feat(manager-core): admin auth gate (Phase 3a)

Closes the regression risk of the admin API and dashboard being open
to anyone reaching the bound port. Required foundation before v1.1
data-plane services land.

Per-user accounts (admin_users), Argon2id passwords, env-var bootstrap
of the first admin that becomes inert once any admin exists, opaque
32-byte session token doubling as bearer credential, 24h sliding TTL
configurable via PICLOUD_SESSION_TTL_HOURS. is_active column lets
admins be deactivated without losing audit history; last-active-admin
guard on DELETE and on PATCH that flips is_active to false (sessions
also wiped on deactivation).

require_admin middleware fronts every /api/v1/admin/* route. The data
plane (/api/v1/execute/{id}), /healthz, /version, and user routes
stay open. picloud admin reset-password <username> subcommand handles
recovery without going through HTTP.

Dashboard gains /admin/login and /admin/admins surfaces, a top-bar
user menu, and a token store with a localStorage echo so refreshes
don't sign you out. Cookie-based auth works in parallel for non-SPA
clients.

Forward compatibility: future RBAC tables (admin_roles,
admin_user_roles) join on admin_users.id; the auth middleware is the
seam where role checks slot in. Email, 2FA, passkeys, and personal
API tokens are all additive without touching admin_users.

Blueprint §11.4 updated to reflect what actually shipped.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
MechaCat02
2026-05-25 19:30:25 +02:00
parent 646bd55174
commit 6891496589
23 changed files with 3103 additions and 37 deletions

37
Cargo.lock generated
View File

@@ -46,6 +46,18 @@ version = "1.0.102"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "7f202df86484c868dbad7eaa557ef785d5c66295e41b460ef922eca0723b842c"
[[package]]
name = "argon2"
version = "0.5.3"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "3c3610892ee6e0cbce8ae2700349fcf8f98adb0dbfbee85aec3c9179d29cc072"
dependencies = [
"base64ct",
"blake2",
"cpufeatures",
"password-hash",
]
[[package]]
name = "assert-json-diff"
version = "2.0.2"
@@ -206,6 +218,15 @@ dependencies = [
"serde_core",
]
[[package]]
name = "blake2"
version = "0.10.6"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "46502ad458c9a52b69d4d4d32775c788b7a1b85e8bc9d482d92250fc0e3f8efe"
dependencies = [
"digest",
]
[[package]]
name = "block-buffer"
version = "0.10.4"
@@ -1233,6 +1254,17 @@ dependencies = [
"windows-link",
]
[[package]]
name = "password-hash"
version = "0.5.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "346f04948ba92c43e8469c1ee6736c7563d71012b17d40745260fe106aac2166"
dependencies = [
"base64ct",
"rand_core 0.6.4",
"subtle",
]
[[package]]
name = "pear"
version = "0.2.9"
@@ -1337,15 +1369,20 @@ dependencies = [
name = "picloud-manager-core"
version = "0.5.1"
dependencies = [
"argon2",
"async-trait",
"axum",
"base64",
"chrono",
"picloud-orchestrator-core",
"picloud-shared",
"rand 0.8.6",
"serde",
"serde_json",
"sha2",
"sqlx",
"thiserror 1.0.69",
"tokio",
"tracing",
"url",
"uuid",

View File

@@ -66,6 +66,12 @@ reqwest = { version = "0.12", default-features = false, features = ["json", "rus
url = "2"
urlencoding = "2"
# Auth (admin users + sessions)
argon2 = "0.5"
rand = { version = "0.8", features = ["getrandom"] }
sha2 = "0.10"
base64 = "0.22"
[workspace.lints.rust]
unsafe_code = "forbid"

View File

@@ -22,3 +22,11 @@ uuid.workspace = true
chrono.workspace = true
sqlx.workspace = true
url.workspace = true
argon2.workspace = true
rand.workspace = true
sha2.workspace = true
base64.workspace = true
[dev-dependencies]
tokio.workspace = true

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
-- Phase 3a admin auth — see blueprint §11.4.
--
-- Per-user platform-operator accounts (distinct from the v1.1+ `users`
-- table, which is for script-end users). Every authenticated admin is a
-- full admin in this cut; role/permission tables will be added later
-- without touching this schema.
--
-- `admin_sessions.token_hash` stores SHA-256 of the raw token; the raw
-- value only ever exists in the login response, the HttpOnly cookie, and
-- bearer-token requests. Cascade on user delete kills the user's sessions
-- automatically — which is also why deactivating a user can simply wipe
-- their rows instead of marking each session expired.
CREATE TABLE admin_users (
id UUID PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
username TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
password_hash TEXT NOT NULL,
is_active BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT TRUE,
created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
updated_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
last_login_at TIMESTAMPTZ
);
CREATE TABLE admin_sessions (
token_hash TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
user_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES admin_users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
expires_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL,
last_used_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW()
);
CREATE INDEX admin_sessions_user_idx ON admin_sessions (user_id);
CREATE INDEX admin_sessions_expiry_idx ON admin_sessions (expires_at);

