Global env-var ceilings enforced in the group write path (mirrors the
per-value caps): PICLOUD_GROUP_KV_MAX_ROWS / _DOCS_MAX_ROWS (per-group row
count, checked only on a NEW key/doc — updates exempt) and
_FILES_MAX_TOTAL_BYTES (per-group total blob bytes). New group_quota env
helpers; count_rows/total_bytes repo methods (trait-default 0 for non-Postgres);
QuotaExceeded error variants on the three group error enums; a with_max_rows
test builder. Pinned by a group_kv_service unit test (3rd key rejected, update
of an existing key at the cap allowed).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
ServiceEventEmitter gains emit_shared(cx, owning_group, event) (default no-op);
OutboxEventEmitter implements it — matches shared triggers on the owning group
and writes outbox rows stamped with the WRITER app_id (dispatch runs under the
writer). GroupKv/Docs/FilesServiceImpl gain an events field (Noop default +
with_events builder) and emit on set/create/update/delete; the host wires the
outbox emitter via with_events. Closes the "group trigger has no app to watch"
gap. Authoring + validation land in M2.4.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Thread `sealed` from the manifest through to the DB column:
- manifest: `sealed` on ManifestRoute + the four event-kind trigger specs
(Kv/Docs/Files/Pubsub), flowing to Bundle via serde.
- persist: NewRoute.sealed + insert_route_tx; insert_trigger_tx `sealed`
param; the reconcile passes br.sealed / bt.sealed().
- validate_bundle_for rejects `sealed` on an app owner (meaningless — an
app route/trigger is never inherited).
- diff: `sealed` joins the route Update comparison and the trigger identity
(both bundle + current sides), so toggling it re-applies rather than NoOp.
`sealed` lives on shared Route + manager-core Trigger (both pure DTOs) so
the diff can see the current value; RouteRow/TriggerRow default it so
RETURNING clauses that omit it still hydrate. No runtime read effect yet —
the two suppression gates land in M3.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Make the route layer owner-aware ahead of the live rebuild. `Route.app_id`
becomes Option + a `group_id` (mirrors `Trigger`); `NewRoute` carries a
`ScriptOwner` so the interactive API passes App and the reconcile can pass
a group. `insert_route_tx` writes both owner columns; `RouteRow` selects
`group_id` everywhere (the interactive delete/list 404 a group template,
which is apply-managed, not app-addressable).
Adds the two repo methods the live rebuild + apply need:
- `list_for_group` — a group's own route templates (apply diff, ls).
- `list_effective` — the all-apps generalization of CHAIN_LEVELS_CTE: for
every app, walk its ancestor chain and join routes owned at each level,
tagging each with the effective (firing) app + the owner's chain depth.
Runs only on a RouteTable rebuild, never per request; validated with
EXPLAIN against the live schema.
`compile_route` now takes the effective app_id explicitly (reused next
commit for the per-app expansion); `compile_routes` skips group templates
(no single app) — they materialize via the effective path. Runtime
behavior is unchanged this commit: the table still rebuilds from
`list_all`, and no group routes can exist yet (authoring lands in R4).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Finish the §11.6 KV slice: declarative authoring, read-only inspection, the
runtime journey, and docs — plus a forced SDK-name fix.
- SDK name: `shared` is a Rhai RESERVED keyword, so `kv::shared(...)` is a parse
error. Renamed the handle constructor to `kv::shared_collection(...)`
(keeps the user's "shared" intent; unambiguous). Updated everywhere.
- CLI manifest: `collections = [...]` on `[group]` only (ManifestApp has no such
field + deny_unknown_fields → an app manifest carrying it is a hard error);
Manifest::collections() accessor; build_bundle emits it.
- plan/apply: a `collection` row group in `pic plan`; created/deleted counts in
the apply summary; collections threaded through PlanDto/NodePlanDto/
ApplyReportDto.
- read-only `pic collections ls --group` → GET /admin/groups/{id}/collections
(viewer+), backed by ApplyService::collection_report + CollectionInfo.
- journey: a group declares `catalog`; app A writes, app B (same subtree) reads
it back; a sibling-subtree app gets CollectionNotShared; `collections ls` +
re-apply NoOp. Full suite 114/114.
- docs: groups-and-project-tool §11.6 (KV-only MVP shipped + deferrals),
sdk-shape.md (the shared-collection handle + trust model), CLAUDE.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The runtime for shared group collections. A script reaches a shared store via
the explicit kv::shared("name") handle (distinct GroupKvHandle Rhai type, so
private-vs-shared scope is a deliberate choice). The service resolves the
owning group from cx.app_id's ancestor chain — the script never names a group,
and that walk is the isolation boundary (a foreign app's chain never contains
the owning group → CollectionNotShared).
- shared: GroupKvService trait + GroupKvError + NoopGroupKvService; threaded
into the Services bundle as a field defaulted to noop, opted into via a new
with_group_kv() (keeps the ~14 Services::new call sites unchanged).
- manager-core: GroupKvServiceImpl with the reads-open/writes-authed split —
reads use script_gate (anonymous public scripts skip), writes use the new
script_gate_require_principal (anonymous fails closed). Owner resolution
behind a GroupCollectionResolver trait (Postgres impl + injectable fake);
unit tests cover off-chain CollectionNotShared, anonymous-read-OK/
anonymous-write-Forbidden, authed-no-role-Forbidden.
- executor-core: GroupKvHandle + kv::shared constructor + get/set/has/delete/
list (Rhai dispatches by receiver type, reusing the block_on bridge).
- picloud: wire PostgresGroupKvRepo + resolver + GroupKvServiceImpl.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add the runtime heart of extension points: `ModuleSource::resolve_policy`
decides lexical vs dynamic resolution by the NEAREST declaration of a name
walking up the importing origin's chain — a concrete module → lexical (seal
to origin, Phase 4b); an extension-point marker → dynamic, resolved against
the inheriting app (`cx.app_id`) so the app can override, falling back to the
default body up-chain; the EP wins a depth tie.
