A fresh two-lens end-to-end review (security + correctness) of the committed M5/M3 diff surfaced four real defects; all fixed here with regressions. - HIGH (M5 authz bypass) — `enforce_env_approval` resolved a group node with a bare `get_by_slug` and SKIPPED the GroupAdmin gate on miss. A node addressed by the group's UUID (which the apply still resolves) let a group EDITOR apply to a confirm-required env without admin. Now resolves UUID-or-slug and fails closed, mirroring authz_tree / prepare_tree. Raw-wire regression added. - FIX-FIRST (M3 correctness) — the legacy `project_key=None` path was not inert: the conflict loop pushed a conflict for any owned group (`Some(oid) != None`), so a keyless/direct-API tree apply touching an already-claimed group was spuriously 409'd. Ownership classification is now gated on a key being present (the discriminator is key-present, not project-persisted, so a first-ever keyed apply still sees an already-owned group as a conflict). Regression added. - FIX-FIRST (M3 data-loss) — the structural-prune guard checked collection MARKERS (`group_collections`) but data outlives its marker: un-declaring a `collections=[...]` entry drops the marker while the kv/docs/files/queue rows survive until group delete. A dropped-then-pruned group would silently CASCADE that orphaned data. The guard now EXISTS-checks the actual data tables (group_kv_entries/docs/files/queue_messages) plus secrets + markers. - MEDIUM (audit) — group ownership takeover (and claim) now emit a tracing::info! audit line with the actor + ousted owner, matching the M5 gated-env audit. Previously only a report counter. Also: documented WHY `pic plan --dir` mints the project key (a rare write for a read-only command) — plan and apply must present the same key or the ownership token folds diverge and trip a spurious StateMoved. Re-verified: 411 manager-core lib tests; 28 CLI journeys (incl. 2 new regressions: uuid-slug admin gate, keyless legacy apply); workspace clippy -D warnings + fmt clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
333 lines
12 KiB
Rust
333 lines
12 KiB
Rust
//! M3 multi-repo single-owner ownership (§7) via `pic apply --dir`.
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//!
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//! On this build groups pre-exist (created via `pic groups create`; the tree
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//! apply reconciles a node's CONTENT and CLAIMS its ownership, it does not
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//! create the group). So each test first creates the group(s), then:
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//! * the first repo to `apply` a group CLAIMS it (its `.picloud/` project key
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//! becomes the group's `owner_project`),
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//! * a SECOND repo (a distinct dir → a distinct project key) applying the
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//! same group is REJECTED with an ownership conflict,
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//! * `--takeover` lets the second repo seize it — admin-gated, so the fixture
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//! instance-owner succeeds, flipping ownership (proven by the first repo now
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//! being the one rejected), but a group `editor` is 403'd (ownership ⟂ RBAC,
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//! §7.4),
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//! * `apply --prune` deletes an owned, now-undeclared, empty group; a group
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//! this project never claimed is never touched.
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//!
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//! Each project lives in its own `TempDir`, so `pic` mints a distinct project
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//! key per repo (`.picloud/project.json`) — the two-repo topology §7 governs.
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use std::fs;
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use std::path::Path;
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use tempfile::TempDir;
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use crate::common;
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use crate::common::cleanup::GroupGuard;
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use crate::common::member;
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/// A single-group project dir declaring the (pre-existing) group `slug`. No
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/// scripts, so a structural prune can delete it (a group holding scripts/apps
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/// is RESTRICT-pinned). `extra` is appended to the `[group]` table verbatim.
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fn group_dir(slug: &str, extra: &str) -> TempDir {
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let dir = TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
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fs::write(
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dir.path().join("picloud.toml"),
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format!("[group]\nslug = \"{slug}\"\nname = \"Owned Group\"\n{extra}"),
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)
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.unwrap();
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dir
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}
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fn apply(env: &common::TestEnv, dir: &Path, extra: &[&str]) -> std::process::Output {
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let mut cmd = common::pic_as(env);
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cmd.args(["apply", "--dir"]).arg(dir).args(extra);
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cmd.output().expect("apply --dir")
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}
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fn create_group(env: &common::TestEnv, slug: &str, parent: Option<&str>) {
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let mut cmd = common::pic_as(env);
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cmd.args(["groups", "create", slug]);
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if let Some(p) = parent {
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cmd.args(["--parent", p]);
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}
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let out = cmd.output().expect("groups create");
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assert!(
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out.status.success(),
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"groups create {slug} failed: {}",
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String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)
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);
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}
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fn ls_groups(env: &common::TestEnv) -> String {
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String::from_utf8(
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common::pic_as(env)
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.args(["groups", "ls"])
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.output()
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.expect("groups ls")
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.stdout,
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)
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.unwrap()
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}
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#[ignore = "needs DATABASE_URL pointing at a running Postgres"]
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#[test]
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fn first_repo_claims_second_is_rejected_then_takeover_flips_ownership() {
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let Some(fx) = common::fixture_or_skip() else {
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return;
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};
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let env = common::admin_env(fx);
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let slug = common::unique_slug("own-g");
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let _g = GroupGuard::new(&env.url, &env.token, &slug);
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create_group(&env, &slug, None);
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// Repo A claims the group on first apply (owner NULL → project A).
