Mangalord/.env.example

# Copy to .env for `docker compose up --build`. Local-dev runs (cargo run
# / npm run dev) read backend/.env if present, or pick up the variables
# from your shell.
#
# Production note: COOKIE_SECURE=true (the default below) makes browsers
# refuse to send the session cookie over plain HTTP. Run with a TLS-
# terminating reverse proxy (Caddy, Traefik, nginx) in front — the
# compose file here doesn't ship one. Local/dev runs without HTTPS
# should set COOKIE_SECURE=false.

# ----- Postgres -----
# These are read by the Postgres container *and* by DATABASE_URL below;
# changing them after the first boot won't migrate existing data, so set
# them up front for any new deployment.
#
# POSTGRES_PASSWORD is REQUIRED — docker-compose.yml fails fast if it
# isn't set in this file, to prevent a deploy without an .env booting
# Postgres with a publicly-known credential.
POSTGRES_USER=mangalord
POSTGRES_PASSWORD=change-me-to-a-strong-random-string
POSTGRES_DB=mangalord

# ----- Backend -----
DATABASE_URL=postgres://mangalord:mangalord@postgres:5432/mangalord
BIND_ADDRESS=0.0.0.0:8080
STORAGE_DIR=/var/lib/mangalord/storage
RUST_LOG=info,mangalord=debug,chromiumoxide::conn=off,chromiumoxide::handler=off
# Postgres connection-pool sizing. One pool serves HTTP handlers and the
# crawler/analysis daemons. DB_MAX_CONNECTIONS caps open connections;
# DB_ACQUIRE_TIMEOUT_SECS is how long a request waits for a free connection
# before failing fast (rather than hanging on the driver's 30s default).
DB_MAX_CONNECTIONS=20
DB_ACQUIRE_TIMEOUT_SECS=10

# ----- Auth / cookies -----
# COOKIE_SECURE controls whether the `Secure` flag is set on the session
# cookie. Keep `true` in production (HTTPS); set to `false` if you're
# serving over plain HTTP locally (e.g., behind a dev reverse proxy).
COOKIE_SECURE=true
# COOKIE_DOMAIN scopes the session cookie. Leave empty to default to the
# requesting host. Set when serving the API and frontend on subdomains of
# a shared parent (e.g., `.example.com`) so the cookie is shared.
COOKIE_DOMAIN=
# Session lifetime in days. Expired sessions are no longer accepted and
# get reaped lazily.
SESSION_TTL_DAYS=30

# ----- Auth brute-force rate limits -----
# Token-bucket budget shared across /auth/login, /auth/register, and
# /auth/me/password. Set per_sec=0 to disable (e.g. behind a
# rate-limiting reverse proxy that already enforces a budget).
AUTH_RATE_PER_SEC=5
AUTH_RATE_BURST=10
# Trust a proxy-supplied X-Forwarded-For as the client IP for per-IP auth
# rate limiting. Enable ONLY when the backend sits behind a trusted proxy
# that overrides the header (the compose deploy: SvelteKit forwards the real
# peer IP). When false, the header is ignored and a single shared bucket is
# used — a directly-exposed backend MUST keep this off or clients could spoof
# their IP to dodge the limit.
AUTH_TRUSTED_PROXY=false

# ----- CORS -----
# Comma-separated origins allowed to call the API with credentials.
# Default is empty: same-origin only. Set when frontend and backend live
# on different hosts. Example: https://app.example.com,https://app.example.de
CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS=

# ----- Admin CSRF allowlist -----
# Browser origins (scheme + host[:port]) permitted to POST to
# /api/v1/admin/* mutating endpoints. Defends the session-cookie-
# authenticated admin surface against SameSite=Lax form-POST CSRF.
# Same shape as CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS (comma-separated). Compare against
# the request's Origin header (falling back to Referer when absent);
# safe methods (GET/HEAD/OPTIONS) are not checked, and requests with
# neither Origin nor Referer (curl, server-to-server callers) are
# always allowed.
#
# Empty does NOT mean "off" for browsers: cookie-authenticated admin
# mutations FAIL CLOSED (403) when this is empty, since there's no
# allowlist to check the Origin against. Non-cookie callers (curl,
# bots with a Bearer token, no Origin/Referer) are still allowed.
# So set this to the SvelteKit origin for any browser-exposed deploy,
# e.g. https://app.example.com. For a same-origin docker-compose deploy
# set the same value the browser uses.
#   Local dev (native `npm run dev`): the Vite origin is
#   http://localhost:5173 — set ADMIN_ALLOWED_ORIGINS=http://localhost:5173
#   or admin toggles (e.g. enabling the analysis worker) return 403.
ADMIN_ALLOWED_ORIGINS=