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
//! CRUD over the `admin_sessions` table.
//!
//! The token never appears in this module — only its SHA-256 hash. The
//! raw value lives in `auth::GeneratedToken` long enough to hit the
//! cookie and the JSON response, then is forgotten. Lookups also filter
//! expired rows at query time so a delayed prune sweep can never extend
//! a session's life.
use async_trait::async_trait;
use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
use picloud_shared::AdminUserId;
use sqlx::PgPool;
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum AdminSessionRepositoryError {
#[error("database error: {0}")]
Db(#[from] sqlx::Error),
}
/// Result of a session lookup. Includes the user id (for auth context)
/// and the existing `expires_at` so the middleware can decide whether
/// the sliding window bump is worth a write.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct AdminSessionLookup {
pub user_id: AdminUserId,
pub expires_at: DateTime<Utc>,
}
#[async_trait]
pub trait AdminSessionRepository: Send + Sync {
async fn create(
&self,
user_id: AdminUserId,
token_hash: &str,
expires_at: DateTime<Utc>,
) -> Result<(), AdminSessionRepositoryError>;
/// Look up a session by token hash. Returns `None` for missing or
/// already-expired rows (the query filters them).
async fn lookup(
&self,
token_hash: &str,
) -> Result<Option<AdminSessionLookup>, AdminSessionRepositoryError>;
/// Sliding-window bump. Sets `last_used_at = NOW()` and `expires_at`
/// to the supplied value.
async fn touch(
&self,
token_hash: &str,
new_expires_at: DateTime<Utc>,
) -> Result<(), AdminSessionRepositoryError>;
async fn delete(&self, token_hash: &str) -> Result<(), AdminSessionRepositoryError>;
/// Delete every session belonging to a user. Used when the user is
/// deactivated or has their password reset out-of-band — both
/// invalidate all current logins for that account.
async fn delete_for_user(
&self,
user_id: AdminUserId,
) -> Result<u64, AdminSessionRepositoryError>;
/// Sweep expired rows. The auth middleware filters expired rows on
/// lookup, so this is just bounded-growth hygiene, not correctness.
async fn prune_expired(&self) -> Result<u64, AdminSessionRepositoryError>;
}
pub struct PostgresAdminSessionRepository {
pool: PgPool,
}
impl PostgresAdminSessionRepository {
#[must_use]
pub fn new(pool: PgPool) -> Self {
Self { pool }
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl AdminSessionRepository for PostgresAdminSessionRepository {
async fn create(
&self,
user_id: AdminUserId,
token_hash: &str,
expires_at: DateTime<Utc>,
) -> Result<(), AdminSessionRepositoryError> {
sqlx::query(
"INSERT INTO admin_sessions (token_hash, user_id, expires_at) \
VALUES ($1, $2, $3)",
)
.bind(token_hash)
.bind(user_id.into_inner())
.bind(expires_at)
.execute(&self.pool)
.await?;
Ok(())
}
async fn lookup(
&self,
token_hash: &str,
) -> Result<Option<AdminSessionLookup>, AdminSessionRepositoryError> {
let row: Option<(uuid::Uuid, DateTime<Utc>)> = sqlx::query_as(
"SELECT user_id, expires_at FROM admin_sessions \
WHERE token_hash = $1 AND expires_at > NOW()",
)
.bind(token_hash)
.fetch_optional(&self.pool)
.await?;
Ok(row.map(|(uid, exp)| AdminSessionLookup {
user_id: uid.into(),
expires_at: exp,
}))
}
async fn touch(
&self,
token_hash: &str,
new_expires_at: DateTime<Utc>,
) -> Result<(), AdminSessionRepositoryError> {
sqlx::query(
"UPDATE admin_sessions SET last_used_at = NOW(), expires_at = $2 \
WHERE token_hash = $1",
)
.bind(token_hash)
.bind(new_expires_at)
.execute(&self.pool)
.await?;
Ok(())
}
async fn delete(&self, token_hash: &str) -> Result<(), AdminSessionRepositoryError> {
sqlx::query("DELETE FROM admin_sessions WHERE token_hash = $1")
.bind(token_hash)
.execute(&self.pool)
.await?;
Ok(())
}
async fn delete_for_user(
&self,
user_id: AdminUserId,
) -> Result<u64, AdminSessionRepositoryError> {
let res = sqlx::query("DELETE FROM admin_sessions WHERE user_id = $1")
.bind(user_id.into_inner())
.execute(&self.pool)
.await?;
Ok(res.rows_affected())
}
async fn prune_expired(&self) -> Result<u64, AdminSessionRepositoryError> {
let res = sqlx::query("DELETE FROM admin_sessions WHERE expires_at <= NOW()")
.execute(&self.pool)
.await?;
Ok(res.rows_affected())
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,322 @@
//! CRUD over the `admin_users` table.
//!
//! Password hashes go in and come out as opaque strings — this module
//! never inspects or computes them; that's `auth.rs`'s job. The "must
//! keep at least one active admin" guard is implemented as a separate
//! count query the API layer composes around `set_active` / `delete`.
use async_trait::async_trait;
use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
use picloud_shared::AdminUserId;
use sqlx::PgPool;
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum AdminUserRepositoryError {
#[error("database error: {0}")]
Db(#[from] sqlx::Error),
#[error("not found: {0}")]
NotFound(AdminUserId),
#[error("username already taken: {0}")]
DuplicateUsername(String),
}
/// Row returned to handlers and bootstrap. Never includes the password
/// hash by accident — that lives in `AdminUserCredentials` (separate
/// fetch from `get_credentials_by_username`).
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct AdminUserRow {
pub id: AdminUserId,
pub username: String,
pub is_active: bool,
pub created_at: DateTime<Utc>,
pub updated_at: DateTime<Utc>,
pub last_login_at: Option<DateTime<Utc>>,
}
/// Credentials fetched for the login path only. Splitting the hash off
/// from the public row makes it obvious in handler code which calls
/// touch a secret.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct AdminUserCredentials {
pub id: AdminUserId,
pub username: String,
pub password_hash: String,
pub is_active: bool,
}
#[async_trait]
pub trait AdminUserRepository: Send + Sync {
async fn get(&self, id: AdminUserId) -> Result<Option<AdminUserRow>, AdminUserRepositoryError>;
async fn get_by_username(
&self,
username: &str,
) -> Result<Option<AdminUserRow>, AdminUserRepositoryError>;
async fn get_credentials_by_username(
&self,
username: &str,
) -> Result<Option<AdminUserCredentials>, AdminUserRepositoryError>;
async fn list(&self) -> Result<Vec<AdminUserRow>, AdminUserRepositoryError>;
async fn create(
&self,
username: &str,
password_hash: &str,
) -> Result<AdminUserRow, AdminUserRepositoryError>;
async fn update_username(
&self,
id: AdminUserId,
username: &str,
) -> Result<AdminUserRow, AdminUserRepositoryError>;
async fn update_password_hash(
&self,
id: AdminUserId,
password_hash: &str,
) -> Result<AdminUserRow, AdminUserRepositoryError>;
async fn set_active(
&self,
id: AdminUserId,
is_active: bool,
) -> Result<AdminUserRow, AdminUserRepositoryError>;
async fn delete(&self, id: AdminUserId) -> Result<(), AdminUserRepositoryError>;
async fn touch_last_login(&self, id: AdminUserId) -> Result<(), AdminUserRepositoryError>;
/// Count of `is_active = true` rows. Used at bootstrap to decide
/// whether to seed the first admin.
async fn count_active(&self) -> Result<i64, AdminUserRepositoryError>;
/// Count of `is_active = true` rows excluding the given id. Used by
/// last-admin protection: "would deactivating / deleting this user
/// leave zero active admins?"
async fn count_active_excluding(
&self,
id: AdminUserId,
) -> Result<i64, AdminUserRepositoryError>;
}
pub struct PostgresAdminUserRepository {
pool: PgPool,
}
impl PostgresAdminUserRepository {
#[must_use]
pub fn new(pool: PgPool) -> Self {
Self { pool }
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl AdminUserRepository for PostgresAdminUserRepository {
async fn get(&self, id: AdminUserId) -> Result<Option<AdminUserRow>, AdminUserRepositoryError> {
let row = sqlx::query_as::<_, AdminUserRecord>(
"SELECT id, username, is_active, created_at, updated_at, last_login_at \
FROM admin_users WHERE id = $1",
)
.bind(id.into_inner())
.fetch_optional(&self.pool)
.await?;
Ok(row.map(Into::into))
}
async fn get_by_username(
&self,
username: &str,
) -> Result<Option<AdminUserRow>, AdminUserRepositoryError> {
let row = sqlx::query_as::<_, AdminUserRecord>(
"SELECT id, username, is_active, created_at, updated_at, last_login_at \
FROM admin_users WHERE username = $1",
)
.bind(username)
.fetch_optional(&self.pool)
.await?;
Ok(row.map(Into::into))
}
async fn get_credentials_by_username(
&self,
username: &str,
) -> Result<Option<AdminUserCredentials>, AdminUserRepositoryError> {
let row = sqlx::query_as::<_, AdminCredsRecord>(
"SELECT id, username, password_hash, is_active \
FROM admin_users WHERE username = $1",
)
.bind(username)
.fetch_optional(&self.pool)
.await?;
Ok(row.map(Into::into))
}
async fn list(&self) -> Result<Vec<AdminUserRow>, AdminUserRepositoryError> {
let rows = sqlx::query_as::<_, AdminUserRecord>(
"SELECT id, username, is_active, created_at, updated_at, last_login_at \
FROM admin_users ORDER BY username",
)
.fetch_all(&self.pool)
.await?;
Ok(rows.into_iter().map(Into::into).collect())
}
async fn create(
&self,
username: &str,
password_hash: &str,
) -> Result<AdminUserRow, AdminUserRepositoryError> {
let res = sqlx::query_as::<_, AdminUserRecord>(
"INSERT INTO admin_users (username, password_hash) \
VALUES ($1, $2) \
RETURNING id, username, is_active, created_at, updated_at, last_login_at",
)
.bind(username)
.bind(password_hash)
.fetch_one(&self.pool)
.await;
match res {
Ok(row) => Ok(row.into()),
Err(sqlx::Error::Database(e)) if e.is_unique_violation() => Err(
AdminUserRepositoryError::DuplicateUsername(username.to_string()),
),
Err(e) => Err(e.into()),
}
}
async fn update_username(
&self,
id: AdminUserId,
username: &str,
) -> Result<AdminUserRow, AdminUserRepositoryError> {
let res = sqlx::query_as::<_, AdminUserRecord>(
"UPDATE admin_users SET username = $2, updated_at = NOW() \
WHERE id = $1 \
RETURNING id, username, is_active, created_at, updated_at, last_login_at",
)
.bind(id.into_inner())
.bind(username)
.fetch_optional(&self.pool)
.await;
match res {
Ok(Some(row)) => Ok(row.into()),
Ok(None) => Err(AdminUserRepositoryError::NotFound(id)),
Err(sqlx::Error::Database(e)) if e.is_unique_violation() => Err(
AdminUserRepositoryError::DuplicateUsername(username.to_string()),
),
Err(e) => Err(e.into()),
}
}
async fn update_password_hash(
&self,
id: AdminUserId,
password_hash: &str,
) -> Result<AdminUserRow, AdminUserRepositoryError> {
let row = sqlx::query_as::<_, AdminUserRecord>(
"UPDATE admin_users SET password_hash = $2, updated_at = NOW() \
WHERE id = $1 \
RETURNING id, username, is_active, created_at, updated_at, last_login_at",
)
.bind(id.into_inner())
.bind(password_hash)
.fetch_optional(&self.pool)
.await?;
row.map(Into::into)
.ok_or(AdminUserRepositoryError::NotFound(id))
}
async fn set_active(
&self,
id: AdminUserId,
is_active: bool,
) -> Result<AdminUserRow, AdminUserRepositoryError> {
let row = sqlx::query_as::<_, AdminUserRecord>(
"UPDATE admin_users SET is_active = $2, updated_at = NOW() \
WHERE id = $1 \
RETURNING id, username, is_active, created_at, updated_at, last_login_at",
)
.bind(id.into_inner())
.bind(is_active)
.fetch_optional(&self.pool)
.await?;
row.map(Into::into)
.ok_or(AdminUserRepositoryError::NotFound(id))
}
async fn delete(&self, id: AdminUserId) -> Result<(), AdminUserRepositoryError> {
let res = sqlx::query("DELETE FROM admin_users WHERE id = $1")
.bind(id.into_inner())
.execute(&self.pool)
.await?;
if res.rows_affected() == 0 {
return Err(AdminUserRepositoryError::NotFound(id));
}
Ok(())
}
async fn touch_last_login(&self, id: AdminUserId) -> Result<(), AdminUserRepositoryError> {
sqlx::query("UPDATE admin_users SET last_login_at = NOW() WHERE id = $1")
.bind(id.into_inner())
.execute(&self.pool)
.await?;
Ok(())
}
async fn count_active(&self) -> Result<i64, AdminUserRepositoryError> {
let (count,): (i64,) =
sqlx::query_as("SELECT COUNT(*)::BIGINT FROM admin_users WHERE is_active")
.fetch_one(&self.pool)
.await?;
Ok(count)
}
async fn count_active_excluding(
&self,
id: AdminUserId,
) -> Result<i64, AdminUserRepositoryError> {
let (count,): (i64,) =
sqlx::query_as("SELECT COUNT(*)::BIGINT FROM admin_users WHERE is_active AND id <> $1")
.bind(id.into_inner())
.fetch_one(&self.pool)
.await?;
Ok(count)
}
}
#[derive(sqlx::FromRow)]
struct AdminUserRecord {
id: uuid::Uuid,
username: String,
is_active: bool,
created_at: DateTime<Utc>,
updated_at: DateTime<Utc>,
last_login_at: Option<DateTime<Utc>>,
}
impl From<AdminUserRecord> for AdminUserRow {
fn from(r: AdminUserRecord) -> Self {
Self {
id: r.id.into(),
username: r.username,
is_active: r.is_active,
created_at: r.created_at,
updated_at: r.updated_at,
last_login_at: r.last_login_at,
}
}
}
#[derive(sqlx::FromRow)]
struct AdminCredsRecord {
id: uuid::Uuid,
username: String,
password_hash: String,
is_active: bool,
}
impl From<AdminCredsRecord> for AdminUserCredentials {
fn from(r: AdminCredsRecord) -> Self {
Self {
id: r.id.into(),
username: r.username,
password_hash: r.password_hash,
is_active: r.is_active,
}
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,320 @@
//! `/api/v1/admin/admins/*` — admin user CRUD. Guarded by
//! `require_admin`; every authenticated admin can call all of these.
//! Role/permission walls land later (see blueprint §11.4 — no
//! privilege levels in this cut).
//!
//! "Last active admin" protection lives at the service layer (not just
//! the DB) so it can produce a clean 422 with a human-readable message
//! rather than a SQL constraint violation. Deactivating a user also
//! wipes their sessions; deleting cascades through the FK.
use std::sync::Arc;
use axum::extract::{Path, State};
use axum::http::StatusCode;
use axum::response::{IntoResponse, Json, Response};
use axum::routing::get;
use axum::Router;
use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
use picloud_shared::AdminUserId;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use serde_json::json;
use crate::admin_session_repo::AdminSessionRepository;
use crate::admin_user_repo::{AdminUserRepository, AdminUserRepositoryError, AdminUserRow};
use crate::auth::hash_password;
/// Validation knobs are tuned by NIST 800-63B-ish guidance: username is
/// a strict ASCII subset so the lookup column stays predictable, and
/// password has a minimum length but no complexity rules (complexity
/// rules push users to predictable patterns).
const USERNAME_MIN: usize = 2;
const USERNAME_MAX: usize = 32;
const PASSWORD_MIN: usize = 8;
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct AdminsState {
pub users: Arc<dyn AdminUserRepository>,
pub sessions: Arc<dyn AdminSessionRepository>,
}
pub fn admins_router(state: AdminsState) -> Router {
Router::new()
.route("/admins", get(list_admins).post(create_admin))
.route(
"/admins/{id}",
get(get_admin).patch(patch_admin).delete(delete_admin),
)
.with_state(state)
}
// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
// DTOs
// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
#[derive(Debug, Serialize)]
pub struct AdminDto {
pub id: AdminUserId,
pub username: String,
pub is_active: bool,
pub created_at: DateTime<Utc>,
pub last_login_at: Option<DateTime<Utc>>,
}
impl From<AdminUserRow> for AdminDto {
fn from(r: AdminUserRow) -> Self {
Self {
id: r.id,
username: r.username,
is_active: r.is_active,
created_at: r.created_at,
last_login_at: r.last_login_at,
}
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
pub struct CreateAdminRequest {
pub username: String,
pub password: String,
}
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize, Default)]
pub struct PatchAdminRequest {
pub username: Option<String>,
pub password: Option<String>,
pub is_active: Option<bool>,
}
// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Handlers
// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
async fn list_admins(
State(state): State<AdminsState>,
) -> Result<Json<Vec<AdminDto>>, AdminApiError> {
let rows = state.users.list().await?;
