Write the notes in an app, a school day at a time

The notes existed but there was nowhere to write them: a CLI command on a
laptop, a tool call through Claude, or a file in a Docker volume. None of
those is reachable from a phone in a lesson, which is where notes are
actually taken.

So: `/app`, served only when WEB_PASSWORD is set. A login, the day's
notes, and a settings page for the Schulcloud token — the one surface
here meant for a person rather than a program.

The shape follows how the notes are written: one note per school day,
one `##` heading per lesson, prose and lists and tables beneath. That
turns out to be the design decision that matters, twice over.

First, it is what lets WebUntis earn its keep. Opening a day with no
note fills in that day's lessons — numbered, with times, teacher and
room, cancellations dropped and substitutions marked. Retyping the
timetable is exactly the work the second upstream exists to avoid, and
"Stunden ergänzen" tops up a note started before the day ended without
touching what is already written.

Second, it changes how notes are indexed. A day note is indexed per
lesson, not whole: search answers "my own note, Deutsch, 18.09.2026"
rather than "my own note, Friday", and `list_notes subject=Deutsch`
finds a day whose frontmatter names no subject at all. Indexed whole,
every hit would read as a weekday and "what did we do in Deutsch" would
match notes whose other five lessons were something else. `lessonHeading`
and `subjectFromHeading` are a loop — the app writes the heading, the
indexer reads the subject back out — and a test holds them to it.

Notes taken in a lesson cannot be retaken, so the editor is built
around not losing them: autosave, every keystroke mirrored to local
storage, a save when the phone locks, and a fallback to the local copy
when the request never arrives. A save that would overwrite a version
the editor never saw is refused and the choice handed back — the notes
folder is synced and open in more than one place, and a phone must not
silently win over a laptop. `replaceNote` is separate from `writeNote`
for that reason: never-overwrite is right for `add_note` and exactly
wrong for an editor.

WEB_PASSWORD is the first credential here a human types, so it is the
first that can be guessed: scrypt at startup, never stored or compared
in the clear, per-address rate limiting — which is not decoration, since
the scrypt cost is itself a denial-of-service vector without it. The
session is a signed HttpOnly SameSite=Strict cookie whose key is derived
from the password, so changing it logs everyone out and there is no
second secret to keep. It opens /api, because a session is the user, and
never /mcp, because nothing in a browser speaks MCP.

Also here, because the app made them matter: frontmatter now reads the
indented `- item` list form editors write, so an Obsidian vault
round-trips its tags; and a four-digit folder is a filing scheme, not a
subject, so `2026/` does not file a school year under one.

357 tests; 106/107 smoke against the local instance, the one failure
being the H5P service that instance does not run.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
MechaCat02
2026-09-19 17:21:17 +02:00
parent af4464decb
commit dc50b4bcd5
29 changed files with 2501 additions and 144 deletions

View File

@@ -251,15 +251,50 @@ access log entry is written. Rotating it means a new value, a recreated
container, and re-adding the connector. Prefer the connector token wherever a
header can be sent: a URL is copied into more places than a header is.
### The app password, for a person
`WEB_PASSWORD` is unlike every other credential here: it is typed by a human, on
a phone, in a lesson. That single fact drives its whole design.
- **It is a passphrase, not a token.** `config.ts` insists on 12 characters and
nothing else; demanding punctuation would buy little next to length, and the
failure mode of a fussy rule is a shorter password, not a better one.
- **It is never stored in the clear.** scrypt (N=16384) at startup; a login
hashes the attempt and compares in constant time. The error states the rule
and never echoes the value.
- **Logins are rate-limited per address**, eight failures in fifteen minutes.
Not optional: a password is guessable in a way a 32-byte token is not, and the
scrypt cost that makes guessing expensive is itself a denial-of-service vector
without a limiter in front of it.
- **The session is a signed cookie**, `HttpOnly` and `SameSite=Strict` — the
latter standing in for CSRF tokens, since nothing links into the app from
anywhere else. 30 days, because the alternative is a login screen at the start
of a lesson.
- **The signing key is derived from the password**, so changing it invalidates
every session that exists. No second secret, nothing to store, and the
behaviour anyone changing a password already expects.
- **The cookie opens `/api` and not `/mcp`.** A session *is* the user, and the
app is built on `/api` — but nothing in a browser speaks MCP, and a surface
that is not needed is not offered.
Unset, the app is not served at all. A login screen that no password can open is
worse than no page, because it looks like a way in.
## Blast radius
Every path in this server is a `GET`, including the `api_get` escape hatch,
which rejects anything not starting with `/api/` and anything carrying a scheme
or host. Someone who obtained both the endpoint URL and `MCP_AUTH_TOKEN` — or
the connector token, or the secret MCP path — could read this account's
Schulcloud data; they could not
the connector token, the secret MCP path, or the app password — could read this
account's Schulcloud data; they could not
post, submit, delete, or otherwise act as the user. With `MCP_AUTH_TOKEN` they
could also call `PUT /api/token`, but it accepts only a live token for the same
account, so the most it can do is hand the server a session the owner already
has. Keep it that way — adding a single write tool would change that property
entirely.
The app password and `MCP_AUTH_TOKEN` additionally reach the notes: they can
read, write and overwrite files under `NOTES_DIR`, and nothing outside it —
`safeComponent` and `resolveWithin` are what make that a property rather than a
hope. That is the only write anywhere in this server, and it touches the user's
own files, never Schulcloud. `NOTES_READONLY=1` removes even that.