- shared: `ModuleResolution { Module | NoProvider | NotFound }` + a
`resolve_policy(origin, inheriting_app, name)` trait method with a
lexical-only default impl (existing fakes inherit it unchanged).
- PostgresModuleSource: one-round-trip nearest-declaration query (min EP depth
vs min module depth over the chain CTEs), then the lexical/dynamic branch.
- module_resolver: calls `resolve_policy(origin, cx.app_id, path)`; maps
NoProvider → a clear "extension point has no provider" error, NotFound →
module-not-found. Cache + AST-source sealing unchanged.
- executor-core tests: a policy fake + 3 cases (app override binds dynamically,
no-provider errors, non-EP stays lexical).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Make `import` resolution lexical (§5.5): an inherited group script's
imports resolve against the module set at its OWN defining node, walking
up from there — a leaf app can't shadow them, and a group script behaves
identically under every inheriting app.
Mechanism — Rhai's `_source` carries the importing AST's origin tag:
- The entry script has no source tag → resolve from `default_origin` (its
defining node, threaded in via C2).
- Each resolved module's AST source is set to `encode(module.owner())`
before `eval_ast_as_new`, so its nested `import`s carry the module's own
node as `_source` and resolve from there — lexical chaining.
- `encode_origin`/`decode_origin` map a `ScriptOwner` to/from `app:<uuid>`
/ `group:<uuid>`.
Cache rekeyed from `(app_id, name)` to the resolved `ScriptId`: a compiled
module is lexically self-contained, so its body is a pure function of
`(script_id, updated_at)` — this also dedupes a shared group module across
inheriting apps and keeps same-named cross-app modules distinct.
Adds two executor-core unit tests (origin-keyed fake) proving the trust
boundary: a group module's import binds the group's module even when an
app-owned module of the same name exists; `ScriptOwner` gains `Hash`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Carry the resolved script's owner (its defining node) from dispatch into
the executor so `import` resolution can be lexical (§5.5). The executing
app (`app_id`) stays the SDK isolation boundary; `script_owner` is a
separate axis — the lexical origin for imports.
- `ExecRequest.script_owner: Option<ScriptOwner>` (serde default; `None`
falls back to `App(app_id)` in the engine for old payloads / cluster wire).
- `ScriptOwner` gains `Serialize`/`Deserialize` for the wire.
- The engine computes `default_origin` and hands it to the resolver
(used fully in C3; the resolve() lookup already uses it).
- Every dispatch site sets it from the resolved `Script.owner()`:
the 4 dispatcher arms (queue/trigger/http/invoke_async, via a new
`ResolvedTrigger.script_owner`), the orchestrator id-bypass, and the
`invoke()` SDK path (new `ResolvedScript.owner`, so a group script
invoked by an app resolves imports from the group).
Behaviour-preserving: app scripts still resolve `App(app_id)`; group
scripts can't yet carry imports (lifted in C4).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Make the module-loading contract origin-aware so group-owned modules
become resolvable and imports can resolve lexically (§5.5).
- `ModuleScript` gains a polymorphic owner (`app_id`/`group_id` + `owner()`),
mirroring `Script`.
- `ModuleSource::lookup(&cx, name)` -> `resolve(origin: ScriptOwner, name)`:
resolution walks the group chain rooted at the importing script's
defining node (nearest-owner-wins), not the inheriting app's view.
- `PostgresModuleSource::resolve` branches on origin: app-rooted
(`CHAIN_LEVELS_CTE`) or a new group-rooted `GROUP_CHAIN_LEVELS_CTE`,
joining `kind='module'` rows.
The executor resolver passes a temporary `App(cx.app_id)` origin (behaviour-
preserving for app scripts; true lexical origin lands in C3). Group scripts
still can't carry imports until C4, so no trust-inversion window opens here.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 4-lite C2. Lets a group own scripts (templates inherited by descendant
apps), with the create/list/manage surface — but not yet the inherited
resolution (binding + runtime), which is C3.
Capabilities: add `GroupScriptsRead` (viewer+ on the group → script:read) and
`GroupScriptsWrite` (editor+ → script:write), mirroring the group-vars tier and
resolved through the same group-ancestor walk.
API:
* New `group_scripts_api`: `POST/GET /groups/{id}/scripts` — create a
group-owned endpoint script and list a group's own (non-inherited) rows.
Phase 4-lite is endpoint-only and self-contained: `kind=module` and any
`import` are rejected (group modules + the lexical resolver are Phase 4b).
Owner resolved first (slug-or-uuid); capability bound to the resolved id.
* The by-id `/scripts/{id}` get/update/delete/logs handlers are now
owner-polymorphic via a `script_cap` helper: app-owned scripts gate on
`App*` exactly as before; group-owned on `GroupScripts*`. This is what
makes `deploy --group` idempotent (update reuses the by-id PUT) and lets a
group script be deleted by id. (C1 had these fail closed for groups.)
Repo: `list_for_group(group_id)` (the group's own rows).
CLI: `pic scripts ls --group <g>`, `pic scripts deploy --group <g>` (create or
update by name; `--app`/`--group` are mutually exclusive, exactly one
required). `pic scripts delete <id>` already works for group scripts via the
owner-polymorphic by-id route.
Live-validated against the dev DB: create → update (v2 via the by-id PUT) →
list → delete, plus module rejection and the polymorphic row shape
(`app_id NULL`, `group_id` set). Group scripts still can't be routed/triggered
or invoked — that lands in C3.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 4-lite C1. Make script ownership polymorphic so a script can be owned
by a GROUP (a template inherited by descendant apps) instead of an app —
mirroring vars/secrets (0048/0049), but ON DELETE RESTRICT (code is not data).