Ok(Json(rows.into_iter().map(Into::into).collect()))
}
async fn get_admin(
State(state): State<AdminsState>,
Path(id): Path<AdminUserId>,
) -> Result<Json<AdminDto>, AdminApiError> {
state
.users
.get(id)
.await?
.map(AdminDto::from)
.map(Json)
.ok_or(AdminApiError::NotFound(id))
}
async fn create_admin(
State(state): State<AdminsState>,
Json(input): Json<CreateAdminRequest>,
) -> Result<(StatusCode, Json<AdminDto>), AdminApiError> {
let username = input.username.trim();
validate_username(username)?;
validate_password(&input.password)?;
let hash = hash_password(&input.password).map_err(|e| AdminApiError::Hash(e.to_string()))?;
let row = state.users.create(username, &hash).await?;
Ok((StatusCode::CREATED, Json(row.into())))
}
async fn patch_admin(
State(state): State<AdminsState>,
Path(id): Path<AdminUserId>,
Json(input): Json<PatchAdminRequest>,
) -> Result<Json<AdminDto>, AdminApiError> {
// Verify the target exists upfront — keeps the error path uniform
// for "rename a missing user" etc.
let _ = state
.users
.get(id)
.await?
.ok_or(AdminApiError::NotFound(id))?;
let mut latest: Option<AdminUserRow> = None;
if let Some(raw_username) = input.username.as_deref() {
let new_username = raw_username.trim();
validate_username(new_username)?;
latest = Some(state.users.update_username(id, new_username).await?);
}
if let Some(new_password) = input.password.as_deref() {
validate_password(new_password)?;
let hash = hash_password(new_password).map_err(|e| AdminApiError::Hash(e.to_string()))?;
latest = Some(state.users.update_password_hash(id, &hash).await?);
// Best practice: rotating your own password should still keep
// your session alive, so we don't wipe sessions here. (If we
// wanted "log everyone else out on password change", that'd be
// a `delete_for_user` + re-issue current session. Out of scope
// for the initial cut.)
}
if let Some(new_active) = input.is_active {
// Last-active-admin guard: only when transitioning to inactive.
if !new_active {
let remaining = state.users.count_active_excluding(id).await?;
if remaining == 0 {
return Err(AdminApiError::LastActiveAdmin);
}
}
latest = Some(state.users.set_active(id, new_active).await?);
// Deactivation invalidates all of the user's sessions. Cheap
// and safer than waiting for sliding-window expiry.
if !new_active {
if let Err(err) = state.sessions.delete_for_user(id).await {
tracing::error!(?err, "failed to delete sessions for deactivated admin");
}
}
}
let row = match latest {
Some(r) => r,
None => state
.users
.get(id)
.await?
.ok_or(AdminApiError::NotFound(id))?,
};
Ok(Json(row.into()))
}
async fn delete_admin(
State(state): State<AdminsState>,
Path(id): Path<AdminUserId>,
) -> Result<StatusCode, AdminApiError> {
let target = state
.users
.get(id)
.await?
.ok_or(AdminApiError::NotFound(id))?;
if target.is_active {
let remaining = state.users.count_active_excluding(id).await?;
if remaining == 0 {
return Err(AdminApiError::LastActiveAdmin);
}
}
state.users.delete(id).await?;
// Sessions cascade via FK; no explicit delete needed.
Ok(StatusCode::NO_CONTENT)
}
// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Validation
// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
fn validate_username(s: &str) -> Result<(), AdminApiError> {
if s.len() < USERNAME_MIN || s.len() > USERNAME_MAX {
return Err(AdminApiError::InvalidUsername(format!(
"username must be {USERNAME_MIN}-{USERNAME_MAX} characters"
)));
}
if !s
.bytes()
.all(|b| b.is_ascii_lowercase() || b.is_ascii_digit() || matches!(b, b'.' | b'_' | b'-'))
{
return Err(AdminApiError::InvalidUsername(
"username may contain only lowercase letters, digits, dot, underscore, and hyphen"
.to_string(),
));
}
Ok(())
}
fn validate_password(s: &str) -> Result<(), AdminApiError> {
if s.chars().count() < PASSWORD_MIN {
return Err(AdminApiError::InvalidPassword(format!(
"password must be at least {PASSWORD_MIN} characters"
)));
}
Ok(())
}
// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Errors
// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum AdminApiError {
#[error("admin user not found: {0}")]
NotFound(AdminUserId),
#[error("{0}")]
InvalidUsername(String),
#[error("{0}")]
InvalidPassword(String),
#[error("cannot leave the system with zero active admins")]
LastActiveAdmin,
#[error("failed to hash password: {0}")]
Hash(String),
#[error("repository error: {0}")]
Repo(#[from] AdminUserRepositoryError),
}
impl IntoResponse for AdminApiError {
fn into_response(self) -> Response {
let (status, message) = match &self {
Self::NotFound(_) => (StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, self.to_string()),
Self::Repo(AdminUserRepositoryError::DuplicateUsername(_)) => {
(StatusCode::CONFLICT, self.to_string())
}
Self::InvalidUsername(_) | Self::InvalidPassword(_) | Self::LastActiveAdmin => {
(StatusCode::UNPROCESSABLE_ENTITY, self.to_string())
}
Self::Repo(AdminUserRepositoryError::NotFound(_)) => {
(StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, self.to_string())
}
Self::Repo(AdminUserRepositoryError::Db(e)) => {
tracing::error!(error = %e, "admin_users db error");
(
StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
"internal error".to_string(),
)
}
Self::Hash(_) => {
tracing::error!(error = %self, "password hashing failed");
(
StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
"internal error".to_string(),
)
}
};
(status, Json(json!({ "error": message }))).into_response()
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn username_validation_accepts_valid() {
for u in ["ab", "alice", "user.name", "a_b-c", "00bot00"] {
assert!(validate_username(u).is_ok(), "should accept {u}");
}
}
#[test]
fn username_validation_rejects_invalid() {
for u in ["", "a", "Alice", "user name", "user@domain", "user!"] {
assert!(validate_username(u).is_err(), "should reject {u:?}");
}
let too_long = "x".repeat(33);
assert!(validate_username(&too_long).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn password_validation_enforces_min_length() {
assert!(validate_password("1234567").is_err());
assert!(validate_password("12345678").is_ok());
assert!(validate_password("a-very-long-password-with-spaces and stuff").is_ok());
}
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
//! Pure auth helpers: password hashing, session-token generation, and
//! token-to-hash conversion. No DB, no HTTP — repos and middleware live
//! in their own modules. Keeping this surface pure also keeps the unit
//! tests fast (no Postgres needed).
//!
//! Hash algorithm is Argon2id with the OWASP default parameters
//! (`Argon2::default()`). Tokens are 32 cryptographically random bytes
//! base64-url-encoded for the wire; their SHA-256 (hex) is what hits the
//! sessions table.
use argon2::password_hash::rand_core::OsRng as ArgonRng;
use argon2::password_hash::{PasswordHash, PasswordHasher, PasswordVerifier, SaltString};
use argon2::Argon2;
use base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD;
use base64::Engine as _;
use rand::rngs::OsRng;
use rand::RngCore;
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
/// Returned when the supplied password hash string isn't a valid PHC
/// Argon2id encoding. Only surfaces at bootstrap time when the operator
/// passes `PICLOUD_ADMIN_PASSWORD_HASH`.
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
#[error("invalid Argon2id PHC hash")]
pub struct InvalidPasswordHash;
/// Hash a raw password into an Argon2id PHC-formatted string suitable
/// for `admin_users.password_hash`. The output already encodes the salt
/// and parameters; nothing else needs to be persisted alongside it.
pub fn hash_password(raw: &str) -> Result<String, argon2::password_hash::Error> {
let salt = SaltString::generate(&mut ArgonRng);
let hash = Argon2::default().hash_password(raw.as_bytes(), &salt)?;
Ok(hash.to_string())
}
/// Constant-ish-time verify of a raw password against a PHC hash.
/// Returns `false` for any error (including malformed stored hash) —
/// callers should treat that case identically to "wrong password" so
/// nothing leaks about why auth failed.
#[must_use]
pub fn verify_password(stored_hash: &str, raw: &str) -> bool {
let Ok(parsed) = PasswordHash::new(stored_hash) else {
return false;
};
Argon2::default()
.verify_password(raw.as_bytes(), &parsed)
.is_ok()
}
/// Validate that a string parses as a PHC Argon2id hash — used at
/// bootstrap to fail fast on malformed `PICLOUD_ADMIN_PASSWORD_HASH`
/// rather than write garbage into the DB and discover it at first login.
pub fn validate_password_hash(stored_hash: &str) -> Result<(), InvalidPasswordHash> {
PasswordHash::new(stored_hash).map_err(|_| InvalidPasswordHash)?;
Ok(())
}
/// Newly minted session token: `raw` goes to the client (cookie + JSON
/// response), `hash` is what gets stored. Raw is unrecoverable from hash
/// even if the DB leaks.
pub struct GeneratedToken {
pub raw: String,
pub hash: String,
}
/// Generate a fresh session token (32 random bytes base64-url-encoded).
/// Always succeeds — `OsRng::fill_bytes` panics on entropy failure
/// instead of returning, but that's a non-recoverable system condition.
#[must_use]
pub fn generate_session_token() -> GeneratedToken {
let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
OsRng.fill_bytes(&mut bytes);
let raw = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(bytes);
let hash = hash_token(&raw);
GeneratedToken { raw, hash }
}
/// SHA-256(raw) as lower-case hex. Stable lookup key for
/// `admin_sessions.token_hash`.
#[must_use]
pub fn hash_token(raw: &str) -> String {
let digest = Sha256::digest(raw.as_bytes());
hex(&digest)
}
fn hex(bytes: &[u8]) -> String {
const HEX: &[u8; 16] = b"0123456789abcdef";
let mut out = String::with_capacity(bytes.len() * 2);
for &b in bytes {
out.push(HEX[(b >> 4) as usize] as char);
out.push(HEX[(b & 0x0f) as usize] as char);
}
out
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn hash_verify_roundtrip() {
let h = hash_password("correct horse battery staple").unwrap();
assert!(verify_password(&h, "correct horse battery staple"));
assert!(!verify_password(&h, "wrong"));
}
#[test]
fn verify_returns_false_on_malformed_hash() {
assert!(!verify_password("not-a-phc-string", "anything"));
}
#[test]
fn validate_password_hash_accepts_phc() {
let h = hash_password("pw").unwrap();
assert!(validate_password_hash(&h).is_ok());
}
#[test]
fn validate_password_hash_rejects_garbage() {
assert!(validate_password_hash("not a hash").is_err());
}
#[test]
fn generate_token_unique_and_hash_stable() {
let a = generate_session_token();
let b = generate_session_token();
assert_ne!(a.raw, b.raw, "tokens must be unique");
assert_ne!(a.hash, b.hash, "hashes must differ");
assert_eq!(a.hash, hash_token(&a.raw), "hash must be reproducible");
assert_eq!(a.hash.len(), 64, "sha256-hex is 64 chars");
}
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,233 @@
//! `/api/v1/admin/auth/*` — login, logout, who-am-I.
//!
//! Login mints an opaque session token, stores its SHA-256, sets the
//! `picloud_session` HttpOnly cookie, and also returns the raw token in
//! the JSON body for non-browser clients. The same token works as
//! `Authorization: Bearer …` afterward; there is no separate "API
//! token" concept yet.
//!
//! Logout deletes the session row regardless of whether the supplied
//! token matched anything (idempotent). `me` returns the row that the
//! middleware already attached to the request extensions.
use axum::body::Body;
use axum::extract::{Extension, Request, State};
use axum::http::{header, HeaderMap, HeaderValue, StatusCode};
use axum::middleware::from_fn_with_state;
use axum::response::{IntoResponse, Json, Response};
use axum::routing::{get, post};
use axum::Router;
use chrono::{DateTime, Duration as ChronoDuration, Utc};
use picloud_shared::AdminUserId;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use serde_json::json;
use crate::auth::{generate_session_token, hash_token, verify_password};
use crate::auth_middleware::{require_admin, AuthState, AuthedAdmin, SESSION_COOKIE};
pub fn auth_router(state: AuthState) -> Router {
// /login + /logout are unguarded (login is how you get in; logout
// is idempotent). /me is guarded — by definition it needs to know
// who you are, so the middleware must run first.
let guarded = Router::new()
.route("/auth/me", get(me))
.route_layer(from_fn_with_state(state.clone(), require_admin));
Router::new()
.route("/auth/login", post(login))
.route("/auth/logout", post(logout))
.merge(guarded)
.with_state(state)
}
// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
// DTOs
// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
pub struct LoginRequest {
pub username: String,
pub password: String,
}
#[derive(Debug, Serialize)]
pub struct LoginResponse {
pub user: AdminUserDto,
pub token: String,
pub expires_at: DateTime<Utc>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Serialize)]
pub struct AdminUserDto {
pub id: AdminUserId,
pub username: String,
}
// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Handlers
// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
async fn login(State(state): State<AuthState>, Json(input): Json<LoginRequest>) -> Response {
// Always perform a verify, even on missing/inactive users, to flatten
// timing and prevent username enumeration. The dummy hash is a real
// Argon2id PHC string for "x" — the verify will simply fail.
const DUMMY_HASH: &str = "$argon2id$v=19$m=19456,t=2,p=1$dGltaW5nLWZsYXR0ZW4$Ux6dgPqgX1Mhg5fRgIeKZF3MWdYqJplKEz/cKLcSdks";
let creds = match state
.users
.get_credentials_by_username(&input.username)
.await
{
Ok(c) => c,
Err(err) => {
tracing::error!(?err, "admin_users credentials lookup failed");
return internal_error();
}
};
let (stored_hash, user_id, username, is_active) = match creds {
Some(c) => (c.password_hash, Some(c.id), c.username, c.is_active),
None => (DUMMY_HASH.to_string(), None, String::new(), false),
};
let password_ok = verify_password(&stored_hash, &input.password);
if !password_ok || user_id.is_none() || !is_active {
return invalid_credentials();
}
let user_id = user_id.unwrap();
let token = generate_session_token();
let expires_at = Utc::now()
+ ChronoDuration::from_std(state.ttl).unwrap_or_else(|_| ChronoDuration::hours(24));
if let Err(err) = state
.sessions
.create(user_id, &token.hash, expires_at)
.await
{
tracing::error!(?err, "admin_sessions insert failed");
return internal_error();
}
if let Err(err) = state.users.touch_last_login(user_id).await {
// Non-fatal — log and continue. Login itself succeeded.
tracing::warn!(?err, "failed to touch admin last_login_at");
}
let mut headers = HeaderMap::new();
headers.insert(
header::SET_COOKIE,
HeaderValue::from_str(&build_cookie(&token.raw, state.ttl)).unwrap_or_else(|_| {
// Cookie text is ASCII-clean by construction; this branch is
// unreachable in practice but the type signature requires it.
HeaderValue::from_static("")
}),
);
(
StatusCode::OK,
headers,
Json(LoginResponse {
user: AdminUserDto {
id: user_id,
username,
},
token: token.raw,
expires_at,
}),
)
.into_response()
}
async fn logout(State(state): State<AuthState>, req: Request<Body>) -> Response {
// Pull token without requiring a valid session (logout is idempotent
// and we still want to clear the cookie on the client side).
let token = extract_token_for_logout(&req);
if let Some(raw) = token {
let hash = hash_token(&raw);
if let Err(err) = state.sessions.delete(&hash).await {
tracing::error!(?err, "admin_sessions delete failed");
// Still clear the cookie below.
}
}
let mut headers = HeaderMap::new();
headers.insert(
header::SET_COOKIE,
HeaderValue::from_static("picloud_session=; HttpOnly; Path=/; SameSite=Lax; Max-Age=0"),
);
(StatusCode::NO_CONTENT, headers).into_response()
}
async fn me(Extension(admin): Extension<AuthedAdmin>) -> Json<AdminUserDto> {
Json(AdminUserDto {
id: admin.id,
username: admin.username,
})
}
// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Helpers
// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
fn build_cookie(raw_token: &str, ttl: std::time::Duration) -> String {
// Secure is on by default; flip to off for HTTP-only dev with
// PICLOUD_COOKIE_SECURE=0. The header-injected bearer token works
// either way, so this is purely for browsers that prefer the cookie
// path (e.g., direct API hits without the dashboard's auth.ts).
let secure = std::env::var("PICLOUD_COOKIE_SECURE").ok().is_none_or(|v| {
!matches!(
v.to_ascii_lowercase().as_str(),
"0" | "false" | "no" | "off"
)
});
let secure_attr = if secure { "; Secure" } else { "" };
format!(
"{SESSION_COOKIE}={raw_token}; HttpOnly{secure_attr}; SameSite=Lax; Path=/; Max-Age={}",
ttl.as_secs()
)
}
fn extract_token_for_logout(req: &Request<Body>) -> Option<String> {
// Same precedence as the middleware — Authorization first, cookie
// fallback. Duplicated here because logout has to read the request
// before any middleware would run.
if let Some(value) = req.headers().get(header::AUTHORIZATION) {
if let Ok(s) = value.to_str() {
if let Some(token) = s.strip_prefix("Bearer ") {
let trimmed = token.trim();
if !trimmed.is_empty() {
return Some(trimmed.to_string());
}
}
}
}
if let Some(value) = req.headers().get(header::COOKIE) {
if let Ok(s) = value.to_str() {
for chunk in s.split(';') {
let chunk = chunk.trim();
if let Some(rest) = chunk.strip_prefix(&format!("{SESSION_COOKIE}=")) {
if !rest.is_empty() {
return Some(rest.to_string());
}
}
}
}
}
None
}
fn invalid_credentials() -> Response {
(
StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
Json(json!({ "error": "invalid credentials" })),
)
.into_response()
}
fn internal_error() -> Response {
(
StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
Json(json!({ "error": "internal error" })),
)
.into_response()
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,293 @@
//! First-run admin seeding from env vars. Idempotent: if any admin
//! already exists, this is a no-op (and a warning is logged when the
//! env vars are also set, so the operator notices the inert state).
//!
//! On a fresh install, exactly one row is inserted from:
//! - `PICLOUD_ADMIN_USERNAME` (required)
//! - `PICLOUD_ADMIN_PASSWORD_HASH` (preferred — pre-computed PHC) OR
//! - `PICLOUD_ADMIN_PASSWORD` (fallback — raw, hashed on the way in)
//!
//! After that initial seed, the env vars become inert. This is
//! deliberate: the env var is a one-time setup hatch, not a permanent
//! override (which would let anyone with systemd/compose access change
//! any admin's password without authentication). Recovery is the CLI
//! subcommand `picloud admin reset-password <username>`.
//!
//! The env-var reading is factored into `BootstrapEnv::from_process`
//! so the core logic stays pure (and testable) — the only side effect
//! in `bootstrap_first_admin` is the DB write and a tracing log.
use tracing::{info, warn};
use crate::admin_user_repo::AdminUserRepository;
use crate::auth::{hash_password, validate_password_hash};
pub const ENV_USERNAME: &str = "PICLOUD_ADMIN_USERNAME";
pub const ENV_PASSWORD: &str = "PICLOUD_ADMIN_PASSWORD";
pub const ENV_PASSWORD_HASH: &str = "PICLOUD_ADMIN_PASSWORD_HASH";
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum BootstrapError {
#[error("repository error: {0}")]
Repo(#[from] crate::admin_user_repo::AdminUserRepositoryError),
#[error("{ENV_USERNAME} not set (required to bootstrap the first admin)")]
MissingUsername,
#[error(
"no admin password env var set; provide {ENV_PASSWORD_HASH} (preferred) or {ENV_PASSWORD}"
)]
MissingPassword,
#[error("{ENV_PASSWORD_HASH} is not a valid Argon2id PHC string")]
InvalidHash,
#[error("failed to hash password: {0}")]
HashFailure(String),
}
/// Captured-at-call-site env values. The fields map 1:1 to the bootstrap
/// env vars. Read from the live process with `from_process`, or build
/// directly in tests to keep them free of process-env races.
#[derive(Debug, Default, Clone)]
pub struct BootstrapEnv {
pub username: Option<String>,
pub password: Option<String>,
pub password_hash: Option<String>,
}
impl BootstrapEnv {
/// Snapshot the bootstrap env vars from the current process.
#[must_use]
pub fn from_process() -> Self {
Self {
username: std::env::var(ENV_USERNAME).ok(),
password: std::env::var(ENV_PASSWORD).ok(),
password_hash: std::env::var(ENV_PASSWORD_HASH).ok(),
}
}
fn any_set(&self) -> bool {
self.username.is_some() || self.password.is_some() || self.password_hash.is_some()
}
}
/// Run the bootstrap. Reads env vars from the live process — the
/// canonical wiring for the binary.
pub async fn bootstrap_first_admin<R: AdminUserRepository + ?Sized>(
repo: &R,
) -> Result<(), BootstrapError> {
bootstrap_first_admin_with(repo, BootstrapEnv::from_process()).await
}
/// Run the bootstrap against an explicit env. Used by tests to keep
/// the bootstrap logic independent of process state.
pub async fn bootstrap_first_admin_with<R: AdminUserRepository + ?Sized>(
repo: &R,
env: BootstrapEnv,
) -> Result<(), BootstrapError> {
if repo.count_active().await? > 0 {
if env.any_set() {
warn!(
"{ENV_USERNAME}/{ENV_PASSWORD}/{ENV_PASSWORD_HASH} set but admin_users \
already populated — env values ignored. Use \
`picloud admin reset-password <user>` to change a password."
);
}
return Ok(());
}
let username = env.username.ok_or(BootstrapError::MissingUsername)?;
let password_hash = match (env.password_hash, env.password) {
(Some(hash), maybe_raw) => {
if maybe_raw.is_some() {
warn!(
"both {ENV_PASSWORD_HASH} and {ENV_PASSWORD} set — \
using the pre-computed hash; raw password ignored."
);
}
validate_password_hash(&hash).map_err(|_| BootstrapError::InvalidHash)?;
hash
}
(None, Some(raw)) => {
hash_password(&raw).map_err(|e| BootstrapError::HashFailure(e.to_string()))?
}
(None, None) => return Err(BootstrapError::MissingPassword),
};
repo.create(&username, &password_hash).await?;
info!(username = %username, "bootstrapped initial admin user");
Ok(())
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
//! These tests use an in-memory `AdminUserRepository` and the
//! `bootstrap_first_admin_with` overload so they never touch
//! process-global env vars. They can run in parallel safely.
use super::*;
use async_trait::async_trait;
use chrono::Utc;
use picloud_shared::AdminUserId;
use std::sync::Mutex;
use crate::admin_user_repo::{AdminUserCredentials, AdminUserRepositoryError, AdminUserRow};
#[derive(Default)]
struct InMemoryRepo {
rows: Mutex<Vec<AdminUserRow>>,
}
#[async_trait]
impl AdminUserRepository for InMemoryRepo {
async fn get(
&self,
_id: AdminUserId,
) -> Result<Option<AdminUserRow>, AdminUserRepositoryError> {
unimplemented!()
}
async fn get_by_username(
&self,
_u: &str,
) -> Result<Option<AdminUserRow>, AdminUserRepositoryError> {
unimplemented!()
}
async fn get_credentials_by_username(
&self,
_u: &str,
) -> Result<Option<AdminUserCredentials>, AdminUserRepositoryError> {
unimplemented!()
}
async fn list(&self) -> Result<Vec<AdminUserRow>, AdminUserRepositoryError> {
unimplemented!()
}
async fn create(
&self,
username: &str,
_password_hash: &str,
) -> Result<AdminUserRow, AdminUserRepositoryError> {
let row = AdminUserRow {
id: AdminUserId::new(),
username: username.to_string(),
is_active: true,
created_at: Utc::now(),
updated_at: Utc::now(),
last_login_at: None,
};
self.rows.lock().unwrap().push(row.clone());
Ok(row)
}
async fn update_username(
&self,
_i: AdminUserId,
_u: &str,
) -> Result<AdminUserRow, AdminUserRepositoryError> {
unimplemented!()
}
async fn update_password_hash(
&self,
_i: AdminUserId,
_h: &str,
) -> Result<AdminUserRow, AdminUserRepositoryError> {
unimplemented!()
}
async fn set_active(
&self,
_i: AdminUserId,
_a: bool,
) -> Result<AdminUserRow, AdminUserRepositoryError> {
unimplemented!()
}
async fn delete(&self, _i: AdminUserId) -> Result<(), AdminUserRepositoryError> {
unimplemented!()
}
async fn touch_last_login(&self, _i: AdminUserId) -> Result<(), AdminUserRepositoryError> {
unimplemented!()
}
async fn count_active(&self) -> Result<i64, AdminUserRepositoryError> {
Ok(i64::try_from(self.rows.lock().unwrap().len()).unwrap_or(i64::MAX))
}
async fn count_active_excluding(
&self,
_i: AdminUserId,
) -> Result<i64, AdminUserRepositoryError> {
unimplemented!()
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn empty_db_creates_admin_from_raw_password() {
let repo = InMemoryRepo::default();
let env = BootstrapEnv {
username: Some("alice".into()),
password: Some("supersecret".into()),
password_hash: None,
};
bootstrap_first_admin_with(&repo, env).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(repo.rows.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn empty_db_with_pre_hashed_password_succeeds() {
let repo = InMemoryRepo::default();
let prehashed = hash_password("pw").unwrap();
let env = BootstrapEnv {
username: Some("alice".into()),
password: None,
password_hash: Some(prehashed),
};
bootstrap_first_admin_with(&repo, env).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(repo.rows.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn populated_db_is_noop() {
let repo = InMemoryRepo::default();
repo.create("seeded", "x").await.unwrap();
let env = BootstrapEnv {
username: Some("alice".into()),
password: Some("supersecret".into()),
password_hash: None,
};
bootstrap_first_admin_with(&repo, env).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(repo.rows.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn missing_username_fails() {
let repo = InMemoryRepo::default();
let env = BootstrapEnv {
username: None,
password: Some("supersecret".into()),
password_hash: None,
};
let err = bootstrap_first_admin_with(&repo, env).await.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, BootstrapError::MissingUsername));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn missing_password_fails() {
let repo = InMemoryRepo::default();
let env = BootstrapEnv {
username: Some("alice".into()),
password: None,
password_hash: None,
};
let err = bootstrap_first_admin_with(&repo, env).await.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, BootstrapError::MissingPassword));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn invalid_hash_fails() {
let repo = InMemoryRepo::default();
let env = BootstrapEnv {
username: Some("alice".into()),
password: None,
password_hash: Some("not a phc hash".into()),
};
let err = bootstrap_first_admin_with(&repo, env).await.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, BootstrapError::InvalidHash));
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
//! `require_admin` axum middleware: gates a router on a valid admin
//! session. Accepts the token from either the `picloud_session` cookie
//! or an `Authorization: Bearer …` header — same token system serves
//! the dashboard and CLI/CI clients.
//!
//! On success, injects `AuthedAdmin` as a request extension so handlers
//! can `Extension<AuthedAdmin>` to know who's calling. On failure,
//! returns 401 with a generic JSON body (no enumeration about whether
//! the token was wrong vs. the user was deactivated).
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::time::Duration;
use axum::body::Body;
use axum::extract::{Request, State};
use axum::http::{header, StatusCode};
use axum::middleware::Next;
use axum::response::{IntoResponse, Json, Response};
use chrono::Utc;
use picloud_shared::AdminUserId;
use serde_json::json;
use crate::admin_session_repo::AdminSessionRepository;
use crate::admin_user_repo::AdminUserRepository;
use crate::auth::hash_token;
pub const SESSION_COOKIE: &str = "picloud_session";
/// Shared state for auth: the two repos plus the configured sliding
/// session TTL. Cheap to clone (`Arc` everywhere).
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct AuthState {
pub users: Arc<dyn AdminUserRepository>,
pub sessions: Arc<dyn AdminSessionRepository>,
pub ttl: Duration,
}
/// Request-extension type that authenticated handlers extract via
/// `Extension<AuthedAdmin>`. Available only inside guarded routers.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct AuthedAdmin {
pub id: AdminUserId,
pub username: String,
}
/// Middleware function. Wire with
/// `axum::middleware::from_fn_with_state(auth_state, require_admin)`.
pub async fn require_admin(
State(state): State<AuthState>,
mut req: Request<Body>,
next: Next,
) -> Response {
let Some(token) = extract_token(&req) else {
return unauthorized();
};
let token_hash = hash_token(&token);
let lookup = match state.sessions.lookup(&token_hash).await {
Ok(Some(lookup)) => lookup,
Ok(None) => return unauthorized(),
Err(err) => {
tracing::error!(?err, "admin_sessions lookup failed");
return internal_error();
}
};
// Resolve the user. A deleted user is impossible here (FK cascade
// wipes their sessions), but a deactivated user still needs to be
// rejected — and so does the edge case of a session predating the
// deactivate (we wipe their sessions on deactivate, but a race
// could land a request in flight).
let user = match state.users.get(lookup.user_id).await {
Ok(Some(u)) if u.is_active => u,
Ok(_) => return unauthorized(),
Err(err) => {
tracing::error!(?err, "admin_users lookup failed");
return internal_error();
}
};
// Sliding window bump. Inline (not fire-and-forget) so a DB blip
// surfaces as a request error rather than silent stale sessions.
let new_expires_at = Utc::now() + chrono::Duration::from_std(state.ttl).unwrap_or_default();
if let Err(err) = state.sessions.touch(&token_hash, new_expires_at).await {
tracing::error!(?err, "admin_sessions touch failed");
return internal_error();
}
req.extensions_mut().insert(AuthedAdmin {
id: user.id,
username: user.username,
});
next.run(req).await
}
/// Pull the bearer token out of an `Authorization` header (preferred)
/// or the `picloud_session` cookie (fallback for browser clients).
fn extract_token(req: &Request<Body>) -> Option<String> {
if let Some(value) = req.headers().get(header::AUTHORIZATION) {
if let Ok(s) = value.to_str() {
if let Some(token) = s.strip_prefix("Bearer ") {
let trimmed = token.trim();
if !trimmed.is_empty() {
return Some(trimmed.to_string());
}
}
}
}
if let Some(value) = req.headers().get(header::COOKIE) {
if let Ok(s) = value.to_str() {
for chunk in s.split(';') {
let chunk = chunk.trim();
if let Some(rest) = chunk.strip_prefix(&format!("{SESSION_COOKIE}=")) {
if !rest.is_empty() {
return Some(rest.to_string());
}
}
}
}
}
None
}
fn unauthorized() -> Response {
(
StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
Json(json!({ "error": "authentication required" })),
)
.into_response()
}
fn internal_error() -> Response {
(
StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
Json(json!({ "error": "internal error" })),
)
.into_response()
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use axum::http::Request;
fn req_with_header(name: &str, value: &str) -> Request<Body> {
Request::builder()
.header(name, value)
.body(Body::empty())
.unwrap()
}
#[test]
fn extracts_bearer_token() {
let r = req_with_header("authorization", "Bearer abc123");
assert_eq!(extract_token(&r).as_deref(), Some("abc123"));
}
#[test]
fn ignores_bearer_with_no_token() {
let r = req_with_header("authorization", "Bearer ");
assert_eq!(extract_token(&r), None);
}
#[test]
fn extracts_cookie_token() {
let r = req_with_header("cookie", "foo=bar; picloud_session=xyz; baz=qux");
assert_eq!(extract_token(&r).as_deref(), Some("xyz"));
}
#[test]
fn bearer_wins_over_cookie() {
let r = Request::builder()
.header("authorization", "Bearer header-token")
.header("cookie", "picloud_session=cookie-token")
.body(Body::empty())
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(extract_token(&r).as_deref(), Some("header-token"));
}
#[test]
fn returns_none_when_neither_present() {
let r = Request::builder().body(Body::empty()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(extract_token(&r), None);
}
}

