Files
PiCloud/crates/picloud-cli/tests/approval.rs
MechaCat02 4c68d2fa33 fix(project-tool): close M5+M3 review findings (authz + data-loss + None-path)
A fresh two-lens end-to-end review (security + correctness) of the committed
M5/M3 diff surfaced four real defects; all fixed here with regressions.

- HIGH (M5 authz bypass) — `enforce_env_approval` resolved a group node with a
  bare `get_by_slug` and SKIPPED the GroupAdmin gate on miss. A node addressed
  by the group's UUID (which the apply still resolves) let a group EDITOR apply
  to a confirm-required env without admin. Now resolves UUID-or-slug and fails
  closed, mirroring authz_tree / prepare_tree. Raw-wire regression added.

- FIX-FIRST (M3 correctness) — the legacy `project_key=None` path was not inert:
  the conflict loop pushed a conflict for any owned group (`Some(oid) != None`),
  so a keyless/direct-API tree apply touching an already-claimed group was
  spuriously 409'd. Ownership classification is now gated on a key being present
  (the discriminator is key-present, not project-persisted, so a first-ever
  keyed apply still sees an already-owned group as a conflict). Regression added.

- FIX-FIRST (M3 data-loss) — the structural-prune guard checked collection
  MARKERS (`group_collections`) but data outlives its marker: un-declaring a
  `collections=[...]` entry drops the marker while the kv/docs/files/queue rows
  survive until group delete. A dropped-then-pruned group would silently CASCADE
  that orphaned data. The guard now EXISTS-checks the actual data tables
  (group_kv_entries/docs/files/queue_messages) plus secrets + markers.

- MEDIUM (audit) — group ownership takeover (and claim) now emit a
  tracing::info! audit line with the actor + ousted owner, matching the M5
  gated-env audit. Previously only a report counter.

Also: documented WHY `pic plan --dir` mints the project key (a rare write for a
read-only command) — plan and apply must present the same key or the ownership
token folds diverge and trip a spurious StateMoved.

Re-verified: 411 manager-core lib tests; 28 CLI journeys (incl. 2 new
regressions: uuid-slug admin gate, keyless legacy apply); workspace clippy
-D warnings + fmt clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-05 20:45:23 +02:00

