EventSnap/docs/SECURITY-BACKLOG.md

Security & Hardening Backlog

Tracks the deliberately-deferred items from the 2026-06-27 security audit and its review passes.

Provenance & reconciliation. This document was extracted from the fix/audit-2026-06-27-critical-medium branch and reconciled against main on 2026-06-30. That audit's Critical→Medium findings were largely re-implemented into main through the later batch branches (security-review-followups, security-review-batch-2, the UX batches) rather than by merging the audit branch — so git shows no merge, but the controls are present. Each item below is tagged with its current status in main:

• ✅ Done in main — addressed (possibly via a different implementation).
• ⬜ Open — still applies to main.
• 🔀 Contingent — only relevant if main adopts the audit's signed-media gateway (see DECISION-media-auth.md).

The audit branch additionally implemented an authenticated, signed media gateway that main did not adopt — main serves media unauthenticated (static ServeDir + UUID-capability /api/v1/upload/{id}/original). That architectural choice is written up separately in DECISION-media-auth.md; the "by-design notes" at the bottom of this file describe the audit branch's model and apply to main only if that gateway is adopted.

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🅱 Worth a tracked ticket (real, not one-liners)

• ⬜ Moderation UI gap — the backend DELETE /host/upload/{id} and DELETE /host/comment/{id} endpoints have no frontend caller, so a host cannot remove a guest's content from the UI (the feed ContextSheet only offers delete for the viewer's own uploads — target.user_id === myUserId). Still a functional hole in main. Needs a host-facing "remove" action wired to those endpoints, gated on host/admin role.

• ✅/⬜ Feed reactivity — Mostly fixed in main. The full-reload-on-every-SSE-event problem (a single like-update/new-comment/upload-processed calling loadFeed(true) and collapsing a scrolled feed) was fixed in the UX batch: main now patches the affected card in place (patchCount) and debounces processing (scheduleInPlaceRefresh). ⬜ Remaining sub-item: owner-deleted uploads are still not broadcast — delete_upload returns 204 with no upload-deleted SSE, so other clients keep showing a deleted post until refresh (only host deletes broadcast). Emit upload-deleted from the owner delete path too.

• 🔀 Media HMAC domain separation — Only applies if the signed-media gateway is adopted. The audit's signed-media tokens reuse jwt_secret as the HMAC key; a dedicated derived key (HKDF(jwt_secret, "media-url")) would isolate the domains so a future change to one can't weaken the other. N/A to main as it stands (no signed media).

• ⬜ Quota mount-detection + low-disk guard — Still applies to main. compute_storage_quota (backend/src/handlers/upload.rs) and admin.rs pick the disk via starts_with, so root (/) is a wildcard prefix that can match the wrong device; and there's no hard min-free-space precheck when the quota is disabled. Use longest-prefix match; add an unconditional 507/429 when free space is critically low.

✅ Fixed in main since the audit (for the record)

These audit findings are present in main today (verified 2026-06-30): server-side MIME/ext allowlist on upload, recovery-PIN lockout backoff, DB port no longer publicly exposed, bcrypt offloaded via spawn_blocking, bounded compression concurrency (semaphore), bounded feed queries (LIMIT ≤ 100), and the viewport-fit / reduced-motion / aria a11y pass. An image-decode decompression-bomb cap (image::Limits 12000×12000 / 256 MiB) lives in backend/src/services/compression.rs.

Fixed in the 2026-07 review pass (previously claimed fixed here but were not — corrected):

• Effective JWT production-secret guard — APP_ENV=production is now set for the app service, and config.rs::validate_secrets rejects any placeholder-ish JWT_SECRET/ADMIN_PASSWORD_HASH (not just the exact dev sentinel) and enforces len ≥ 32 unconditionally in prod.
• Unspoofable client IP in the rate limiter — client_ip now takes the right-most X-Forwarded-For entry (the hop Caddy appends), so a client-supplied left-most value is ignored.
• Live role/ban re-check — the auth extractor re-reads the user row and trusts the DB role and is_banned flag rather than the JWT claim, revoking demoted/banned sessions immediately.
• Container healthchecks — app and frontend now have healthchecks and Caddy waits on service_healthy.
• Event-scoped ban_user — the ban UPDATE is now scoped by event_id like its siblings.

🅲 Consciously won't-fix at ~100-guest single-box scale

Diminishing returns vs. the deployment's actual threat model. Revisit only if the scale or tenancy model changes.

• Rate-limiter HashMap key LRU/cap (attacker-chosen recover:{ip}:{name} keys accumulate up to the 24h prune ceiling) — bounded and pruned; not worth an LRU.
• "Last host" / host↔host role-churn guard — operational, low blast radius.
• Performance micro-indexes (idx_like_user_upload, comment pagination index) — current queries are sub-ms at this row count.
• Optimistic-like in-flight guard, ownership-snapshot-at-mount, assorted copy tweaks — UX polish.

By-design notes (audit branch's signed-media model — see DECISION-media-auth.md)

These describe the audit branch's signed-gateway model. main does not serve media this way; for main's actual media-access posture and the tradeoff, see DECISION-media-auth.md.

• Banned user retains ≤24h media access via already-held signed URLs. The audit's media gateway authorizes by signature + uploader visibility, not requester identity, and signed URLs are time-boxed (24h, bucketed). A banned/revoked-session user cannot mint new URLs (every API call 401/403s) but can replay URLs they already hold until expiry — only for content they already saw. Accepted there: tightening would require per-request identity on every <img> load, which the <img>-can't-send-a-Bearer constraint precludes.
• Two DB queries per cold media fetch (upload row + uploader row). Mitigated by browser caching and the stable bucketed URL. Could be one JOIN if it ever shows up in profiling.