Schema (0050): `scripts.group_id` (nullable FK→groups RESTRICT), `app_id` made
nullable, `scripts_owner_exactly_one` CHECK, and the per-app name index split
into two per-owner partial-unique indexes. Existing app-owned rows keep their
exact `(app_id, lower(name))` uniqueness.
Type: `Script.app_id` becomes `Option<AppId>`; add `Script.group_id` +
`ScriptOwner` / `is_owned_by_app()`. `NewScript` gains the same polymorphic
owner. The execution-context app (what a script runs *under*) is supplied by
the invoking route/trigger/caller, never read off the script — group scripts
have no single app.
Behavior is fully preserved for app-owned scripts (the only kind creatable
today): every isolation backstop and authz site now uses `is_owned_by_app`,
which is byte-identical for app owners and **fails closed** for group owners.
A group script therefore can't yet be run, route/trigger-bound, invoked, or
managed via the app-script API — those land in C2 (group-script creation) and
C3 (chain-membership resolution + binding). The `/execute/{id}` bypass 404s a
group script (no app context to run under).
Re-blesses expected_schema.txt; note the golden was last blessed at migration
0044, so this also captures the already-committed 0045–0049 schema.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Scripts can now read group-inherited config via vars::get(key) / vars::all().
- shared: VarsService trait (read-only get/all) + NoopVarsService; added as
the 14th field on the Services bundle.
- manager-core: VarsServiceImpl resolves the calling app's config via
config_resolver (derives app_id from cx.app_id; AppVarsRead-gated for
authed principals, script-as-gate for anon).
- executor-core: vars:: Rhai bridge (get/all), registered in the SDK.
- authz: AppVarsRead/Write, GroupVarsRead/Write, GroupSecretsRead/Write
capabilities (group caps resolve via the Phase-2 ancestor walk; the
GroupSecretsRead human-read gate is group_admin-only, distinct from an
app's runtime injection).
- wired VarsServiceImpl into the picloud binary; updated the executor-core
test Services::new call sites.
386 manager-core lib tests green; clippy clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Server-side foundation for Phase-2 groups (no group-owned resources yet):
Shared types:
- GroupId, Group; App gains group_id; AppRole::{precedence,max} for
folding the highest effective role across the membership chain.
Repos:
- group_repo: tree CRUD with reparent (ancestor-walk cycle guard under a
coarse instance-wide structural advisory lock; slug frozen; bumps
structure_version) and delete=RESTRICT (refuses non-empty groups).
- group_members_repo: per-(user, group) role grants, mirroring app_members.
Hierarchy-aware authz (§5.3):
- AuthzRepo gains effective_app_role / effective_group_role (default to
direct membership / none, so the ~18 existing test stubs are untouched);
the Postgres impl resolves each via one depth-bounded recursive CTE that
MAXes the app's own row with every ancestor group_members row.
- can(): the Member path now folds inherited group roles, so a group_admin
on any ancestor is implicitly app_admin beneath it. New Capability
variants InstanceCreateGroup / Group{Read,Write,Admin}; group caps carry
no app_id (bound API keys can't manage groups). 8 new unit tests.
Admin API:
- groups_api: group CRUD + reparent (admin at both source and destination
parent, §5.6) + per-group members, all capability-gated.
- apps: POST /apps takes an optional parent group (default root); app
responses carry group_id; my_role now reflects the effective role.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase-1 `enabled` three-state lifecycle (§4.3), data-model half. Triggers
already carried `enabled`; this adds it to scripts and routes and threads
it through the declarative project tool. Runtime honoring (disabled route
404 / script non-invocable / dispatcher fire-time re-check) is the next
commit — this change only stores and reconciles the flag.
- Migration 0045: `enabled BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT TRUE` on scripts +
routes. Default true ⇒ no behavior change on migrate.
- `Script`/`Route` (shared) gain `enabled` (serde default true via the new
`picloud_shared::default_true`); repos' SELECT/INSERT/UPDATE SQL, row
structs, `NewScript`/`NewRoute`/`ScriptPatch` all carry it.
- Apply diff treats `enabled` as a declarative field (omitted ⇒ active):
`script_update_reason` + `diff_routes` detect a toggle as an Update, and
the create/update/insert paths persist it. The bound-plan `state_token`
re-includes script/route `enabled` (removed in the earlier review fix
precisely because the diff didn't key on it yet — now it does).
- CLI manifest model + `build_bundle` + `pull` round-trip `enabled`
(serialized only when false; omitted ⇒ active). `pic init` scaffold and
the interactive script/route create paths default active.
Tested: manager-core lib 365 (incl. enabled diff + token sensitivity) +
cli bins 31 (incl. manifest skip-serialize) green; clippy -D warnings
clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes the gaps and the one security finding from the second end-to-end
CLI test (E2E_STASH_REPORT.md), plus the H1 boot-regression found while
re-reviewing those fixes.
Security
- S6: reserved-path validation (`check_reserved`) now case-folds before
comparing, so `/API/v2/x`, `/HEALTHZ`, `/Admin/x` are rejected like
their lowercase forms. Request-time matching stays case-sensitive.
- S10: "public route != public data" callout in sdk-shape.md (script_gate
skips authz when the principal is anonymous).
Observability / features
- G1: trigger executions now write `execution_logs`. Migration 0043 adds
a `source` column (CHECK mirrors ExecutionSource/OutboxSourceKind,
DEFAULT 'http' backfills history); a shared `build_execution_log` helper
in executor-core; dispatcher logging for outbox triggers + queue
consumers (skips sync-HTTP rows the orchestrator already logs). `pic
logs` gains a source column + `--source` filter.
- G5: dev-only in-memory email capture under PICLOUD_DEV_MODE with no SMTP
(email::send succeeds locally), readable at GET /api/v1/admin/dev/emails
(Owner/Admin only; route mounted only in capture mode).
- G6: generalized the Rhai in-place-mutation footgun note (trim/replace/
make_upper/make_lower/crop/truncate/pad return ()).
