An extension point (§5.5) marks a module name a node offers for descendants
to provide/override — resolved dynamically against the inheriting app rather
than lexically sealed. Lay the storage:
- migration 0051: owner-polymorphic `extension_points(id, group_id?, app_id?,
name)` marker table — exactly-one CHECK + per-owner partial-unique LOWER(name)
indexes + lookup indexes (mirrors 0050). ON DELETE CASCADE (a marker is
config, not code). No default-body column — the optional default body is a
co-located kind=module script (Phase 4b stores/resolves/caches those).
- extension_point_repo: `list_for_owner` + idempotent `insert_extension_point_tx`
/ `delete_extension_point_tx`, keyed by the shared `ScriptOwner` (mirrors the
var/secret tx-fn style).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 4-lite C1. Make script ownership polymorphic so a script can be owned
by a GROUP (a template inherited by descendant apps) instead of an app —
mirroring vars/secrets (0048/0049), but ON DELETE RESTRICT (code is not data).
Schema (0050): `scripts.group_id` (nullable FK→groups RESTRICT), `app_id` made
nullable, `scripts_owner_exactly_one` CHECK, and the per-app name index split
into two per-owner partial-unique indexes. Existing app-owned rows keep their
exact `(app_id, lower(name))` uniqueness.
Type: `Script.app_id` becomes `Option<AppId>`; add `Script.group_id` +
`ScriptOwner` / `is_owned_by_app()`. `NewScript` gains the same polymorphic
owner. The execution-context app (what a script runs *under*) is supplied by
the invoking route/trigger/caller, never read off the script — group scripts
have no single app.
Behavior is fully preserved for app-owned scripts (the only kind creatable
today): every isolation backstop and authz site now uses `is_owned_by_app`,
which is byte-identical for app owners and **fails closed** for group owners.
A group script therefore can't yet be run, route/trigger-bound, invoked, or
managed via the app-script API — those land in C2 (group-script creation) and
C3 (chain-membership resolution + binding). The `/execute/{id}` bypass 404s a
group script (no app context to run under).
Re-blesses expected_schema.txt; note the golden was last blessed at migration
0044, so this also captures the already-committed 0045–0049 schema.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Migration 0049 reshapes `secrets` to the same polymorphic-owner contract
as `vars` (0048): a secret is owned by an app XOR an ancestor group,
carries an `environment_scope`, and the old PK `(app_id, name)` becomes
two partial-unique indexes `(owner, environment_scope, name)`. Existing
rows backfill to `app_id` + scope `'*'`; the v1 AAD does NOT include the
scope, so every current ciphertext keeps decrypting byte-for-byte.
`SecretsRepo` is generalised to be owner+scope keyed (`SecretOwner` moves
down from `secrets_service` and is re-exported for path stability). The
SDK read path now goes through `SecretsRepo::resolve`, which reuses the
shared `CHAIN_LEVELS_CTE` to walk app→ancestor-group→root, env-filters,
and takes the nearest level (`@E` beating `*` within a level) — returning
the winning owner so the value is decrypted under the AAD it was sealed
with. Runtime injection stays anchored to `cx.app_id`: an app only ever
resolves its own and its ancestors' secrets.
All callers updated to owner+scope (`SecretOwner::App(_)`, scope `'*'`):
the app-secrets admin API, the SDK service, and the apply email-secret
path. The 21 secrets unit tests (incl. the app/group AAD-disjointness and
cross-row swap proofs) stay green; the chain-walk was live-verified
against Postgres (nearest-wins + env-filter). Admin API for group secrets
and the masked-read endpoint land next (Step E).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 3 foundation (docs §3): env-filtered, proximity-first config
inheritance down the group tree.
- Migration 0048: `vars` (polymorphic group|app owner via two nullable FKs
+ CHECK exactly-one, env scope, JSONB value, explicit tombstone) +
`apps.environment` (the env marker the resolver filters on — 'an
environment is an app').
- config_resolver: a shared chain-walk CTE (mirrors effective_app_role) that
walks app → ancestor groups, env-filters in SQL, plus a pure Rust
resolution pass implementing the §3 semantics SQL can't — per-key
proximity-first, @E-over-* within a level, map deep-merge, tombstone
suppression, and provenance for --explain.
Verified: 8 unit tests (incl. the §3.2 proximity-beats-env-specificity call,
deep-merge, tombstone, boundary) + the candidate-fetch CTE against live
Postgres (env-filter drops a non-matching @production value; nearer level
shadows farther).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 2 (blueprint §5): groups form a single-parent org tree ABOVE apps.
This migration adds the tree + membership tables and gives every app a
parent (§9 adoption):
- groups: id, parent_id (self-FK ON DELETE RESTRICT), slug (instance-
global UNIQUE, frozen at creation), name, description, structure_version
(bumped on structural mutation), owner_project (inert §7 seam).
- group_members: (group_id, user_id, role) with the SAME three role
literals as app_members so AppRole round-trips and the authz rank table
covers both.
- apps.group_id: nullable add → backfill every app under a seeded 'root'
group → promote to NOT NULL + FK RESTRICT.
No group-owned resources yet (scripts/secrets stay app-owned — Phase 3).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Schema groundwork for the trigger `name` identity (the manifest merge key
that will let `apply` Update a trigger in place rather than only
Create/Delete). A `gen_random_uuid()` default keeps the existing write
paths valid and unique without code changes; existing rows are backfilled
to the readable `{kind}-{n}` form; `UNIQUE(app_id, name)` is enforced.
No behavior change yet — the manager-core write paths and the apply diff
start using the name in the follow-up. Verified the migration applies and
the trigger journeys (which create triggers via the unnamed path → default
name) stay green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase-1 `enabled` three-state lifecycle (§4.3), data-model half. Triggers
already carried `enabled`; this adds it to scripts and routes and threads
it through the declarative project tool. Runtime honoring (disabled route
404 / script non-invocable / dispatcher fire-time re-check) is the next
commit — this change only stores and reconciles the flag.
- Migration 0045: `enabled BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT TRUE` on scripts +
routes. Default true ⇒ no behavior change on migrate.
- `Script`/`Route` (shared) gain `enabled` (serde default true via the new
`picloud_shared::default_true`); repos' SELECT/INSERT/UPDATE SQL, row
structs, `NewScript`/`NewRoute`/`ScriptPatch` all carry it.
- Apply diff treats `enabled` as a declarative field (omitted ⇒ active):
`script_update_reason` + `diff_routes` detect a toggle as an Update, and
the create/update/insert paths persist it. The bound-plan `state_token`
re-includes script/route `enabled` (removed in the earlier review fix
precisely because the diff didn't key on it yet — now it does).
- CLI manifest model + `build_bundle` + `pull` round-trip `enabled`
(serialized only when false; omitted ⇒ active). `pic init` scaffold and
the interactive script/route create paths default active.
