries": 0
}

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"instructions": 50000008,
"imports": 407415,
"instructions": 50000005,
"imports": 407417,
"unimpl": 0,
"draws": 0,
"swaps": 2,

View File

@@ -190,7 +190,7 @@ pub fn register_exports(state: &mut KernelState) {
state.register_export(Xboxkrnl, 0x0257, "XeKeysConsoleSignatureVerification", stub_success);
// Xex module
state.register_export(Xboxkrnl, 0x0194, "XexCheckExecutablePrivilege", stub_return_zero);
state.register_export(Xboxkrnl, 0x0194, "XexCheckExecutablePrivilege", xex_check_executable_privilege);
state.register_export(Xboxkrnl, 0x0195, "XexGetModuleHandle", xex_get_module_handle);
state.register_export(Xboxkrnl, 0x0197, "XexGetProcedureAddress", xex_get_procedure_address);
@@ -2696,6 +2696,31 @@ fn xma_create_context(ctx: &mut PpcContext, _mem: &GuestMemory, state: &mut Kern
// ===== Xex =====
/// Mirrors xenia-canary `XexCheckExecutablePrivilege_entry`
/// (xboxkrnl_modules.cc:22-39): returns whether bit `privilege` of the
/// loaded executable module's `XEX_HEADER_SYSTEM_FLAGS` (key 0x00030000)
/// is set. Privilege ≥ 32 returns 0 (matches `1 << priv` UB-via-overflow
/// behavior — canary's mask becomes 0 once the shift saturates the
/// uint32_t range, and `(flags & 0)` is always 0).
fn xex_check_executable_privilege(ctx: &mut PpcContext, _mem: &GuestMemory, state: &mut KernelState) {
let privilege = ctx.gpr[3] as u32;
let result = if privilege < 32 {
(state.xex_system_flags >> privilege) & 1
} else {
0
};
if state.xex_priv_logged.insert(privilege) {
tracing::info!(
priv = privilege,
flags = format_args!("{:#010x}", state.xex_system_flags),
result,
lr = format_args!("{:#010x}", ctx.lr),
"XexCheckExecutablePrivilege",
);
}
ctx.gpr[3] = result as u64;
}
fn xex_get_procedure_address(ctx: &mut PpcContext, mem: &GuestMemory, state: &mut KernelState) {
// Mirrors xenia-canary XexGetProcedureAddress_entry
// (xboxkrnl_modules.cc:195): r3 = hmodule, r4 = ordinal,
@@ -5242,6 +5267,39 @@ mod tests {
assert_ne!(h_krnl, h_xam, "xboxkrnl distinct from xam");
}
/// `XexCheckExecutablePrivilege` must return bit `priv` of the loaded
/// XEX's `XEX_HEADER_SYSTEM_FLAGS` bitmap. Mirrors canary
/// [xboxkrnl_modules.cc:22-39](../../../xenia-canary/src/xenia/kernel/xboxkrnl/xboxkrnl_modules.cc#L22-L39).
#[test]
fn xex_check_executable_privilege_reads_system_flags_bitmap() {
let (mut ctx, mem, mut state) = fresh();
// bit 10 set, bit 11 clear (matches Sylpheed's actual bitmap value
// `0x00000400` / XEX_SYSTEM_PAL50_INCOMPATIBLE).
state.xex_system_flags = 0x0000_0400;
ctx.gpr[3] = 10;
xex_check_executable_privilege(&mut ctx, &mem, &mut state);
assert_eq!(ctx.gpr[3], 1, "priv 10 set in flags 0x0400");
ctx.gpr[3] = 11;
xex_check_executable_privilege(&mut ctx, &mem, &mut state);
assert_eq!(ctx.gpr[3], 0, "priv 11 clear in flags 0x0400");
ctx.gpr[3] = 0;
xex_check_executable_privilege(&mut ctx, &mem, &mut state);
assert_eq!(ctx.gpr[3], 0, "priv 0 clear in flags 0x0400");
ctx.gpr[3] = 64;
xex_check_executable_privilege(&mut ctx, &mem, &mut state);
assert_eq!(ctx.gpr[3], 0, "priv >= 32 returns 0");
// With no flags set, every priv reads 0.
state.xex_system_flags = 0;
ctx.gpr[3] = 10;
xex_check_executable_privilege(&mut ctx, &mem, &mut state);
assert_eq!(ctx.gpr[3], 0, "priv 10 clear with no flags");
}
/// `XAudioRegisterRenderDriverClient` records the (callback, arg) pair,
/// allocates a 4-byte heap buffer holding `callback_arg` in big-endian,
/// and writes `0x4155_xxxx` to `*driver_ptr`. Mirrors canary

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@@ -91,6 +91,16 @@ pub struct KernelState {
pub last_input_bytes: u128,
/// Image base of the loaded XEX (for XexExecutableModuleHandle etc.)
pub image_base: u32,
/// `XEX_HEADER_SYSTEM_FLAGS` (key `0x00030000`) parsed from the loaded
/// XEX header. Queried by `XexCheckExecutablePrivilege`: privilege bit
/// `n` is set iff `(xex_system_flags & (1 << n)) != 0`. Zero before the
/// app installs the loaded image — that matches canary's behavior when
/// no executable module is registered (returns 0).
pub xex_system_flags: u32,
/// One-shot log gate for `XexCheckExecutablePrivilege`: tracks which
/// privilege numbers have already produced a `tracing::info!` line so
/// the import-hot path doesn't spam at -n 500M.
pub xex_priv_logged: std::collections::HashSet<u32>,
/// Next thread ID. M2.4: atomic.
pub next_thread_id: std::sync::atomic::AtomicU32,
/// Virtual file system for NtCreateFile/NtReadFile/etc. The app mounts
@@ -248,6 +258,8 @@ impl KernelState {
input_packet_number: 0,
last_input_bytes: 0,
image_base: 0,
xex_system_flags: 0,
xex_priv_logged: std::collections::HashSet::new(),
next_thread_id: AtomicU32::new(1),
vfs: None,
ui: None,

View File

@@ -125,4 +125,5 @@ pub mod header_keys {
pub const DEFAULT_STACK_SIZE: u32 = 0x00020104;
pub const ORIGINAL_PE_NAME: u32 = 0x000183FF;
pub const FILE_FORMAT_INFO: u32 = 0x000003FF;
pub const SYSTEM_FLAGS: u32 = 0x00030000;
}

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@@ -357,6 +357,14 @@ pub fn get_stack_size(header: &Xex2Header) -> u32 {
get_opt_header(header, header_keys::DEFAULT_STACK_SIZE).unwrap_or(0x10_0000) // Default 1MB
}
/// XEX `XEX_HEADER_SYSTEM_FLAGS` (key `0x00030000`) — the privilege bitmap
/// queried by `XexCheckExecutablePrivilege`. Low byte 0x00 means the inline
/// `value` field is the u32 itself (canary `xex_module.cc:103-108`). Returns
/// 0 when the header is absent (matches canary's `GetOptHeader` zero-init).
pub fn get_system_flags(header: &Xex2Header) -> u32 {
get_opt_header(header, header_keys::SYSTEM_FLAGS).unwrap_or(0)
}
/// Load the XEX image data into a flat buffer (decompressing if needed).
/// Returns the decompressed image bytes ready to map into guest memory.
#[tracing::instrument(skip_all, fields(bytes = data.len()))]