Files
EventSnap/e2e/specs/01-auth/join.spec.ts
fabi 89057d605f fix(rate-limit): key the guest-facing limiters per user, not per IP
At a venue every guest is behind one NAT, so an IP-keyed limiter hands the
whole party a single bucket. On a fresh deploy 12 guests arriving together
meant 5 joined and 7 were turned away, with no Retry-After telling them when
to retry. `/feed` (60/min) and `/export` (3 per DAY — the fourth guest to
fetch their keepsake locked out until tomorrow) had the same defect.

`feed_delta` was already keyed per-user and its comment states the exact
rationale ("so one client can't starve others behind a shared NAT"); this
makes its siblings match.

- feed:{ip}   -> feed:{user_id}    (auth was already in scope)
- export:{ip} -> export:{user_id}  (resolved from the download ticket's
  session, which was previously looked up and discarded)
- join:{ip}: pre-auth, so there is no user to key on. Split in two — a loose
  per-IP ceiling that only bounds raw volume (new `join_ip_rate_per_min`,
  default 60, migration 017), plus the real 5/60s anti-spam bucket keyed
  per (ip, name), mirroring the existing `recover:{ip}:{name}`.

admin_login / recover / pin_reset_req stay IP-keyed on purpose and are now
commented as such: they guard credential guessing, where a per-user or
per-name key would just hand an attacker a fresh bucket per guess.

Retry-After: the machinery existed but 7 of 8 sites called `check()` and
hard-coded `None`, so a throttled client was told to back off but never for
how long. Delete the bool `check()` wrapper entirely so `check_with_retry`
is the only entry point and the delay cannot be discarded by accident. Also
surface it for the PIN lockout, where the deadline was already known.

Fix the "unknown" fallback while here: every client_ip() caller passed that
literal, so any request without X-Forwarded-For — anything reaching the app
directly rather than through Caddy — shared ONE global bucket. Serve with
connect-info and use the peer address.

Tests: the reseed forces every limiter toggle off before each test, which is
why this whole class was invisible. Add 01-auth/rate-limit-shared-nat, which
enables them and asserts 12 guests share an IP without collision, that one
guest hammering their own name IS still throttled (so the fix re-keys rather
than removes the limit), and that feed/export buckets are per-user. Retarget
the ddos join test at the new per-IP ceiling — it asserted the defect.

Also seed `admin_login_rate_enabled` (read by the handler, seeded by no
migration and no reseed) and register `join_ip_rate_per_min` in the admin
config allowlist. Unrelated pre-existing red test fixed: 01-auth/join
asserted a "Willkommen!" heading the wedding redesign removed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-27 21:56:49 +02:00