Tested: manager-core lib 365 (incl. enabled diff + token sensitivity) +
cli bins 31 (incl. manifest skip-serialize) green; clippy -D warnings
clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes the gaps and the one security finding from the second end-to-end
CLI test (E2E_STASH_REPORT.md), plus the H1 boot-regression found while
re-reviewing those fixes.
Security
- S6: reserved-path validation (`check_reserved`) now case-folds before
comparing, so `/API/v2/x`, `/HEALTHZ`, `/Admin/x` are rejected like
their lowercase forms. Request-time matching stays case-sensitive.
- S10: "public route != public data" callout in sdk-shape.md (script_gate
skips authz when the principal is anonymous).
Observability / features
- G1: trigger executions now write `execution_logs`. Migration 0043 adds
a `source` column (CHECK mirrors ExecutionSource/OutboxSourceKind,
DEFAULT 'http' backfills history); a shared `build_execution_log` helper
in executor-core; dispatcher logging for outbox triggers + queue
consumers (skips sync-HTTP rows the orchestrator already logs). `pic
logs` gains a source column + `--source` filter.
- G5: dev-only in-memory email capture under PICLOUD_DEV_MODE with no SMTP
(email::send succeeds locally), readable at GET /api/v1/admin/dev/emails
(Owner/Admin only; route mounted only in capture mode).
- G6: generalized the Rhai in-place-mutation footgun note (trim/replace/
make_upper/make_lower/crop/truncate/pad return ()).
- G2/G3/G4 (CLI): `pic members`, `pic files`, `pic queues`, read-only
`pic kv` (+ new kv_api.rs); `pic deploy --timeout/--memory/--kind/
--sandbox`; first-class `pic triggers create-{docs,files,pubsub,queue,
email}` wrappers. All new client path segments percent-encoded via seg().
H1 regression fix (found in re-review)
- The S6 change also runs in `compile_routes`, which compiles every stored
route at boot and on each route CRUD. A single stored route the new
validation rejects (creatable while the S6 gap existed) made the whole
compile Err and aborted startup. `compile_routes` is now lenient: it
skips an un-compilable row with a warning instead of bricking boot
(route creation still validates separately). Migration 0044 sweeps
pre-existing reserved-path routes on upgrade (WHERE mirrors
check_reserved exactly). Added regression tests for both.
Verified: cargo fmt, clippy --all-targets --all-features -D warnings, the
schema_snapshot test, and the new S6/lenient-compile unit tests all pass;
boot-resilience and G1/G5 confirmed live.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
At-rest secrets were AES-256-GCM sealed with no Associated
Authentication Data, so anyone with Postgres write access could
ciphertext-swap rows across apps (or rename via row edit) and the
decrypt would silently succeed under the wrong identity, returning
attacker-chosen plaintext. This breaks the cross-app isolation boundary
the moment DB write access is achieved.
Adds an AAD-bound envelope (v1) alongside the legacy no-AAD layout (v0),
discriminated by a per-row `version` column:
* shared::crypto — new encrypt_with_aad / decrypt_with_aad using
aes_gcm::aead::Payload { msg, aad }. Originals retained for v0 reads.
Tests: AAD round-trip, AAD-mismatch fails, empty-AAD round-trip.
* migration 0042 — adds `secrets.version SMALLINT NOT NULL DEFAULT 0`
and `app_secrets.realtime_signing_key_version SMALLINT NOT NULL
DEFAULT 0`. Existing rows stay v0; new writes are v1.
* secrets (SDK + admin API) — seal() now binds AAD =
"secret:{app_id}:{name}" and emits v1; open() dispatches on version.
StoredSecret gains a `version` field; SecretsRepo::set takes it.
Both secrets_service::set and secrets_api::set_secret go through the
v1 path. Tests prove a cross-app swap and a cross-name swap both
surface Corrupted, and that a hand-built v0 row still decrypts.
* app_secrets (realtime signing key) — get_or_create_signing_key writes
v1 with AAD = "app_secret:{app_id}:realtime_signing_key"; decode
dispatches on version. Tests cover v0 decode, v1 round-trip, and v1
decode-under-wrong-app failing.
* email-trigger inbound secret — kept on v0 (seal_legacy/open_legacy)
and explicitly deferred: email_trigger_details has no version column
and the trigger_id isn't known at seal time. The audit classes the
email-trigger AAD gap as Medium; folded into v1.2's key-versioning
pass per SECURITY_AUDIT.md.
* expected_schema.txt re-blessed by hand (no local Postgres) for the two
new columns + migration 0042.
Also folds in a let-else clippy fix in auth_api.rs (login Argon2
semaphore acquire, from the H-B1 commit) and two cargo-fmt reflows.
No re-encryption sweep — v0 rows decrypt as-is; the sweep is deferred to
v1.2's key-versioning pass (audit "Notes on remediation methodology").
Audit ref: security_audit/03_crypto_secrets.md (H-D1).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes 4 dashboard hardening findings and 5 of the Lows from the audit.
Dashboard hardening:
- Subtabs no longer re-fetch the app via api.apps.get on every page
load. users/files/dead-letters drop the fetch outright (the variable
was set but never read); queues + queues/[name] now consume the
layout's AppContext via getContext for the page title. The layout's
reloadApp() owns the historical-slug redirect — subtab-local redirect
blocks are removed so there's no race.
- The global :global(details > summary::before) chevron is now scoped
to details.chevron. The script editor's "Advanced sandbox" details
and the inbound-email-shape help-text both opt in; the script
exec-list logs no longer inherit a spurious chevron.
- deriveTab now matches the path segment by anchored ===, so a future
/apps/<slug>/queues-archived route wouldn't activate the queues tab.
Lows cherry-pick:
- ExecError gains Serialize/Deserialize derives + a snake_case tag so
RemoteExecutorClient (cluster mode v1.3+) can round-trip the variant.
- triggers_api rejects queue triggers whose visibility_timeout_secs is
below the dispatcher's per-message executor budget; with no minimum
the reclaim task races the handler and the queue silently
double-delivers. Existing test using 5s updated to 30s.
- New migration 0040: execution_logs.script_id cascade switched from
ON DELETE CASCADE to ON DELETE SET NULL so deleting a script no
longer wipes the forensic history that motivated the delete.
- New migration 0041: dead_letters composite index on
(app_id, created_at DESC) so the "list all" dashboard view stops
falling back to seqscan + sort when unresolved=false.
- Schema snapshot re-blessed.
Deferred to v1.2: the ExecRequest principal serde(skip) marker
(documented in-place; the cluster-mode PR will introduce the wire-safe
snapshot at that point) and the `pic --help` mention of
`picloud admin reset-password` (one-line follow-up).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
No unique constraint on (app_id, lower(email)) for pending rows meant
calling users::invite("alice@…") N times created N rows with N valid
tokens. Combined with accept_invite returning Ok(None) silently when
the email already exists, an attacker who learned one token could
permanently consume it without effect.
Migration 0040 adds a partial unique index keyed on
(app_id, lower(email)) WHERE accepted_at IS NULL. Re-inviting after a
previous invite was accepted still works — the accepted row falls
outside the index.
