Dockurr/tor's stock entrypoint binds the control port to localhost (unreachable from a sibling container), refuses to run as a non-default user (its setup chowns dirs and su-execs down to its `tor` user, both requiring root), and skips its own HashedControlPassword injection whenever the user's torrc declares a ControlPort. The combination meant the original cookie-via-shared- volume design couldn't work without fighting the image. This commit: - Adds tor/entrypoint.sh, a small wrapper that hashes $PASSWORD with `tor --hash-password`, appends the hash to a writable copy of /etc/tor/torrc, then execs tor. Container runs as root only for that bring-up; the torrc's `User tor` directive drops privs after port binding. - Adds a healthcheck on the tor service that gates downstream containers on both 9050 + 9051 actually listening (was service_started, which fires before tor finishes bootstrap). - Loosens MaxCircuitDirtiness 60 → 600. The 60s value would have rotated mid-chapter for any chapter with > ~50 images, which is exactly the kind of fingerprint we're trying to avoid. - Wires TOR_CONTROL_PASSWORD as a REQUIRED .env var on both sides (PASSWORD on tor, CRAWLER_TOR_CONTROL_PASSWORD on backend). docker-compose.yml fails fast if unset. - Removes the tor-data shared volume on backend (cookie auth is no longer the default; operators wanting cookie can mount it back). - Documents the pivot + the cookie-vs-password tradeoff in .env.example. End-to-end validated: `docker compose up -d tor`, then `printf 'AUTHENTICATE "test"\r\nSIGNAL NEWNYM\r\nQUIT\r\n' | nc tor 9051` returns three `250 OK` lines. Audit ref: #2, #3, #6. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
117 lines
4.8 KiB
YAML
117 lines
4.8 KiB
YAML
# Production-like compose. Requires a populated `.env` next to this
|
|
# file: at minimum POSTGRES_PASSWORD must be set to a non-default
|
|
# value (the `?required` form below fails fast otherwise). The
|
|
# frontend container expects HTTPS in front (Caddy/Traefik/nginx)
|
|
# because COOKIE_SECURE=true browsers will refuse to send the session
|
|
# cookie over plain HTTP.
|
|
services:
|
|
postgres:
|
|
image: postgres:16-alpine
|
|
environment:
|
|
POSTGRES_USER: ${POSTGRES_USER:-mangalord}
|
|
POSTGRES_PASSWORD: ${POSTGRES_PASSWORD:?POSTGRES_PASSWORD must be set in .env}
|
|
POSTGRES_DB: ${POSTGRES_DB:-mangalord}
|
|
volumes:
|
|
- postgres-data:/var/lib/postgresql/data
|
|
healthcheck:
|
|
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "pg_isready -U ${POSTGRES_USER:-mangalord}"]
|
|
interval: 5s
|
|
timeout: 5s
|
|
retries: 10
|
|
|
|
tor:
|
|
# SOCKS5 proxy for the crawler, plus a control port so the backend
|
|
# can signal NEWNYM on bad pages. See tor/torrc for the daemon
|
|
# config; both ports are only `expose`d (compose-internal), never
|
|
# bound on the host.
|
|
#
|
|
# We bypass dockurr/tor's stock entrypoint because it binds the
|
|
# control port to localhost (unreachable from the backend
|
|
# container) and skips its own HashedControlPassword injection
|
|
# when the user's torrc declares a ControlPort. Our wrapper
|
|
# (tor/entrypoint.sh) generates the hash from $PASSWORD and execs
|
|
# tor with our torrc. Backend authenticates with the same plain
|
|
# string via CRAWLER_TOR_CONTROL_PASSWORD.
|
|
image: dockurr/tor:latest
|
|
entrypoint: ["/bin/sh", "/usr/local/bin/mangalord-entrypoint.sh"]
|
|
environment:
|
|
PASSWORD: ${TOR_CONTROL_PASSWORD:?TOR_CONTROL_PASSWORD must be set in .env}
|
|
volumes:
|
|
- ./tor/torrc:/etc/tor/torrc:ro
|
|
- ./tor/entrypoint.sh:/usr/local/bin/mangalord-entrypoint.sh:ro
|
|
expose:
|
|
- "9050"
|
|
- "9051"