- G2/G3/G4 (CLI): `pic members`, `pic files`, `pic queues`, read-only
`pic kv` (+ new kv_api.rs); `pic deploy --timeout/--memory/--kind/
--sandbox`; first-class `pic triggers create-{docs,files,pubsub,queue,
email}` wrappers. All new client path segments percent-encoded via seg().
H1 regression fix (found in re-review)
- The S6 change also runs in `compile_routes`, which compiles every stored
route at boot and on each route CRUD. A single stored route the new
validation rejects (creatable while the S6 gap existed) made the whole
compile Err and aborted startup. `compile_routes` is now lenient: it
skips an un-compilable row with a warning instead of bricking boot
(route creation still validates separately). Migration 0044 sweeps
pre-existing reserved-path routes on upgrade (WHERE mirrors
check_reserved exactly). Added regression tests for both.
Verified: cargo fmt, clippy --all-targets --all-features -D warnings, the
schema_snapshot test, and the new S6/lenient-compile unit tests all pass;
boot-resilience and G1/G5 confirmed live.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Addresses findings from an independent review of the gap-closing commits:
- R1 (regression): add #[serde(default)] to HttpDispatchPayload.method so
async-HTTP outbox rows enqueued before the field existed still decode
after upgrade instead of dead-lettering on "missing field `method`".
Adds a regression test for the missing-key path.
- method case: uppercase ctx.request.method at the orchestrator boundary
so it honors its documented "uppercased" contract for extension verbs.
Route matching is already case-insensitive, so matching is unaffected.
- CLI hardening: percent-encode free-form path segments (app slug, topic
name, ids, secret name) in the reqwest client so a value containing
`/ ? #` can't break out of its URL segment. Adds a `seg()` helper +
unit test and applies it uniformly across all path-interpolating
methods (new and pre-existing).
- S1 (docs): correct the users::email_available enumeration framing — it
adds no new vector vs. create's uniqueness error, but is cheaper and
unthrottled; there is no built-in throttle/CAPTCHA primitive, so the
honest mitigation is a kv-based counter. Updated SDK doc-comments,
trait docs, and stdlib-reference.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
`users::find_by_email` requires an authenticated principal (F-S-003,
anti-enumeration), so the natural check-then-create register pattern 502s
for anonymous public scripts. Add `users::email_available(email) -> bool`,
gated like `create` (the registration write path) but without the
anonymous rejection: it leaks only a single boolean — no more than
`create`'s own uniqueness error already does — so self-serve register
scripts can pre-check. Also document find_by_email's principal
requirement in the SDK doc-comment.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
C-2 follow-up: sanitize_stored_content_type previously let a CRLF pass
through an allowlisted prefix (e.g. "image/png\r\nX-Injected: 1" matched
the image/ branch and returned the original), which would inject a
response header / panic HeaderValue on download. Now any control byte
(<0x20 or 0x7f) coerces to application/octet-stream up front.
F-SE-H-03: disable_symbol("debug") to match "print" (the comment
already claimed both were disabled) so scripts can't write
attacker-controlled bytes to the operator's stderr.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
At-rest secrets were AES-256-GCM sealed with no Associated
Authentication Data, so anyone with Postgres write access could
ciphertext-swap rows across apps (or rename via row edit) and the
decrypt would silently succeed under the wrong identity, returning
attacker-chosen plaintext. This breaks the cross-app isolation boundary
the moment DB write access is achieved.
Adds an AAD-bound envelope (v1) alongside the legacy no-AAD layout (v0),
discriminated by a per-row `version` column:
* shared::crypto — new encrypt_with_aad / decrypt_with_aad using
aes_gcm::aead::Payload { msg, aad }. Originals retained for v0 reads.
Tests: AAD round-trip, AAD-mismatch fails, empty-AAD round-trip.
* migration 0042 — adds `secrets.version SMALLINT NOT NULL DEFAULT 0`
and `app_secrets.realtime_signing_key_version SMALLINT NOT NULL
DEFAULT 0`. Existing rows stay v0; new writes are v1.
* secrets (SDK + admin API) — seal() now binds AAD =
"secret:{app_id}:{name}" and emits v1; open() dispatches on version.
StoredSecret gains a `version` field; SecretsRepo::set takes it.
Both secrets_service::set and secrets_api::set_secret go through the
v1 path. Tests prove a cross-app swap and a cross-name swap both
surface Corrupted, and that a hand-built v0 row still decrypts.
* app_secrets (realtime signing key) — get_or_create_signing_key writes
v1 with AAD = "app_secret:{app_id}:realtime_signing_key"; decode
dispatches on version. Tests cover v0 decode, v1 round-trip, and v1
decode-under-wrong-app failing.
* email-trigger inbound secret — kept on v0 (seal_legacy/open_legacy)
and explicitly deferred: email_trigger_details has no version column
and the trigger_id isn't known at seal time. The audit classes the
email-trigger AAD gap as Medium; folded into v1.2's key-versioning
pass per SECURITY_AUDIT.md.
* expected_schema.txt re-blessed by hand (no local Postgres) for the two
new columns + migration 0042.
Also folds in a let-else clippy fix in auth_api.rs (login Argon2
semaphore acquire, from the H-B1 commit) and two cargo-fmt reflows.
No re-encryption sweep — v0 rows decrypt as-is; the sweep is deferred to
v1.2's key-versioning pass (audit "Notes on remediation methodology").
Audit ref: security_audit/03_crypto_secrets.md (H-D1).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Rhai SDK email::send path went straight to the SMTP relay with no
admission control. EmailRateLimiter lived in users_service.rs (gating
verification + password-reset emails) but was unreachable from the SDK
surface. Any anonymous-callable HTTP-route script could loop email::send
to burn the operator's SMTP quota or BCC-bomb thousands of recipients
per request.
