Files
Schulcloud-MCP/docs/ROADMAP.md
MechaCat02 a8badc2fd1 Read submitted text and teacher feedback from the homework page
You were right that this data never reaches the browser as an API call.
The legacy front end calls the Feathers API server-side for
submission.comment, submission.grade and submission.gradeComment and
renders them into GET /homework/{taskId}. That Feathers API is not
exposed publicly — /api/v1/* 404s — so the rendered page is the only way
to reach these fields from outside.

core/homework-page.ts parses it, hooked on the data-testid attributes
the project's own e2e tests use rather than incidental markup. The page
authenticates by jwt *cookie*; an Authorization header is ignored and
redirects to the identity provider. Every field is optional and parse
failures return undefined, so a markup change degrades to "not found"
and cannot break get_task. The wording distinguishes the two: absent
feedback is reported as not found, never as none given.

Measured on one course: 4 of 7 graded submissions carry feedback no API
call can return — "vollständig und nachvollziehbar", "Feedback siehe
Zettel", and so on.

This exposed a bug in a shared utility: htmlToText decoded only six
entities, so any named entity passed through raw. German content makes
that routine — "vollständig" would have reached the model verbatim
from boards and task descriptions too, not just here. It now decodes
named, decimal and hex references in one pass, so ä stays
literal instead of decoding twice, and leaves unknown names alone rather
than mangling them.

Also fixes a documented-recovery bug found while restoring the session:
`docker compose restart` does not re-read env_file, so it silently kept
serving the dead token. `up -d` is correct and the docs said the wrong
thing.

78 tests, 38/38 smoke; verified end to end through Claude Code.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-13 13:25:35 +02:00

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Extensions: built and possible

Items 13 are now implemented — see docs/CLI.md and the store/, indexer/ and cli/ modules. What remains below is the rationale (worth keeping) and the items still open.

Decisions already taken

Decision Choice Rejected
Endpoint auth Static bearer token (MCP_AUTH_TOKEN, constant-time check) OAuth 2.1; secret URL path
State Stateless — every tool call hits the API live Postgres cache; cache + full-text search
File delivery Inline extracted text; images inline Raw base64 only
If persistence is added The Pi's existing PostgreSQL, with its own database and user A dedicated container; SQLite

Two of the rejected options need no revisiting. OAuth 2.1 is disproportionate machinery for a single-user endpoint a bearer token already protects. "Raw bytes as well as extracted text" got built anyway — download_file takes raw: true.

1. Full-text search over file contents — BUILT

The gap: search covers course/board/card/lesson/task titles and text, and file names — never file contents. The 93 PDFs in this account are opaque to it. "Where does it explain the Caesar cipher?" only hits if those words are in a filename.

The cost: one search walks ~26 course pages, ~30 board skeletons plus card fetches, and ~150 per-element file listings — roughly 270 upstream requests, several seconds, every time.

Design sketch

  • Postgres tsvector + GIN. Use the german dictionary, so Verschlüsselung matches Verschlüsselungsverfahren; the default english config stems these wrongly.
  • Add pg_trgm alongside. German compounds defeat stemming — Datenschutzgrundverordnung will not match Datenschutz — and trigram similarity also absorbs typos.
  • Index: titles and text of courses, boards, cards, lessons, tasks; file names; and extracted file text.
  • Later, optionally: embeddings in pgvector, so "the thing about encryption" finds Verschlüsselung without sharing a word. Needs an embedding model in the loop, so it is a separate step, not part of this.

2. Cache, with bypass — BUILT (search fresh=true, refresh_index)

The split that makes staleness tolerable — index is discovery, live API is detail. Search the index to find where something is; always re-fetch it to read it. A stale index then costs a missed or spurious hit, never wrong content. That is a far better failure mode than a cache that can serve last week's homework list as current.

  • fresh: true on search (re-crawl the relevant course first) and on the detail tools.
  • State freshness in every cached result ("indexed 2h ago"), regardless of the flag — a bypass only helps if the agent knows it needs one.
  • Extracted file text is cacheable indefinitely. A fileRecord id maps to immutable bytes; an edit produces a new record. PDF parsing happens once, ever. Cheapest large win here, and free of staleness risk.
  • Sync: nightly full crawl (~270 requests, trivial) plus on-demand per course.

Consequence to weigh: coursework text would then live on the Pi at rest, outside Schulcloud. It does not weaken the read-only property, but it is new — consider disk encryption and whether it lands in a backup.

3. "What's new since …" — BUILT (what_changed)

Falls out of having an index with history: diff successive crawls to surface new boards, cards, files and tasks. Impossible today at any speed — the API has no changed-since filter anywhere. Arguably the most useful item on this list for a student, and nearly free once the sync job exists.

4. Remaining gaps, measured

Scanned the instance's 98 GET routes against what the tools cover. Almost everything student-facing is now covered; what is left, with live checks:

Area State on this account
GET /groups/class 3 real classes — the only uncovered endpoint with data
GET /rooms empty — the feature is unused here
GET /media-boards/me exists, no content
GET /course-info 403 — teacher/admin only
GET /alert empty
tools, oauth2, school, registrations, systems, user-login-migrations admin/auth plumbing, not student-facing

Genuinely unavailable, not merely uncovered:

  • Collaborative text editor contents — the endpoint returns an editor URL, never the document text.
  • Calendar — a separate service, absent from the v3 document.
  • Image-only PDFs — 22 of 255 indexed files are scans with no text layer, so their contents cannot be searched without OCR.
  • Numeric grades — the API's grade was null on every graded submission here, so that path stays unverified against real data.

5. Still open

  • Video/audio transcription — this account has 5 MP4s and a WebM that are currently just "here is a file you cannot read".
  • MCP resources and prompts — expose courses/boards as attachable resources; canned prompts such as "summarise this week's homework".
  • Calendar — a separate schulcloud-calendar service, not part of the v3 API mapped in API.md.

5. Ruled out

  • Collaborative text editor contents. Confirmed unavailable: GET /api/v3/collaborative-text-editor/{parentType}/{parentId} returns a URL to the editor, never the document text.
  • OCR — partially wrong, revised. For reading, it remains unnecessary: images go to Claude inline and it reads them. For indexing it is a real gap. Measured after building the indexer: 3 of 4 sampled course PDFs have no embedded fonts at all — they are scans, so extraction legitimately yields nothing and they are unsearchable by content. extract.ts now reports these as image-only rather than as an empty result. Making them searchable would need OCR (or page rasterisation plus a vision pass), which is the largest remaining gap in search coverage.
  • Write tools (submitting homework, marking tasks done). Technically easy, but this forfeits the property that makes an internet-facing endpoint acceptable: that a leaked token cannot act as the user. A deliberate, separate decision — see the invariant in CLAUDE.md.