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let repo_a = group_dir(&slug, "");
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let a1 = apply(&env, repo_a.path(), &[]);
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assert!(
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a1.status.success(),
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"repo A claim apply failed: {}",
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String::from_utf8_lossy(&a1.stderr)
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);
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// Repo B (a different dir → a different project key) is rejected: the group
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// is owned by project A.
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let repo_b = group_dir(&slug, "");
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let b1 = apply(&env, repo_b.path(), &[]);
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assert!(
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!b1.status.success(),
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"repo B apply must be rejected (group owned by A)"
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);
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let b1_err = String::from_utf8_lossy(&b1.stderr).to_lowercase();
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assert!(
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b1_err.contains("owned by another project") || b1_err.contains("takeover"),
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"conflict message should name the ownership clash:\n{b1_err}"
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);
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// Repo B with --takeover succeeds (the fixture token is instance owner, so
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// it holds GroupAdmin on every node) and flips ownership to project B.
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let b2 = apply(&env, repo_b.path(), &["--takeover"]);
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assert!(
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b2.status.success(),
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"repo B --takeover should succeed: {}",
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String::from_utf8_lossy(&b2.stderr)
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);
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// Proof the flip took: repo A — formerly the owner — is now the one
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// rejected without --takeover.
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let a2 = apply(&env, repo_a.path(), &[]);
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assert!(
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!a2.status.success(),
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"after takeover, repo A must now be rejected (B owns the group)"
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);
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}
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#[ignore = "needs DATABASE_URL pointing at a running Postgres"]
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#[test]
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fn takeover_without_group_admin_is_forbidden() {
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// §7.4 — ownership ⟂ RBAC: `--takeover` needs GroupAdmin specifically, a
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// second gate beyond the write caps. A group `editor` (who CAN write group
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// vars) still cannot seize the group for their repo.
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let Some(fx) = common::fixture_or_skip() else {
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return;
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};
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let env = common::admin_env(fx);
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let slug = common::unique_slug("own-ta");
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let _g = GroupGuard::new(&env.url, &env.token, &slug);
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create_group(&env, &slug, None);
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// Admin (repo A) claims the group.
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let repo_a = group_dir(&slug, "");
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assert!(
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apply(&env, repo_a.path(), &[]).status.success(),
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"admin claim apply should succeed"
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);
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// A member granted `editor` (not app_admin/group_admin) on the group.
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let m = member::member_user(fx, &common::unique_username("ta"));
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common::pic_as(&env)
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.args(["groups", "members", "add", &slug, &m.id, "--role", "editor"])
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.output()
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.expect("add group member");
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let member_env = common::custom_env(&fx.url, &m.token);
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common::seed_credentials(&member_env, &m.username);
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// The member's repo B (a distinct project key) declares a group var (so its
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// write cap is satisfied) and attempts a takeover → 403 at the GroupAdmin
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// gate, before any write lands.
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let repo_b = group_dir(&slug, "\n[vars]\nregion = \"eu\"\n");
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let out = apply(&member_env, repo_b.path(), &["--takeover"]);
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assert!(
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!out.status.success(),
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"non-admin --takeover must be forbidden"
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);
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let err = String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr).to_lowercase();
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assert!(
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err.contains("forbidden") || err.contains("403"),
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"takeover denial should be an authz error:\n{err}"
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);
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}
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#[ignore = "needs DATABASE_URL pointing at a running Postgres"]
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#[test]
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fn prune_deletes_owned_undeclared_group_only() {
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let Some(fx) = common::fixture_or_skip() else {
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return;
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};
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let env = common::admin_env(fx);
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let parent = common::unique_slug("own-par");
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let child = common::unique_slug("own-child");
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// Drop order: child (registered last → dropped first), then parent.
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let _gp = GroupGuard::new(&env.url, &env.token, &parent);
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let _gc = GroupGuard::new(&env.url, &env.token, &child);
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create_group(&env, &parent, None);
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create_group(&env, &child, Some(&parent));
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// Repo declares parent (root manifest) + child (a nested dir); apply claims
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// both for this project.
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let dir = TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
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fs::write(
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dir.path().join("picloud.toml"),
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format!("[group]\nslug = \"{parent}\"\nname = \"Parent\"\n"),
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)
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.unwrap();
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fs::create_dir_all(dir.path().join("sub")).unwrap();
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fs::write(
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dir.path().join("sub/picloud.toml"),
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format!("[group]\nslug = \"{child}\"\nname = \"Child\"\n"),
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)
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.unwrap();
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let out = apply(&env, dir.path(), &[]);
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assert!(
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out.status.success(),
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"initial claim apply failed: {}",
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String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)
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);
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let groups = ls_groups(&env);
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assert!(
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groups.contains(&parent) && groups.contains(&child),
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"both groups should exist after claim"
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);
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// Drop the child manifest from the SAME repo (keeping its project key) so
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// the child becomes owned-but-undeclared, then apply --prune: the empty
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// child is deleted; the parent (still declared) is kept.