Two new caps on EmailServiceImpl, both fire BEFORE message assembly +
SMTP connect:
1. Per-message recipient cap (to+cc+bcc combined). Default 20, override
with PICLOUD_EMAIL_MAX_RECIPIENTS. New EmailError::TooManyRecipients
variant. Closes the BCC-bomb amplification path.
2. EmailRateLimiter inlined into EmailServiceImpl:
* Per-(app, recipient): RECIPIENT_BURST=5 / RECIPIENT_WINDOW=60min.
* Per-app daily: APP_DAILY_CAP=200 / 24h.
The structure mirrors users_service's private limiter; defense-in-
depth redundancy is fine since the gates are identical and never
conflict. New EmailError::RateLimited(&'static str) variant; the
string names which bucket tripped so the operator can act.
users_service::map_email_error grows two cases (mapped to
EmailTransport for the script-facing error shape).
Tests:
* too_many_recipients_rejected — 30 recipients, default cap 20, rejected
with TooManyRecipients.
* per_recipient_burst_caps_repeated_send_to_same_address — 6 sends to
the same address; 6th returns RateLimited("per-recipient burst").
Audit ref: security_audit/09_external_integrations.md#f-ext-h-001.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Stored XSS: the previous get_file handler streamed user-supplied bytes
with Content-Disposition: inline, the user-supplied Content-Type, and
no X-Content-Type-Options / CSP. A Rhai script could store an SVG or
HTML payload whose download URL rendered same-origin under the admin
session cookie.
Closes the response side and the storage side:
* shared::sanitize_stored_content_type: allowlist
(octet-stream/pdf/json/text-plain/text-csv/image-non-svg/audio/video)
with anything else coerced to application/octet-stream. New unit tests
cover the safe/unsafe/case-insensitive/parameter-preserving paths.
* files_service::create/update: sanitize the stored content_type after
the shape checks pass (sanitize-after-validate keeps the existing
MissingField / TooLong errors intact). Two new tests confirm text/html
and image/svg+xml are coerced to application/octet-stream on
create/update respectively.
* files_api::get_file (admin download):
- Content-Disposition: attachment (was inline)
- Content-Type re-sanitized via the shared helper as belt-and-
suspenders for any pre-existing row that pre-dates this change.
- X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
- Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; sandbox;
frame-ancestors 'none'
- Referrer-Policy: no-referrer
Audit ref: security_audit/07_http_cors_csrf_xss.md#c07-02 (response side)
+ security_audit/06_files_pathtraversal.md#f-fs-001 (storage side).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
cargo fmt regroups; three clippy fixes:
- F-S-006: hoist MAX_API_KEY_CANDIDATES to module scope to satisfy
clippy::items_after_statements.
- F-S-009: use map_or instead of map().unwrap_or() per
clippy::map_unwrap_or.
- F-P-012: replace `|c| c.encode()` closure with the method itself
per clippy::redundant_closure_for_method_calls.
No behavior change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
http_service::run mapped `Method::from_bytes` failure on a user-supplied
HTTP method to HttpError::Backend with format!("invalid method: {}", …).
Same for HeaderName/HeaderValue validation in build_headers. But that's
user input, not a backend problem — misclassifying as Backend corrupts
retry policies (operators may retry "backend" but not "invalid input").
Add a new HttpError::InvalidArgs(String) variant. Reroute the three
validation paths in http_service (method, header name, header value) to
emit InvalidArgs instead of Backend.
The executor-side `map_http_err` uses Display, so the new variant
surfaces to scripts as "http: invalid method: …" — same format, more
structured behind it.
AUDIT.md anchor: F-Q-008.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
ORDER BY created_at DESC, id DESC but cursor was `WHERE created_at <
$2` — when two users were created at the same instant, pagination
could skip the second row at a page boundary or return it twice.
- Add ListCursor { created_at, id } with `<rfc3339>_<uuid>` encode /
decode helpers.
- Change WHERE predicate to `(created_at, id) < ($2, $3)` matching the
ORDER BY.
- Surface the opaque cursor string through UsersListOpts /
UsersListPage / users_admin_api ListUsersResponse instead of the raw
DateTime — keeps the wire format stable while the id half stops the
boundary bug.
Same shape as F-P-005 (execution_logs).
AUDIT.md anchor: F-P-012.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
PICLOUD_DEV_MODE=true alone fell through to a fully public deterministic
master key — SHA-256("picloud-dev-master-key-v1.1.7"). The warning was
correct but the gate was a single env var. An operator copying a dev
docker-compose file into prod silently encrypted everything with a
world-known key.
Require both:
- PICLOUD_DEV_MODE=true
- PICLOUD_DEV_INSECURE_KEY=i-understand-this-is-insecure
Without the literal-string acknowledgement, MasterKey::from_env returns
the new DevModeUnacknowledged error and the process refuses to start.
Production deployments aren't affected (they set PICLOUD_SECRET_KEY).
AUDIT.md anchor: F-S-009.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Both methods short-circuit the authz gate when cx.principal == None.
An attacker hitting any public route could trigger unbounded outbound
email per call to arbitrary or attacker-supplied addresses — exhausting
SMTP-relay quota, getting the relay blacklisted, or burning provider
credits.
Add an in-memory EmailRateLimiter on UsersServiceImpl with two scopes:
- Per-(app, recipient): 5 calls per rolling 1h window
- Per-app daily cap: 200 calls per rolling 24h window
Both windows reset lazily. Token-bucket counts increment only after
both checks pass — a denied recipient doesn't consume the app counter.
Wired:
- send_verification_email: returns UsersError::EmailRateLimited (→ 429
on the admin HTTP surface).
- request_password_reset: returns Ok(()) silently on rate-limit (would
otherwise enable an existence-leak side channel).
UsersError::EmailRateLimited variant added; AppUsersApiError gains the
same variant + 429 mapping. NoopUsersError trait stub unaffected.
