* Caddy had no read_body, on the reasoning that "a slow body still has to actually send bytes". That is an argument about disk, and disk is not the scarce resource: upload_admission budgets concurrent bodies at 4096 MiB and reserves the DECLARED cap, so a video/* upload reserves 500 MiB. Eight connections that stall mid-body hold the whole budget, every other guest waits 20s and gets a 503, and it never recovers on its own — the permit is held until the handler returns. No attacker needed: eight guests starting real videos and walking out of AP range does it, and TCP will not reap those sockets for hours. 30m carries a 500 MB upload at ~2.2 Mbit/s, so it does not fail the uploads this product exists to collect. * APP_PORT is presented in .env.example as an ordinary editable line, while the healthcheck hardcodes 127.0.0.1:3000 and the Caddyfile hardcodes app:3000. Change it and the app boots and serves happily on the new port, the healthcheck fails forever, app never turns healthy — and because caddy is gated on service_healthy, CADDY NEVER STARTS. Port 443 dead for the whole event, sole diagnostic "dependency failed to start". Pinned in compose beside MEDIA_PATH and EXPORT_PATH, which are there for this reason. * Runbook §12's recovery commands do not run as written: unwrapped "$POSTGRES_USER" is expanded by the operator's shell, which does not have it, so psql answers `FATAL: role "" does not exist`. §9 documents that trap two hundred lines earlier and wraps its own calls in sh -c; §12 did not. This is the block you run with the app crash-looping behind a live Caddy. Its DELETE also hard-coded versions 21,22,23 as if to be copied verbatim, on a tree that now has 31 migrations — now explicitly an example, with the instruction to take the numbers from the actual boot error. * Migration counts corrected across the runbook and .env.example (22 -> 31, commit count 154 -> 196). All four were presented as literal command output the operator is invited to reproduce.
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194 lines
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# ── Domain ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# Public domain Caddy will serve and obtain a TLS certificate for.
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#
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# The DNS A record must already point at this server BEFORE the first `up -d`: Caddy
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# requests a certificate on boot, and Let's Encrypt allows only 5 failed validations per
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# hostname per hour. Never delete the caddy_data volume — it holds the certificate and
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# the ACME account key.
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DOMAIN=my-event.example.com
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# ── Image version ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# Tag pulled for the `app` and `frontend` services (docker-compose.yml). Production runs
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# prebuilt images from the registry and never compiles — see DEPLOYMENT_RUNBOOK.md.
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# Always an immutable tag, never `latest`: rollback is `EVENTSNAP_VERSION=<previous>`
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# + `docker compose up -d`, which works offline if that image is still resident locally.
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#
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# ⚠ THIS TAG DOES NOT EXIST YET. The newest git tag is v0.12.0; v0.13.0 is the release you
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# cut for the event. Build and push it (plus its identical rollback twin v0.13.0-a) BEFORE
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# the first `docker compose up -d` — see DEPLOYMENT_RUNBOOK.md §6 (build) and §9 (rollback).
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# Copying this file and starting the stack without that step fails with `manifest unknown`.
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#
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# Do NOT "fix" this by dropping back to v0.12.0: no image was ever built for it, and a
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# 6-migration tree booting against a 31-migration database returns VersionMissing and
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# crash-loops forever behind a live Caddy. §9 covers this in full.
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EVENTSNAP_VERSION=v0.13.0
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# ── App server ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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APP_PORT=3000
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# Set to `production` in real deployments. This activates the secret guard that
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# refuses to boot with placeholder JWT_SECRET / ADMIN_PASSWORD_HASH values.
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# (docker-compose.yml already sets APP_ENV=production for the app service.)
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APP_ENV=production
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# ── Database ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# Set a strong password and keep it in sync between DATABASE_URL and
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# POSTGRES_PASSWORD. Generate one with: openssl rand -hex 24
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#
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# SET THIS BEFORE THE FIRST `docker compose up -d`. Postgres reads POSTGRES_PASSWORD
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# only when it initialises its data directory, on that very first boot. Change it
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# afterwards and the app authenticates with the new password against a volume still
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# holding the old one — a permanent restart loop ("password authentication failed").
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# The only ways out are restoring the old password or `docker compose down -v`, which
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# deletes the database, the media and the exports. In production the app refuses to
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# boot while this is still the placeholder below, so it cannot be missed by accident.
