feat(project-tool): per-env approval-policy gating (§4.2/§6)
Salvaged from the superseded feat/hierarchies-extension-points branch (M5),
re-ported onto main's evolved tree-apply engine. Fills the §7/§11.1 "per-env
approval-policy gating" that main's design doc still lists as intended but
unbuilt.
A project's root manifest declares which environments require explicit
approval; `pic apply --dir --env <e>` to a confirm-required env needs an
explicit `--approve <e>` (a blanket `--yes` does NOT cover it). The approval
is admin-gated (admin on every declared node) and audited, and the policy
folds into the bound-plan token.
- manifest: `[project]` block → ManifestProject { environments[{name,confirm}] },
root-manifest-only (rejected elsewhere by build_tree).
- discover: build_tree emits `project` into the bundle from the root manifest.
- apply_service: TreeBundle.project + ProjectPolicy; policy folds into the
state_token; plan surfaces approvals_required; ApplyError::ApprovalRequired
→ 409.
- apply_api: enforce_env_approval (after authz_tree) — refuses a gated env not
in approved_envs, requires AppAdmin/GroupAdmin on every declared node on
approval, audits. Server re-derives policy from the bundle (authoritative).
- CLI: --approve (repeatable); resolve_approvals refuses a gated env
non-interactively, prompts on a TTY; plan renders gated envs. Single-node
apply --file refuses a confirm-required env and directs to --dir.
- approval journey + manifest/ProjectPolicy unit tests. No migration (policy
lives in the manifest, like takeover/blast-radius).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -287,6 +287,15 @@ struct TreeApplyRequest {
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prune: bool,
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#[serde(default)]
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expected_token: Option<String>,
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/// Selected environment (the overlay applied). Drives per-env approval
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/// gating (§4.2, M5).
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#[serde(default)]
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env: Option<String>,
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/// Environments the actor explicitly approved this apply for (§4.2, M5). A
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/// confirm-required env (per the bundle's `[project]` policy) is refused
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/// unless it appears here; `--yes` alone does NOT add it.
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#[serde(default)]
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approved_envs: Vec<String>,
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}
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async fn tree_plan_handler(
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@@ -304,6 +313,14 @@ async fn tree_apply_handler(
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Json(req): Json<TreeApplyRequest>,
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) -> Result<Json<ApplyReport>, ApplyError> {
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authz_tree(&svc, &principal, &req.bundle, Some(req.prune)).await?;
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enforce_env_approval(
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&svc,
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&principal,
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&req.bundle,
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req.env.as_deref(),
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&req.approved_envs,
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)
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.await?;
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let report = svc
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.apply_tree(
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&req.bundle,
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@@ -315,6 +332,62 @@ async fn tree_apply_handler(
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Ok(Json(report))
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}
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/// Per-env approval gate (§4.2, §6, M5). If the apply selects a confirm-required
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/// environment (per the bundle's `[project]` policy, re-derived here — the CLI's
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/// enforcement is convenience, this is authoritative), it must be explicitly
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/// approved via `approved_envs` (`pic apply --approve <env>`); a blanket `--yes`
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/// does NOT satisfy it. An approved gated apply additionally requires ADMIN
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/// authority on every declared node — the "override a gate" capability (§4.2), a
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/// deliberate step up from the editor-level write caps an ordinary apply needs —
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/// and is audited.
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async fn enforce_env_approval(
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svc: &ApplyService,
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principal: &Principal,
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bundle: &TreeBundle,
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env: Option<&str>,
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approved_envs: &[String],
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) -> Result<(), ApplyError> {
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let (Some(policy), Some(env)) = (&bundle.project, env) else {
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return Ok(());
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};
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if !policy.confirm_required(env) {
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return Ok(());
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}
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if !approved_envs.iter().any(|e| e == env) {
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return Err(ApplyError::ApprovalRequired(env.to_string()));
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}
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// Approved: require admin authority on every declared node.
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for node in &bundle.nodes {
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match node.kind {
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NodeKind::App => {
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let app_id = resolve_app_id(svc.apps.as_ref(), &node.slug).await?;
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require(svc.authz.as_ref(), principal, Capability::AppAdmin(app_id))
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.await
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.map_err(map_authz)?;
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}
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NodeKind::Group => {
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if let Some(g) = svc
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.groups
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.get_by_slug(&node.slug)
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.await
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.map_err(|e| ApplyError::Backend(e.to_string()))?
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{
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require(svc.authz.as_ref(), principal, Capability::GroupAdmin(g.id))
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.await
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.map_err(map_authz)?;
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}
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}
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}
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}
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tracing::info!(
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user_id = ?principal.user_id,
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env = %env,
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nodes = bundle.nodes.len(),
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"apply: approved gated-environment apply (audit)"
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);
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Ok(())
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}
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/// Per-node capability check for a tree plan/apply. `prune` widens an apply's
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/// write requirement to every kind. A plan (`prune` ignored, no writes) needs
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/// only the per-node read cap.
