MechaCat02 5c33b7490b feat(project-tool): multi-repo single-owner ownership + takeover (§7 M3) ...

Ports the M3 milestone from the superseded feat/hierarchies branch onto main's
evolved apply engine. A group node is authoritatively managed by at most one
project-root; `pic apply --dir` claims, conflicts, takes over, and (with
--prune) structurally reaps owned nodes.

- Migration 0066: `projects(id, key UNIQUE)` + promote the inert
  `groups.owner_project` (0047) to a real FK (ON DELETE SET NULL) + index.
- CLI mints a stable, gitignored project key in `.picloud/project.json`
  (`pic init`, or lazily on first tree plan/apply) and presents it on every
  tree request; `pic apply --dir --takeover` flag; `pic plan --dir` surfaces
  ownership conflicts + structural-prune candidates read-only.
- Server: prepare_tree resolves ownership read-only (token folds each group's
  owner key, so a claim/takeover by another repo between plan and apply trips
  StateMoved). apply_tree upserts the project in-tx, claims unclaimed declared
  groups, and takes over owned ones under `--takeover`. --prune reaps
  owned-but-undeclared groups leaf-first (delete_group_tx RESTRICT — never
  another repo's or a UI-owned node).
- Authz (§7.4, ownership ⟂ RBAC): takeover requires GroupAdmin per contested
  node — enforced in authz_tree (pre-tx) AND re-verified in-tx at the ownership
  decision, so --force (which waives the staleness token) can't open a
  takeover-without-admin window. The attacker-supplied project key is
  length/charset-validated server-side.

Adaptation to main (which lacks the superseded branch's M2 declarative group
create/reparent): groups pre-exist, so ownership stamps existing declared
nodes rather than claim-on-create; the declarative attach-point is deferred.

Review fixes (adversarial pass, 3 findings, all closed):
- HIGH: an empty `[group]` node was claimed capability-free — require a
  baseline GroupScriptsWrite (editor) on every group apply node, so claiming
  ownership needs write authority (Ownership ⟂ RBAC).
- MEDIUM: structural prune would silently CASCADE a group's §11.6 shared
  collections + secrets (which postdate M3's original design). Guard: a prune
  candidate holding shared data/secrets is KEPT with a warning (plus its
  candidate ancestors, so a preserved child never aborts a parent delete).
- LOW: a corrupt `.picloud/project.json` silently re-minted a new key
  (orphaning ownership) — now fails loudly if the file exists but won't parse.

Tests: tests/ownership.rs (claim → conflict → takeover → flip; non-admin
takeover → 403; prune-owned-only; prune-refuses-to-cascade-shared-data);
format_conflicts + validate_project_key unit tests; schema golden reblessed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

2026-07-05 20:29:12 +02:00

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