The service-layer 409-conflict UX (the audit's secondary suggestion)
is a separate follow-up; this commit closes the data-shape hole.
AUDIT.md anchor: F-S-013.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two (encrypted, nonce) column pairs are each nullable independently in
the current schema:
- email_trigger_details.inbound_secret_encrypted / _nonce
- app_secrets.realtime_signing_key_encrypted / _nonce
A bug or partial write could leave one populated and the other NULL,
silently bypassing signature verification (receivers decrypt only if
the encrypted column is set).
Migration 0038 adds CHECK ((enc IS NULL) = (nonce IS NULL)) on both
tables — defence-in-depth: catches an invariant violation at the DB
boundary even if the writing code regresses.
AUDIT.md anchor: F-M-002.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Migration 0017_cron_triggers.sql created idx_cron_triggers_due on
(last_fired_at) with a comment claiming it serves the scheduler. The
actual scheduler query has no last_fired_at predicate — it filters
purely on `t.enabled = TRUE FOR UPDATE OF d SKIP LOCKED`. The index
has been pure write amplification with no read payoff.
Migration 0037 drops it. Reversible by re-running 0017's CREATE INDEX
if the planner story ever changes.
AUDIT.md anchor: F-M-001.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
list_active_queue_consumers fires every 100ms from the dispatcher
queue arm and predicates on `WHERE t.kind='queue' AND t.enabled=TRUE`
with no app_id filter — but the only available index
`idx_triggers_app_kind_enabled` is keyed on `(app_id, kind)` and so
requires an app_id predicate to be useful. Without one, the planner
falls back to a sequential scan every tick.
Add migration 0036 with a partial index on `kind` (WHERE enabled =
TRUE) so the hot dispatcher query becomes an index-only lookup.
AUDIT.md anchor: F-P-010.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- 0034_queue_messages.sql: per-app durable named queues. (app_id, queue_name)
is the identity tuple; no queue registry table. Partial indexes on
(claim_token IS NULL) for the dispatch hot path and (claim_token IS NOT NULL)
for the visibility-timeout reclaim scan. The queue table IS the outbox
for queue semantics — no double-buffering.
- 0035_queue_triggers.sql: widens triggers.kind CHECK to admit 'queue';
widens outbox.source_kind CHECK to admit 'invoke' (for invoke_async).
Adds queue_trigger_details(trigger_id PK, queue_name, visibility_timeout_secs,
last_fired_at). Retry policy lives on the parent triggers row — same
pattern as every other kind. One-consumer-per-queue is API-layer enforced
via pg_advisory_xact_lock (partial unique index can't span parent.app_id).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Migration 0033 widens topics.auth_mode CHECK to include 'session'
alongside 'public' and 'token'.
TopicAuthMode enum gains a Session variant (as_str + from_db
extended uniformly).
RealtimeAuthorityImpl now takes Arc<dyn UsersService> as a third
constructor arg. The Session branch of authorize_subscribe
delegates to UsersService::verify_session_for_realtime(app_id,
token):
* Returns Some(user) → allow. The service bumps the sliding TTL
on success.
* Returns None → Unauthorized.
* Defense-in-depth: even though verify_session_for_realtime
already enforces cross-app isolation, the branch re-checks
user.app_id == app_id.
Tests added (4 new cases): valid session token allows; missing
token is Unauthorized; wrong token is Unauthorized; cross-app
session token is Unauthorized. All 12 realtime_authority tests
pass.
Dashboard: TopicAuthMode TypeScript union widened to include
'session'; the topic create + edit forms gain a third radio option
labeled "session — requires a per-app user session minted by
users::login (v1.1.8)".
picloud binary: construction order reshuffled so users is built
before realtime_authority. app_secrets_repo is now .clone()'d into
the pubsub realtime wiring so the original Arc can be re-used by
realtime_authority.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
v1.1.7 added at-rest encryption for app_secrets.realtime_signing_key
plus a startup task that backfilled encryption over the plaintext
column. v1.1.7's CHANGELOG committed v1.1.8 to dropping the
plaintext column; this commit follows through.
Migration 0032:
* Guard query: refuses to apply if any row still has
realtime_signing_key IS NOT NULL but realtime_signing_key_encrypted
IS NULL. Forces operators who skipped v1.1.7 to apply it first.
* ALTER TABLE app_secrets DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS
realtime_signing_key.
app_secrets_repo:
* decode_signing_key now reads encrypted+nonce only; the plaintext
fallback is gone. (The schema still allows it via DROP IF EXISTS
semantics on replay; once dropped, the column doesn't exist —
the SELECT no longer requests it.)
* Removed migrate_plaintext_keys (the v1.1.7 startup sweep).
* Tests for the falls-back-to-plaintext path are gone with it; the
remaining tests cover the encrypted-only happy path, the
missing-columns None case, and the wrong-master-key Crypto error.
picloud/lib.rs: removed the migrate_plaintext_keys startup call
+ replaced with a comment explaining the upgrade-path requirement.
LOAD-BEARING: v1.1.8 requires v1.1.7 to have been applied first.
Operators upgrading directly from v1.1.6 or earlier must apply
v1.1.7 (which performs the encryption pass) before applying v1.1.8.
This is enforced both by the migration guard and by the CHANGELOG
(in a later commit).
Brief mentioned dropping a "realtime_signing_key_nonce_LEGACY_IF_EXISTS"
column — recon confirmed migration 0025 only added the plaintext
column + the encrypted/nonce pair, so no legacy nonce column exists
to drop. Documented in HANDBACK §7.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
migration 0031: app_user_roles table — composite PK (app_id, user_id,
role) so add is idempotent (ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING). v1.1.8 stores
strings only; permission matrices / hierarchies / role registry are
explicitly v1.2 work per the brief.
UsersServiceImpl wires roles: Arc<dyn AppUserRoleRepo>:
* fetch_roles() now actually queries the repo (replacing the empty
Vec stub from commit 4). Every AppUser returned from get /
find_by_email / list / update / verify / login now carries its
role list.
* users::add_role gated on AppUsersAdmin; first checks the user
exists in this app so a FK violation can't leak "no such user".
* users::remove_role gated on AppUsersAdmin; idempotent.
* users::has_role gated on AppUsersRead.
* accept_invite now applies pre-staged roles atomically with the
user creation; malformed role strings are skipped with a warn
rather than aborting the whole accept (the invitation was an
admin's promise — we honor as much of it as we can).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
migration 0030: app_user_invitations table — surrogate id PK + unique
token_hash, app_id FK cascading, pre-stages email + display_name +
roles for a user that doesn't exist yet. One-shot via atomic UPDATE
SET accepted_at = NOW() WHERE accepted_at IS NULL.
