61119be817
Two independent lines of production hardening diverged at7d0334band attacked overlapping problems. Neither was a superset, so this is a merge of substance rather than a fast-forward: every conflict was resolved on the merits, and the losing side's intent was re-checked against the winner rather than assumed. MIGRATIONS. The branch's 021/022/023 collided with main's already-DEPLOYED 021_hashtag_counts_respect_bans and 022_client_upload_idempotency. Renumbered to 023/024/025 in a prior commit — main's versions are applied in production, so their version numbers are immutable and the branch's had to move. Verified by running the full sqlx::test suite, which applies the whole chain from scratch. RESOLVED IN MAIN'S FAVOUR (the branch would have regressed these): * upload-queue.ts wholesale — the branch's copy has ZERO client_upload_id references, so taking it would have silently destroyed end-to-end upload idempotency, the one thing standing between a lost response and a duplicate photo charged twice against the guest's quota. * maintenance.rs supervisor — the branch replaced it with a bare tokio::spawn, where one panic silently stops session pruning, media reclaim, the temp sweep and both HashMap prunes, permanently and with no log line. * The decode-budget probe on spawn_blocking, not inline on the async runtime. * feed/+page.svelte's 8s debounce + jitter + max-wait + hidden-tab deferral, against the branch's naive 800ms — at 100 guests the branch's version walks straight into the per-user feed rate limit. * db.rs pool tuning, /uploaders, and the docker-compose deployment story. * ONE /health, still DB-backed. The branch's split (dependency-free liveness + DB-backed readiness) is defensible, but a constant-"ok" /health is the exact defectfaea555fixed and verified live, its motive (Caddy's boot gate) is already covered by app depends_on db: service_healthy, and the two handlers were the same SELECT 1 under two names. TAKEN FROM THE BRANCH: * The large-PNG OOM guard and its bounded-retry counter (023). Together these turn a single upload that can OOM-kill a 1G container into a bounded failure instead of an infinite restart loop under `restart: unless-stopped`. * 024_feed_scalar_counts — the feed no longer aggregates the whole event per page. Pure SQL; column names, order and types are unchanged by design. * The admin-lockout fix: look the admin up BY ROLE, never by name. 025 also frees any guest already squatting on a reserved name. * PIN lockout tier ordering, bounded caption/hashtag reads, SSE ticket caps, PoolTimedOut -> 503 + Retry-After, and the ffmpeg stderr drain. * backfill_video_posters, which main lacked entirely. * TempFileGuard, plus sweep_orphan_originals wired into main's SUPERVISED loop (not the branch's bare one) — it reclaims final-named originals whose commit never happened, a class main's .tmp-only sweep structurally cannot see. * shouldAbortForStall, hand-ported into main's upload-queue.ts since that file was resolved to main. Widens the watchdog at loadend instead of disarming it, bounding a half-open socket at 2 minutes rather than handing the window to xhr.timeout (5-60 min) with the whole queue's `processing` latch held. ALSO: RUST_LOG and EXPORT_PATH pinned in compose. The code fallback was `debug` (a line per request, all night) and EXPORT_PATH was the one path with a mount-shaped default that nothing validated. Verified: cargo check --all-targets, cargo clippy (clean), 144/144 backend tests against a live Postgres including upload_idempotency and upload_concurrency, 51/51 vitest, svelte-check 0 errors, eslint clean, vite build. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
