383cfbed3b
Adds the full auth flow. Reads stay public; writes (currently only POST
/api/v1/mangas) require a CurrentUser. Both browsers and bot scripts hit
the same endpoints — they just present credentials differently.
Migration 0002_auth.sql introduces users.password_hash, a sessions
table, and an api_tokens table. Sessions and api_tokens store only
sha256(raw_token) — the raw value lives in the cookie or the
Authorization header.
New endpoints under /api/v1/auth/:
- POST /register — argon2id hash, creates a session, sets cookie.
- POST /login — verifies, rotates to a fresh session (old ones expire
naturally so other devices stay signed in).
- POST /logout — deletes the server-side session row + clears the
cookie via Max-Age=0.
- GET /me — current user via the new CurrentUser extractor.
- POST /tokens — issue a bot bearer token; raw value returned exactly
once at creation.
- DELETE /tokens/{id} — owner-only: 404 if unknown, 403 if it exists
but belongs to another user, 204 on success.
The CurrentUser axum extractor resolves cookie first, then
Authorization: Bearer; failure → AppError::Unauthenticated (401). New
AppError variants Unauthenticated/Forbidden/Conflict carry the matching
envelope codes; the top-level match in `code()` stays exhaustive.
Backend integration coverage in tests/api_auth.rs: register sets a
HttpOnly SameSite=Lax cookie and never leaks password_hash; duplicate
username → 409; weak password → 400; login rotates the cookie; wrong
password / unknown user → 401; /me with vs without cookie; logout
invalidates the cookie; bot-token roundtrip via Bearer; user A cannot
delete user B's token (403); unknown delete → 404.
Frontend:
- lib/api/auth.ts — typed wrappers; me() returns null on 401.
- lib/session.svelte.ts — per-tab user state with a seq counter to
guard against an in-flight /me clobbering a fresh setUser.
- lib/api/client.ts — request<T> returns undefined for 204.
- routes/login + routes/register — forms with action="javascript:void(0)"
so the no-JS path is a no-op (avoids the hydration-race where a
pre-attach click would submit via the browser default).
- routes/+layout.svelte — session-aware nav: spinner → user + Logout,
or Login / Register.
- e2e/auth-flow.spec.ts — login flips the layout, logout flips back;
bad credentials surface the API error message.
Config grows AuthConfig (cookie_secure, cookie_domain, session_ttl_days)
and CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS. CORS middleware is mounted in app::build and
stays a no-op (same-origin) until origins are listed.
Lockstep version bump to 0.3.0.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
32 lines
828 B
JSON
32 lines
828 B
JSON
{
|
|
"name": "mangalord-frontend",
|
|
"version": "0.3.0",
|
|
"private": true,
|
|
"type": "module",
|
|
"scripts": {
|
|
"dev": "vite dev",
|
|
"build": "vite build",
|
|
"preview": "vite preview",
|
|
"check": "svelte-kit sync && svelte-check --tsconfig ./tsconfig.json",
|
|
"test": "vitest run",
|
|
"test:watch": "vitest",
|
|
"test:e2e": "playwright test"
|
|
},
|
|
"devDependencies": {
|
|
"@playwright/test": "^1.48.0",
|
|
"@sveltejs/adapter-node": "^5.2.0",
|
|
"@sveltejs/kit": "^2.7.0",
|
|
"@sveltejs/vite-plugin-svelte": "^4.0.0",
|
|
"@testing-library/jest-dom": "^6.6.0",
|
|
"@testing-library/svelte": "^5.2.0",
|
|
"@types/node": "^22.7.0",
|
|
"jsdom": "^25.0.0",
|
|
"svelte": "^5.0.0",
|
|
"svelte-check": "^4.0.0",
|
|
"tslib": "^2.7.0",
|
|
"typescript": "^5.6.0",
|
|
"vite": "^5.4.0",
|
|
"vitest": "^2.1.0"
|
|
}
|
|
}
|