UsersServiceImpl gains invitations: Arc<dyn AppUserInvitationRepo>
plus a mint_session() helper factored from login() and reused by
accept_invite().
users::invite(email, opts) is gated on AppUsersAdmin (per brief —
the most senior of the three new capabilities). Optional
EmailTemplateOpts inside InviteOpts: omitting the template skips the
email send so an admin can stamp invitations for out-of-band
delivery (mailers, printed onboarding letters, etc.). If the template
is present and the email service isn't configured, surfaces as
NotConfigured; non-NotConfigured failures are logged but kept silent
so the invitation row remains valid for retry.
users::accept_invite(token, password, display_name?) atomically
consumes the invitation, validates the new password, creates the
user (returning () on DuplicateEmail — sign-up beat acceptance,
they'll log in normally), and mints a fresh session via mint_session
so the caller can return both the user and a working session token
in one round trip.
Pre-staged roles are stored on the invitation row but not yet
applied — the app_user_roles table arrives in commit 8 (migration
0031). For commit 7 the staged-but-not-applied case logs an info
record so an operator can audit the gap.
list_invitations + revoke_invitation (admin-mediated, gated on
AppUsersAdmin) ship in this commit and become reachable from the
HTTP surface later in the series.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
migration 0029: app_user_password_resets table — same shape as
verification (token_hash PK, app_id + user_id FKs, expires_at,
consumed_at). One-shot via atomic UPDATE WHERE consumed_at IS NULL.
Default TTL 1h (shorter than verification's 48h — reset tokens are
higher-risk).
UsersServiceImpl gains password_resets: Arc<dyn AppUserPasswordResetRepo>.
users::request_password_reset(email, opts):
* Returns Ok(()) regardless of whether the email matched — no
existence-leak signal in script-land (per brief).
* Email-not-configured surfaces as NotConfigured so scripts can
fall back to a synchronous reset path. Other email errors are
silently swallowed and logged server-side; surfacing them would
leak which addresses produced a "real send attempted" signal vs
a no-op.
users::complete_password_reset(token, new_password):
* Atomically consumes the token, updates the Argon2id hash, and
revokes EVERY active session for that user (anyone with a stale
token shouldn't be able to ride out the reset). Emits
users::password_changed.
* Returns the user on success, () on bad/expired/already-used.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
migration 0028: app_user_email_verifications table — token_hash PK,
app_id + user_id FKs cascading, expires_at, consumed_at. Single-use
via atomic UPDATE WHERE consumed_at IS NULL.
UsersServiceImpl gains:
* verifications: Arc<dyn AppUserVerificationRepo>
* email: Arc<dyn EmailService>
users::send_verification_email(user_id, opts) mints a 32-byte token,
stores SHA-256(token), and calls EmailService::send with the body
template's {link} placeholder substituted by link_base + ?token=raw.
EmailError::NotConfigured propagates as UsersError::EmailNotConfigured
so scripts already handling email-disabled mode (v1.1.7 email::send)
don't need new branches.
users::verify_email(token) atomically consumes the one-shot token via
the verifications repo, marks the user's email_verified_at = NOW(),
and emits a "users::email_verified" event for future triggers.
Internal email send uses a synthesized SdkCallCx with principal=None
so the email-service AppEmailSend authz check is skipped (the
users::* surface has already gated on AppUsersWrite — the internal
hop isn't the script's direct call). Documented in HANDBACK §7.
EmailTemplateOpts now requires `from` (the v1.1.7 email service needs
an envelope sender). The brief example omitted it; deviation logged
in HANDBACK §7.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
App-user session storage (migration 0027) mirrors admin_sessions but
adds three things v1.1.8 needs:
* app_id column + FK cascade — every v1.1+ table starts with app_id
so cross-app isolation is bright at the SQL layer (lookup keys
off the hash only, but defense-in-depth: a leaked row's session
still scopes to its app on every read).
* absolute_expires_at — hard cap on the sliding window (default 30d
via PICLOUD_APP_USER_SESSION_ABSOLUTE_HOURS). Beyond this the
user must re-login regardless of recent activity.
* revoked_at — explicit revocation by token (logout) or per-user
(admin revoke-sessions button, password reset). Lookups reject
revoked rows immediately so revocation takes effect before the
weekly GC sweep runs.
The repo's gc() uses FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED matching the dead-letter
and abandoned-executions sweep patterns; the GC wiring lands in a
later commit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Per-app end-user table for the v1.1.8 users::* SDK. Distinct from
admin_users (control-plane operators) — same Argon2id password hash
shape but everything else (uniqueness scope, ownership, lifecycle)
independent.
- Uniqueness on (app_id, lower(email)) — case-insensitive within an
app; same email may exist across two apps.
- AppUserRepository trait + Postgres impl; every method takes app_id
explicitly so cross-app reads are unmistakable at the call site
(matches v1.1.3 cross-app discipline).
- Public AppUserRow never includes the password hash; the credentials
shape is its own struct returned only by the login lookup.
- Cursor-based list keyed on (created_at, id).
- Reserved a timing-flat dummy Argon2id PHC constant in auth.rs for
the upcoming login path so the bad-email and good-email branches
share wall-clock cost.
- Added AppUserId + InvitationId id types in shared::ids.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two-phase encryption of app_secrets.realtime_signing_key:
- migration 0025 adds NULL-able realtime_signing_key_encrypted +
_nonce columns and drops NOT NULL on the plaintext column.
- PostgresAppSecretsRepo now holds the master key: new keys are written
encrypted-only; reads prefer the encrypted columns and fall back to
plaintext during the compat window.
- Startup task migrate_plaintext_keys() encrypts any pre-existing
plaintext rows (plaintext left in place for rollback safety).
- v1.1.8 will drop the plaintext column.
The RealtimeAuthority read path is unchanged (it calls signing_key),
so SSE keeps working throughout. Unit tests cover the
encrypted-wins / plaintext-fallback / post-drop precedence.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Inbound email: a provider POSTs a normalized JSON message to
POST /api/v1/email-inbound/{app_id}/{trigger_id}; the public receiver
verifies the optional HMAC signature, builds a TriggerEvent::Email, and
enqueues an outbox row the dispatcher delivers like any async trigger.
Handlers see ctx.event.email = #{from,to,cc,subject,text,html,
received_at,message_id}.
- migration 0024: widen triggers.kind + outbox.source_kind CHECKs to
'email'; new email_trigger_details table.
- TriggerKind::Email, TriggerDetails::Email{has_inbound_secret},
OutboxSourceKind::Email, TriggerEvent::Email; dispatcher routes the
email row via the generic resolve_trigger path.
- Admin POST /apps/{id}/triggers/email (validate_trigger_target; module
+ cross-app rejection). inbound_secret is stored ENCRYPTED via the
master key (deviation from the brief's plaintext default; decrypted
per inbound request — see HANDBACK §7).
- Dashboard: email trigger form on the Triggers tab + webhook URL +
expected-payload help.
- 8 DB-gated e2e tests (202/401/404/422/cross-app/handler-fire) +
receiver unit tests (HMAC verify, secret round-trip, payload parse).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Encrypted per-app secrets, reachable from scripts as
secrets::{get,set,delete,list}(name) and managed from the dashboard
Secrets tab. Values are AES-256-GCM-sealed with the process master key
(picloud_shared::crypto) before they touch Postgres; the repo only ever
sees ciphertext + nonce. JSON round-trip preserves Rhai types.