162 lines
11 KiB
Plaintext
162 lines
11 KiB
Plaintext
# ── Domain ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
# Public domain Caddy will serve and obtain a TLS certificate for.
|
|
#
|
|
# The DNS A record must already point at this server BEFORE the first `up -d`: Caddy
|
|
# requests a certificate on boot, and Let's Encrypt allows only 5 failed validations per
|
|
# hostname per hour. Never delete the caddy_data volume — it holds the certificate and
|
|
# the ACME account key.
|
|
DOMAIN=my-event.example.com
|
|
|
|
# ── Image version ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
# Tag pulled for the `app` and `frontend` services (docker-compose.yml). Production runs
|
|
# prebuilt images from the registry and never compiles — see DEPLOYMENT_RUNBOOK.md.
|
|
# Always an immutable tag, never `latest`: rollback is `EVENTSNAP_VERSION=<previous>`
|
|
# + `docker compose up -d`, which works offline if that image is still resident locally.
|
|
EVENTSNAP_VERSION=v0.13.0
|
|
|
|
# ── App server ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
APP_PORT=3000
|
|
# Set to `production` in real deployments. This activates the secret guard that
|
|
# refuses to boot with placeholder JWT_SECRET / ADMIN_PASSWORD_HASH values.
|
|
# (docker-compose.yml already sets APP_ENV=production for the app service.)
|
|
APP_ENV=production
|
|
|
|
# ── Database ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
# Set a strong password and keep it in sync between DATABASE_URL and
|
|
# POSTGRES_PASSWORD. Generate one with: openssl rand -hex 24
|
|
#
|
|
# SET THIS BEFORE THE FIRST `docker compose up -d`. Postgres reads POSTGRES_PASSWORD
|
|
# only when it initialises its data directory, on that very first boot. Change it
|
|
# afterwards and the app authenticates with the new password against a volume still
|
|
# holding the old one — a permanent restart loop ("password authentication failed").
|
|
# The only ways out are restoring the old password or `docker compose down -v`, which
|
|
# deletes the database, the media and the exports. In production the app refuses to
|
|
# boot while this is still the placeholder below, so it cannot be missed by accident.
|
|
DATABASE_URL=postgres://eventsnap:CHANGE_ME_use_a_strong_password@db:5432/eventsnap
|
|
POSTGRES_USER=eventsnap
|
|
POSTGRES_PASSWORD=CHANGE_ME_use_a_strong_password
|
|
POSTGRES_DB=eventsnap
|
|
# Connection pool size. Default 10. For a busy event (~100 guests polling the feed
|
|
# + SSE + uploads at once) raise to ~30 so requests don't queue on a pool permit.
|
|
# PAIRED WITH THE DB CONTAINER'S MEMORY LIMIT: 30 backends plus Postgres 16's default
|
|
# shared_buffers is already snug in the 1G that docker-compose.yml allots the `db`
|
|
# service. If you raise this, raise `db.deploy.resources.limits.memory` with it — an
|
|
# OOM in Postgres doesn't degrade one feature, it takes the whole event down.
|
|
DATABASE_MAX_CONNECTIONS=30
|
|
|
|
# Log level. `info` is the right production default: at `debug` the tower-http trace
|
|
# layer writes a line per request AND per response, which on a busy event is a large
|
|
# multiple of the useful output. Container logs are capped at 10m x 3 per service
|
|
# (docker-compose.yml), so a chatty level buys you a shorter history, not more of it.
|
|
# To debug a live event: RUST_LOG=eventsnap_backend=debug docker compose up -d app
|
|
RUST_LOG=info
|
|
|
|
# ── Authentication ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
# Generate with: openssl rand -hex 64
|
|
JWT_SECRET=change_me_to_a_random_64_byte_hex_string
|
|
SESSION_EXPIRY_DAYS=30
|
|
|
|
# Admin dashboard password (bcrypt hash).
|
|
# Generate with an image the stack already pulls (htpasswd needs apache2-utils, which
|
|
# a stock VPS does not have):
|
|
# docker run --rm caddy:2-alpine caddy hash-password --plaintext 'yourpassword'
|
|
# IMPORTANT: keep the SINGLE QUOTES. A bcrypt hash is full of `$` (e.g. $2b$12$…$…),
|
|
# and both Docker Compose's env_file interpolation and dotenvy's variable substitution
|
|
# would otherwise eat the `$…` segments (reading them as unset vars) and corrupt the
|
|
# hash — every admin login then 401s. Single quotes make both read it literally.
|
|
ADMIN_PASSWORD_HASH='$2y$12$placeholder_replace_me'