AUDIT.md anchor: F-S-002.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Files (per-file cap), secrets (64 KB default), and email (25 MB default)
already enforce limits; kv::set, docs::create/update, pubsub::publish_durable
and queue::enqueue accepted any JSON value straight to a JSONB column with
no size validation. An anonymous public-HTTP script could fill disk via
queue::enqueue or amplify a single publish into N outbox rows × payload bytes.
Adds four new error variants:
- KvError::ValueTooLarge { limit, actual }
- DocsError::ValueTooLarge { limit, actual }
- PubsubError::MessageTooLarge { limit, actual }
- QueueError::PayloadTooLarge { limit, actual }
Each stateful service grows a `max_value_bytes` field with:
- Conservative 256 KB default (DEFAULT_KV_MAX_VALUE_BYTES etc.).
- New `with_max_*` constructor preserving the old `new()` signature.
- Env-knob reader (`*_max_*_from_env()`) — mirrors SecretsConfig::from_env.
Validation runs at the entry point BEFORE authz so an anonymous DoS doesn't
pay a membership lookup per attempt.
Wired via env knobs:
- PICLOUD_KV_MAX_VALUE_BYTES
- PICLOUD_DOCS_MAX_VALUE_BYTES
- PICLOUD_PUBSUB_MAX_MESSAGE_BYTES
- PICLOUD_QUEUE_MAX_PAYLOAD_BYTES
Documented in CLAUDE.md runtime config table.
New unit test in queue_service verifying the cap fires before authz.
AUDIT.md anchor: F-S-001. Depends on F-Q-004 (Backend variant).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Brings QueueError / PubsubError / InvokeError in line with sibling
shape used by KvError / DocsError / FilesError / SecretsError:
- QueueError gains an explicit Forbidden variant (previously authz
denial was squashed into Rejected("forbidden") in queue_service.rs:68,
losing the structured variant a 403-translation layer would need).
- QueueError::Unavailable renamed → Backend.
- PubsubError::Unavailable renamed → Backend.
- InvokeError::Unavailable renamed → Backend.
- Call sites updated (queue_service, pubsub_service, invoke_service,
Noop* stubs, From<PubsubRepoError> impl, one test assertion).
- New unit test verifying authed-denied → QueueError::Forbidden.
AUDIT.md anchor: F-Q-004.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
shared/invoke.rs introduces the InvokeService trait + InvokeTarget enum:
- InvokeTarget::Path(String) — resolves via the route trie
- InvokeTarget::Name(String) — (cx.app_id, name) -> script_id via get_by_name
- InvokeTarget::Id(ScriptId) — direct lookup
InvokeService::resolve enforces same-app at the service layer
(InvokeError::CrossApp). InvokeService::enqueue_async writes a v1.1.9
OutboxSourceKind::Invoke row for fire-and-forget composition.
Errors: NotFound, CrossApp, DepthExceeded(u32), Forbidden, Rejected,
Unavailable. NoopInvokeService surfaces all calls as Unavailable for
harnesses that don't wire the service.
ScriptRepository gains get_by_name(app_id, name) backed by the existing
(app_id, name) uniqueness constraint. Postgres impl + in-memory mock +
the picloud crate's PostgresScriptRepoHandle delegate added.
Services::new gains invoke: Arc<dyn InvokeService> positionally after
queue. with_noop_services wires NoopInvokeService. 12 test sites
threaded through. picloud/lib.rs binds NoopInvokeService at this commit
boundary — the real InvokeResolver lands in commit 8.
Deviation from plan (flagged for HANDBACK §7): the plan called for
moving ExecutorClient + ScriptIdentity from orchestrator-core to shared
so the invoke bridge could call a re-entrant variant. Re-evaluated:
the bridge lives in executor-core which can hold Arc<Engine> directly,
making the trait move unnecessary. Engine::execute is sync, returns
ExecResponse, and shares the engine instance + per-call SdkCallCx
exactly as required. AST cache reuse across invokes is a v1.2 optimization
(invokes recompile each call — ms-scale cost, acceptable).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- shared/services.rs: Services::new gains queue: Arc<dyn QueueService>
positionally after users (mirrors v1.1.8's append of users).
with_noop_services adds NoopQueueService.
- manager-core/queue_service.rs: QueueServiceImpl wraps QueueRepo with
script-as-gate authz on AppQueueEnqueue. enqueue clamps max_attempts
to [1,20] and delay_ms to [0, 86_400_000ms]. depth/depth_pending are
read-only — no authz check (scripts in the app can see their own
queue depths). cx.principal threads through as enqueued_by_principal
(forensic only).
- manager-core/authz.rs: AppQueueEnqueue(AppId) capability — script:write
scope, granted to editor+ (same trust shape as AppPubsubPublish).
- picloud/lib.rs: wires PostgresQueueRepo + QueueServiceImpl into
Services::new alongside the existing v1.1.7+ services.
- 11 sdk test binaries + manager-core/realtime_authority.rs updated to
pass NoopQueueService to Services::new.
Unit tests cover empty queue_name reject, max_attempts clamping
(0/21 → invalid), delay_ms negative-reject, anonymous principal skips
authz, depth/depth_pending pass-through.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- shared/queue.rs: QueueService trait (enqueue / depth / depth_pending),
EnqueueOpts, QueueError, NoopQueueService. Methods derive app_id from
cx.app_id — no script-passed app_id. The handle-less surface mirrors
pubsub (queues are the grouping unit).
- shared/ids.rs: QueueMessageId.