147 lines
5.6 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* USER_JOURNEYS.md §1 (First-time guest), §2 (Returning guest, same device),
* §3 (Returning guest, new device). Covers the happy path through
* /join, the PIN modal, the onboarding overlay landing, and the
* name-already-taken recovery transformation.
*/
import { test, expect } from '../../fixtures/test';
import { JoinPage } from '../../page-objects';
import { readStorage, STORAGE_KEYS, clearAllStorage } from '../../helpers/storage-helpers';
test.describe('Auth — join flow', () => {
test('happy path: name → PIN modal → feed @smoke', async ({ page }) => {
const join = new JoinPage(page);
await join.goto();
// The join form's landing state. There is no "Willkommen!" heading — the wedding
// redesign (f243bfe) split it into a "Willkommen bei" lead-in plus the event name as
// the <h1>, and this assertion was never updated, so it had been failing since.
// Anchor on the testid the markup provides rather than on copy.
await expect(page.getByTestId('join-event-name')).toBeVisible();
const { pin } = await join.joinAs('Alice');
expect(pin).toMatch(/^\d{4}$/);
// PIN copy button toggles to "Kopiert!" on click
await join.pinCopyButton.click();
await expect(join.pinCopyButton).toHaveText(/Kopiert/i);
await join.continueToFeed();
await expect(page).toHaveURL(/\/feed$/);
const storage = await readStorage(page);
expect(storage.jwt, 'JWT in localStorage').toMatch(/^eyJ/);
expect(storage.pin).toBe(pin);
expect(storage.userId).toMatch(/^[0-9a-f-]{36}$/);
expect(storage.displayName).toBe('Alice');
});
test('returning guest with valid JWT is redirected to /feed', async ({ page, guest, signIn }) => {
const alice = await guest('Bob');
await signIn(page, alice);
// Now visit the root — should auto-redirect to /feed.
await page.goto('/');
await page.waitForURL('**/feed', { timeout: 5_000 });
});
test('returning guest, new device: same name shows the inline recovery form', async ({
page,
guest,
}) => {
const original = await guest('Charlie');
// Brand-new browser context (cleared storage) — landing on /join with same name
await clearAllStorage(page);
const join = new JoinPage(page);
await join.goto();
await join.fillName('Charlie');
await join.submit();
await expect(join.recoveryPinInput).toBeVisible();
await expect(page.getByText(/Charlie.*bereits vergeben/)).toBeVisible();
// Type correct PIN → land on /feed with a new JWT. Filling the 4th digit
// auto-submits (see pin-auto-submit.spec), so an explicit submit click would
// race the navigation; click only as a fallback if the button is still around.
await join.recoveryPinInput.fill(original.pin);
if (await join.recoverySubmit.isEnabled().catch(() => false)) {
await join.recoverySubmit.click().catch(() => {});
}
await page.waitForURL('**/feed');
const storage = await readStorage(page);
expect(storage.userId).toBe(original.userId);
expect(storage.pin).toBe(original.pin);
});
test('wrong PIN three times locks the account for 15 minutes', async ({ page, guest, db }) => {
const dave = await guest('Dave');
await clearAllStorage(page);
const join = new JoinPage(page);
await join.goto();
await join.fillName('Dave');
await join.submit();
await expect(join.recoveryPinInput).toBeVisible();
// Wrong PIN (real one is dave.pin)
const wrong = dave.pin === '0000' ? '1111' : '0000';
for (let i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
await join.recoveryPinInput.fill(wrong);
await join.recoverySubmit.click();
await expect(join.recoveryError).toBeVisible();
}
// Fourth attempt should hit the 429 lockout (even with the correct PIN now)
await join.recoveryPinInput.fill(dave.pin);
await join.recoverySubmit.click();
await expect(join.recoveryError).toContainText(/15 Minuten/);
// Sanity: DB row reflects the lock
// (The handler sets pin_locked_until directly — verify via API "recover" returning 429)
void db; // unused for now, documenting that db.lockUserPin exists if we want shortcut path
});
test('"Anderen Namen wählen" returns to the normal join form', async ({ page, guest }) => {
await guest('Eve');
await clearAllStorage(page);
const join = new JoinPage(page);
await join.goto();
await join.fillName('Eve');
await join.submit();
await expect(join.recoveryPinInput).toBeVisible();
await join.tryDifferentNameButton.click();
await expect(join.nameInput).toBeVisible();
await expect(join.recoveryPinInput).not.toBeVisible();
});
test('"Ich habe bereits einen Account" link routes to /recover', async ({ page }) => {
const join = new JoinPage(page);
await join.goto();
await join.linkToRecover.click();
await expect(page).toHaveURL(/\/recover$/);
});
test('JWT and PIN keys are exactly the ones auth.ts expects', async ({ page, guest, signIn }) => {
const handle = await guest('Frank');
await signIn(page, handle);
// Read raw localStorage to make sure no test accidentally uses a different key.
const raw = await page.evaluate(() => ({
jwt: localStorage.getItem('eventsnap_jwt'),
pin: localStorage.getItem('eventsnap_pin'),
userId: localStorage.getItem('eventsnap_user_id'),
displayName: localStorage.getItem('eventsnap_display_name'),
}));
expect(raw.jwt).toBe(handle.jwt);
expect(raw.pin).toBe(handle.pin);
expect(raw.userId).toBe(handle.userId);
expect(raw.displayName).toBe('Frank');
// Sanity: the keys we just checked match STORAGE_KEYS in storage-helpers.ts
expect(STORAGE_KEYS.jwt).toBe('eventsnap_jwt');
});
});