- migration 0023_secrets.sql (PRIMARY KEY (app_id, name)).
- SecretsService trait (picloud-shared) + SecretsServiceImpl + repo
(manager-core), wired into the Services bundle and Rhai engine.
- Capability::AppSecretsRead/Write (→ script:read / script:write); no
new Scope variants (seven-scope commitment).
- Admin API GET/POST/DELETE /apps/{id}/secrets (list returns names +
updated_at, never values).
- build_app now takes a MasterKey, sourced from PICLOUD_SECRET_KEY in
main.rs; test callers pass a fixed test key.
- 64 KB value cap (PICLOUD_SECRET_MAX_VALUE_BYTES); no ServiceEvent
emission (secret writes don't fire triggers, by design).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Durable pub/sub through the universal outbox — the sixth trigger kind.
- `pubsub::publish_durable(topic, message)` Rhai SDK (no handle; topics
ARE the grouping unit). Message JSON-encoded; Blobs base64 at any
depth.
- `PubsubService` trait in picloud-shared with the topic matcher +
validator (exact / `<prefix>.*` / `*`; mid-pattern wildcards
rejected). `PostgresPubsubRepo` + `PubsubServiceImpl` in manager-core.
- Publish-time fan-out: one outbox row per matching enabled pubsub
trigger, all in ONE transaction (no half-fan-out on crash). No
matching trigger → publish succeeds silently, zero rows.
- `pubsub:*` trigger kind via Layout-E (0020: widen both CHECKs +
pubsub_trigger_details + partial index), TriggerEvent::Pubsub +
ctx.event.pubsub, dispatcher arm, admin endpoint POST /triggers/pubsub
(validates topic pattern + reuses validate_trigger_target).
- AppPubsubPublish capability → script:write (seven-scope held).
- Dashboard Pub/Sub trigger form on the Triggers tab + list rendering.
publish_ephemeral stays deferred to v1.2. ~18 new tests (service
in-memory incl. transactional-rollback, shared matcher, bridge
encoding). No DB required for the suite.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Filesystem-backed blob storage as the fifth concrete trigger kind.
- `files::collection(c).{create,head,get,update,delete,list}` Rhai SDK
(blob in/out; metadata maps; missing-field throws naming the field).
- `FilesService` trait in picloud-shared; `FsFilesRepo` (atomic
write: temp→fsync→rename→fsync-dir→DB; single-pass SHA-256;
checksum-verified reads → Corrupted) + `FilesServiceImpl` in
manager-core. Metadata in Postgres (0018), bytes on disk under
PICLOUD_FILES_ROOT with 0o700 shard dirs.
- `files:*` trigger kind via the Layout-E pattern (0019: widen both
CHECKs + files_trigger_details), TriggerEvent::Files (metadata only,
no bytes), emit_files fan-out, dispatcher arm, admin endpoint
POST /triggers/files (reuses validate_trigger_target).
- AppFilesRead/AppFilesWrite capabilities → script:read/script:write
(seven-scope commitment held). AppPubsubPublish reserved for v1.1.6.
- Admin files API (list + delete) + dashboard Files view per app.
Cross-app isolation keyed on cx.app_id at every layer. ~45 new tests
(service in-memory, fs tempdir, bridge integration). No DB required
for the suite. publish_ephemeral and the orphan sweep stay deferred.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
HTTP (`http::*`):
- `HttpService` trait (picloud-shared) + reqwest-backed `HttpServiceImpl`
(manager-core), wired into the `Services` bundle.
- SSRF deny-list applied to the resolved IP via a custom reqwest
`dns_resolver` (covers every redirect hop + defeats DNS rebinding) plus
a literal-IP check at URL-parse time. Scheme/port restrictions, request
+ response body caps (stream-with-cap), layered timeout. Error reason is
a CIDR category, never the IP. `PICLOUD_HTTP_ALLOW_PRIVATE` dev override
(logs a startup warning).
- Rhai bridge with three-arg split `verb(url, body, opts)` (resolves the
brief's body-vs-opts contradiction; unknown opt keys throw). Body
dispatch by type; response `#{status,headers,body,body_raw}` with JSON
auto-parse; non-2xx does not throw.
- `Capability::AppHttpRequest` → existing `script:write` scope (no new
Scope variant). `SdkCallCx` gains `script_id` (attribution + User-Agent).
Cron triggers (4th trigger kind):
- Migration 0017 widens the kind/source_kind CHECKs and adds
`cron_trigger_details`. `cron`/`chrono-tz` parse + validate 6-field
schedules and IANA timezones.
- `spawn_cron_scheduler` polls due triggers and enqueues to the universal
outbox; the dispatcher delivers them (one-line match-arm extension).
Catch-up fires exactly once per trigger per tick, not once per missed
window. `ctx.event.cron` for handlers.
- `POST /api/v1/admin/apps/{id}/triggers/cron` reuses the v1.1.3
cross-app + kind!=module target check.
- Dashboard: admin-gated Triggers tab (cron create form + list).
Follow-ups: redact module backend errors at the resolver boundary (log
original at error level); pin `rhai = "=1.24"`; CHANGELOG incl. retroactive
v1.1.3 cross-app-trigger security note. Version bumps: workspace 1.1.4,
SDK 1.5, dashboard 0.10.0.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Lays down the v1.1.3 plumbing:
- `ScriptKind` enum in `picloud-shared` ('endpoint' | 'module').
- `ModuleSource` trait + `ModuleScript` DTO + `NoopModuleSource` in
`picloud-shared`. Resolver lives in `executor-core`; Postgres impl
in `manager-core` (`PostgresModuleSource`).
- `Services::new` grows a fifth `modules: Arc<dyn ModuleSource>` arg.
- `ScriptValidator` returns `ValidatedScript { imports }` so the
manager can populate the dep-graph table on save. New
`validate_module` method on the trait gates module-shape rules.
- `Engine::execute_ast(&Arc<rhai::AST>, req)` lets the orchestrator's
script cache reuse compiled ASTs. `Engine::execute(&str, req)` is
preserved as a convenience that compiles inline. `Engine::compile`
exposes the AST for callers that want to cache.
- `PicloudModuleResolver` replaces `DummyModuleResolver` per-call.
Bridges Rhai's sync `ModuleResolver::resolve` to async
`ModuleSource::lookup` via `Handle::block_on`. Enforces:
- cross-app isolation (resolver captures `Arc<SdkCallCx>`),
- circular import detection (in-progress stack on the resolver),
- import depth limit (default 8 via
`Limits::module_import_depth_max`).
- Module-shape validation walks `ast.statements()` via `rhai/internals`
and accepts only `Var { CONSTANT }`, `Import`, and `Noop`. The
manager admin endpoint runs `validate_module` at save (primary
gate); resolver re-runs it at load (defense in depth).
- LRU cache `(AppId, name) -> (updated_at, Arc<Module>)` owned by
`Engine`. Size from `PICLOUD_MODULE_CACHE_SIZE` (default 512).
