MechaCat02 8b5a02b3ef fix(audit-2026-06-11/H-B2): inbound_secret mandatory + bad-signature lockout on email triggers
Two gaps:

1. /api/v1/admin/apps/{id}/triggers/email accepted `inbound_secret: null`
   and treated it as "this trigger is unsigned". The runtime then
   skipped HMAC verification entirely. URL discovery (logs, ops
   dashboards, bruteforce on the 122-bit TriggerId space) then fan-out-
   amplified into the outbox for free — anonymous DoS via the
   dispatcher.

2. Even signed triggers had no per-trigger rate limit on signature-
   verify failures, so an attacker who knew the URL could pump unsigned
   POSTs to force Argon2-equivalent work (HMAC verify + nonce-dedup +
   stored-secret decrypt) at line rate.

Fix:

* triggers_api::create_email_trigger now requires a non-empty
  inbound_secret. 400 on missing / empty / whitespace-only.
* email_inbound_api::receive_inbound_email returns 401 immediately when
  the resolved target has no inbound_secret_encrypted column (pre-fix
  rows). The previous `if let Some(ct), Some(nonce)` branch is gone.
* New `BadSignatureLimiter`: per-`(app_id, trigger_id)` sliding-window
  bucket (10 fails / 60 s). On lockout the receiver returns 429 with
  Retry-After instead of 401. record_failure runs on both the
  "no-secret" 401 path and any verify_signature failure.

Test fallout:
* email_inbound integration tests that relied on None secret: removed
  the now-impossible `unsigned_trigger_accepts_without_signature` test,
  replaced with `create_without_inbound_secret_is_rejected` covering
  null / "" / "   "; updated `malformed_body_is_422` and
  `cross_app_path_is_404` to pass + sign with a secret.
* Two new unit tests pin the limiter behavior (burst lockout + per-
  trigger independence).

Audit refs: security_audit/08_dos_resource.md#h-3,
security_audit/09_external_integrations.md#f-ext-m-001.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-11 20:49:31 +02:00

PiCloud

A lightweight, self-hosted, event-driven serverless compute platform. Upload a Rhai script, get an HTTP endpoint. Designed to run on a single modest server with no idle CPU cost, and to scale out to a small cluster when you need it.

Status: Phase 1 — MVP scaffolding in progress.

The authoritative design lives in serverless_cloud_blueprint.md.

Why

Existing serverless platforms are either cloud-locked, heavyweight, or both. PiCloud aims for the opposite end of the spectrum: one binary, one database, one reverse proxy — running on hardware you already own.

Architecture (one paragraph)

PiCloud splits into three logical services — manager (control plane: scripts, schedules, dashboard), orchestrator (per-node event ingress and dispatch), and executor (per-node Rhai sandbox) — each backed by a *-core Rust library. In MVP they run in a single process; in cluster mode they run as three binaries with one manager and one orchestrator + executor per node. Caddy fronts everything; PostgreSQL is the single source of truth.

See CLAUDE.md for working notes and serverless_cloud_blueprint.md for the full design.

Quick Start

Coming as scaffolding lands. For now:

# Rust toolchain (pinned via rust-toolchain.toml)
cargo check --workspace

# Run the all-in-one MVP binary (once main.rs is wired up)
cargo run -p picloud

Repository Layout

crates/
  shared/                 cross-cutting types
  executor-core/          Rhai engine + sandbox
  orchestrator-core/      event ingress, dispatch
  manager-core/           control plane
  picloud/                MVP all-in-one binary
  picloud-{manager,orchestrator,executor}/   cluster-mode binaries (skeleton)
dashboard/                SvelteKit
caddy/                    Caddyfile
docker/                   Dockerfiles
docs/
  git-workflow.md         Trunk-based workflow

Contributing

See docs/git-workflow.md for the branching and commit conventions. TL;DR: trunk-based, short-lived branches, Conventional Commits, no force-pushing main.

License

TBD.

Description
No description provided
Readme 7.9 MiB
Languages
Rust 87.9%
Svelte 6.2%
TypeScript 5.7%