Adds an end-to-end Playwright test suite under e2e/ that spins up an
isolated docker-compose stack (Postgres :55432, Caddy :3101, backend with
EVENTSNAP_TEST_MODE=1, SvelteKit adapter-node frontend) and exercises the
SvelteKit app against the real Rust backend.
Phase 1 — happy paths covering every documented USER_JOURNEYS.md flow:
01-auth/ join, recover, admin login, leave event, PIN lockout
02-upload/ gallery picker (API path), rate-limit + admin toggle
03-feed/ like/comment SSE, filters, SSE reconnect on visibility
04-host/ event lock API, ban/unban, promote
05-admin/ config validation, foundational authz guards, stats
06-export/ /export status + download stub
__smoke/ cross-UA happy-path (runs on every UA project)
Phase 2 — adversarial + browser chaos:
07-adversarial/ XSS payloads (6 × display name path), SQLi shapes,
length / encoding / RTL override / NUL byte;
file-upload boundaries (ELF body claimed as JPEG,
oversize vs max_image_size_mb, zero-byte, NUL
filename, path-traversal, SVG-with-script);
JWT alg:none, signature/payload tamper, expired
session, PIN brute-force (serial + parallel),
admin password brute-force; deep authz (cross-user
delete, banned user across like/comment/feed-read,
host→admin escalation); small-scale DDoS (20× /join,
10MB comment body, 10 concurrent SSE).
08-browser-chaos/ localStorage / sessionStorage / cookie purge,
IndexedDB drop mid-session, offline → reconnect,
slow-3G, 503 flakes, 429 with no retry storm,
multi-tab same/different user, no-JS, hostile CSS,
clock skew ±1h / -2d, localStorage quota exhausted.
Phase 3 — mobile gestures (runs only on chromium-mobile / Pixel 7):
09-mobile/ touch-target ≥44px audit, env(safe-area-inset-bottom)
structural check, long-press (FeedListCard → ContextSheet,
quick-tap negation, click-suppression), double-tap
(feed card like + lightbox heart-burst, via synthetic
pointer events to bypass the first-tap-fires-click trap),
viewport reflow (portrait/landscape/narrow/phablet),
plus fixme stubs documenting planned gestures (swipe
lightbox L/R, swipe-down dismiss, pull-to-refresh,
long-press-comment).
Cross-UA matrix (chromium-engine projects run @smoke only):
chromium-pixel7, chromium-galaxy-s22, samsung-internet (Samsung UA
emulation on Galaxy viewport), edge-android, plus webkit-iphone,
chrome-ios, firefox-android, firefox-desktop — the latter four need
libavif16 on the host (Playwright dep) but the configs are in place.
Infrastructure:
- fixtures/test.ts central test.extend (api, db, adminToken, guest,
host, signIn). Per-test DB truncate via the dev-only POST
/admin/__truncate route, gated by EVENTSNAP_TEST_MODE=1.
- helpers/sse-listener.ts, helpers/upload-client.ts (Node-side
multipart for adversarial file-upload tests + JPEG/PNG/ELF magic
constants), helpers/touch.ts (longPress / doubleTap / swipe /
inlineStyle / computedStyle).
- 10 page objects covering every route + UploadSheet/Lightbox.
- global-setup waits for /health, logs in admin, disables every
rate-limit and quota toggle.
- .github/workflows/e2e.yml: PR check runs chromium-desktop + the
smoke matrix in parallel, uploads playwright-report/ and traces on
failure.
Findings the suite surfaces as live `[finding]` warnings (not silenced):
1. /admin/login has no rate-limit or lockout (bcrypt cost only).
2. PIN-attempt counter races under parallel /recover requests.
3. Zero-byte uploads pass /api/v1/upload.
4. SVG-with-script can pass the magic-byte check (consider CSP +
X-Content-Type-Options on /media/*).
Stack-internal docs live in e2e/README.md (UA tier table, Samsung
Internet escalation tiers A/B/C, debugging tips, roadmap).
Final tally: 134 passed / 0 failed / 9 skipped (test.fixme stubs for
not-yet-shipped gestures and one UI-upload-flow investigation).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
49 lines
2.1 KiB
TypeScript
49 lines
2.1 KiB
TypeScript
/**
|
|
* Node-side multipart upload helper. Lets adversarial specs post arbitrary
|
|
* bytes with arbitrary `Content-Type` claims to /api/v1/upload without
|
|
* driving the UI. Crucial for MIME-spoofing, oversize, polyglot, and
|
|
* filename-injection tests.
|
|
*
|
|
* Field shape matches [backend/src/handlers/upload.rs]:
|
|
* - file (binary; carries filename + content_type in the part headers)
|
|
* - caption (text, optional)
|
|
* - hashtags (CSV text, optional)
|
|
*/
|
|
// Node 22+ ships FormData and Blob as globals — no import needed.
|
|
|
|
const BASE = process.env.E2E_FRONTEND_URL ?? 'http://localhost:3101';
|
|
|
|
export type UploadOptions = {
|
|
filename?: string;
|
|
contentType?: string;
|
|
caption?: string;
|
|
hashtags?: string;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
export async function uploadRaw(token: string, body: Uint8Array | Buffer, opts: UploadOptions = {}) {
|
|
const form = new FormData();
|
|
const blob = new Blob([body as any], { type: opts.contentType ?? 'application/octet-stream' });
|
|
form.append('file', blob as any, opts.filename ?? 'upload.bin');
|
|
if (opts.caption !== undefined) form.append('caption', opts.caption);
|
|
if (opts.hashtags !== undefined) form.append('hashtags', opts.hashtags);
|
|
return fetch(`${BASE}/api/v1/upload`, {
|
|
method: 'POST',
|
|
headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${token}` },
|
|
body: form as any,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Convenience: read a fixture from disk and upload it. */
|
|
export async function uploadFile(token: string, path: string, opts: UploadOptions = {}) {
|
|
const { readFile } = await import('node:fs/promises');
|
|
const body = await readFile(path);
|
|
return uploadRaw(token, body, opts);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Tiny valid JPEG header — magic bytes only, useful for "claim image but is N MB of zeros" tests. */
|
|
export const JPEG_MAGIC = new Uint8Array([0xff, 0xd8, 0xff, 0xe0, 0x00, 0x10, 0x4a, 0x46, 0x49, 0x46]);
|
|
/** Tiny valid PNG magic bytes. */
|
|
export const PNG_MAGIC = new Uint8Array([0x89, 0x50, 0x4e, 0x47, 0x0d, 0x0a, 0x1a, 0x0a]);
|
|
/** ELF header — the magic bytes of a Linux executable. `infer` reports `application/x-executable`. */
|
|
export const ELF_MAGIC = new Uint8Array([0x7f, 0x45, 0x4c, 0x46]);
|