- Migration `0015_scripts_kind.sql` adds `scripts.kind` + composite
index + module-name shape CHECK.
- Migration `0016_script_imports.sql` adds the dep-graph table with
FK CASCADE on both columns.
- Repo: `kind` threaded through SELECT/INSERT/UPDATE. New
`count_routes_for_script` / `count_triggers_for_script` /
`list_imports` methods. `create`/`update` open a transaction and
call `replace_imports_tx` to populate the dep-graph.
- Admin endpoint: accepts `kind`; rejects reserved module names;
rejects `endpoint → module` transitions when routes / triggers
exist.
- SDK_VERSION 1.3 → 1.4.
Workspace builds; full test suite (~440 tests) green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Migrations 0013_docs.sql + 0014_docs_triggers.sql land the docs table
(JSONB body + GIN-on-jsonb_path_ops index, PK keyed on (app_id,
collection, id) for cross-app isolation) and widen the triggers.kind
and outbox.source_kind CHECK constraints to include 'docs', plus the
docs_trigger_details detail table mirroring kv_trigger_details.
picloud-shared grows the DocsService trait + DocRow/DocsListPage/
DocsError + NoopDocsService, the TriggerEvent::Docs variant with the
prev_data change-data-capture surface, the DocsEventOp enum, the docs
field on the Services bundle, and the SDK_VERSION bump 1.2 -> 1.3.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Routes gain `dispatch_mode TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'sync'` (migration
0012). Existing routes default to sync so the migration is
non-breaking. `DispatchMode` enum lands in `picloud-shared`.
The user-routes orchestrator handler now branches:
- `dispatch_mode = async` → write outbox row with `reply_to = None`,
return `202 Accepted` + `{accepted_at, execution_id}`. Dispatcher
fires the script in the background; retries / dead-letters via
the framework from commit 5.
- `dispatch_mode = sync` → register an inbox channel
(`tokio::sync::oneshot`), write outbox row with `reply_to =
inbox_id`, `.await` on the receiver with a timeout =
script.timeout_seconds + 2s buffer. Dispatcher hands the result
back; orchestrator maps `InboxResult` into the HTTP response per
the design-notes §3 status-code table (422/502/503/504/507/500).
`InboxRegistry` (orchestrator-core/src/inbox.rs) is the in-process
implementation of `InboxResolver`. Lock-free HashMap of pending
oneshot senders keyed by `inbox_id`. Tests cover register/deliver
round-trip, unknown-id is abandoned, dropped-receiver is abandoned,
explicit cancel. Cluster mode (v1.3+) swaps this for
LISTEN/NOTIFY-keyed lookup behind the same trait.
`OutboxWriter` trait lives in `picloud-shared` so orchestrator-core
can write to the outbox without depending on manager-core (which
would invert the dependency arrow). `PostgresOutboxRepo` implements
both `OutboxRepo` (dispatcher surface) and `OutboxWriter`
(orchestrator surface); the picloud binary clones the same concrete
Arc into both trait views.
The dispatcher's HTTP arm (commit 5 had a stub) now decodes the
`HttpDispatchPayload` off the outbox row, looks up the script,
synthesizes an `ExecRequest`, and runs it through the executor.
Outcome routing reuses the same path as KV triggers — sync HTTP
flows through the inbox, async dispatch gets dropped after
success (or DL'd on exhaustion).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Migrations 0008-0011 lay down the triggers framework's storage:
- `triggers` + `kv_trigger_details` + `dead_letter_trigger_details`
(Layout E, design notes §2). Parent table carries common columns
including `registered_by_principal` — the dispatcher uses this to
run the trigger as the user that registered it (design notes §4).
- `outbox`: universal async dispatch substrate. KV/cron/pubsub/queue/
email/dead-letter all write rows in the same shape; the dispatcher
claims due rows via FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED. `reply_to` is the
NATS-style inbox id for sync HTTP (commit 6) — its presence flags
"don't retry" per the design.
- `dead_letters`: exact schema from design notes §4 with the four-
value `resolution` CHECK constraint (`replayed | ignored |
handled_by_script | handler_failed`) and partial index on
unresolved rows for the dashboard badge.
- `abandoned_executions`: forensic table for the dispatcher's
"tried to resolve a dropped inbox" edge case (design notes §3 #9).
Repo surfaces with Postgres impls behind traits so unit tests can
swap in-memory backings:
- `TriggerRepo` — CRUD + the `list_matching_kv` /
`list_matching_dead_letter` hot paths the dispatcher uses.
Includes a `collection_matches` helper that handles `*`, `prefix:*`,
and exact-name globs.
- `OutboxRepo` — insert + claim-due + delete + reschedule.
- `DeadLetterRepo` — insert + get + list + unresolved-count +
resolve + GC.
- `AbandonedRepo` — insert + GC.
`TriggerConfig::from_env` (new module) follows the existing
`SandboxCeiling` env-loading pattern for `PICLOUD_MAX_TRIGGER_DEPTH`,
`PICLOUD_TRIGGER_RETRY_*`, `PICLOUD_DEAD_LETTER_RETENTION_DAYS`, and
`PICLOUD_ABANDONED_EXECUTIONS_RETENTION_DAYS`.
`Capability::AppManageTriggers(AppId)` and `AppDeadLetterManage(AppId)`
join the enum. Both map onto the existing `Scope::AppAdmin` per the
seven-scope commitment; `role_satisfies` grants them at the
`AppAdmin` per-app role.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
First v1.1.1 commit. Adds the KV store the design notes commit to:
`(app_id, collection, key)` identity with JSONB value and a per-app
index. Trait lives in `picloud-shared` so the executor-core Rhai
bridge (next commit), the Postgres impl, and tests all depend on the
same surface without coupling crates.
The `Services` bundle grows from empty to three fields: `kv`,
`dead_letters` (NoopDeadLetterService stub — replaced by the
Postgres impl in commit 8), and `events` (NoopEventEmitter until the
outbox emitter lands with the dispatcher). Tests use
`Services::default()` for an all-noop bundle.
New capabilities `AppKvRead` / `AppKvWrite` join the Capability
enum. They map onto the existing seven-value `Scope` (script:read /
script:write) — the scope vocabulary stays locked per the
`docs/versioning.md` commitment.
Script-as-gate semantics in `KvServiceImpl`: capability check runs
when `cx.principal.is_some()`, skipped when None (public HTTP).
Cross-app isolation is enforced independently by deriving every
row's `app_id` from `cx.app_id` rather than a script-passed argument.
In-memory `KvRepo` impl + unit tests cover the round-trips, the
cross-app isolation property, empty-collection rejection,
script-as-gate behaviour for both anonymous and authed contexts,
and cursor-style pagination. Postgres impl exists; integration
testing waits for a real DB harness (see HANDBACK).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds instance_role + reserved email/mfa_secret columns to admin_users,
creates app_members for per-app role grants, and creates api_keys for
bearer-token credentials. Schema snapshot re-blessed.
