Seventh round, both defects in the keepsake — the one artifact that leaves the
system entirely, and so the one where a green server-side signal carries no
information at all.
Squashed from 2 commits, original messages preserved below.
──────── fix(export): stop a caption bricking the viewer, and ship readable archives
Two defects in the keepsake, both silent server-side and both only visible by
extracting the real artifact and trying to use it.
1. A CAPTION COULD BRICK THE VIEWER.
The viewer's data is inlined as `<script>window.__EXPORT_DATA__={…}</script>` -- it has
to be, since guests open index.html over file:// where fetching a sibling data.json is
blocked. The escape was `</` -> `<\/`. Against XSS that holds; I fired
`</script><img src=x onerror=…>` through a real Chromium parser and it round-trips
inert.
It does not stop the caption steering the HTML TOKENIZER. `<!--<script` with no later
`-->` drives the parser into script-data-double-escaped state, where the template's own
`</script>` only steps back to script-data-escaped instead of closing the element.
Everything after it -- including the viewer bundle -- is swallowed as script data.
Nothing executes and nothing leaks: `__EXPORT_DATA__` is simply never assigned and the
keepsake opens blank. A denial of the deliverable, not an XSS.
Reproduced in Chromium before changing anything, and the near-miss is worth recording:
`<!--<script>alert(1)</script>-->` comes back CLEAN, because the trailing `-->` returns
the parser to script-data state. A probe using the terminated form quietly repairs the
thing it is testing for.
Fix: escape every `<` as `<`, not just `</`. `<` never appears in JSON structural
syntax -- only inside string values -- so a global replace is sound, and one rule covers
`</script`, `<!--` and `<script` together. That is the point: the old escape was named
for the single case it handled. Only the INLINED copy is escaped; data.json is written
separately, in no HTML context, and stays literal.
2. EVERY ENTRY IN BOTH ARCHIVES WAS STORED MODE 0000.
`ZipEntryBuilder::new` leaves the external file attribute at zero and async_zip's host
compatibility defaults to Unix, so `unzip -Z` showed `?---------` on every line of both
Gallery.zip and Memories.zip. Windows Explorer ignores Unix modes, which is why this
survived; on Linux and macOS `unzip` faithfully applies what the archive asks for and
the guest gets a folder of photos none of which they can open.
Unconditional -- every keepsake ever produced, no hostile input required -- and
invisible server-side: the export succeeds, the ZIP is well-formed, the job writes
`done`, /export/status is green.
Found by accident. The browser test for defect 1 failed with ERR_ACCESS_DENIED on
file://, which looked exactly like a Playwright sandbox quirk; I twice "worked around"
it (fresh context, then a separately launched browser) before checking the extracted
files and finding mode 000. The workaround was suppressing a real bug. Both workarounds
are gone -- the ordinary `page` fixture loads the archive fine now.
Fix: all six ZipEntryBuilder sites route through one `keepsake_entry` helper stamping
`S_IFREG | 0644`, so the mode cannot be forgotten at a call site.
Tests: 3 unit (no `<` survives; the payload still decodes to the original value, because
this is a transport encoding and not a sanitiser; a clean payload is untouched) and 2
e2e that release for real, download the real archives, and check them from outside the
app -- one opening index.html over file:// in Chromium and asserting the viewer booted,
the captions came back verbatim and nothing executed; one asserting every stored mode
and every extracted file is readable. Both assertions verified to FAIL against the
pre-fix artifacts.
──────── fix(admin): reject quota_tolerance = 0 instead of silently blocking every upload
Zero is inside the documented 0–1 range and catastrophic. The per-user limit is
`free_disk * tolerance / active_uploaders`, so a tolerance of 0 makes every limit 0 and
refuses EVERY upload -- mid-event, with "Du hast dein Upload-Limit für dieses Event
erreicht", an error naming the wrong cause entirely. An admin reaching for an off-switch
wants `storage_quota_enabled`; the rejection now says so.
Rejecting the value rather than raising the floor. A floor of 0.01 was the obvious fix
and it is wrong: very small tolerances are legitimate -- they are how a large disk is
throttled down to a sensible per-guest ceiling, and how the quota specs steer it
(tolerance = target * active / free lands around 1e-5 on the 174 GB volume this suite
runs on). A floor would forbid real configurations, and would have broken the entire
storage-quota describe block, to prevent one typo. Verified: those four tests still pass.
Tests: the rejection, that the stored value is untouched (validation fully precedes any
write), and the mirror -- 0.00001 still round-trips -- so the guard can't quietly become
a floor later.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
126 lines
5.9 KiB
TypeScript
126 lines
5.9 KiB
TypeScript
/**
|
|
* Regression guard — a guest-authored caption cannot brick the offline keepsake.
|
|
*
|
|
* The viewer's data is inlined as `<script>window.__EXPORT_DATA__={…};</script>` (it must be:
|
|
* guests open index.html over file://, where a cross-origin fetch of a sibling data.json is
|
|
* blocked). Captions and comments are guest text and land in that payload.
|
|
*
|
|
* The escape used to be `</` → `<\/`. Against XSS that holds — `</script><img src=x onerror=…>`
|
|
* round-trips inert. It does NOT stop the caption steering the HTML TOKENIZER: `<!--<script` with
|
|
* no later `-->` drives the parser into script-data-double-escaped state, where the template's own
|
|
* `</script>` steps back to script-data-escaped instead of closing the element. Everything after —
|
|
* including the viewer bundle — is swallowed as script data. Nothing executes and nothing leaks;
|
|
* `__EXPORT_DATA__` is never assigned and the keepsake renders blank.