# ----- Admin bootstrap -----
# When BOTH are set and non-empty, the backend ensures a user with this
# username exists at startup, promotes it to admin, and (for a brand-new
# row only) sets the password. An existing user's password is NEVER
# overwritten by this — rotate via the dashboard or `/auth/me/password`.
# Leave BOTH empty in a fully provisioned deploy.
ADMIN_USERNAME=
ADMIN_PASSWORD=

# ----- Site-wide auth gates (env-ONLY) -----
# PRIVATE_MODE: when `true`, every endpoint except a small public allowlist
# (/health, /auth/config, /auth/login, /auth/logout) demands a valid
# session — anonymous reads return 401. Self-registration is also
# force-disabled regardless of ALLOW_SELF_REGISTER. Default `false`.
PRIVATE_MODE=false
# ALLOW_SELF_REGISTER: when `false`, /auth/register returns 403 and the
# frontend hides its register affordance. Admins can still mint accounts
# via /admin/users. Default `true` (open registration). Forced to `false`
# when PRIVATE_MODE=true.
ALLOW_SELF_REGISTER=true

# ----- Upload limits -----
# Per-request body cap. axum rejects oversized requests with 413 before
# our handlers run. Default 200 MiB.
MAX_REQUEST_BYTES=209715200
# Per-image-part cap. Enforced after reading each part, so a single
# oversized image is rejected even when the total request fits.
# Default 20 MiB.
MAX_FILE_BYTES=20971520
# Max page images accepted in one chapter upload. Bounds how many parts
# the handler will stage before rejecting the request with 413, so a
# client can't pin a worker with an unbounded page count. Default 2000.
# Setting 0 disables THIS cap — the total is then bounded only by
# MAX_REQUEST_BYTES (the whole-request body limit above), so leave 0 only
# if you intend that body limit to be the sole backstop.
MAX_PAGES_PER_CHAPTER=2000

# ----- Crawler download safety -----
# Hosts the crawler is allowed to fetch images/covers from, in addition
# to CRAWLER_START_URL's host and CRAWLER_CDN_HOST. Comma-separated.
# Defends against SSRF via scraped <img src="http://10.0.0.1/...">.
CRAWLER_DOWNLOAD_ALLOWLIST=
# Bypass the host allowlist entirely. Intended for sources that shard
# images across numbered CDN subdomains (cdn1/cdn2/…) where enumerating
# every host upfront is impractical. The private-IP / localhost / non-
# http(s) scheme defenses STAY ON — a scraped <img src="http://10.0.0.1/">
# is still refused with this flag set.
CRAWLER_ALLOW_ANY_HOST=false
# Hard cap on a single image body. Default 32 MiB.
CRAWLER_MAX_IMAGE_BYTES=33554432
# Hard cap on the number of page images in one crawled chapter. The
# per-image byte cap doesn't stop a hostile reader page listing thousands
# of <img> tags; an over-cap chapter is acked failed instead of downloaded.
# 0 disables the cap. Default 2000.
CRAWLER_MAX_IMAGES_PER_CHAPTER=2000
# Max manga detail fetches per metadata pass (both the in-process daemon
# and the `bin/crawler` CLI). 0 means no cap — let the source walker run
# to completion. Useful for capped test runs against a new source.
CRAWLER_LIMIT=0