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@@ -503,7 +576,9 @@ impl IntoResponse for ApplyError {
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StatusCode::UNPROCESSABLE_ENTITY,
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json!({ "error": self.to_string() }),
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),
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Self::StateMoved => (StatusCode::CONFLICT, json!({ "error": self.to_string() })),
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Self::StateMoved | Self::ApprovalRequired(_) => {
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(StatusCode::CONFLICT, json!({ "error": self.to_string() }))
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}
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Self::Forbidden => (StatusCode::FORBIDDEN, json!({ "error": self.to_string() })),
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Self::AuthzRepo(e) => {
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tracing::error!(error = %e, "apply authz repo error");
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@@ -505,6 +505,46 @@ pub struct TreeNode {
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pub struct TreeBundle {
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#[serde(default)]
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pub nodes: Vec<TreeNode>,
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/// Project-level policy from the repo's root manifest `[project]` block
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/// (§4.2/§6, M5). The server re-derives env approval policy from here — the
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/// CLI's enforcement is convenience, this is authoritative.
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#[serde(default)]
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pub project: Option<ProjectPolicy>,
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}
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/// Project-level policy (the root manifest's `[project]` block, M5).
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, Deserialize)]
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pub struct ProjectPolicy {
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#[serde(default)]
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pub environments: Vec<EnvPolicy>,
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}
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/// One environment's apply policy. `confirm = true` makes applying to this env a
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/// gated, default-off step: a per-env `--approve <name>` is required (a blanket
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/// `--yes` does NOT cover it) and the act is admin-gated + audited (§4.2).
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize)]
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pub struct EnvPolicy {
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pub name: String,
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#[serde(default)]
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pub confirm: bool,
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}
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impl ProjectPolicy {
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/// Does environment `env` require explicit approval to apply?
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#[must_use]
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pub fn confirm_required(&self, env: &str) -> bool {
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self.environments.iter().any(|e| e.name == env && e.confirm)
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}
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/// Names of every confirm-required environment (for `plan` to surface).
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#[must_use]
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pub fn gated_envs(&self) -> Vec<String> {
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self.environments
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.iter()
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.filter(|e| e.confirm)
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.map(|e| e.name.clone())
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.collect()
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}
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}
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/// One node's diff within a tree plan.
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@@ -523,6 +563,11 @@ pub struct NodePlan {
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pub struct TreePlanResult {
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pub nodes: Vec<NodePlan>,
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pub state_token: String,
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/// Environments the project marks confirm-required (§4.2, M5): applying to
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/// one needs an explicit `pic apply --approve <env>`. Surfaced so CI sees
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/// the gate at `plan` time, before an `apply` refuses.
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#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Vec::is_empty")]
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pub approvals_required: Vec<String>,
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}
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// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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@@ -627,6 +672,11 @@ pub enum ApplyError {
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StateMoved,
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#[error("forbidden")]
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Forbidden,
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#[error(
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"environment `{0}` requires explicit approval to apply; \
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re-run with `--approve {0}` (a blanket `--yes` does not cover it)"
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)]
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ApprovalRequired(String),
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#[error("authorization repo error: {0}")]
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AuthzRepo(String),
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#[error("backend: {0}")]
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@@ -1463,9 +1513,15 @@ impl ApplyService {
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plan: p.plan,
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})
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.collect();
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let approvals_required = bundle
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.project
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.as_ref()
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.map(ProjectPolicy::gated_envs)
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.unwrap_or_default();
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Ok(TreePlanResult {
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nodes,
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state_token: token,
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approvals_required,
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})
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}
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@@ -1719,6 +1775,18 @@ impl ApplyService {
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token_parts.push(format!("gs|{gid}|{}", g.structure_version));
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}
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}
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// Fold the env approval policy (desired state) into the token, so a
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// policy edit between plan and apply trips StateMoved (M5). Sorted for
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// order-independence.
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if let Some(policy) = &bundle.project {
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let mut envs: Vec<String> = policy
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.environments
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.iter()
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.map(|e| format!("{}={}", e.name, e.confirm))
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.collect();
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envs.sort_unstable();
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token_parts.push(format!("proj|{}", envs.join(",")));
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}
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token_parts.sort_unstable();
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Ok((prepared, combine_tokens(&token_parts)))
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}
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@@ -4732,4 +4800,24 @@ mod tests {
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"queue identity is queue_name-only: {p:?}"
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);
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}
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#[test]
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fn project_policy_gates_only_confirm_required_envs() {
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let policy = ProjectPolicy {
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environments: vec![
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EnvPolicy {
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name: "production".into(),
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confirm: true,
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},
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EnvPolicy {
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name: "staging".into(),
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confirm: false,
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},
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],
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};
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assert!(policy.confirm_required("production"));
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assert!(!policy.confirm_required("staging"));
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assert!(!policy.confirm_required("unknown"));
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assert_eq!(policy.gated_envs(), vec!["production".to_string()]);
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}
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}
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