|
|
*
|
|
* What makes it worth a browser-level test rather than a unit test alone: the failure is SILENT and
|
|
* POST-DISTRIBUTION. The export succeeds, the ZIP is well-formed, the job writes `done`,
|
|
* /export/status is green, and the host hands out a file that only fails when a guest
|
|
* double-clicks it — in every copy, unfixably. It is not visible by reading the escape. It is only
|
|
* visible by running a real parser over the real artifact, which is what this does: release, pull
|
|
* the actual Memories.zip, extract index.html, open it over file:// in Chromium, and assert the
|
|
* viewer actually booted.
|
|
*
|
|
* The near-miss worth recording: `<!--<script>alert(1)</script>-->` comes back CLEAN, because the
|
|
* trailing `-->` returns the parser to script-data state. A probe using the terminated form
|
|
* quietly repairs the very thing it is testing for. Only the unterminated variant exposes it.
|
|
*/
|
|
import { test, expect } from '../../fixtures/test';
|
|
import { execFileSync } from 'node:child_process';
|
|
import { mkdtempSync, writeFileSync, rmSync } from 'node:fs';
|
|
import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
|
|
import { join } from 'node:path';
|
|
import { seedUpload } from '../../helpers/seed';
|
|
import { BASE } from '../../helpers/env';
|
|
|
|
/** Unterminated on purpose — see the header. The terminated form self-repairs. */
|
|
const TOKENIZER_PAYLOAD = '<!--<script';
|
|
/** The classic break-out. Already handled, kept so the fix can never regress on it. */
|
|
const BREAKOUT_PAYLOAD = '</script><img src=x onerror=window.__XSS__=1>';
|
|
|
|
test.describe('Export — a caption cannot brick the keepsake viewer', () => {
|
|
test('the exported viewer boots with a tokenizer-hostile caption in it', async ({
|
|
page,
|
|
host,
|
|
guest,
|
|
db,
|
|
}) => {
|
|
test.setTimeout(120_000);
|
|
const bearer = { Authorization: `Bearer ${host.jwt}` };
|
|
|
|
const g = await guest('Trickster');
|
|
const a = await seedUpload(g.jwt, { caption: TOKENIZER_PAYLOAD });
|
|
const b = await seedUpload(g.jwt, { caption: BREAKOUT_PAYLOAD });
|
|
for (const id of [a, b]) {
|
|
await expect.poll(() => db.compressionStatus(id), { timeout: 30_000 }).toBe('done');
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
expect(
|
|
(await fetch(`${BASE}/api/v1/host/gallery/release`, { method: 'POST', headers: bearer }))
|
|
.status
|
|
).toBe(204);
|
|
|
|
await expect
|
|
.poll(
|
|
async () => {
|
|
const res = await fetch(`${BASE}/api/v1/export/status`, { headers: bearer });
|
|
return (await res.json()).html?.status;
|
|
},
|
|
{ timeout: 90_000, intervals: [500] }
|
|
)
|
|
.toBe('done');
|
|
|
|
const ticketRes = await fetch(`${BASE}/api/v1/export/ticket`, {
|
|
method: 'POST',
|
|
headers: bearer,
|
|
});
|
|
const { ticket } = (await ticketRes.json()) as { ticket: string };
|
|
const dl = await fetch(`${BASE}/api/v1/export/html?ticket=${encodeURIComponent(ticket)}`);
|
|
expect(dl.status).toBe(200);
|
|
|
|
const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'eventsnap-viewer-'));
|
|
try {
|
|
const zipPath = join(dir, 'Memories.zip');
|
|
writeFileSync(zipPath, Buffer.from(await dl.arrayBuffer()));
|
|
// Extract the WHOLE archive: index.html pulls in the viewer's own JS/CSS, and the point of
|
|
// this test is that those later resources are still reachable by the parser.
|
|
execFileSync('unzip', ['-qo', zipPath, '-d', dir]);
|
|
|
|
// file://, not http://. That is how a guest actually opens the keepsake, and it is the
|
|
// whole reason the data is inlined rather than fetched from a sibling data.json.
|
|
let xss = false;
|
|
page.on('dialog', (d) => {
|
|
xss = true;
|
|
void d.dismiss();
|
|
});
|
|
await page.goto('file://' + join(dir, 'index.html'));
|
|
|
|
// 1. The payload was assigned at all. This is the assertion that fails on the old escape —
|
|
// the second script block is never reached, so the global stays undefined.
|
|
const captions = await page.evaluate(() => {
|
|
const d = (window as unknown as { __EXPORT_DATA__?: { posts?: { caption?: string }[] } })
|
|
.__EXPORT_DATA__;
|
|
return d?.posts?.map((p) => p.caption ?? '') ?? null;
|
|
});
|
|
expect(captions, '__EXPORT_DATA__ was never assigned — the viewer is bricked').not.toBeNull();
|
|
|
|
// 2. The captions survived verbatim. The escape is a transport encoding, not a sanitiser:
|
|
// a guest's text has to come back exactly, or we have silently rewritten their words.
|
|
expect(captions).toContain(TOKENIZER_PAYLOAD);
|
|
expect(captions).toContain(BREAKOUT_PAYLOAD);
|
|
|
|
// 3. And nothing executed.
|
|
expect(
|
|
await page.evaluate(() => (window as unknown as { __XSS__?: number }).__XSS__ === 1),
|
|
'the caption must be inert, not merely non-fatal'
|
|
).toBe(false);
|
|
expect(xss).toBe(false);
|
|
|
|
// 4. The viewer actually rendered — the whole document parsed, not just the head. If the
|
|
// tokenizer had swallowed the bundle, the body would be empty of viewer output.
|
|
await expect(page.locator('body')).not.toBeEmpty();
|
|
} finally {
|
|
rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
});
|