Reserves invites and service_accounts shapes in a trailing comment
block — both land in their own migrations when those flows ship.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Apps become the isolation boundary for scripts, routes, domains, and
later data. Doing this now — while the surface is small — avoids
several migrations on populated tables once v1.1 data-plane services
ship.
Schema (migration 0005_apps.sql):
- New tables: apps, app_domains (with shape_key UNIQUE for collision
detection), app_slug_history (for permanent slug-rename redirects).
- app_id added to scripts, routes, execution_logs (non-null, cascading
rules per row).
- Script-name uniqueness becomes per-app; the route unique index is
swapped for an app-scoped version.
- The "default" app is seeded unconditionally with a localhost claim;
existing scripts/routes backfill into it. Fresh installs additionally
get the Hello World seed via seed_hello_world_if_fresh after
migrations run (idempotent — only fires when the default app has no
scripts).
Orchestrator dispatch is two-phase: AppDomainTable resolves Host →
app_id (most-specific match wins, exact beats wildcard), then the
existing route matcher runs against that app's partitioned slice via
RouteTable. Unknown hosts return 404 at the app layer with a clear
message; /api/v1/execute/{id} still works as the implicit
__internal__ claim, decoupled from any public domain.
Manager API: full CRUD for /api/v1/admin/apps/* and
/api/v1/admin/apps/{id_or_slug}/domains/*, with slug:check + force
takeover semantics implementing the rename-history flow (two-step
check → confirm, never a single endpoint). Script create requires
app_id; list accepts ?app= filter. Route create validates host
against the parent app's claims; conflict detection stays strictly
intra-app.
Dashboard: /admin/apps and /admin/apps/{slug} (overview + scripts +
domains + settings tabs, with slug-history-aware redirects). Root
path redirects to the apps list. Script detail page gains an app
breadcrumb and threads app_id into the route preview.
Deferred per design: per-app admin roles. The require_admin middleware
remains the seam where role checks will slot in later.
Blueprint §11.5 and roadmap updated to reflect what shipped; docs/
versioning.md notes the schema 3 → 5 bump.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes the regression risk of the admin API and dashboard being open
to anyone reaching the bound port. Required foundation before v1.1
data-plane services land.
Per-user accounts (admin_users), Argon2id passwords, env-var bootstrap
of the first admin that becomes inert once any admin exists, opaque
32-byte session token doubling as bearer credential, 24h sliding TTL
configurable via PICLOUD_SESSION_TTL_HOURS. is_active column lets
admins be deactivated without losing audit history; last-active-admin
guard on DELETE and on PATCH that flips is_active to false (sessions
also wiped on deactivation).
require_admin middleware fronts every /api/v1/admin/* route. The data
plane (/api/v1/execute/{id}), /healthz, /version, and user routes
stay open. picloud admin reset-password <username> subcommand handles
recovery without going through HTTP.
Dashboard gains /admin/login and /admin/admins surfaces, a top-bar
user menu, and a token store with a localStorage echo so refreshes
don't sign you out. Cookie-based auth works in parallel for non-SPA
clients.
Forward compatibility: future RBAC tables (admin_roles,
admin_user_roles) join on admin_users.id; the auth middleware is the
seam where role checks slot in. Email, 2FA, passkeys, and personal
API tokens are all additive without touching admin_users.
Blueprint §11.4 updated to reflect what actually shipped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Scripts can now answer at user-chosen paths (e.g. /greet, /greet/:name,
/webhooks/*), on user-chosen hosts (strict or *.example.com wildcards),
on user-chosen methods. The internal /api/v1/execute/{id} endpoint
stays as the always-available ID-based bypass.
Routing rules (decided in design with the user; see chat history):
Path kinds:
exact /greet literal
prefix /greet/* strict-subtree; stored as "/greet/";
does NOT match bare /greet (add an
exact route for that case)
param /users/:id :name captures one whole segment;
mid-segment colons are rejected;
{name} is reserved for a future SDK
Host kinds:
any no Host header constraint
strict sub.example.com literal match (case-insensitive)
wildcard *.example.com suffix match; multi-level subdomains OK
Within-kind uniqueness:
two routes of the same kind that could match the same request
conflict at config time. Algorithm (orchestrator_core::routing::
conflict):
exact: literal equality
prefix: literal equality (longer-prefix coexists; longer wins
at request time)
param: same segment count + same literals at every
literal-vs-literal position (the user's example:
:id vs :userId at same shape is a conflict)
Request-time precedence:
exact > param > prefix
among non-exact: more leading-literal segments wins
tie: param > prefix (more constrained)
within prefix: longest matching prefix wins
host bucket: strict > wildcard (longer suffix) > any; fall through
to less specific buckets when path doesn't match
Reserved path prefixes: /api/, /admin/, /healthz, /version
Routes that look invalid at config time return 422 with the precise
parse error; conflicting routes return 409 with the conflicting route
in the body (so the dashboard can render the conflict inline).
What landed:
* 0003_routes.sql — routes table (host_kind, host, host_param_name,
path_kind, path, method, script_id) with UNIQUE index on the
literal binding tuple. Schema 2 → 3.
* shared::Route / HostKind / PathKind — flat storage shape that
crosses wire boundaries cleanly.
* orchestrator_core::routing — four sub-modules, all unit-tested:
pattern.rs (16 tests) parse + validate + display
conflict.rs (12 tests) within-kind overlap predicate
matcher.rs (12 tests) runtime dispatch (specificity-aware)
table.rs Arc<RwLock<Vec<CompiledRoute>>>
shared by manager (writes) and
orchestrator (reads); atomic replace
after each admin write
* manager-core::route_admin — five new admin endpoints under
/api/v1/admin:
POST /scripts/{id}/routes create
GET /scripts/{id}/routes list per script
DELETE /routes/{route_id} delete (refreshes table)
POST /routes:check pre-flight conflict check
(powers the dashboard's
live conflict warning)
POST /routes:match synthetic URL → matched
route + extracted params
(powers the dashboard's
match-preview tool)
Stored path strings stay raw (user-typed); normalization
happens only in the in-memory CompiledRoute so re-parses are
idempotent.
* orchestrator_core::api::user_routes_router — fallback handler
mounted in picloud after the system routes. Reads Host /
method / path / query from the request, dispatches via the
table, builds an ExecRequest with params/query/rest filled,
calls the executor, writes to the log sink. 10 MiB body cap.
* executor-core::ctx (SDK 1.0 → 1.1) — adds
ctx.request.params (map of named-param captures)
ctx.request.query (parsed query string)
ctx.request.rest (suffix for prefix routes; "" otherwise)
All three are always present (empty when not applicable) so
scripts can read them unconditionally.
* picloud::build_app — now async; loads routes at startup,
populates the shared table, mounts route_admin_router under
/api/v1/admin alongside the script CRUD, and the user-routes
fallback at the app root.