# ----- Crawler reliability knobs -----
# Hard upper bound on a single chapter-content job dispatch (seconds).
# A job that exceeds the budget is acked failed (with exponential
# backoff) instead of wedging a worker. Default 600s.
CRAWLER_JOB_TIMEOUT_SECS=600
# Idle seconds the daemon waits for new jobs before parking (between
# scheduled passes). Lower for snappier dev loops; higher for fewer
# wakeups in steady state. Default 600.
CRAWLER_IDLE_TIMEOUT_S=600
# Concurrent chapter-content workers. Each pulls one chapter at a time
# from the queue. Higher = faster on multi-core hosts BUT also more
# pressure on the source (raise CRAWLER_RATE_MS in tandem). Default 1.
CRAWLER_CHAPTER_WORKERS=1
# Days of completed `crawler_jobs` rows kept before vacuum (per-row
# audit trail; failed rows survive to make retries traceable). Default 7.
CRAWLER_JOB_RETENTION_DAYS=7
# Days of `crawl_metrics` rows kept (per-run aggregate dashboard
# data). Longer history → bigger dashboard charts; shorter → less DB.
# Default 90.
CRAWL_METRICS_RETENTION_DAYS=90
# Politeness rate limit between requests to the source (milliseconds).
# Pause inserted after each fetch. Raising slows the crawl but is
# friendlier to small sources. Default 1000ms.
CRAWLER_RATE_MS=1000
# Politeness rate for the CDN host (CRAWLER_CDN_HOST). Defaults to
# CRAWLER_RATE_MS when unset — set lower if the CDN tolerates faster
# pulls, or higher if it rate-limits aggressively. Default 1000ms.
CRAWLER_CDN_RATE_MS=1000
# User-Agent string for crawler HTTP requests. Leave unset for a
# generic default. Some sources fingerprint UA — set a realistic
# browser UA if the source 403s the default.
CRAWLER_USER_AGENT=
# Source session cookie value (PHPSESSID). Required when the source
# gates listings behind a logged-in session. Treat as a secret.
CRAWLER_PHPSESSID=
# Cookie domain the crawler scopes its session to. Usually the source
# host (e.g. `mangadex.org`). Leave unset to let reqwest infer it.
CRAWLER_COOKIE_DOMAIN=
# Consecutive metadata-pass `fetch_manga` failures that abort the pass
# (circuit breaker for a source outage). The pass does NOT mark a clean
# exit, so the next tick does a recovery sweep. Default 10.
CRAWLER_METADATA_MAX_CONSECUTIVE_FAILURES=10
# Consecutive transient chapter failures (after TOR recircuit is
# exhausted) that trigger an automatic coordinated browser restart.
# Default 3.
CRAWLER_BROWSER_RESTART_THRESHOLD=3
# CDP Fetch interception that re-validates every headless-browser
# navigation/redirect/subresource against the SSRF check (blocks a scraped page
# that drives the browser — via a redirect OR page JS/subresource — to an
# internal target such as the cloud metadata service or postgres). Default TRUE:
# with it off, only the top-level URL string is checked and page JS/subresources
# reach internal IPs (the reqwest SafeResolver does not cover Chromium's own
# stack). The CDP Fetch hook can't be exercised in CI (no Chromium); before
# relying on a fresh deploy, validate it doesn't wedge navigation:
#   CRAWLER_CHROMIUM_BINARY=/usr/bin/chromium \
#     cargo test -p mangalord --test crawler_browser_smoke -- --ignored \
#     ssrf_interception_does_not_wedge_allowed_navigation
# Set to false only as a break-glass if the hook destabilizes a deployment.
CRAWLER_SSRF_INTERCEPT=true
# Path to a system Chromium binary. When set, the crawler skips the
# bundled-fetcher download. Required on platforms without a usable
# upstream Chromium build (notably Linux_arm64 / Raspberry Pi). On
# Debian: /usr/bin/chromium-headless-shell or /usr/bin/chromium. On
# Ubuntu the package is chromium-browser (different path). Pair with
# `docker compose build --build-arg INSTALL_CHROMIUM=true backend` so
# the image actually contains the binary.
CRAWLER_CHROMIUM_BINARY=

