5c33b7490b
Ports the M3 milestone from the superseded feat/hierarchies branch onto main's evolved apply engine. A group node is authoritatively managed by at most one project-root; `pic apply --dir` claims, conflicts, takes over, and (with --prune) structurally reaps owned nodes. - Migration 0066: `projects(id, key UNIQUE)` + promote the inert `groups.owner_project` (0047) to a real FK (ON DELETE SET NULL) + index. - CLI mints a stable, gitignored project key in `.picloud/project.json` (`pic init`, or lazily on first tree plan/apply) and presents it on every tree request; `pic apply --dir --takeover` flag; `pic plan --dir` surfaces ownership conflicts + structural-prune candidates read-only. - Server: prepare_tree resolves ownership read-only (token folds each group's owner key, so a claim/takeover by another repo between plan and apply trips StateMoved). apply_tree upserts the project in-tx, claims unclaimed declared groups, and takes over owned ones under `--takeover`. --prune reaps owned-but-undeclared groups leaf-first (delete_group_tx RESTRICT — never another repo's or a UI-owned node). - Authz (§7.4, ownership ⟂ RBAC): takeover requires GroupAdmin per contested node — enforced in authz_tree (pre-tx) AND re-verified in-tx at the ownership decision, so --force (which waives the staleness token) can't open a takeover-without-admin window. The attacker-supplied project key is length/charset-validated server-side. Adaptation to main (which lacks the superseded branch's M2 declarative group create/reparent): groups pre-exist, so ownership stamps existing declared nodes rather than claim-on-create; the declarative attach-point is deferred. Review fixes (adversarial pass, 3 findings, all closed): - HIGH: an empty `[group]` node was claimed capability-free — require a baseline GroupScriptsWrite (editor) on every group apply node, so claiming ownership needs write authority (Ownership ⟂ RBAC). - MEDIUM: structural prune would silently CASCADE a group's §11.6 shared collections + secrets (which postdate M3's original design). Guard: a prune candidate holding shared data/secrets is KEPT with a warning (plus its candidate ancestors, so a preserved child never aborts a parent delete). - LOW: a corrupt `.picloud/project.json` silently re-minted a new key (orphaning ownership) — now fails loudly if the file exists but won't parse. Tests: tests/ownership.rs (claim → conflict → takeover → flip; non-admin takeover → 403; prune-owned-only; prune-refuses-to-cascade-shared-data); format_conflicts + validate_project_key unit tests; schema golden reblessed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
57 lines
1.1 KiB
Rust
57 lines
1.1 KiB
Rust
//! Integration-test binary for the `pic` CLI.
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//!
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//! Every `#[test]` in this binary routes through `common::fixture()`, a
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//! `LazyLock` that spawns picloud once on a private port and reuses it
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//! across all journey modules. Mirrors the dashboard Playwright suite,
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//! which spins backend + Vite up once for 63 specs.
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//!
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//! Gated on `DATABASE_URL`. To run:
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//!
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//! docker compose up -d postgres
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//! DATABASE_URL=postgres://picloud:picloud@127.0.0.1:15432/picloud \
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//! cargo test -p picloud-cli --test cli -- --include-ignored
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mod common;
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mod admins;
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mod api_keys;
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mod apply;
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mod approval;
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mod apps;
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mod auth;
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mod collections;
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mod config;
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mod dead_letters;
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mod email_queue;
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mod enabled;
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mod env_overlay;
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mod extension_points;
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mod group_modules;
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mod group_routes;
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mod group_scripts;
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mod group_secrets;
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mod group_triggers;
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mod groups;
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mod init;
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mod invoke;
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mod logs;
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mod output;
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mod ownership;
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mod plan;
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mod prune;
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mod pull;
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mod roles;
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mod routes;
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mod scripts;
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mod sealed;
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mod secrets;
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mod shared_queues;
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mod shared_topics;
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mod shared_triggers;
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mod staleness;
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mod stateful_templates;
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mod suppress;
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mod tree;
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mod triggers;
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mod vars;
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