View File

@@ -4,7 +4,14 @@
//! the same DB for now; once we add caching and per-node ingress, the
//! manager will publish change events.
pub mod admin_session_repo;
pub mod admin_user_repo;
pub mod admin_users_api;
pub mod api;
pub mod auth;
pub mod auth_api;
pub mod auth_bootstrap;
pub mod auth_middleware;
pub mod log_sink;
pub mod migrations;
pub mod repo;
@@ -13,7 +20,21 @@ pub mod route_repo;
pub mod sandbox;
pub mod scheduler;
pub use admin_session_repo::{
AdminSessionLookup, AdminSessionRepository, AdminSessionRepositoryError,
PostgresAdminSessionRepository,
};
pub use admin_user_repo::{
AdminUserCredentials, AdminUserRepository, AdminUserRepositoryError, AdminUserRow,
PostgresAdminUserRepository,
};
pub use admin_users_api::{admins_router, AdminsState};
pub use api::{admin_router, AdminState};
pub use auth_api::auth_router;
pub use auth_bootstrap::{
bootstrap_first_admin, bootstrap_first_admin_with, BootstrapEnv, BootstrapError,
};
pub use auth_middleware::{require_admin, AuthState, AuthedAdmin, SESSION_COOKIE};
pub use log_sink::PostgresExecutionLogSink;
pub use repo::{
ExecutionLogRepository, NewScript, PostgresExecutionLogRepository, PostgresScriptRepository,

View File

@@ -6,10 +6,13 @@
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::time::Duration;
use axum::middleware::from_fn_with_state;
use axum::{routing::get, Json, Router};
use picloud_executor_core::{Engine, Limits};
use picloud_manager_core::{
admin_router, compile_routes, migrations, route_admin_router, AdminState,
admin_router, admins_router, auth_router, compile_routes, migrations, require_admin,
route_admin_router, AdminSessionRepository, AdminState, AdminUserRepository, AdminsState,
AuthState, PostgresAdminSessionRepository, PostgresAdminUserRepository,
PostgresExecutionLogRepository, PostgresExecutionLogSink, PostgresRouteRepository,
PostgresScriptRepository, RepoResolver, RouteAdminState, RouteRepository, SandboxCeiling,
};
@@ -24,6 +27,38 @@ use sqlx::postgres::PgPoolOptions;
use sqlx::PgPool;
use tower_http::trace::TraceLayer;
/// Default session TTL when `PICLOUD_SESSION_TTL_HOURS` isn't set.
const DEFAULT_SESSION_TTL_HOURS: u64 = 24;
/// Bundles the auth-related dependencies that both `build_app` and the
/// startup bootstrap need. Built once in `main.rs` from the shared pool.
pub struct AuthDeps {
pub users: Arc<dyn AdminUserRepository>,
pub sessions: Arc<dyn AdminSessionRepository>,
pub ttl: Duration,
}
impl AuthDeps {
/// Construct from a pool with the binary's standard defaults.
#[must_use]
pub fn from_pool(pool: PgPool) -> Self {
Self {
users: Arc::new(PostgresAdminUserRepository::new(pool.clone())),
sessions: Arc::new(PostgresAdminSessionRepository::new(pool)),
ttl: read_session_ttl(),
}
}
}
fn read_session_ttl() -> Duration {
let hours = std::env::var("PICLOUD_SESSION_TTL_HOURS")
.ok()
.and_then(|s| s.parse::<u64>().ok())
.filter(|h| *h > 0)
.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_SESSION_TTL_HOURS);
Duration::from_secs(hours * 3600)
}
/// Compose the manager + orchestrator routes on top of a shared
/// Postgres pool, returning an Axum router ready to be served.
///
@@ -31,7 +66,15 @@ use tower_http::trace::TraceLayer;
/// is mounted by Caddy at `/admin/*` (its base path). Anything else
/// falls through to the user-route table — user scripts can bind to
/// arbitrary paths (subject to the reserved-prefix list).
pub async fn build_app(pool: PgPool) -> anyhow::Result<Router> {
///
/// `auth` carries the admin user/session repositories and the
/// configured session TTL. The manager-side admin endpoints
/// (`/api/v1/admin/scripts/*`, `/api/v1/admin/routes/*`,
/// `/api/v1/admin/admins/*`, `/api/v1/admin/auth/me`) are guarded by
/// the `require_admin` middleware. The data plane
/// (`/api/v1/execute/{id}`, the user-route fallthrough, `/healthz`,
/// `/version`) stays open — it's the public ingress for user scripts.
pub async fn build_app(pool: PgPool, auth: AuthDeps) -> anyhow::Result<Router> {
let engine = Arc::new(Engine::new(Limits::default()));
let script_repo = Arc::new(PostgresScriptRepository::new(pool.clone()));
@@ -68,9 +111,29 @@ pub async fn build_app(pool: PgPool) -> anyhow::Result<Router> {
routes: route_table,
};
let auth_state = AuthState {
users: auth.users.clone(),
sessions: auth.sessions.clone(),
ttl: auth.ttl,
};
let admins_state = AdminsState {
users: auth.users,
sessions: auth.sessions,
};
// /admin/auth/login + /logout are unguarded by design (login is how
// you get in). /admin/auth/me applies the middleware internally so
// the same Router::with_state machinery composes cleanly. Everything
// else under /admin gets the require_admin layer.
let guarded_admin = Router::new()
.merge(admin_router(admin))
.merge(route_admin_router(route_admin))
.merge(admins_router(admins_state))
.layer(from_fn_with_state(auth_state.clone(), require_admin));
let api_v1 = Router::new()
.nest("/admin", admin_router(admin))
.nest("/admin", route_admin_router(route_admin))
.nest("/admin", auth_router(auth_state))
.nest("/admin", guarded_admin)
.merge(data_plane_router(data_plane.clone()));
Ok(Router::new()