241 lines
8.8 KiB
Rust

//! M5 per-env approval gating (§4.2, §6) via `pic apply --dir`:
//! * a root manifest `[project]` block marks an environment confirm-required,
//! * applying to that env WITHOUT `--approve` is refused (a blanket `--yes`
//! does not cover it) — refused non-interactively at the CLI,
//! * `--approve <env>` (as an admin) lets it through,
//! * a non-gated environment applies with plain `--yes`,
//! * single-node `apply --file` to a gated env is refused (no silent bypass),
//! * approving a gated apply needs ADMIN authority on the node — a non-admin
//! editor with `--approve` is refused server-side (403).
use std::fs;
use std::path::Path;
use tempfile::TempDir;
use crate::common;
use crate::common::cleanup::{AppGuard, GroupGuard};
use crate::common::member;
/// A single-app project dir whose root manifest declares a `[project]` policy:
/// `production` is confirm-required, `staging` is not. A `[vars]` entry gives
/// the app write-requiring content so an `editor` member's AppVarsWrite is
/// exercised (proving the admin gate is ABOVE editor-write). Vars cascade with
/// the app; scripts are ON DELETE RESTRICT and would break AppGuard teardown.
fn project_dir(app: &str) -> TempDir {
let dir = TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
fs::write(
dir.path().join("picloud.toml"),
format!(
"[app]\nslug = \"{app}\"\nname = \"Gated App\"\n\n\
[[project.environments]]\nname = \"production\"\nconfirm = true\n\n\
[[project.environments]]\nname = \"staging\"\nconfirm = false\n\n\
[vars]\nregion = \"eu\"\n"
),
)
.unwrap();
// `--env <e>` requires the overlay file to exist; empty overlays keep the
// base slug (same app across envs — we're testing the gate, not env routing).
fs::write(dir.path().join("picloud.production.toml"), "").unwrap();
fs::write(dir.path().join("picloud.staging.toml"), "").unwrap();
dir
}
fn apply(env: &common::TestEnv, dir: &Path, extra: &[&str]) -> std::process::Output {
let mut cmd = common::pic_as(env);
cmd.args(["apply", "--dir"]).arg(dir).args(extra);
cmd.output().expect("apply --dir")
}
#[ignore = "needs DATABASE_URL pointing at a running Postgres"]
#[test]
fn confirm_required_env_needs_explicit_approval() {
let Some(fx) = common::fixture_or_skip() else {
return;
};
let env = common::admin_env(fx);
let group = common::unique_slug("appr-g");
let app = common::unique_slug("appr-a");
let _g = GroupGuard::new(&env.url, &env.token, &group);
common::pic_as(&env)
.args(["groups", "create", &group])
.assert()
.success();
let _a = AppGuard::new(&env.url, &env.token, &app);
common::pic_as(&env)
.args(["apps", "create", &app, "--group", &group])
.assert()
.success();
let dir = project_dir(&app);
// --- production is confirm-required: --yes alone is refused. ---
let out = apply(&env, dir.path(), &["--env", "production", "--yes"]);
assert!(
!out.status.success(),
"production apply without --approve must be refused"
);
let err = String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr).to_lowercase();
assert!(
err.contains("approve"),
"refusal should mention --approve:\n{err}"
);
// --- with --approve production, it applies. ---
let ok = apply(
&env,
dir.path(),
&["--env", "production", "--approve", "production"],
);
assert!(
ok.status.success(),
"approved production apply should succeed: {}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&ok.stderr)
);
// --- staging is NOT gated: plain --yes applies. ---
let ok2 = apply(&env, dir.path(), &["--env", "staging", "--yes"]);
assert!(
ok2.status.success(),
"non-gated staging apply should succeed: {}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&ok2.stderr)
);
// --- single-node `apply --file` to a gated env is refused (no bypass). ---
let single = common::pic_as(&env)
.args(["apply", "--file"])
.arg(dir.path().join("picloud.toml"))
.args(["--env", "production", "--yes"])
.output()
.expect("apply --file");
assert!(
!single.status.success(),
"single-node apply to a confirm-required env must be refused"
);
let serr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&single.stderr).to_lowercase();
assert!(
serr.contains("confirm-required") || serr.contains("--dir"),
"single-node refusal should point at --dir:\n{serr}"
);
}
#[ignore = "needs DATABASE_URL pointing at a running Postgres"]
#[test]
fn approving_a_gated_apply_requires_admin() {
// §4.2: approving a confirm-required env is admin-gated — a second gate on
// top of the editor-level write caps an ordinary apply needs. An editor who
// CAN write the app (its `[vars]`) still cannot approve a gated apply.
let Some(fx) = common::fixture_or_skip() else {
return;
};
let env = common::admin_env(fx);
let group = common::unique_slug("appr2-g");
let app = common::unique_slug("appr2-a");
let _g = GroupGuard::new(&env.url, &env.token, &group);
common::pic_as(&env)
.args(["groups", "create", &group])
.assert()
.success();
let _a = AppGuard::new(&env.url, &env.token, &app);
common::pic_as(&env)
.args(["apps", "create", &app, "--group", &group])
.assert()
.success();
// A member with `editor` (write) on the app — enough for an ordinary apply,
// not enough to approve a gated environment.
let m = member::member_user(fx, &common::unique_username("appr"));
member::grant_membership(fx, &app, &m.id, "editor");
let member_env = common::custom_env(&fx.url, &m.token);
common::seed_credentials(&member_env, &m.username);
let dir = project_dir(&app);
let out = apply(
&member_env,
dir.path(),
&["--env", "production", "--approve", "production"],
);
assert!(
!out.status.success(),
"a non-admin editor must not be able to approve a gated apply"
);
let err = String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr).to_lowercase();
assert!(
err.contains("forbidden") || err.contains("403"),
"approval denial should be an authz error:\n{err}"
);
}
#[ignore = "needs DATABASE_URL pointing at a running Postgres"]
#[test]
fn gated_group_node_admin_gate_is_not_bypassable_by_uuid_slug() {
// Regression (§4.2): `enforce_env_approval` must resolve a group node by
// UUID-or-slug and FAIL CLOSED — a bare `get_by_slug` skipped the GroupAdmin
// gate when the node addressed the group by its UUID (which the apply still
// resolves), letting a group EDITOR apply to a confirm-required env without
// admin. We drive the raw `/tree/apply` wire directly (the CLI only ever
// sends slugs) with the group node's UUID as its slug.
let Some(fx) = common::fixture_or_skip() else {
return;
};
let env = common::admin_env(fx);
let group = common::unique_slug("appr3-g");
let _g = GroupGuard::new(&env.url, &env.token, &group);
common::pic_as(&env)
.args(["groups", "create", &group])
.assert()
.success();
// Resolve the group's UUID.
let http = reqwest::blocking::Client::new();
let detail: serde_json::Value = http
.get(format!("{}/api/v1/admin/groups/{}", env.url, group))
.bearer_auth(&env.token)
.send()
.expect("get group")
.json()
.expect("group json");
let group_uuid = detail["id"].as_str().expect("group id").to_string();
// A group `editor` — write caps, but NOT GroupAdmin.
let m = member::member_user(fx, &common::unique_username("appr3"));
common::pic_as(&env)
.args([
"groups", "members", "add", &group, &m.id, "--role", "editor",
])
.assert()
.success();
// A gated bundle whose single group node is addressed by UUID. A `vars`
// entry makes the node non-empty (and exercises the editor's write cap).
let body = serde_json::json!({
"bundle": {
"nodes": [{
"kind": "group",
"slug": group_uuid,
"bundle": { "vars": { "region": "eu" } }
}],
"project": { "environments": [{ "name": "production", "confirm": true }] }
},
"prune": false,
"env": "production",
"approved_envs": ["production"],
"allow_takeover": false,
});
let resp = http
.post(format!("{}/api/v1/admin/tree/apply", env.url))
.bearer_auth(&m.token)
.json(&body)
.send()
.expect("tree apply");
assert_eq!(
resp.status().as_u16(),
403,
"a group editor must be 403'd approving a gated apply even when the node \
is addressed by UUID (got {}: {})",
resp.status(),
resp.text().unwrap_or_default()
);
}