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DATABASE_URL=postgres://eventsnap:CHANGE_ME_use_a_strong_password@db:5432/eventsnap
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POSTGRES_USER=eventsnap
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POSTGRES_PASSWORD=CHANGE_ME_use_a_strong_password
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POSTGRES_DB=eventsnap
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# Connection pool size. The code default is 10 (backend/src/db.rs) — set it explicitly,
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# because a `.env` written by hand from this file's secrets is otherwise silently on 10.
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#
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# SIZE IT TO THE CORES, NOT TO THE GUESTS. The earlier advice here was ~30, reasoned from
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# "~100 guests polling the feed at once" back when a feed page cost ~449 ms and connections
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# were spent waiting. Migration 024 replaced the feed view's GROUP BY with scalar subqueries
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# and a page now costs well under a millisecond, so concurrency is no longer where the time
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# goes. On a 2 vCPU box 30 simultaneous queries cannot run — they queue on the CPU instead of
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# on the pool, which is the same wait wearing a different hat, and 30 Postgres backends plus
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# shared_buffers is snug in the 1G that docker-compose.yml allots `db`.
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#
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# 15 on 2 vCPU / 4 GB. Raise toward 30 only alongside more cores AND a bigger `db` memory
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# limit — an OOM in Postgres doesn't degrade one feature, it takes the whole event down.
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DATABASE_MAX_CONNECTIONS=15
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# Log level: see the "Logging" section near the bottom of this file.
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#
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# Defined THERE and nowhere else, deliberately. This file used to assign RUST_LOG twice —
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# once here and once there — and Compose takes the LAST assignment, so editing this line to
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# `debug` to chase a problem during the event changed nothing at all, silently. A key that
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# appears twice in a .env is a trap regardless of which value is better.
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# ── Authentication ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# Generate with: openssl rand -hex 64
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JWT_SECRET=change_me_to_a_random_64_byte_hex_string
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SESSION_EXPIRY_DAYS=30
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# Admin dashboard password (bcrypt hash).
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# Generate with an image the stack already pulls (htpasswd needs apache2-utils, which
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# a stock VPS does not have):
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# docker run --rm caddy:2-alpine caddy hash-password --plaintext 'yourpassword'
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# IMPORTANT: keep the SINGLE QUOTES. A bcrypt hash is full of `$` (e.g. $2b$12$…$…),
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# and both Docker Compose's env_file interpolation and dotenvy's variable substitution
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# would otherwise eat the `$…` segments (reading them as unset vars) and corrupt the
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# hash — every admin login then 401s. Single quotes make both read it literally.
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ADMIN_PASSWORD_HASH='$2y$12$placeholder_replace_me'
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# ── Event ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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EVENT_NAME=Max & Maria's Wedding
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EVENT_SLUG=max-maria-2026
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# ── Storage ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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MEDIA_PATH=/media
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# Export archives (Gallery.zip / Memories.zip). MUST be outside MEDIA_PATH —
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# /media is publicly served, so exports here would be downloadable without auth.
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EXPORT_PATH=/exports
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# ── Runtime settings (upload limits, rate limits, capacity) ───────────────────
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# NOTE: These are NOT environment variables. Upload size caps, rate limits, guest
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# count and quota tolerance are stored in the database `config` table (seeded once
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# at first boot) and changed at runtime from the ADMIN DASHBOARD — the backend does
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# not read them from .env. Setting them here has no effect. Current seeded defaults:
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# upload rate 100 / hour / guest (raised from 10 by migration 015)
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# feed rate 60 / minute
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# export rate 3 / day
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# max image size 20 MB
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# max video size 500 MB
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# estimated guests 100
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# quota tolerance 0.75 (see below — NOT a warning threshold)
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# Adjust these in the admin UI before the event if needed.
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#
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# quota_tolerance is the MULTIPLIER IN THE PER-USER QUOTA FORMULA, not the point at
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# which anything warns you:
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#
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# divisor = max(active_uploaders, estimated_guest_count, 1)
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# per_user_limit = max(floor(free_disk * quota_tolerance / divisor), 500 MiB)
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#
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# estimated_guest_count is a FLOOR ON THE DIVISOR, not decoration — it is a live knob
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# (upload::quota_limit_bytes). Earlier drafts of this file and the runbook both omitted
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# it and told operators it was inert; it is not.
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#
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# It is recomputed against LIVE free space on every upload, so it self-throttles: guests
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# converge on a fixed point at tolerance/(1+tolerance) of the free space you started
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# with — 43% at 0.75, i.e. ~30 GB of a fresh 70 GB.