View File

@@ -1,17 +1,36 @@
//! PiCloud all-in-one binary — see `lib.rs` for the actual app
//! composition; this file is only the runtime shell (env config,
//! logger, migrations, listener).
//! logger, migrations, listener) plus the small `admin` CLI subcommand
//! used for out-of-band password recovery.
use std::io::{BufRead, Write};
use std::net::SocketAddr;
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::time::Duration;
use picloud::{build_app, init_db};
use picloud_manager_core::migrations;
use picloud::{build_app, init_db, AuthDeps};
use picloud_manager_core::{
auth::{hash_password, validate_password_hash},
bootstrap_first_admin, migrations, AdminSessionRepository, AdminUserRepository,
};
use tracing_subscriber::EnvFilter;
#[tokio::main]
async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
init_tracing();
// Subcommand dispatch — `picloud admin reset-password <username>`.
// Kept handwritten to avoid pulling clap in just for one verb. Falls
// through to the server when no subcommand is given.
let args: Vec<String> = std::env::args().collect();
if args.get(1).map(String::as_str) == Some("admin") {
return run_admin_cli(&args[2..]).await;
}
run_server().await
}
async fn run_server() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
let addr: SocketAddr = std::env::var("PICLOUD_BIND")
.unwrap_or_else(|_| "0.0.0.0:8080".into())
.parse()?;
@@ -22,7 +41,15 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
migrations::run(&pool).await?;
tracing::info!("migrations applied");
let app = build_app(pool).await?;
let auth = AuthDeps::from_pool(pool.clone());
bootstrap_first_admin(&*auth.users).await?;
// Background session-prune sweep. Cheap; keeps the table from
// growing unbounded. Expired rows are also rejected at lookup time,
// so a delayed sweep can't extend session lifetimes.
spawn_session_pruner(auth.sessions.clone());
let app = build_app(pool, auth).await?;
let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind(addr).await?;
tracing::info!(%addr, "picloud all-in-one listening");
@@ -33,6 +60,112 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
Ok(())
}
fn spawn_session_pruner(sessions: Arc<dyn AdminSessionRepository>) {
tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut ticker = tokio::time::interval(Duration::from_secs(600));
// First tick fires immediately; skip it so we don't race startup.
ticker.tick().await;
loop {
ticker.tick().await;
match sessions.prune_expired().await {
Ok(n) if n > 0 => tracing::debug!(pruned = n, "expired admin sessions pruned"),
Ok(_) => {}
Err(err) => tracing::warn!(?err, "admin session prune failed"),
}
}
});
}
// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
// `admin` subcommand
// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
async fn run_admin_cli(args: &[String]) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
match args.first().map(String::as_str) {
Some("reset-password") => {
let username = args.get(1).ok_or_else(|| {
anyhow::anyhow!(
"usage: picloud admin reset-password <username> [--password-hash <hash>]"
)
})?;
// Optional inline hash via --password-hash <hash>; otherwise
// read a raw password from stdin.
let hash_arg = parse_flag(&args[2..], "--password-hash");
cmd_reset_password(username, hash_arg).await
}
Some(other) => Err(anyhow::anyhow!("unknown admin subcommand: {other}")),
None => Err(anyhow::anyhow!(
"usage: picloud admin reset-password <username>"
)),
}
}
fn parse_flag(args: &[String], name: &str) -> Option<String> {
let mut it = args.iter();
while let Some(a) = it.next() {
if a == name {
return it.next().cloned();
}
}
None
}
async fn cmd_reset_password(username: &str, password_hash: Option<String>) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
let database_url =
std::env::var("DATABASE_URL").map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("DATABASE_URL is required"))?;
let pool = init_db(&database_url).await?;
migrations::run(&pool).await?;
let users = picloud_manager_core::PostgresAdminUserRepository::new(pool.clone());
let sessions = picloud_manager_core::PostgresAdminSessionRepository::new(pool);
let target = users
.get_by_username(username)
.await?
.ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("no admin user named {username:?}"))?;
let hash = if let Some(h) = password_hash {
validate_password_hash(&h)
.map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("--password-hash is not a valid Argon2id PHC string"))?;
h
} else {
let raw = prompt_password_from_stdin()?;
hash_password(&raw).map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("failed to hash password: {e}"))?
};
users.update_password_hash(target.id, &hash).await?;
// Recovery implies the operator already lost control of the account;
// re-activate it (so a deactivated admin can also recover) and wipe
// any pre-existing sessions in case the original holder is still
// signed in elsewhere.
if !target.is_active {
users.set_active(target.id, true).await?;
}
let dropped = sessions.delete_for_user(target.id).await?;
println!("Password reset for {username}. Sessions dropped: {dropped}. Active: true.");
Ok(())
}
fn prompt_password_from_stdin() -> anyhow::Result<String> {
eprint!("New password (will be read from stdin, no echo): ");
std::io::stderr().flush().ok();
let mut line = String::new();
std::io::stdin()
.lock()
.read_line(&mut line)
.map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("failed to read stdin: {e}"))?;
let pw = line.trim_end_matches(['\n', '\r']).to_string();
if pw.is_empty() {
return Err(anyhow::anyhow!("password must not be empty"));
}
Ok(pw)
}
// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Misc
// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
fn init_tracing() {
tracing_subscriber::fmt()
.with_env_filter(EnvFilter::try_from_default_env().unwrap_or_else(|_| "info".into()))

View File

@@ -17,9 +17,35 @@ use axum_test::TestServer;
use serde_json::{json, Value};
use sqlx::PgPool;
/// Build the all-in-one app over the test pool, seed a single admin
/// directly through the repo (bypassing the env-var bootstrap path so
/// tests don't contaminate the process environment), log in, and bake
/// the bearer token into the TestServer as a default header so every
/// request in the test passes the `require_admin` middleware.
async fn server(pool: PgPool) -> TestServer {
let app = picloud::build_app(pool).await.expect("build_app");
TestServer::new(app).expect("TestServer should build")
use picloud_manager_core::auth::hash_password;
let auth = picloud::AuthDeps::from_pool(pool.clone());
let hash = hash_password("test-pw").expect("hash");
auth.users
.create("test-admin", &hash)
.await
.expect("seed admin");
let app = picloud::build_app(pool, auth).await.expect("build_app");
let mut server = TestServer::new(app).expect("TestServer should build");
let resp = server
.post("/api/v1/admin/auth/login")
.json(&json!({ "username": "test-admin", "password": "test-pw" }))
.await;
resp.assert_status_ok();
let token = resp.json::<Value>()["token"]
.as_str()
.expect("login should return token")
.to_string();
server.add_header("authorization", format!("Bearer {token}"));
server
}
// ============================================================================
@@ -705,7 +731,7 @@ async fn version_includes_public_base_url(pool: PgPool) {
let v: Value = r.json();
assert!(v["public_base_url"].is_string());
assert_eq!(v["api"], 1);
assert_eq!(v["schema"], 3);
assert_eq!(v["schema"], 4);
assert_eq!(v["sdk"], "1.1");
}

View File

@@ -50,3 +50,4 @@ macro_rules! id_type {
id_type!(ScriptId);
id_type!(ExecutionId);
id_type!(RequestId);
id_type!(AdminUserId);

View File

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ pub mod version;
pub use error::Error;
pub use execution_log::{ExecutionLog, ExecutionStatus};
pub use ids::{ExecutionId, RequestId, ScriptId};
pub use ids::{AdminUserId, ExecutionId, RequestId, ScriptId};
pub use log_sink::{ExecutionLogSink, LogSinkError};
pub use route::{HostKind, PathKind, Route};
pub use sandbox::ScriptSandbox;

View File

@@ -5,6 +5,11 @@
// the same Caddy upstream so the "Test invoke" panel can hit it
// without any cross-origin gymnastics.
import { goto } from '$app/navigation';
import { base } from '$app/paths';
import { browser } from '$app/environment';
import { clearSession, getToken, setSession, type AdminUser } from './auth';
export interface ScriptSandbox {
max_operations?: number;
max_string_size?: number;
@@ -134,12 +139,26 @@ export class ApiError extends Error {
}
async function adminRequest<T>(path: string, init?: RequestInit): Promise<T> {
const res = await fetch(path, {
...init,
headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json', ...(init?.headers ?? {}) }
});
const headers: Record<string, string> = {
'content-type': 'application/json',
...((init?.headers as Record<string, string>) ?? {})
};
const tok = getToken();
if (tok && !headers['authorization']) {
headers['authorization'] = `Bearer ${tok}`;
}
const res = await fetch(path, { ...init, headers });
const text = await res.text();
const parsed: unknown = text ? safeJson(text) : null;
if (res.status === 401) {
// Token gone stale or never present. Drop any cached session
// and bounce to login — unless we're already on it, in which
// case throw and let the login form render the error.
clearSession();
if (browser && !window.location.pathname.endsWith('/login')) {
void goto(`${base}/login`);
}
}
if (!res.ok) {
const message =
(parsed && typeof parsed === 'object' && 'error' in parsed
@@ -158,11 +177,76 @@ function safeJson(text: string): unknown {
}
}
export interface AdminUserRecord {
id: string;
username: string;
is_active: boolean;
created_at: string;
last_login_at: string | null;
}
export interface CreateAdminInput {
username: string;
password: string;
}
export interface PatchAdminInput {
username?: string;
password?: string;
is_active?: boolean;
}
interface LoginResponse {
user: AdminUser;
token: string;
expires_at: string;
}
export const api = {
health: () => fetch('/healthz').then((r) => r.text()),
version: () => adminRequest<VersionInfo>('/version'),
auth: {
login: async (username: string, password: string): Promise<AdminUser> => {
const r = await adminRequest<LoginResponse>('/api/v1/admin/auth/login', {
method: 'POST',
body: JSON.stringify({ username, password })
});
setSession(r.user, r.token);
return r.user;
},
logout: async (): Promise<void> => {
try {
await adminRequest<null>('/api/v1/admin/auth/logout', { method: 'POST' });
} finally {
// Always clear locally — logout is idempotent server-side
// and we don't want a network blip to strand the SPA in
// a "logged out on server, still logged in client-side"
// state.
clearSession();
}
},
me: () => adminRequest<AdminUser>('/api/v1/admin/auth/me')
},
admins: {
list: () => adminRequest<AdminUserRecord[]>('/api/v1/admin/admins'),
get: (id: string) => adminRequest<AdminUserRecord>(`/api/v1/admin/admins/${id}`),
create: (input: CreateAdminInput) =>
adminRequest<AdminUserRecord>('/api/v1/admin/admins', {
method: 'POST',
body: JSON.stringify(input)
}),
update: (id: string, input: PatchAdminInput) =>
adminRequest<AdminUserRecord>(`/api/v1/admin/admins/${id}`, {
method: 'PATCH',
body: JSON.stringify(input)
}),
remove: (id: string) =>
adminRequest<null>(`/api/v1/admin/admins/${id}`, { method: 'DELETE' })
},
routes: {
listForScript: (scriptId: string) =>
adminRequest<Route[]>(`/api/v1/admin/scripts/${scriptId}/routes`),

60
dashboard/src/lib/auth.ts Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
// Session state for the dashboard. Backed by a pair of Svelte stores
// plus a tiny localStorage echo so a page reload doesn't sign you out.
//
// The bearer token doubles as the cookie value on the server side, so
// in browsers that honor the Set-Cookie response the cookie path "just
// works"; the token-in-localStorage path covers the rest (HTTP dev, API
// clients impersonating the dashboard) by being injected into the
// Authorization header in api.ts.
import { writable, get } from 'svelte/store';
import { browser } from '$app/environment';
export interface AdminUser {
id: string;
username: string;
}
const TOKEN_KEY = 'picloud.admin.token';
function readStoredToken(): string | null {
if (!browser) return null;
try {
return localStorage.getItem(TOKEN_KEY);
} catch {
return null;
}
}
function writeStoredToken(value: string | null) {
if (!browser) return;
try {
if (value === null) localStorage.removeItem(TOKEN_KEY);
else localStorage.setItem(TOKEN_KEY, value);
} catch {
// Non-fatal: localStorage can be disabled. The session will
// just not survive page reloads, but the in-memory store still
// works for the current SPA lifetime.
}
}
export const token = writable<string | null>(readStoredToken());
export const currentUser = writable<AdminUser | null>(null);
token.subscribe((value) => writeStoredToken(value));
/** Snapshot of the current token without subscribing — used by the
* fetch wrapper. Returns null when no admin is logged in. */
export function getToken(): string | null {
return get(token);
}
export function setSession(user: AdminUser, raw_token: string) {
currentUser.set(user);
token.set(raw_token);
}
export function clearSession() {
currentUser.set(null);
token.set(null);
}

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@@ -1,6 +1,44 @@
<script lang="ts">
import { base } from '$app/paths';
import { goto } from '$app/navigation';
import { onMount } from 'svelte';
import { page } from '$app/state';
import { api } from '$lib/api';
import { currentUser, getToken } from '$lib/auth';
let { children } = $props();
let booting = $state(true);
const user = $derived($currentUser);
const isLoginRoute = $derived(page.url.pathname.endsWith('/login'));
onMount(async () => {
// Hydrate the session: if there's a token, ask the server who we
// are. On 401 the fetch wrapper already redirects to /login and
// clears state; on success we land in the SPA fully signed in.
const tok = getToken();
if (!tok) {
if (!isLoginRoute) {
await goto(`${base}/login`);
}
booting = false;
return;
}
try {
const me = await api.auth.me();
currentUser.set(me);
} catch {
// adminRequest handles 401 redirects. For other errors fall
// through — the page will surface its own error state.
}
booting = false;
});
async function handleLogout() {
await api.auth.logout();
await goto(`${base}/login`);
}
</script>
<div class="shell">
@@ -8,10 +46,22 @@
<a href={base + '/'} class="brand">PiCloud</a>
<nav>
<a href={base + '/'}>Scripts</a>
<a href={base + '/admins'}>Admins</a>
</nav>
<div class="spacer"></div>
{#if user}
<div class="usermenu">
<span class="username">{user.username}</span>
<button type="button" class="logout" onclick={handleLogout}>Logout</button>
</div>
{/if}
</header>
<main>
{@render children?.()}
{#if booting}
<p class="boot">Loading…</p>
{:else}
{@render children?.()}
{/if}
</main>
</div>
@@ -45,6 +95,11 @@
text-decoration: none;
}
nav {
display: flex;
gap: 1.5rem;
}
nav a {
color: #94a3b8;
text-decoration: none;
@@ -55,6 +110,36 @@
color: #e2e8f0;
}
.spacer {
flex: 1;
}
.usermenu {
display: flex;
align-items: center;
gap: 0.75rem;
font-size: 0.875rem;
}
.username {
color: #cbd5e1;
}
.logout {
background: transparent;
color: #94a3b8;
border: 1px solid #334155;
padding: 0.35rem 0.75rem;
border-radius: 0.375rem;
cursor: pointer;
font-size: 0.8rem;
}
.logout:hover {
background: #1e293b;
color: #e2e8f0;
}
main {
flex: 1;
padding: 2rem;
@@ -63,4 +148,8 @@
margin: 0 auto;
box-sizing: border-box;
}
.boot {
color: #64748b;
}
</style>