- manager-core/queue_repo.rs: PostgresQueueRepo with:
- enqueue(NewQueueMessage) — single INSERT
- claim(app_id, queue_name) — atomic UPDATE WHERE id = (SELECT … FOR
UPDATE SKIP LOCKED LIMIT 1) RETURNING — the single-round-trip claim
from the design notes
- ack(id, claim_token) — DELETE WHERE id AND claim_token (lease check)
- nack(id, claim_token, retry_delay) — clear claim + set deliver_after
- reclaim_visibility_timeouts() — periodic UPDATE joining triggers +
queue_trigger_details, clears claims older than per-queue
visibility_timeout_secs
- depth / depth_pending / list_for_app (dashboard read-only)
- dead_letter(...) — atomic move to dead_letters + DELETE from
queue_messages, in one transaction. Uses a JSON payload shaped the
same as TriggerEvent::Queue so the existing fan_out_dead_letter
path delivers the original to registered dead_letter triggers
without special-casing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
8 files needed re-wrapping after the F2 clippy-fix pass landed
un-fmt'd. Pure cosmetic — no behavioral change. Re-runs of
`cargo fmt --all -- --check` now exit clean.
Reviewer-supplied per REVIEW.md §7; folded onto the branch
to avoid a NEEDS-CHANGES round-trip on a purely mechanical fix.
Workspace package version 1.1.7 -> 1.1.8.
shared::version::SDK_VERSION 1.8 -> 1.9 with the additive surface
note: users::* (CRUD, login/verify/logout, email verification,
password reset, invitations, string-tagged roles) added to the
Services bundle; topic auth_mode 'session' added server-side.
Dashboard package version 0.13.0 -> 0.14.0.
@picloud/client does NOT bump in v1.1.8 — the auth.login/logout
helpers it already ships call dev-defined endpoints; nothing to
change in the client.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
users_admin_api router merged into the guarded admin tree at
/api/v1/admin/apps/{id_or_slug}/users/* + /invitations/*.
Endpoints (capability gates applied via the service layer):
GET /users AppUsersRead
GET /users/{user_id} AppUsersRead
POST /users AppUsersWrite
PATCH /users/{user_id} AppUsersWrite
DELETE /users/{user_id} AppUsersWrite (admins satisfy implicitly)
POST /users/{user_id}/reset-password AppUsersAdmin -> one-shot token
POST /users/{user_id}/revoke-sessions AppUsersAdmin
GET /invitations AppUsersAdmin
POST /invitations AppUsersAdmin
DELETE /invitations/{invite_id} AppUsersAdmin
DTOs never include password_hash, session tokens, or unrotated
reset tokens. The reset-password endpoint returns the raw one-shot
token exactly once in the response body so an admin can paste it
into a manual reset link (TTL 1h by default).
Synth_cx() factors the admin-side cx construction into one place
(marked) so the SDK and admin code paths share the service's authz
fan-out. Admin-mediated trait methods (admin_create_invitation,
admin_reset_password_token, admin_revoke_all_sessions,
list_invitations, revoke_invitation) take &Principal directly,
not the synthesized cx.
UsersServiceImpl: removed the NOT_YET_IMPL constant + unused
auth alias (every method has a real implementation now). Added
Serialize+Deserialize on the AppUser / Invitation shared DTOs so
the admin HTTP layer doesn't need a parallel set of types.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
migration 0028: app_user_email_verifications table — token_hash PK,
app_id + user_id FKs cascading, expires_at, consumed_at. Single-use
via atomic UPDATE WHERE consumed_at IS NULL.
UsersServiceImpl gains:
* verifications: Arc<dyn AppUserVerificationRepo>
* email: Arc<dyn EmailService>
users::send_verification_email(user_id, opts) mints a 32-byte token,
stores SHA-256(token), and calls EmailService::send with the body
template's {link} placeholder substituted by link_base + ?token=raw.
EmailError::NotConfigured propagates as UsersError::EmailNotConfigured
so scripts already handling email-disabled mode (v1.1.7 email::send)
don't need new branches.
users::verify_email(token) atomically consumes the one-shot token via
the verifications repo, marks the user's email_verified_at = NOW(),
and emits a "users::email_verified" event for future triggers.
Internal email send uses a synthesized SdkCallCx with principal=None
so the email-service AppEmailSend authz check is skipped (the
users::* surface has already gated on AppUsersWrite — the internal
hop isn't the script's direct call). Documented in HANDBACK §7.
EmailTemplateOpts now requires `from` (the v1.1.7 email service needs
an envelope sender). The brief example omitted it; deviation logged
in HANDBACK §7.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
UsersService trait in shared::users + Postgres-backed impl in
manager-core::users_service. Wired into the Services bundle (new
`users` field) and the picloud binary's startup.
Commit 4 ships:
* CRUD: create / get / find_by_email / update / delete / list
(cursor-paged on created_at). create validates email shape,
8-char password minimum, optional display_name; throws
DuplicateEmail on (app_id, lower(email)) collision.
* Auth: login (timing-flat — runs verify_password against the
shared dummy Argon2id PHC even on email miss, so the
bad-email and good-email branches share wall-clock cost);
verify (sliding TTL bump capped at absolute_expires_at);
logout (revoke by token).
* verify_session_for_realtime — non-SDK method taking app_id
explicitly; used by the F3 realtime auth_mode='session' path
in a later commit.
* Cross-app isolation everywhere: cx.app_id (or explicit app_id)
is the only source of truth; a logout for a foreign-app token
is a silent no-op rather than a probe of session existence.
Email-tied flows (verification, password reset, invitations), roles,
and admin-mediated helpers are stubbed UsersError::Backend and ship
in later commits in this series.
Config (UsersServiceConfig) sources from env with documented
defaults:
PICLOUD_APP_USER_SESSION_TTL_HOURS (24)
PICLOUD_APP_USER_SESSION_ABSOLUTE_HOURS (720 = 30d)
PICLOUD_APP_USER_VERIFICATION_TTL_HOURS (48)
PICLOUD_APP_USER_PASSWORD_RESET_TTL_HOURS (1)
PICLOUD_APP_USER_INVITATION_TTL_DAYS (7)
Reserved a TIMING_FLAT_DUMMY_HASH constant on manager-core::auth so
the dummy PHC is one shared definition.