* caddy/Caddyfile + Caddyfile.prod widened: anything not
/healthz, /version, /api/v1/admin/*, /api/v1/execute/*,
/api/* (404 sunset), or /admin/* (dashboard) → picloud.
* Dashboard moves to /admin/* via SvelteKit paths.base. Its
internal Caddy strips the prefix and serves with SPA fallback.
All in-app links use $app/paths. The dashboard URL is now
http://localhost:8000/admin/ — one-time break for the new
URL freedom users gained.
* PICLOUD_PUBLIC_BASE_URL env var, exposed via /version so the
dashboard renders full URLs for routes regardless of the
operator's external port / TLS setup.
* memory_limit_mb stays in the schema, still v1.3+ advisory.
Verified live through Caddy:
/version → schema 3, sdk 1.1, public_base_url
GET /admin/ → 200, dashboard HTML containing "PiCloud"
POST /api/v1/admin/scripts → 201
POST .../scripts/{id}/routes (path=/greet/:name) → 201
GET /greet/alice?lang=en → 200 {"name":"alice","q":"en"}
POST conflicting route → 409 with conflicting_route body
POST /admin/foo route → 422 "reserved"
POST /api/v1/admin/routes:match → matched + params extracted
GET /unbound-path → 404 JSON
Tests:
* 40 routing unit tests (pattern + conflict + matcher tables)
* 14 executor-core unit tests (one new for ctx.request.params/
query/rest exposure)
* 32 integration tests (10 new for routing CRUD + dispatch +
conflict + reserved + specificity tie-break + match preview +
delete invalidation + /version returns public_base_url)
* default cargo test --workspace stays green; opt-in via
DATABASE_URL + --include-ignored for the integration suite
Bumps: schema 2 → 3; SDK 1.0 → 1.1; product 0.3.0 → 0.4.0.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds optional per-script overrides for the six Rhai sandbox knobs
(max_operations, max_string_size, max_array_size, max_map_size,
max_call_levels, max_expr_depth). The executor merges its defaults
with each script's overrides on every call; the manager validates
overrides against an admin-set ceiling at write time, so the
executor trusts whatever is stored.
Storage chose JSONB on the existing scripts table over six new
columns: lets future knobs land as code-only changes, keeps the
sparse common case (most scripts override nothing) cheap to store
and serialize, and matches how the manager + executor pass the
config across the wire.
* 0002_sandbox.sql — ALTER TABLE scripts ADD COLUMN sandbox
JSONB NOT NULL DEFAULT '{}'
* shared::ScriptSandbox — six Option<u64> fields with
deny_unknown_fields so typos surface as 422
* Script.sandbox + ExecRequest.sandbox_overrides — typed end
to end; cluster mode just serializes the same struct
* executor-core::Limits::with_overrides — field-by-field
replacement; tests cover the override actually tightening
the live engine
* manager-core::SandboxCeiling — built-in conservative
defaults (10M ops, 1 MiB strings, 100k array/map, 128
call/expr depth); env vars override per knob, invalid
values warn-and-skip rather than blocking boot
* manager-core admin API — POST/PUT accept `sandbox`; values
above the ceiling return 422 with the specific field +
requested + ceiling; absent or `{}` keeps platform defaults
* picloud all-in-one — wires SandboxCeiling::from_env() into
AdminState
* memory_limit_mb stays in the schema, marked v1.3+ advisory
(no enforcement until OS-level isolation lands with
cluster-mode executors)
Verified live through Caddy:
* /version reports schema 2, product 0.3.0
* Script with max_operations: 500 → 507 on a 10k-iteration loop
* Same script after PUT raising to 1M → succeeds, returns 10000
* POST with max_operations: 1_000_000_000 → 422 (exceeds ceiling)
Tests:
* 13 executor-core unit tests (added 2 for override semantics)
* 20 integration tests (added 6 for sandbox CRUD + ceiling +
unknown-field rejection + executor honoring overrides)
* default cargo test --workspace stays green (integration tests
remain #[ignore]'d until DATABASE_URL is set)
Bumps:
* schema 1 → 2
* product 0.2.0 → 0.3.0
* SDK unchanged (scripts see nothing new)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Brings the MVP feature set online: upload a Rhai script, get an HTTP
endpoint that runs it sandboxed in-process, list/update/delete it, and
have invalid sources rejected at upload time. Verified live through
Caddy with a full lifecycle (`create → list → get → execute → update
→ delete`) plus error paths (syntax error, duplicate name, deleted).
Layout — every concern lands behind the trait seam its layer owns, so
cluster-mode in v1.3+ is a swap of two impls, not a rewrite:
* shared::ScriptValidator — manager calls into validation without
a hard dep on executor-core; executor-core impls the trait on
`Engine`. Pinned in shared so neither crate has to know about
the other.
* executor-core::Engine — real Rhai engine: sandbox limits (max
operations / string size / map size / call depth), disabled
`print`, blocked `import` (DummyModuleResolver), `log::trace
/info/warn/error` registered as a static module with shared
log-capture buffer (no `log::debug` because `debug` is a Rhai
reserved keyword — `log::trace` covers the same need).
- `ctx` is pushed as a Scope constant exposing
execution_id, script_id, script_name, request_id,
invocation_type, request.{path,headers,body}.
- Response convention: a Map with `statusCode` is the
structured shape (`{statusCode, headers?, body}`); any
other return value is a 200 with the value as the body.
- Engine::execute is now synchronous (pure compute); the
async wrapper + wall-clock timeout live in
LocalExecutorClient, which spawns_blocking and applies a
300s hard ceiling regardless of per-script config.
- 10 unit tests cover validate, exec, structured response,
ctx exposure, log capture, op-budget enforcement, runtime
errors, blocked imports, JSON round-tripping.
* manager-core::repo — full sqlx CRUD over the `scripts` table,
with proper unique-violation handling for duplicate names.
Embedded migrations via `sqlx::migrate!` (one initial
`0001_init.sql` for pgcrypto + scripts + execution_logs).
* manager-core::api — `admin_router` mounts `/scripts` and
`/scripts/{id}`. Create + Update validate source through the
injected `ScriptValidator` before persistence. Returns proper
422/409/404 status codes via `ApiError::IntoResponse`.
* orchestrator-core::api — `data_plane_router` mounts
`/execute/{id}`: resolves the script through `ScriptResolver`,
constructs the `ExecRequest` from headers+body, awaits
`ExecutorClient::execute(..., timeout)`, translates the
`ExecResponse` to an axum `Response` with header passthrough.
Maps `ExecError` variants to 422/504/502/507.
* picloud all-in-one — opens the pool, runs migrations, builds
one engine, nests both routers under `/api/admin` and `/api`,
enables structured JSON tracing and graceful shutdown on
SIGTERM. Single `PostgresScriptRepository` Arc is shared by
the admin router (writes) and the resolver (reads).
Other changes:
* Workspace axum bump 0.7 → 0.8 for the `{id}` path syntax
matching the route definitions.
* Workspace clippy: allow `needless_pass_by_value` and
`boxed_local` to keep API ergonomics over pedantic noise.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