|
|
# Wait for both control + SOCKS ports to listen before downstream
|
|
# services start. dockurr/tor's main process spawns before tor
|
|
# itself is bound, so `service_started` alone races the first
|
|
# NEWNYM call.
|
|
healthcheck:
|
|
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "nc -z 127.0.0.1 9050 && nc -z 127.0.0.1 9051"]
|
|
interval: 5s
|
|
timeout: 5s
|
|
retries: 20
|
|
start_period: 30s
|
|
restart: unless-stopped
|
|
|
|
backend:
|
|
build: ./backend
|
|
depends_on:
|
|
postgres:
|
|
condition: service_healthy
|
|
tor:
|
|
condition: service_healthy
|
|
environment:
|
|
DATABASE_URL: postgres://${POSTGRES_USER:-mangalord}:${POSTGRES_PASSWORD:?POSTGRES_PASSWORD must be set in .env}@postgres:5432/${POSTGRES_DB:-mangalord}
|
|
BIND_ADDRESS: 0.0.0.0:8080
|
|
STORAGE_DIR: /var/lib/mangalord/storage
|
|
RUST_LOG: ${RUST_LOG:-info,mangalord=debug}
|
|
# Auth / cookies — see .env.example for context.
|
|
COOKIE_SECURE: ${COOKIE_SECURE:-true}
|
|
COOKIE_DOMAIN: ${COOKIE_DOMAIN:-}
|
|
SESSION_TTL_DAYS: ${SESSION_TTL_DAYS:-30}
|
|
# CORS — same-origin by default; populate when serving the API on
|
|
# a different host than the frontend.
|
|
CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS: ${CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS:-}
|
|
# Upload limits.
|
|
MAX_REQUEST_BYTES: ${MAX_REQUEST_BYTES:-209715200}
|
|
MAX_FILE_BYTES: ${MAX_FILE_BYTES:-20971520}
|
|
# System-chromium override for the crawler. Leave blank to use the
|
|
# bundled fetcher; set to e.g. /usr/bin/chromium-headless-shell on
|
|
# arm64 deployments. Pair with `--build-arg INSTALL_CHROMIUM=true`
|
|
# so the image actually contains the binary.
|
|
CRAWLER_CHROMIUM_BINARY: ${CRAWLER_CHROMIUM_BINARY:-}
|
|
# TOR proxy + NEWNYM recircuit (see .env.example for details).
|
|
# Defaults assume the bundled `tor` service above; override
|
|
# CRAWLER_PROXY= and CRAWLER_TOR_CONTROL_URL= (both empty) in
|
|
# .env to disable. CRAWLER_TOR_CONTROL_PASSWORD MUST match the
|
|
# tor service's PASSWORD (both wired to the same TOR_CONTROL_PASSWORD
|
|
# .env var below).
|
|
CRAWLER_PROXY: ${CRAWLER_PROXY-socks5h://tor:9050}
|
|
CRAWLER_TOR_CONTROL_URL: ${CRAWLER_TOR_CONTROL_URL-tcp://tor:9051}
|
|
CRAWLER_TOR_CONTROL_PASSWORD: ${TOR_CONTROL_PASSWORD:?TOR_CONTROL_PASSWORD must be set in .env}
|
|
CRAWLER_TOR_RECIRCUIT_MAX_ATTEMPTS: ${CRAWLER_TOR_RECIRCUIT_MAX_ATTEMPTS:-3}
|
|
volumes:
|
|
- storage-data:/var/lib/mangalord/storage
|
|
# No host port mapping in the default setup — the frontend proxies
|
|
# /api/* through its hooks.server.ts. Expose :8080 only if you want
|
|
# to hit the API directly from the host (e.g., bot scripts during
|
|
# development).
|
|
expose:
|
|
- "8080"
|
|
|
|
frontend:
|
|
build: ./frontend
|
|
depends_on:
|
|
- backend
|
|
environment:
|
|
# SvelteKit's hooks.server.ts proxies /api/* to this URL so the
|
|
# browser only ever talks to :3000 and cookies stay same-origin.
|
|
BACKEND_URL: http://backend:8080
|
|
ports:
|
|
- "3000:3000"
|
|
|
|
volumes:
|
|
postgres-data:
|
|
storage-data:
|