Added AppUserId + InvitationId id types in picloud-shared.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Per-app end-user table for the v1.1.8 users::* SDK. Distinct from
admin_users (control-plane operators) — same Argon2id password hash
shape but everything else (uniqueness scope, ownership, lifecycle)
independent.
- Uniqueness on (app_id, lower(email)) — case-insensitive within an
app; same email may exist across two apps.
- AppUserRepository trait + Postgres impl; every method takes app_id
explicitly so cross-app reads are unmistakable at the call site
(matches v1.1.3 cross-app discipline).
- Public AppUserRow never includes the password hash; the credentials
shape is its own struct returned only by the login lookup.
- Cursor-based list keyed on (created_at, id).
- Reserved a timing-flat dummy Argon2id PHC constant in auth.rs for
the upcoming login path so the bad-email and good-email branches
share wall-clock cost.
- Added AppUserId + InvitationId id types in shared::ids.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Inbound email: a provider POSTs a normalized JSON message to
POST /api/v1/email-inbound/{app_id}/{trigger_id}; the public receiver
verifies the optional HMAC signature, builds a TriggerEvent::Email, and
enqueues an outbox row the dispatcher delivers like any async trigger.
Handlers see ctx.event.email = #{from,to,cc,subject,text,html,
received_at,message_id}.
- migration 0024: widen triggers.kind + outbox.source_kind CHECKs to
'email'; new email_trigger_details table.
- TriggerKind::Email, TriggerDetails::Email{has_inbound_secret},
OutboxSourceKind::Email, TriggerEvent::Email; dispatcher routes the
email row via the generic resolve_trigger path.
- Admin POST /apps/{id}/triggers/email (validate_trigger_target; module
+ cross-app rejection). inbound_secret is stored ENCRYPTED via the
master key (deviation from the brief's plaintext default; decrypted
per inbound request — see HANDBACK §7).
- Dashboard: email trigger form on the Triggers tab + webhook URL +
expected-payload help.
- 8 DB-gated e2e tests (202/401/404/422/cross-app/handler-fire) +
receiver unit tests (HMAC verify, secret round-trip, payload parse).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Outbound email reachable from scripts as email::send(#{...}) (plain
text) and email::send_html(#{...}) (multipart text + HTML). Backed by a
lettre SMTP relay configured from PICLOUD_SMTP_HOST/PORT/USER/PASSWORD/
TLS/TIMEOUT_SECS; if HOST/USER/PASSWORD aren't all set the service runs
in disabled mode (every send throws NotConfigured, warned at startup).
- EmailService trait + OutboundEmail DTO (picloud-shared);
EmailServiceImpl + EmailTransport seam + lettre transport
(manager-core), wired into the Services bundle and Rhai engine.
- Capability::AppEmailSend (→ script:write); seven-scope commitment held.
- Required-field + RFC5322-ish address validation; 25 MB per-message cap
(PICLOUD_EMAIL_MAX_MESSAGE_BYTES). reply_to defaults to from.
- Per-call connection (pooling deferred to v1.2); no per-app from
validation (operator's SMTP/SPF/DKIM concern).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Encrypted per-app secrets, reachable from scripts as
secrets::{get,set,delete,list}(name) and managed from the dashboard
Secrets tab. Values are AES-256-GCM-sealed with the process master key
(picloud_shared::crypto) before they touch Postgres; the repo only ever
sees ciphertext + nonce. JSON round-trip preserves Rhai types.
- migration 0023_secrets.sql (PRIMARY KEY (app_id, name)).
- SecretsService trait (picloud-shared) + SecretsServiceImpl + repo
(manager-core), wired into the Services bundle and Rhai engine.
- Capability::AppSecretsRead/Write (→ script:read / script:write); no
new Scope variants (seven-scope commitment).
- Admin API GET/POST/DELETE /apps/{id}/secrets (list returns names +
updated_at, never values).
- build_app now takes a MasterKey, sourced from PICLOUD_SECRET_KEY in
main.rs; test callers pass a fixed test key.
- 64 KB value cap (PICLOUD_SECRET_MAX_VALUE_BYTES); no ServiceEvent
emission (secret writes don't fire triggers, by design).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add picloud_shared::crypto: AES-256-GCM encrypt/decrypt envelope
(12-byte CSPRNG nonce, 128-bit tag appended to ciphertext) plus a
MasterKey sourced from PICLOUD_SECRET_KEY (base64 of 32 bytes), with
a deterministic dev-key fallback gated on PICLOUD_DEV_MODE=true. Unset
key without dev mode is fatal. Key rotation is out of v1.1.7 scope.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Durable pub/sub through the universal outbox — the sixth trigger kind.
- `pubsub::publish_durable(topic, message)` Rhai SDK (no handle; topics
ARE the grouping unit). Message JSON-encoded; Blobs base64 at any
depth.
- `PubsubService` trait in picloud-shared with the topic matcher +
validator (exact / `<prefix>.*` / `*`; mid-pattern wildcards
rejected). `PostgresPubsubRepo` + `PubsubServiceImpl` in manager-core.
- Publish-time fan-out: one outbox row per matching enabled pubsub
trigger, all in ONE transaction (no half-fan-out on crash). No
matching trigger → publish succeeds silently, zero rows.
- `pubsub:*` trigger kind via Layout-E (0020: widen both CHECKs +
pubsub_trigger_details + partial index), TriggerEvent::Pubsub +
ctx.event.pubsub, dispatcher arm, admin endpoint POST /triggers/pubsub
(validates topic pattern + reuses validate_trigger_target).
- AppPubsubPublish capability → script:write (seven-scope held).
- Dashboard Pub/Sub trigger form on the Triggers tab + list rendering.
publish_ephemeral stays deferred to v1.2. ~18 new tests (service
in-memory incl. transactional-rollback, shared matcher, bridge
encoding). No DB required for the suite.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