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fs::remove_dir_all(dir.path().join("sub")).unwrap();
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let out2 = apply(&env, dir.path(), &["--prune", "--yes"]);
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assert!(
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out2.status.success(),
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"prune apply failed: {}",
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String::from_utf8_lossy(&out2.stderr)
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);
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let groups = ls_groups(&env);
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assert!(groups.contains(&parent), "declared parent must be kept");
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assert!(
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!groups.contains(&child),
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"owned-but-undeclared child must be pruned"
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);
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}
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#[ignore = "needs DATABASE_URL pointing at a running Postgres"]
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#[test]
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fn prune_refuses_to_cascade_a_groups_shared_data() {
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// §7 M3 data-loss guard: an owned-but-undeclared group is NOT structurally
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// pruned if it holds §11.6 shared collections/secrets (those CASCADE) — it
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// is kept with a warning instead of being silently vaporized.
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let Some(fx) = common::fixture_or_skip() else {
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return;
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};
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let env = common::admin_env(fx);
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let parent = common::unique_slug("own-dpar");
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let child = common::unique_slug("own-dchild");
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let _gp = GroupGuard::new(&env.url, &env.token, &parent);
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let _gc = GroupGuard::new(&env.url, &env.token, &child);
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create_group(&env, &parent, None);
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create_group(&env, &child, Some(&parent));
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// Declare parent + child; the child declares a shared KV collection, so the
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// first apply claims both AND creates a group-owned collection marker.
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let dir = TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
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fs::write(
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dir.path().join("picloud.toml"),
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format!("[group]\nslug = \"{parent}\"\nname = \"Parent\"\n"),
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)
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.unwrap();
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fs::create_dir_all(dir.path().join("sub")).unwrap();
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fs::write(
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dir.path().join("sub/picloud.toml"),
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format!("[group]\nslug = \"{child}\"\nname = \"Child\"\n\ncollections = [\"catalog\"]\n"),
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)
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.unwrap();
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assert!(
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apply(&env, dir.path(), &[]).status.success(),
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"initial claim+collection apply should succeed"
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);
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// Drop the child node, then prune: the child owns a shared collection, so it
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// must be KEPT (with a warning), not cascaded away.
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fs::remove_dir_all(dir.path().join("sub")).unwrap();
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let out = apply(&env, dir.path(), &["--prune", "--yes"]);
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assert!(
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out.status.success(),
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"prune apply should succeed (skipping the protected group): {}",
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String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)
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);
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let combined = format!(
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"{}{}",
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String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stdout),
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String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)
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);
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assert!(
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combined.contains("shared collections"),
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"prune should warn it skipped a group owning shared data:\n{combined}"
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);
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assert!(
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ls_groups(&env).contains(&child),
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"a group owning shared collections must NOT be pruned"
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);
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}
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#[ignore = "needs DATABASE_URL pointing at a running Postgres"]
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#[test]
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fn legacy_apply_without_project_key_ignores_ownership() {
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// Regression (§7): a tree apply with NO project key (legacy / direct-API
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// caller) must skip ALL ownership — no conflicts, no claims. A bug gated the
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// conflict classification on `our_project_id` (None for a keyless caller),
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// so ANY already-owned declared group was spuriously rejected. Drive the raw
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// wire without `project_key` (the CLI always sends one).
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let Some(fx) = common::fixture_or_skip() else {
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return;
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};
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let env = common::admin_env(fx);
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let slug = common::unique_slug("own-legacy");
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let _g = GroupGuard::new(&env.url, &env.token, &slug);
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create_group(&env, &slug, None);
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// Repo A claims the group (a normal CLI apply — sends a project key).
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let repo_a = group_dir(&slug, "");
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assert!(
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apply(&env, repo_a.path(), &[]).status.success(),
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"claim apply should succeed"
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);
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// A keyless raw apply of the same (now-owned) group must NOT 409 — ownership
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// is simply not evaluated without a project key.
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let http = reqwest::blocking::Client::new();
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let body = serde_json::json!({
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"bundle": { "nodes": [{ "kind": "group", "slug": slug, "bundle": {} }] },
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"prune": false,
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});
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let resp = http
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.post(format!("{}/api/v1/admin/tree/apply", env.url))
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.bearer_auth(&env.token)
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.json(&body)
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.send()
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.expect("tree apply");
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assert!(
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resp.status().is_success(),
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"a keyless (legacy) apply must ignore ownership, not conflict (got {}: {})",
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resp.status(),
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resp.text().unwrap_or_default()
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);
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}
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