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#
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# Raising it therefore AUTHORISES GUESTS TO FILL MORE OF THE DISK. Setting 0.95 in the
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# belief that it means "warn me later" moves the fixed point to ~49% and eats the
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# headroom the keepsake needs — and the keepsake needs a lot, because Gallery.zip and
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# Memories.zip are each roughly a second copy of every original (both store media
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# uncompressed). Budget for media + 2x media, or move exports to their own volume.
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#
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# 0.75 is the tested default. Lower it if the box is tight; raise it only if you have
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# provisioned export headroom separately.
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# ── Workers ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# Number of parallel media compression workers. Default 2. Boot-time only.
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#
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# CORRECTION TO EARLIER GUIDANCE: this used to say "each worker can run an ffmpeg
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# transcode, so raise the app memory limit to ~2G if you set 4". There is NO video
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# transcode anywhere in this codebase — services/video.rs runs
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# `ffmpeg -ss <t> -i <src> -vframes 1 -vf scale=...`, a single poster frame, and video
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# originals are stored and served byte-for-byte. Poster extraction costs ~150-250 MB
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# for a moment; it is not the constraint.
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#
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# The real memory consumer is the IMAGE path. `image` 0.25's resize builds an Rgba32F
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# intermediate at 16 BYTES PER PIXEL, sized (source_width x target_height) — which the
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# 256 MiB decode guard in imaging.rs does NOT cover. Peak per photo, decode + the 2048px
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# display resize: ~145 MB at 12 MP, ~223 MB at 24 MP, ~354 MB at 48 MP.
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#
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# So on a 2 vCPU / 4 GB box (e.g. Hetzner CX22) KEEP THIS AT 2:
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# * concurrency 4 would put two giants at ~1.5 GB against the 1G app limit — OOM.
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# * and app=2G + db=1G + frontend/caddy 256M each + ~370 MB of OS/Docker exceeds the
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# ~3910 MiB a "4 GB" VM actually reports. Raising the limit oversubscribes the host.
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# 4 is only reasonable on the 4 vCPU / 8 GB box README.md documents.
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#
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# The "two 48 MP photos at once" worst case this number used to be sized against is no
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# longer reachable: compression.rs takes an EXCLUSIVE `heavy` permit for any job whose
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# estimated peak exceeds HEAVY_IMAGE_BYTES (150 MiB), so two giants serialise no matter what
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# this is set to. What concurrency 2 now buys is two ORDINARY phone photos in parallel
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# (~145 MB peak each), which is both memory-safe and short enough not to starve the two
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# tokio worker threads a 2 vCPU box gets.
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#
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# Do NOT drop this to 1 hoping to protect the CPU. It halves throughput on the common light
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# path for a heavy path that is already serialised, and a longer compression backlog means
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# more feed tiles served from full-size originals (VirtualFeed falls back to /original while
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# derivatives are pending) — trading a little CPU for a lot of venue-wifi bandwidth.
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#
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# Throughput at 2 is not the bottleneck anyone thinks it is: ~2.5s per 12 MP photo, so
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# 100 photos is ~250 CPU-seconds spread over an entire evening.
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COMPRESSION_WORKER_CONCURRENCY=2
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# ── Comments ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# Master switch for the comment feature. Boot-time only (NOT in the admin UI), so it
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# needs a `docker compose up -d` to apply. Anything other than false/0/no/off is on.
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#
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# When false the backend rejects NEW comments with 403 and the frontend hides the whole
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# comment UI, including in the offline keepsake viewer. Likes and captions are entirely
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# separate features and are unaffected. Existing comments stay in the database (hidden),
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# so flipping it back restores them.
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#
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# Note it gates POSTING only: GET /upload/{id}/comments still serves already-existing
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# comments, and the keepsake's data.json still embeds their text. Irrelevant if the flag
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# is off from the first boot, since no comment can ever have been written.
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# NOTE for the current deployment: `docker-compose.yml` PINS this to "false" on the app
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# service, and `environment` overrides `env_file` — so changing it here has no effect in
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# production. Remove that line from the compose file first if you want comments back.
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COMMENTS_ENABLED=true
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# ── Logging ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# SET THIS IN PRODUCTION. Without it the app falls back to
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# `eventsnap_backend=debug,tower_http=debug` (see main.rs), and with TraceLayer that is a
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# debug line per HTTP request — including every preview and thumbnail fetch. Combined with
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# Docker's json-file driver it writes to the same filesystem as the database and the media.
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# docker-compose.yml caps each service's logs at 30 MB; this keeps the volume sane in the
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# first place. The e2e stack has always used exactly this value.
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RUST_LOG=eventsnap_backend=info,tower_http=warn
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