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Two independent lines of production hardening diverged at7d0334band attacked overlapping problems. Neither was a superset, so this is a merge of substance rather than a fast-forward: every conflict was resolved on the merits, and the losing side's intent was re-checked against the winner rather than assumed. MIGRATIONS. The branch's 021/022/023 collided with main's already-DEPLOYED 021_hashtag_counts_respect_bans and 022_client_upload_idempotency. Renumbered to 023/024/025 in a prior commit — main's versions are applied in production, so their version numbers are immutable and the branch's had to move. Verified by running the full sqlx::test suite, which applies the whole chain from scratch. RESOLVED IN MAIN'S FAVOUR (the branch would have regressed these): * upload-queue.ts wholesale — the branch's copy has ZERO client_upload_id references, so taking it would have silently destroyed end-to-end upload idempotency, the one thing standing between a lost response and a duplicate photo charged twice against the guest's quota. * maintenance.rs supervisor — the branch replaced it with a bare tokio::spawn, where one panic silently stops session pruning, media reclaim, the temp sweep and both HashMap prunes, permanently and with no log line. * The decode-budget probe on spawn_blocking, not inline on the async runtime. * feed/+page.svelte's 8s debounce + jitter + max-wait + hidden-tab deferral, against the branch's naive 800ms — at 100 guests the branch's version walks straight into the per-user feed rate limit. * db.rs pool tuning, /uploaders, and the docker-compose deployment story. * ONE /health, still DB-backed. The branch's split (dependency-free liveness + DB-backed readiness) is defensible, but a constant-"ok" /health is the exact defectfaea555fixed and verified live, its motive (Caddy's boot gate) is already covered by app depends_on db: service_healthy, and the two handlers were the same SELECT 1 under two names. TAKEN FROM THE BRANCH: * The large-PNG OOM guard and its bounded-retry counter (023). Together these turn a single upload that can OOM-kill a 1G container into a bounded failure instead of an infinite restart loop under `restart: unless-stopped`. * 024_feed_scalar_counts — the feed no longer aggregates the whole event per page. Pure SQL; column names, order and types are unchanged by design. * The admin-lockout fix: look the admin up BY ROLE, never by name. 025 also frees any guest already squatting on a reserved name. * PIN lockout tier ordering, bounded caption/hashtag reads, SSE ticket caps, PoolTimedOut -> 503 + Retry-After, and the ffmpeg stderr drain. * backfill_video_posters, which main lacked entirely. * TempFileGuard, plus sweep_orphan_originals wired into main's SUPERVISED loop (not the branch's bare one) — it reclaims final-named originals whose commit never happened, a class main's .tmp-only sweep structurally cannot see. * shouldAbortForStall, hand-ported into main's upload-queue.ts since that file was resolved to main. Widens the watchdog at loadend instead of disarming it, bounding a half-open socket at 2 minutes rather than handing the window to xhr.timeout (5-60 min) with the whole queue's `processing` latch held. ALSO: RUST_LOG and EXPORT_PATH pinned in compose. The code fallback was `debug` (a line per request, all night) and EXPORT_PATH was the one path with a mount-shaped default that nothing validated. Verified: cargo check --all-targets, cargo clippy (clean), 144/144 backend tests against a live Postgres including upload_idempotency and upload_concurrency, 51/51 vitest, svelte-check 0 errors, eslint clean, vite build. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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8.4 KiB