A fresh two-lens end-to-end review (security + correctness) of the committed
M5/M3 diff surfaced four real defects; all fixed here with regressions.
- HIGH (M5 authz bypass) — `enforce_env_approval` resolved a group node with a
bare `get_by_slug` and SKIPPED the GroupAdmin gate on miss. A node addressed
by the group's UUID (which the apply still resolves) let a group EDITOR apply
to a confirm-required env without admin. Now resolves UUID-or-slug and fails
closed, mirroring authz_tree / prepare_tree. Raw-wire regression added.
- FIX-FIRST (M3 correctness) — the legacy `project_key=None` path was not inert:
the conflict loop pushed a conflict for any owned group (`Some(oid) != None`),
so a keyless/direct-API tree apply touching an already-claimed group was
spuriously 409'd. Ownership classification is now gated on a key being present
(the discriminator is key-present, not project-persisted, so a first-ever
keyed apply still sees an already-owned group as a conflict). Regression added.
- FIX-FIRST (M3 data-loss) — the structural-prune guard checked collection
MARKERS (`group_collections`) but data outlives its marker: un-declaring a
`collections=[...]` entry drops the marker while the kv/docs/files/queue rows
survive until group delete. A dropped-then-pruned group would silently CASCADE
that orphaned data. The guard now EXISTS-checks the actual data tables
(group_kv_entries/docs/files/queue_messages) plus secrets + markers.
- MEDIUM (audit) — group ownership takeover (and claim) now emit a
tracing::info! audit line with the actor + ousted owner, matching the M5
gated-env audit. Previously only a report counter.
Also: documented WHY `pic plan --dir` mints the project key (a rare write for a
read-only command) — plan and apply must present the same key or the ownership
token folds diverge and trip a spurious StateMoved.
Re-verified: 411 manager-core lib tests; 28 CLI journeys (incl. 2 new
regressions: uuid-slug admin gate, keyless legacy apply); workspace clippy
-D warnings + fmt clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Salvaged from the superseded feat/hierarchies-extension-points branch (M5),
re-ported onto main's evolved tree-apply engine. Fills the §7/§11.1 "per-env
approval-policy gating" that main's design doc still lists as intended but
unbuilt.
A project's root manifest declares which environments require explicit
approval; `pic apply --dir --env <e>` to a confirm-required env needs an
explicit `--approve <e>` (a blanket `--yes` does NOT cover it). The approval
is admin-gated (admin on every declared node) and audited, and the policy
folds into the bound-plan token.
- manifest: `[project]` block → ManifestProject { environments[{name,confirm}] },
root-manifest-only (rejected elsewhere by build_tree).
- discover: build_tree emits `project` into the bundle from the root manifest.
- apply_service: TreeBundle.project + ProjectPolicy; policy folds into the
state_token; plan surfaces approvals_required; ApplyError::ApprovalRequired
→ 409.
- apply_api: enforce_env_approval (after authz_tree) — refuses a gated env not
in approved_envs, requires AppAdmin/GroupAdmin on every declared node on
approval, audits. Server re-derives policy from the bundle (authoritative).
- CLI: --approve (repeatable); resolve_approvals refuses a gated env
non-interactively, prompts on a TTY; plan renders gated envs. Single-node
apply --file refuses a confirm-required env and directs to --dir.
- approval journey + manifest/ProjectPolicy unit tests. No migration (policy
lives in the manifest, like takeover/blast-radius).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