# ----- Crawler TOR proxy + recircuit -----
# The compose stack ships a `tor` service (dockurr/tor) and defaults
# CRAWLER_PROXY to it, so by default all crawler traffic exits via the
# TOR network. To opt out, set CRAWLER_PROXY= (empty) AND
# CRAWLER_TOR_CONTROL_URL= (empty) below — the tor service can stay
# running, it just won't be used.
#
# Going through TOR adds latency to every fetch; image downloads in
# particular slow noticeably. The win is on sites that rate-limit or
# fingerprint by exit IP — NEWNYM recirculation makes a fresh exit
# cheap to reach for.
#
# CRAWLER_PROXY: SOCKS5(h) URL. Use `socks5h://` (not `socks5://`) so
# DNS resolution also goes through TOR, avoiding leaks via the host's
# resolver. Leave unset to talk to the upstream directly.
CRAWLER_PROXY=socks5h://tor:9050
# Control-port URL for SIGNAL NEWNYM ("get a fresh circuit"). Triggered
# automatically on bad pages (broken-page body, missing #logo) and on
# the Unauthenticated session probe outcome. Leave unset to disable
# the recircuit feature (the SOCKS proxy still works).
CRAWLER_TOR_CONTROL_URL=tcp://tor:9051
# Max NEWNYM-and-retry cycles per recircuit-eligible failure. Default 3.
CRAWLER_TOR_RECIRCUIT_MAX_ATTEMPTS=3
# Path to a tor cookie-auth file. Alternative to TOR_CONTROL_PASSWORD —
# the TorController prefers cookie when both are present. Useful when
# running against an externally managed tor daemon that uses
# `CookieAuthentication 1` instead of HashedControlPassword. Default unset.
CRAWLER_TOR_CONTROL_COOKIE_PATH=

# ----- TOR control-port password -----
# Shared between the bundled dockurr/tor service (which hashes it into
# its HashedControlPassword) and the backend's
# CRAWLER_TOR_CONTROL_PASSWORD. REQUIRED — docker-compose.yml fails
# fast if absent. Generate a strong random string; rotate by setting
# a new value and restarting both `tor` and `backend`.
#
# Operators running their own non-dockurr tor daemon with cookie-file
# auth can ignore this var and instead set
# CRAWLER_TOR_CONTROL_COOKIE_PATH on the backend — the TorController
# prefers cookie when both are present.
TOR_CONTROL_PASSWORD=change-me-to-a-strong-random-string

# ----- Frontend -----
# The frontend container runs SvelteKit's Node adapter on :3000 and
# proxies /api/* to BACKEND_URL via src/hooks.server.ts. In compose the
# default `http://backend:8080` reaches the backend service over the
# internal docker network. Override only if you're running the
# frontend container against a backend somewhere else.
BACKEND_URL=http://backend:8080
# Per-request wall-clock cap for the /api/* reverse proxy (milliseconds).
# Default 300000 (5 min) covers a typical 200 MiB chapter upload over
# 25 Mbps; raise for users on slower upstream links or lower if a
# tighter front proxy already bounds the request lifetime.
BACKEND_PROXY_TIMEOUT_MS=300000

# ----- Runtime settings (crawler + analysis) -----
# The crawler and analysis subsystems are configured at runtime from the
# `app_settings` table and edited live in the admin dashboard
# (Admin → Settings) — no restart needed. The CRAWLER_* / ANALYSIS_* env
# vars below act as the BOOT SEED: on first boot (when the row is absent)
# the env values populate the DB; thereafter the DB is the source of
# truth and env changes are ignored for those fields.
#
# Host/infra and secret fields stay env-ONLY (never persisted, shown
# read-only in the dashboard): the chromium binary/dir, browser mode/args,
# CRAWLER_PROXY, all CRAWLER_TOR_CONTROL_*, the cookie domain, and the
# analysis ANALYSIS_API_KEY. The important site levers (PRIVATE_MODE,
# ALLOW_SELF_REGISTER) also remain env-only by design.
#
# Crawler boot seeds (effective only on first boot, then editable from the
# dashboard):
#   CRAWLER_START_URL   The catalog listing URL the crawler walks. Without
#                       it, the cron is disabled (no daemon-driven sweeps;
#                       force-resync from the dashboard still works).
#   CRAWLER_CDN_HOST    Distinct host the source serves images from. Used to
#                       set a slower rate limit (CRAWLER_CDN_RATE_MS) and
#                       seed the download allowlist.
CRAWLER_START_URL=
CRAWLER_CDN_HOST=
# CRAWLER_DAEMON / CRAWLER_DAILY_AT / CRAWLER_TZ — the daemon sweep
# schedule. CRAWLER_DAEMON=false keeps the in-process daemon off; clicks
# in the dashboard still work. DAILY_AT is `HH:MM` in the chosen TZ;
# TZ is an IANA name (e.g. `Europe/Berlin`). Default: daemon on, runs
# at 00:00 UTC.
CRAWLER_DAEMON=true
CRAWLER_DAILY_AT=00:00
CRAWLER_TZ=UTC
#
# New analysis knobs (all optional, all seed defaults):
#   ANALYSIS_TEMPERATURE       Sampling temperature. Default 0 (deterministic).
#   ANALYSIS_SYSTEM_PROMPT     Override the single-call vision system prompt.
#   ANALYSIS_OCR_PROMPT        Override the tall-page OCR (pass A) prompt.
#   ANALYSIS_GROUNDING_PROMPT  Override the tags/scene/safety (pass B) prompt.
# Leave the prompt vars unset to use the built-in defaults (also editable,
# with a per-prompt "reset to default", in the dashboard).

