a4b2c5bd1c
Security audit follow-up. No Critical/High existed; these close the
Medium/Low findings.
F1 [Med] Host privilege boundary: a host could demote a peer host to
guest and then ban / PIN-reset (→ account takeover via /recover) them,
because the ban/pin-reset peer guards key off the target's *current*
role. set_role now blocks a non-admin from demoting a host.
F2 [Med] Moderation now revokes preview/thumbnail access: they are served
through visibility-checked aliases (/api/v1/upload/{id}/{preview,
thumbnail}) that filter soft-deleted / ban-hidden uploads, and direct
/media/previews|thumbnails is 404-blocked. Feed emits the gated URLs;
Caddy keeps them privately cacheable (max-age=300, short so moderation
revokes promptly — the live feed already evicts cards via SSE). Uses a
lean find_visible_media() (paths+mime only) on the media hot path.
F3 [Med/Low] npm audit fix: svelte 5.55.1→5.56.4 (SSR-XSS advisories),
devalue 5.6.4→5.8.1 (DoS). Prod deps: 0 vulnerabilities.
F4 [Low] /recover no longer leaks account existence: unknown display name
returns the same 401 as a wrong PIN, and runs a dummy bcrypt verify so
timing matches — closing the enumeration + timing oracle.
F5 [Low] SSE streams re-validate the session every ~60s and close once it
is logged out / expired, instead of running until client disconnect.
F6 [Info] X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff set at the app layer on all
media responses (defense-in-depth alongside the edge).
Tests: new e2e specs for F1 (host cannot demote peer host), F2 (preview
gated + 404 after delete + direct /media blocked), F4 (uniform 401).
40 backend unit tests + 182 e2e passing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
43 lines
1.7 KiB
Caddyfile
43 lines
1.7 KiB
Caddyfile
{$DOMAIN} {
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# Compress everything EXCEPT the SSE stream — gzip buffering delays
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# "real-time" likes/comments until the ~30s keep-alive tick.
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@compressible not path /api/v1/stream
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encode @compressible zstd gzip
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# Site-wide security headers (defense-in-depth). HSTS is free since Caddy
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# already terminates TLS. nosniff also covers all of /media/*.
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header {
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Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains"
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X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff"
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X-Frame-Options "DENY"
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Referrer-Policy "strict-origin-when-cross-origin"
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}
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# SvelteKit frontend — static assets with long-lived cache (content-hashed filenames)
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@hashed_assets path_regexp hashed /_app/immutable/.*\.[a-f0-9]{8,}\.(js|css|woff2)$
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header @hashed_assets Cache-Control "public, max-age=31536000, immutable"
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# Preview/thumbnail images. These are now served by the app through a
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# visibility-checked alias (/api/v1/upload/{id}/{preview,thumbnail}) so moderation
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# can revoke access; direct /media/previews|thumbnails is 404-blocked at the app.
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# Privately cacheable for a short window (the app sets the same header; this is the
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# edge carve-out from the blanket no-store below). Kept short so a moderated image
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# stops being served to a direct-URL holder promptly.
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@media_api path /api/v1/upload/*/preview /api/v1/upload/*/thumbnail
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header @media_api Cache-Control "private, max-age=300"
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# API — never cache, EXCEPT the gated image routes above.
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@api {
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path /api/*
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not path /api/v1/upload/*/preview /api/v1/upload/*/thumbnail
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}
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header @api Cache-Control "no-store"
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# Route API and media requests to the Rust backend
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reverse_proxy /api/* app:3000
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reverse_proxy /media/* app:3000
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# Everything else goes to SvelteKit frontend
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reverse_proxy frontend:3001
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}
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