|
|
|
|
# ── Event ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
EVENT_NAME=Max & Maria's Wedding
|
|
EVENT_SLUG=max-maria-2026
|
|
|
|
# ── Storage ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
MEDIA_PATH=/media
|
|
# Export archives (Gallery.zip / Memories.zip). MUST be outside MEDIA_PATH —
|
|
# /media is publicly served, so exports here would be downloadable without auth.
|
|
EXPORT_PATH=/exports
|
|
|
|
# ── Runtime settings (upload limits, rate limits, capacity) ───────────────────
|
|
# NOTE: These are NOT environment variables. Upload size caps, rate limits, guest
|
|
# count and quota tolerance are stored in the database `config` table (seeded once
|
|
# at first boot) and changed at runtime from the ADMIN DASHBOARD — the backend does
|
|
# not read them from .env. Setting them here has no effect. Current seeded defaults:
|
|
# upload rate 100 / hour / guest (raised from 10 by migration 015)
|
|
# feed rate 60 / minute
|
|
# export rate 3 / day
|
|
# max image size 20 MB
|
|
# max video size 500 MB
|
|
# estimated guests 100
|
|
# quota tolerance 0.75 (see below — NOT a warning threshold)
|
|
# Adjust these in the admin UI before the event if needed.
|
|
#
|
|
# quota_tolerance is the MULTIPLIER IN THE PER-USER QUOTA FORMULA, not the point at
|
|
# which anything warns you:
|
|
#
|
|
# per_user_limit = floor(free_disk * quota_tolerance / active_uploaders)
|
|
#
|
|
# It is recomputed against LIVE free space on every upload, so it self-throttles: guests
|
|
# converge on a fixed point at tolerance/(1+tolerance) of the free space you started
|
|
# with — 43% at 0.75, i.e. ~30 GB of a fresh 70 GB.
|
|
#
|
|
# Raising it therefore AUTHORISES GUESTS TO FILL MORE OF THE DISK. Setting 0.95 in the
|
|
# belief that it means "warn me later" moves the fixed point to ~49% and eats the
|
|
# headroom the keepsake needs — and the keepsake needs a lot, because Gallery.zip and
|
|
# Memories.zip are each roughly a second copy of every original (both store media
|
|
# uncompressed). Budget for media + 2x media, or move exports to their own volume.
|
|
#
|
|
# 0.75 is the tested default. Lower it if the box is tight; raise it only if you have
|
|
# provisioned export headroom separately.
|
|
|
|
# ── Workers ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
# Number of parallel media compression workers. Default 2. Boot-time only.
|
|
#
|
|
# CORRECTION TO EARLIER GUIDANCE: this used to say "each worker can run an ffmpeg
|
|
# transcode, so raise the app memory limit to ~2G if you set 4". There is NO video
|
|
# transcode anywhere in this codebase — services/video.rs runs
|
|
# `ffmpeg -ss <t> -i <src> -vframes 1 -vf scale=...`, a single poster frame, and video
|
|
# originals are stored and served byte-for-byte. Poster extraction costs ~150-250 MB
|
|
# for a moment; it is not the constraint.
|
|
#
|
|
# The real memory consumer is the IMAGE path. `image` 0.25's resize builds an Rgba32F
|
|
# intermediate at 16 BYTES PER PIXEL, sized (source_width x target_height) — which the
|
|
# 256 MiB decode guard in imaging.rs does NOT cover. Peak per photo, decode + the 2048px
|
|
# display resize: ~145 MB at 12 MP, ~223 MB at 24 MP, ~354 MB at 48 MP.
|
|
#
|
|
# So on a 2 vCPU / 4 GB box (e.g. Hetzner CX22) KEEP THIS AT 2:
|
|
# * concurrency 2, two 48 MP photos ≈ 800 MB against the 1G app limit — ~25% margin.
|
|
# * concurrency 4, the same pair ≈ 1.5 GB — OOM.
|
|
# * and app=2G + db=1G + frontend/caddy 256M each + ~370 MB of OS/Docker exceeds the
|
|
# ~3910 MiB a "4 GB" VM actually reports. Raising the limit oversubscribes the host.
|
|
# 4 is only reasonable on the 4 vCPU / 8 GB box README.md documents.
|
|
#
|
|
# Throughput at 2 is not the bottleneck anyone thinks it is: ~2.5s per 12 MP photo, so
|
|
# 100 photos is ~250 CPU-seconds spread over an entire evening.
|
|
COMPRESSION_WORKER_CONCURRENCY=2
|
|
|
|
# ── Comments ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
# Master switch for the comment feature. Boot-time only (NOT in the admin UI), so it
|
|
# needs a `docker compose up -d` to apply. Anything other than false/0/no/off is on.
|
|
#
|
|
# When false the backend rejects NEW comments with 403 and the frontend hides the whole
|
|
# comment UI, including in the offline keepsake viewer. Likes and captions are entirely
|
|
# separate features and are unaffected. Existing comments stay in the database (hidden),
|
|
# so flipping it back restores them.
|
|
#
|
|
# Note it gates POSTING only: GET /upload/{id}/comments still serves already-existing
|
|
# comments, and the keepsake's data.json still embeds their text. Irrelevant if the flag
|
|
# is off from the first boot, since no comment can ever have been written.
|
|
# NOTE for the current deployment: `docker-compose.yml` PINS this to "false" on the app
|
|
# service, and `environment` overrides `env_file` — so changing it here has no effect in
|
|
# production. Remove that line from the compose file first if you want comments back.
|
|
COMMENTS_ENABLED=true
|
|
|
|
# ── Logging ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
# SET THIS IN PRODUCTION. Without it the app falls back to
|
|
# `eventsnap_backend=debug,tower_http=debug` (see main.rs), and with TraceLayer that is a
|
|
# debug line per HTTP request — including every preview and thumbnail fetch. Combined with
|
|
# Docker's json-file driver it writes to the same filesystem as the database and the media.
|
|
# docker-compose.yml caps each service's logs at 30 MB; this keeps the volume sane in the
|
|
# first place. The e2e stack has always used exactly this value.
|
|
RUST_LOG=eventsnap_backend=info,tower_http=warn
|