# ----- Analysis (vision) — boot seeds + env-only secret -----
# The page-analysis worker (off by default) POSTs each page image at a
# Chat-Completions-compatible vision endpoint and persists OCR + tags.
# All fields except ANALYSIS_API_KEY are boot seeds for the app_settings
# row and switch to dashboard-editable once persisted.
#
# ANALYSIS_ENABLED   Turn the worker on at first boot. Toggleable live in
#                    the dashboard. Default `false`.
ANALYSIS_ENABLED=false
# ANALYSIS_BACKEND  Which engine the worker runs. env-ONLY (deploy-time).
#                   `ocr` (default) = the in-process ocrs engine: fast,
#                   CPU-only, text-only, ideal for a Pi.
#                   NOTE: the `vision` backend (local LLM at ANALYSIS_VISION_URL,
#                   full OCR + tags + scene + safety) is TEMPORARILY DISABLED —
#                   its code is kept intact but the worker forces OCR regardless,
#                   logging a warning if `vision` is requested. So setting
#                   `vision` here currently has no effect; the ANALYSIS_VISION_* /
#                   ANALYSIS_API_KEY knobs below are dormant until it's re-enabled.
ANALYSIS_BACKEND=ocr
# OCRS_DETECTION_MODEL / OCRS_RECOGNITION_MODEL  Paths to the ocrs `.rten`
#   text-detection / -recognition models (only read when ANALYSIS_BACKEND=ocr).
#   The backend image bakes both into /models, so the defaults work unchanged;
#   override only to point at custom-trained models.
OCRS_DETECTION_MODEL=/models/text-detection.rten
OCRS_RECOGNITION_MODEL=/models/text-recognition.rten
# ANALYSIS_VISION_URL  /v1/chat/completions endpoint. Required when enabled.
#                      For the bundled vision container, use
#                      http://mangalord-vision:8000/v1/chat/completions.
ANALYSIS_VISION_URL=
# ANALYSIS_VISION_MODEL  Model id the endpoint expects (`model:` field).
ANALYSIS_VISION_MODEL=
# ANALYSIS_WORKERS  Concurrent vision dispatches. Default 1.
ANALYSIS_WORKERS=1
# ANALYSIS_JOB_TIMEOUT_SECS  Hard upper bound per vision call before the
#                            job is acked failed (backoff). Default 600.
ANALYSIS_JOB_TIMEOUT_SECS=600
# ANALYSIS_API_KEY  env-ONLY. Bearer-attached to every vision call; never
#                   persisted, never logged.
ANALYSIS_API_KEY=
# Analysis tuning — boot seeds (live-editable from the dashboard once
# persisted). Defaults are tuned for a 4 GiB-class local vision model;
# raise/lower as the model and budget allow.
#   ANALYSIS_MAX_TOKENS         Output-token cap per call. Default 4096.
#   ANALYSIS_MAX_PIXELS         Per-image pixel budget; we resize to fit.
#                               Default 1_000_000 (~1 MP).
#   ANALYSIS_MIN_SLICE_HEIGHT   Slice grid height for tall pages, px.
#                               Default 640.
#   ANALYSIS_SLICE_OVERLAP      Fractional overlap between adjacent slices
#                               so text on a cut survives. Default 0.12.
#   ANALYSIS_TALL_ASPECT        Slice only when `height/width` exceeds this;
#                               normal pages take a single call. Default 1.6.
#   ANALYSIS_MAX_SLICES         Hard cap on slices per page (coarsens
#                               beyond cap). Default 16.
#   ANALYSIS_MAX_IMAGE_BYTES    Per-image byte cap before downscale.
#                               Default 8388608 (8 MiB).
#   ANALYSIS_OCR_MAX_DECODE_PIXELS  Decompression-bomb guard for the OCR
#                               backend: hard cap on a page's *decoded* pixel
#                               count (encoded size is bounded separately).
#                               Default 100000000 (100 MP).
#   ANALYSIS_RESPONSE_FORMAT    `json_schema` | `json_object` | `none`.
#                               Default `json_schema`.
#   ANALYSIS_FREQUENCY_PENALTY  Discourages repetition loops. Default 0.3.
#   ANALYSIS_TEMPERATURE        Sampling temperature; 0 = deterministic.
#                               Default 0.
ANALYSIS_MAX_TOKENS=4096
ANALYSIS_MAX_PIXELS=1000000
ANALYSIS_MIN_SLICE_HEIGHT=640
ANALYSIS_SLICE_OVERLAP=0.12
ANALYSIS_TALL_ASPECT=1.6
ANALYSIS_MAX_SLICES=16
ANALYSIS_MAX_IMAGE_BYTES=8388608
ANALYSIS_OCR_MAX_DECODE_PIXELS=100000000
ANALYSIS_RESPONSE_FORMAT=json_schema
ANALYSIS_FREQUENCY_PENALTY=0.3
ANALYSIS_TEMPERATURE=0.0