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,687 @@
<script lang="ts">
import { goto } from '$app/navigation';
import { base } from '$app/paths';
import { onMount } from 'svelte';
import { api, ApiError, type AdminUserRecord } from '$lib/api';
import { currentUser } from '$lib/auth';
let admins = $state<AdminUserRecord[]>([]);
let loadError = $state<string | null>(null);
let banner = $state<{ kind: 'error' | 'info'; message: string } | null>(null);
const me = $derived($currentUser);
let createOpen = $state(false);
let createForm = $state({ username: '', password: '', confirm: '' });
let createPending = $state(false);
let createError = $state<string | null>(null);
let passwordTarget = $state<AdminUserRecord | null>(null);
let passwordForm = $state({ password: '', confirm: '' });
let passwordPending = $state(false);
let passwordError = $state<string | null>(null);
let deleteTarget = $state<AdminUserRecord | null>(null);
let deletePending = $state(false);
let actionsOpenFor = $state<string | null>(null);
onMount(refresh);
async function refresh() {
loadError = null;
try {
admins = await api.admins.list();
} catch (e) {
loadError = e instanceof ApiError ? e.message : 'failed to load admins';
}
}
function flash(kind: 'error' | 'info', message: string) {
banner = { kind, message };
setTimeout(() => {
if (banner?.message === message) banner = null;
}, 6000);
}
function openCreate() {
createForm = { username: '', password: '', confirm: '' };
createError = null;
createOpen = true;
}
async function submitCreate(event: SubmitEvent) {
event.preventDefault();
createError = null;
if (createForm.password !== createForm.confirm) {
createError = 'Passwords do not match';
return;
}
createPending = true;
try {
await api.admins.create({
username: createForm.username.trim(),
password: createForm.password
});
createOpen = false;
await refresh();
flash('info', `Created admin "${createForm.username.trim()}".`);
} catch (e) {
createError = e instanceof ApiError ? e.message : 'failed to create admin';
} finally {
createPending = false;
}
}
function openPassword(row: AdminUserRecord) {
passwordTarget = row;
passwordForm = { password: '', confirm: '' };
passwordError = null;
actionsOpenFor = null;
}
async function submitPassword(event: SubmitEvent) {
event.preventDefault();
if (!passwordTarget) return;
passwordError = null;
if (passwordForm.password !== passwordForm.confirm) {
passwordError = 'Passwords do not match';
return;
}
passwordPending = true;
try {
await api.admins.update(passwordTarget.id, { password: passwordForm.password });
const name = passwordTarget.username;
passwordTarget = null;
flash('info', `Password updated for "${name}".`);
} catch (e) {
passwordError = e instanceof ApiError ? e.message : 'failed to update password';
} finally {
passwordPending = false;
}
}
async function toggleActive(row: AdminUserRecord) {
actionsOpenFor = null;
try {
const updated = await api.admins.update(row.id, { is_active: !row.is_active });
admins = admins.map((a) => (a.id === updated.id ? updated : a));
flash('info', `${updated.username} ${updated.is_active ? 'reactivated' : 'deactivated'}.`);
} catch (e) {
flash('error', e instanceof ApiError ? e.message : 'failed to update admin');
}
}
function openDelete(row: AdminUserRecord) {
deleteTarget = row;
actionsOpenFor = null;
}
async function confirmDelete() {
if (!deleteTarget) return;
deletePending = true;
const target = deleteTarget;
try {
await api.admins.remove(target.id);
deleteTarget = null;
if (me && me.id === target.id) {
// Just deleted ourselves — sign out and bounce.
await api.auth.logout();
await goto(`${base}/login`);
return;
}
await refresh();
flash('info', `Deleted "${target.username}".`);
} catch (e) {
flash('error', e instanceof ApiError ? e.message : 'failed to delete admin');
} finally {
deletePending = false;
}
}
function toggleActions(id: string) {
actionsOpenFor = actionsOpenFor === id ? null : id;
}
function relative(iso: string | null): string {
if (!iso) return 'Never';
const then = new Date(iso).getTime();
const now = Date.now();
const sec = Math.round((now - then) / 1000);
if (sec < 60) return `${sec} second${sec === 1 ? '' : 's'} ago`;
const min = Math.round(sec / 60);
if (min < 60) return `${min} minute${min === 1 ? '' : 's'} ago`;
const hr = Math.round(min / 60);
if (hr < 24) return `${hr} hour${hr === 1 ? '' : 's'} ago`;
const day = Math.round(hr / 24);
if (day === 1) return 'Yesterday';
if (day < 7) return `${day} days ago`;
return new Date(iso).toLocaleDateString();
}
function absolute(iso: string | null): string {
return iso ? new Date(iso).toISOString() : '';
}
function shortDate(iso: string): string {
return new Date(iso).toISOString().slice(0, 10);
}
</script>
<header class="head">
<h1>Admin Users</h1>
<button type="button" class="primary" onclick={openCreate}>+ New admin user</button>
</header>
{#if banner}
<div class="banner banner-{banner.kind}">{banner.message}</div>
{/if}
{#if loadError}
<div class="error">
{loadError}
<button type="button" class="retry" onclick={refresh}>Retry</button>
</div>
{:else if admins.length === 0}
<p class="empty">No admin users yet. Add one to get started.</p>
{:else}
<div class="table">
<div class="row head-row">
<div>Username</div>
<div>Status</div>
<div>Created</div>
<div>Last login</div>
<div class="actions-col"></div>
</div>
{#each admins as row (row.id)}
<div class="row">
<div class="username-cell">
<span class="name">{row.username}</span>
{#if me && me.id === row.id}
<span class="you-tag">(you)</span>
{/if}
</div>
<div>
{#if row.is_active}
<span class="status status-active">● Active</span>
{:else}
<span class="status status-inactive">○ Inactive</span>
{/if}
</div>
<div>{shortDate(row.created_at)}</div>
<div title={absolute(row.last_login_at)}>{relative(row.last_login_at)}</div>
<div class="actions-col">
<button
type="button"
class="kebab"
aria-label="Actions for {row.username}"
onclick={() => toggleActions(row.id)}
>
</button>
{#if actionsOpenFor === row.id}
<div class="menu">
<button type="button" onclick={() => openPassword(row)}>Change password</button>
<button type="button" onclick={() => toggleActive(row)}>
{row.is_active ? 'Deactivate' : 'Reactivate'}
</button>
<button type="button" class="danger" onclick={() => openDelete(row)}>Delete</button>
</div>
{/if}
</div>
</div>
{/each}
</div>
{/if}
<!-- New admin modal -->
{#if createOpen}
<div
class="modal-backdrop"
role="presentation"
onclick={(e) => {
if (e.target === e.currentTarget) createOpen = false;
}}
>
<form class="modal" onsubmit={submitCreate}>
<div class="modal-head">
<h2>New admin user</h2>
<button
type="button"
class="x"
aria-label="Close"
onclick={() => (createOpen = false)}>✕</button
>
</div>
<label>
<span>Username</span>
<input
type="text"
autocomplete="off"
spellcheck="false"
bind:value={createForm.username}
required
/>
<small>Lowercase letters, digits, . _ -</small>
</label>
<label>
<span>Password</span>
<input
type="password"
autocomplete="new-password"
bind:value={createForm.password}
required
/>
<small>Minimum 8 characters</small>
</label>
<label>
<span>Confirm password</span>
<input
type="password"
autocomplete="new-password"
bind:value={createForm.confirm}
required
/>
</label>
{#if createError}
<div class="error">{createError}</div>
{/if}
<div class="modal-actions">
<button type="button" class="ghost" onclick={() => (createOpen = false)}>Cancel</button>
<button type="submit" class="primary" disabled={createPending}>
{createPending ? 'Creating…' : 'Create user'}
</button>
</div>
</form>
</div>
{/if}
<!-- Change password modal -->
{#if passwordTarget}
<div
class="modal-backdrop"
role="presentation"
onclick={(e) => {
if (e.target === e.currentTarget) passwordTarget = null;
}}
>
<form class="modal" onsubmit={submitPassword}>
<div class="modal-head">
<h2>Change password — {passwordTarget.username}</h2>
<button type="button" class="x" aria-label="Close" onclick={() => (passwordTarget = null)}
>✕</button
>
</div>
<label>
<span>New password</span>
<input
type="password"
autocomplete="new-password"
bind:value={passwordForm.password}
required
/>
</label>
<label>
<span>Confirm password</span>
<input
type="password"
autocomplete="new-password"
bind:value={passwordForm.confirm}
required
/>
</label>
{#if passwordError}
<div class="error">{passwordError}</div>
{/if}
<div class="modal-actions">
<button type="button" class="ghost" onclick={() => (passwordTarget = null)}>Cancel</button>
<button type="submit" class="primary" disabled={passwordPending}>
{passwordPending ? 'Updating…' : 'Update'}
</button>
</div>
</form>
</div>
{/if}
<!-- Delete confirmation modal -->
{#if deleteTarget}
<div
class="modal-backdrop"
role="presentation"
onclick={(e) => {
if (e.target === e.currentTarget) deleteTarget = null;
}}
>
<div class="modal">
<div class="modal-head">
<h2>Delete {deleteTarget.username}?</h2>
<button type="button" class="x" aria-label="Close" onclick={() => (deleteTarget = null)}
>✕</button
>
</div>
{#if me && me.id === deleteTarget.id}
<p>
You are about to delete <strong>your own</strong> account. You will be signed out immediately
and will not be able to sign back in with these credentials.
</p>
{:else}
<p>
This permanently removes <strong>{deleteTarget.username}</strong> and all their sessions.
This cannot be undone.
</p>
{/if}
<div class="modal-actions">
<button type="button" class="ghost" onclick={() => (deleteTarget = null)}>Cancel</button>
<button type="button" class="danger" disabled={deletePending} onclick={confirmDelete}>
{deletePending ? 'Deleting…' : 'Delete'}
</button>
</div>
</div>
</div>
{/if}
<style>
.head {
display: flex;
align-items: center;
justify-content: space-between;
margin-bottom: 1.5rem;
}
h1 {
font-size: 1.25rem;
margin: 0;
color: #e2e8f0;
}
.banner {
padding: 0.5rem 0.75rem;
border-radius: 0.375rem;
margin-bottom: 1rem;
font-size: 0.85rem;
}
.banner-error {
background: #450a0a;
border: 1px solid #b91c1c;
color: #fecaca;
}
.banner-info {
background: #0c2a36;
border: 1px solid #155e75;
color: #a5f3fc;
}
.empty {
color: #64748b;
text-align: center;
padding: 3rem 0;
border: 1px dashed #1e293b;
border-radius: 0.5rem;
}
.table {
display: flex;
flex-direction: column;
border: 1px solid #1e293b;
border-radius: 0.5rem;
overflow: visible;
background: #0b1220;
}
.row {
display: grid;
grid-template-columns: 1.5fr 0.9fr 1fr 1.2fr 3rem;
align-items: center;
gap: 1rem;
padding: 0.75rem 1rem;
border-bottom: 1px solid #1e293b;
font-size: 0.9rem;
}
.row:last-child {
border-bottom: none;
}
.head-row {
color: #94a3b8;
font-size: 0.75rem;
text-transform: uppercase;
letter-spacing: 0.05em;
background: #0f172a;
}
.username-cell {
display: flex;
align-items: baseline;
gap: 0.5rem;
}
.name {
color: #e2e8f0;
font-weight: 500;
}
.you-tag {
color: #64748b;
font-size: 0.75rem;
}
.status {
font-size: 0.8rem;
}
.status-active {
color: #34d399;
}
.status-inactive {
color: #64748b;
}
.actions-col {
position: relative;
display: flex;
justify-content: flex-end;
}
.kebab {
background: transparent;
border: none;
color: #94a3b8;
font-size: 1.25rem;
cursor: pointer;
padding: 0 0.5rem;
border-radius: 0.25rem;
}
.kebab:hover {
background: #1e293b;
color: #e2e8f0;
}
.menu {
position: absolute;
top: 100%;
right: 0;
background: #0b1220;
border: 1px solid #1e293b;
border-radius: 0.375rem;
display: flex;
flex-direction: column;
min-width: 12rem;
z-index: 10;
box-shadow: 0 6px 16px rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.4);
}
.menu button {
background: transparent;
border: none;
color: #cbd5e1;
text-align: left;
padding: 0.5rem 0.75rem;
cursor: pointer;
font-size: 0.85rem;
}
.menu button:hover {
background: #1e293b;
color: #e2e8f0;
}
.menu button.danger {
color: #fca5a5;
}
.menu button.danger:hover {
background: #450a0a;
color: #fecaca;
}
.error {
background: #450a0a;
border: 1px solid #b91c1c;
color: #fecaca;
padding: 0.5rem 0.75rem;
border-radius: 0.375rem;
font-size: 0.85rem;
display: flex;
align-items: center;
justify-content: space-between;
gap: 1rem;
}
.retry {
background: transparent;
border: 1px solid #b91c1c;
color: #fecaca;
padding: 0.25rem 0.6rem;
border-radius: 0.25rem;
cursor: pointer;
font-size: 0.75rem;
}
button.primary {
background: #38bdf8;
color: #0b1220;
border: none;
padding: 0.55rem 0.9rem;
border-radius: 0.375rem;
font-weight: 600;
cursor: pointer;
font-size: 0.875rem;
}
button.primary:disabled {
opacity: 0.6;
cursor: not-allowed;
}
button.ghost {
background: transparent;
color: #94a3b8;
border: 1px solid #334155;
padding: 0.5rem 0.9rem;
border-radius: 0.375rem;
cursor: pointer;
font-size: 0.875rem;
}
button.ghost:hover {
background: #1e293b;
color: #e2e8f0;
}
button.danger {
background: #b91c1c;
color: #fef2f2;
border: none;
padding: 0.55rem 0.9rem;
border-radius: 0.375rem;
cursor: pointer;
font-weight: 600;
font-size: 0.875rem;
}
button.danger:disabled {
opacity: 0.6;
cursor: not-allowed;
}
.modal-backdrop {
position: fixed;
inset: 0;
background: rgba(15, 23, 42, 0.7);
display: flex;
justify-content: center;
align-items: center;
z-index: 50;
}
.modal {
background: #0b1220;
border: 1px solid #1e293b;
border-radius: 0.5rem;
padding: 1.5rem;
min-width: 24rem;
max-width: 28rem;
display: flex;
flex-direction: column;
gap: 1rem;
box-shadow: 0 12px 32px rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.5);
}
.modal-head {
display: flex;
align-items: center;
justify-content: space-between;
}
.modal h2 {
margin: 0;
font-size: 1rem;
color: #e2e8f0;
}
.x {
background: transparent;
border: none;
color: #64748b;
font-size: 1.1rem;
cursor: pointer;
}
.x:hover {
color: #e2e8f0;
}
.modal label {
display: flex;
flex-direction: column;
gap: 0.4rem;
font-size: 0.85rem;
color: #cbd5e1;
}
.modal label small {
color: #64748b;
font-size: 0.75rem;
}
.modal input {
background: #0f172a;
color: #e2e8f0;
border: 1px solid #1e293b;
border-radius: 0.375rem;
padding: 0.55rem 0.75rem;
font-size: 0.9rem;
box-sizing: border-box;
}
.modal input:focus {
outline: none;
border-color: #38bdf8;
}
.modal-actions {
display: flex;
justify-content: flex-end;
gap: 0.75rem;
margin-top: 0.5rem;
}
p {
color: #cbd5e1;
font-size: 0.9rem;
margin: 0;
line-height: 1.5;
}
</style>

