498b4e256b
C1: reset_user_pin wrote to a non-existent column (pin_failed_attempts);
the real column is failed_pin_attempts, so every PIN reset 500'd. Fixed
the column name; new e2e (pin-reset.spec.ts) proves a reset returns a
usable PIN and the target can recover with it.
C2: config.rs::validate_secrets now rejects placeholder-ish secrets
(change_me/dev_secret/placeholder), enforces len>=32 in prod, and
requires a real ADMIN_PASSWORD_HASH. docker-compose.yml sets
APP_ENV=production so the guard actually runs. Corrected the false
"fixed" claim in SECURITY-BACKLOG.md. .env.example documents the rule.
Riders in these files (documented here since git can't split hunks):
- host.rs also carries the event-scoped ban_user fix and the
close_event/open_event no-op broadcast guard (medium).
- docker-compose.yml also adds ORIGIN (H6), app/frontend healthchecks with
Caddy waiting on health, and per-service memory limits (medium).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
100 lines
2.3 KiB
YAML
100 lines
2.3 KiB
YAML
services:
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db:
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image: postgres:16-alpine
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restart: unless-stopped
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env_file: .env
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environment:
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POSTGRES_USER: ${POSTGRES_USER}
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POSTGRES_PASSWORD: ${POSTGRES_PASSWORD}
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POSTGRES_DB: ${POSTGRES_DB}
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volumes:
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- postgres_data:/var/lib/postgresql/data
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healthcheck:
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test: ["CMD-SHELL", "pg_isready -U ${POSTGRES_USER} -d ${POSTGRES_DB}"]
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interval: 5s
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timeout: 5s
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retries: 10
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deploy:
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resources:
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limits:
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memory: 512M
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app:
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build:
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context: ./backend
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dockerfile: Dockerfile
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restart: unless-stopped
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env_file: .env
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environment:
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# Activates the production secret guard in config.rs — refuses to boot with
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# placeholder JWT_SECRET / ADMIN_PASSWORD_HASH.
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APP_ENV: production
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depends_on:
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db:
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condition: service_healthy
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volumes:
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- media_data:/media
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expose:
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- "3000"
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healthcheck:
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test: ["CMD-SHELL", "wget -q -O- http://localhost:3000/health || exit 1"]
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interval: 10s
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timeout: 5s
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retries: 5
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start_period: 20s
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deploy:
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resources:
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limits:
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# Bounds a runaway ffmpeg transcode (large uploads, 2 workers) so it can't
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# OOM the single box and take down Postgres.
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memory: 1G
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frontend:
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build:
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context: ./frontend
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dockerfile: Dockerfile
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restart: unless-stopped
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env_file: .env
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environment:
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# adapter-node behind Caddy TLS needs the public origin for CSRF checks on
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# POST form actions — without it they fail only in production.
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ORIGIN: "https://${DOMAIN}"
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depends_on:
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- app
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expose:
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- "3001"
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healthcheck:
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test: ["CMD-SHELL", "wget -q -O- http://localhost:3001/ >/dev/null 2>&1 || exit 1"]
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interval: 10s
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timeout: 5s
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retries: 5
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start_period: 15s
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deploy:
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resources:
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limits:
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memory: 256M
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caddy:
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image: caddy:2-alpine
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restart: unless-stopped
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ports:
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- "80:80"
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- "443:443"
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volumes:
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- ./Caddyfile:/etc/caddy/Caddyfile:ro
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- caddy_data:/data
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depends_on:
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app:
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condition: service_healthy
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frontend:
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condition: service_healthy
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deploy:
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resources:
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limits:
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memory: 256M
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volumes:
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postgres_data:
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media_data:
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caddy_data:
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