# ----- Vision autoscaling (the `ai` compose profile) -----
# The mangalord-vision (llama.cpp) container pins ~4.4 GiB and has no
# idle-unload, so the `vision-manager` sidecar starts it on demand and
# idle-stops it. Bring the two helper containers up with:
#   docker compose --profile ai up -d
# The vision container itself is NOT defined in compose — it lives elsewhere
# on the host and the manager drives it by name. See VISION-AUTOSCALE.md.
#
# ANALYSIS_VISION_HEALTH_URL — env-ONLY readiness gate for the analysis
# worker. When set, the worker refuses to lease a page until this answers
# 2xx, so the manager can stop vision mid-idle without jobs burning their
# retries / landing `failed` rows. MUST point at the same vision instance the
# worker analyses against. Leave empty to disable the gate (always-on setups).
ANALYSIS_VISION_HEALTH_URL=http://mangalord-vision:8000/health
#
# vision-manager knobs:
# VISION_MANAGER_DATABASE_URL — REQUIRED for the `ai` profile. A read-only
#   role, NOT the backend creds: apply vision-manager/readonly-role.sql once,
#   then set e.g.
#   VISION_MANAGER_DATABASE_URL=postgres://vision_manager:<pw>@postgres:5432/mangalord
VISION_MANAGER_DATABASE_URL=
# VISION_CONTAINER          Container name the manager starts/stops. Default mangalord-vision.
# VISION_HEALTH_URL         /health URL the manager polls after start. Default http://mangalord-vision:8000/health.
# VISION_POLL_INTERVAL      Backlog poll cadence, seconds. Default 20.
# VISION_STOP_DEBOUNCE      Idle seconds before stopping vision. Default 600 (debounces bursty enqueues).
# VISION_START_HEALTH_TIMEOUT  Max seconds to wait for /health 200 after start. Default 300 (cold model load).
# VISION_RESPECT_CRAWL_MUTEX   1 = don't start vision while a crawl runs (RAM mutex on the 8 GiB box). Default 1.
# VISION_MAX_UPTIME         >0 = force-stop vision after N seconds running (backstop). Default 0 (disabled).
#
# Memory-pressure yield — the dynamic generalization of the crawl mutex. The
# manager reads host-wide used% (from /proc/meminfo MemAvailable) and stops a
# RUNNING vision when memory gets tight, so a spike elsewhere (a crawl, CI, a
# backend burst) can finish instead of the kernel OOM-killer shooting something
# stateful. Two watermarks give hysteresis; the cooldown prevents stop/restart
# thrash when vision itself is the hog. See VISION-MEMORY-YIELD.md.
# VISION_MEM_YIELD_ENABLED      1 = enable the gate, 0 = disable entirely. Default 1.
# VISION_MEM_HIGH_WATERMARK_PCT used% >= this → actively stop a running vision. Default 92.
# VISION_MEM_LOW_WATERMARK_PCT  used% >= this → inhibit starts (keep HIGH - LOW >= ~10 so the band beats jitter). Default 80.
# VISION_MEM_YIELD_COOLDOWN     Seconds after a pressure-stop during which restart is refused regardless of backlog. Default 300.
# VISION_MEM_POLL_INTERVAL      Mem sub-poll cadence, seconds (<= VISION_POLL_INTERVAL); catches spikes between backlog ticks. Default 5.