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
<script lang="ts">
import { base } from '$app/paths';
import { goto } from '$app/navigation';
import { onMount } from 'svelte';
import { api, ApiError } from '$lib/api';
import { getToken } from '$lib/auth';
let username = $state('');
let password = $state('');
let pending = $state(false);
let error = $state<string | null>(null);
onMount(async () => {
// Already signed in? Skip the form.
if (!getToken()) return;
try {
await api.auth.me();
await goto(`${base}/`);
} catch {
// stale token; let the form render
}
});
async function submit(event: SubmitEvent) {
event.preventDefault();
error = null;
pending = true;
try {
await api.auth.login(username, password);
await goto(`${base}/`);
} catch (e) {
error = e instanceof ApiError ? e.message : 'Login failed';
} finally {
pending = false;
}
}
</script>
<div class="login-shell">
<form class="card" onsubmit={submit}>
<h1>PiCloud</h1>
<p class="sub">Admin sign-in</p>
<label>
<span>Username</span>
<input
name="username"
type="text"
autocomplete="username"
autocapitalize="off"
spellcheck="false"
bind:value={username}
required
/>
</label>
<label>
<span>Password</span>
<input
name="password"
type="password"
autocomplete="current-password"
bind:value={password}
required
/>
</label>
<button type="submit" disabled={pending}>
{pending ? 'Signing in…' : 'Sign in →'}
</button>
{#if error}
<div class="error">{error}</div>
{/if}
<p class="hint">
Lost access? Run <code>picloud admin reset-password &lt;username&gt;</code> on the host.
</p>
</form>
</div>
<style>
.login-shell {
display: flex;
justify-content: center;
align-items: center;
min-height: 60vh;
}
.card {
display: flex;
flex-direction: column;
gap: 1rem;
background: #0b1220;
border: 1px solid #1e293b;
border-radius: 0.5rem;
padding: 2rem;
min-width: 22rem;
max-width: 26rem;
}
h1 {
margin: 0;
font-size: 1.5rem;
color: #38bdf8;
text-align: center;
}
.sub {
margin: 0 0 0.5rem 0;
text-align: center;
color: #94a3b8;
font-size: 0.9rem;
}
label {
display: flex;
flex-direction: column;
gap: 0.4rem;
font-size: 0.85rem;
color: #cbd5e1;
}
input {
background: #0f172a;
color: #e2e8f0;
border: 1px solid #1e293b;
border-radius: 0.375rem;
padding: 0.6rem 0.75rem;
font-size: 0.95rem;
box-sizing: border-box;
}
input:focus {
outline: none;
border-color: #38bdf8;
}
button {
background: #38bdf8;
color: #0b1220;
border: none;
padding: 0.65rem 1rem;
border-radius: 0.375rem;
font-weight: 600;
cursor: pointer;
font-size: 0.95rem;
}
button:disabled {
opacity: 0.6;
cursor: not-allowed;
}
.error {
background: #450a0a;
border: 1px solid #b91c1c;
color: #fecaca;
padding: 0.5rem 0.75rem;
border-radius: 0.375rem;
font-size: 0.85rem;
}
.hint {
margin: 0;
font-size: 0.75rem;
color: #64748b;
text-align: center;
}
code {
background: #1e293b;
padding: 0.1rem 0.35rem;
border-radius: 0.25rem;
color: #cbd5e1;
}
</style>

View File

@@ -732,9 +732,11 @@ volumes:
---
## 11.4 Admin Auth (Phase 3a)
## 11.4 Admin Auth (Phase 3a) — Shipped
**Purpose**: gate the admin API (`/api/v1/admin/*`) and dashboard (`/admin/*`) behind per-user authentication. Today the surface is open — anyone reaching the bound port can create, edit, and delete scripts.
**Status**: shipped. Implementation lives in `crates/manager-core/src/{auth,auth_*,admin_user_repo,admin_session_repo,admin_users_api}.rs`; migration `0004_admin_auth.sql`.
**Purpose**: gate the admin API (`/api/v1/admin/*`) and dashboard (`/admin/*`) behind per-user authentication. Before this phase the surface was open — anyone reaching the bound port could create, edit, and delete scripts.
**Why per-user, not a shared secret**: shared admin passwords get shared between humans, leave no audit trail, and can't be revoked per-person. Per-user accounts solve all three. The initial cut deliberately stops there — no roles, no per-app permissions — because that scope is small enough to ship in a single phase without blocking Phase 3b. Roles + per-app permissions are queued for v1.3+.
@@ -746,26 +748,29 @@ We reserve the unqualified **`users`** table for the v1.1+ Rhai SDK feature (scr
```sql
CREATE TABLE admin_users (
id UUID PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
username TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
password_hash TEXT NOT NULL, -- Argon2id
created_at TIMESTAMP DEFAULT NOW(),
updated_at TIMESTAMP DEFAULT NOW(),
last_login_at TIMESTAMP
id UUID PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
username TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
password_hash TEXT NOT NULL, -- Argon2id (PHC string)
is_active BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT TRUE,
created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
updated_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
last_login_at TIMESTAMPTZ
);
CREATE TABLE admin_sessions (
token_hash TEXT PRIMARY KEY, -- SHA-256 of the bearer token; raw token only exists in the login response + cookie
user_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES admin_users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
created_at TIMESTAMP DEFAULT NOW(),
expires_at TIMESTAMP NOT NULL,
last_used_at TIMESTAMP DEFAULT NOW()
token_hash TEXT PRIMARY KEY, -- SHA-256(hex) of the bearer token; raw token only exists in the login response + cookie
user_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES admin_users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
expires_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL,
last_used_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW()
);
CREATE INDEX idx_admin_sessions_user ON admin_sessions(user_id);
CREATE INDEX idx_admin_sessions_expiry ON admin_sessions(expires_at);
CREATE INDEX admin_sessions_user_idx ON admin_sessions (user_id);
CREATE INDEX admin_sessions_expiry_idx ON admin_sessions (expires_at);
```
`is_active` was added to the shipped cut so admins can be deactivated (login rejected, sessions wiped) without losing audit history; deletion still cascades sessions through the FK.
**Password hashing**: Argon2id with default OWASP parameters. This also resolves the v1.1+ open question about user-password hashing (§10) — the platform settles on Argon2id once, here.
### Bootstrap
@@ -814,13 +819,17 @@ Companion endpoints:
```
GET /api/v1/admin/admins — list
POST /api/v1/admin/admins — create
POST /api/v1/admin/admins — create ({ username, password })
GET /api/v1/admin/admins/{id} — get
PATCH /api/v1/admin/admins/{id} — update (username, password)
DELETE /api/v1/admin/admins/{id} — delete (rejected if it would leave zero admins)
PATCH /api/v1/admin/admins/{id} — update ({ username?, password?, is_active? })
DELETE /api/v1/admin/admins/{id} — delete
```
Initial cut: every authenticated admin can call all of these. No self-elevation concerns because there are no privilege levels yet.
Initial cut: every authenticated admin can call all of these. No self-elevation concerns because there are no privilege levels yet. The PATCH and DELETE handlers both refuse to leave the system with zero active admins (`422 Unprocessable Entity` with a clear message); PATCH that transitions `is_active` from true to false also wipes that user's sessions immediately.
Validation: username `^[a-z0-9._-]{2,32}$`, password minimum 8 characters (no complexity rules — follows NIST 800-63B guidance).
Dashboard surface: `/admin/login` (unauthed), `/admin/admins` (user list with add / change-password / deactivate / reactivate / delete actions per row). The top-bar shows the logged-in admin and a logout button. Token is held in a Svelte store with a localStorage echo so a page refresh doesn't sign you out; cookie-based auth works in parallel for non-SPA browser hits.
### Forward Compatibility
@@ -1031,7 +1040,7 @@ The scripts and routes endpoints keep their existing shape — this avoids forci
Two foundation pieces that must land before the v1.1 service expansion, because retrofitting them later is expensive.
**3a. Admin auth**see section 11.4. Per-user `admin_users` (not a shared secret), Argon2id passwords, env-var bootstrap of the first admin, session-token doubling as bearer token for API. No roles in this cut; schema is forward-compatible with later RBAC.
**3a. Admin auth**✓ shipped. See section 11.4. Per-user `admin_users` (not a shared secret), Argon2id passwords, env-var bootstrap of the first admin, session-token doubling as bearer token for API. No roles in this cut; schema is forward-compatible with later RBAC.
**3b. Multi-app scoping** — see section 11.5. Introduce `apps`, `app_domains`, and `app_id` columns on `scripts` and `routes`. Migration assigns existing data to a `default` app (or seeds a `Hello World` app on fresh installs). Orchestrator dispatch becomes two-phase (Host → app → route). Reserved internal domain (`__internal__`) keeps `/api/v1/execute/{id}/*` working for app scripts without requiring a public hostname. Dashboard becomes app-hierarchical (`/admin/apps/{slug}/...`); API keeps its existing flat shape with new app-management endpoints under `/api/v1/admin/apps/*`.