Adds docker-compose.override.yml (local-only: publishes the server on 127.0.0.1:8080 and Postgres on 127.0.0.1:55432, crawls on demand) and docs/LOCAL.md covering the stack, Claude Code registration over both transports, the CLI, and the test suites. Two bugs that only running the real container could find: The mirror volume was root-owned while the container runs as node, so every file write failed with EACCES. Docker initialises a named volume from the image directory including its ownership, so the fix is to create /data/mirror owned by node in the image. This was easy to miss because the indexer records a per-file failure rather than crashing — the crawl "succeeded" with 4 skipped. Earlier direct-node testing missed it entirely by writing to a scratch dir owned by the developer. The store tests TRUNCATE, and pointing TEST_DATABASE_URL at the dev database put their fixtures into real data. They now refuse any database whose name does not contain "test". Verified against the rebuilt container: 4 files mirrored, image-only PDF detection firing in the real pipeline, both transports showing ✔ Connected in `claude mcp list`, and a whoami tool call driven end to end through `claude -p`. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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CLAUDE.md
Guidance for Claude Code when working in this repository.
What this is
Read-only access to a Schulcloud (HPI Schul-Cloud / Schulcloud-Verbund-Software)
account: courses, column boards, lessons, tasks, files with text extraction, and
a Postgres-backed full-text index. TypeScript, Node 22+,
@modelcontextprotocol/sdk.
Three entry points over one core:
src/bin/http.ts— Streamable HTTP +/api, the deployed form, behind Caddy on a Pi.src/bin/stdio.ts— stdio, for local Claude Code / Desktop use.src/bin/cli.ts— theschulcloudCLI, which talks to the HTTP server, never to Schulcloud.
Commands
npm run build # tsc → dist/ (also copies store/migrations/*.sql)
npm run dev # watch mode, runs src/ directly via type stripping
npm test # unit tests (node:test), no network
npm run typecheck
npm run probe # verify token + API assumptions against the LIVE instance
npm run smoke # full end-to-end: real server + real MCP client + real data
npm run keepalive-status # is the deployed container holding its session?
npm run session-diagnose # ~2.5h: measure what actually ends the session
docker-compose.override.yml is local-only and publishes the server on
127.0.0.1:8080 and Postgres on 127.0.0.1:55432; see docs/LOCAL.md.
probe and smoke hit the live Schulcloud and need a valid .env. Both are
read-only with respect to Schulcloud. Run smoke after touching src/core/,
src/mcp/ or src/http/ — the unit tests cover only pure functions.
Run smoke both ways: with DATABASE_URL set (34 checks, index-backed) and
without (32 checks, live-only). The degradation path is a supported mode, not a
fallback nobody exercises.
Store tests need a database and skip without one:
TEST_DATABASE_URL=postgresql://… npm test. They use a real Postgres on
purpose — the generation/diff semantics are entirely SQL, so a mock would test
nothing. They TRUNCATE, and refuse to run unless the database name
contains "test"; that guard exists because pointing them at the dev database
once put fixtures into real data.
Architecture
bin/{http,stdio}.ts ─┬─ mcp/server.ts ── mcp/tools/*
└─ http/{server,api,auth}.ts /mcp and /api
│
bin/cli.ts ──HTTP──────────┘ cli/{config,client,sync}.ts
services.ts (process-wide: client, Store, Indexer)
│
indexer/indexer.ts ── store/store.ts ── Postgres
│
core/{client,board,crawl,extract,text,paths,types}
core/knows nothing of MCP, HTTP or the CLI.client.ts— every upstream call;GET-only exceptextendSession.board.ts— a column board needs three kinds of call to reconstruct.crawl.ts— the one traversal. Search, the indexer, the what-changed diff and the file mirror all need it; keep it here, not in a tool.paths.ts— the security boundary for mirrored filenames. See Invariants.
store/— crawl generations, identity diffs,german+pg_trgmFTS.Store.openreturnsundefinedwhen Postgres is down; callers degrade.indexer/— crawl → persist → mirror bytes → extract text → index. Coalesces concurrent refreshes; enforces a minimum interval.mcp/tools/*.ts— tool descriptions are prompts: they are how Claude picks a tool, so they carry the German domain terms (Kurse, Themen, Aufgaben) and say when not to use the tool.context.ts— per-session state. Only/meis cached, because the school id is on every files-storage path and cannot change for a token.
Invariants
Everything that touches Schulcloud is read-only. Every client method is a
GET except extendSession (the keepalive's refresh-session call, which
touches only our own session and is not exposed as a tool, so no model-driven
call can be a POST). api_get rejects non-/api/ paths and anything carrying a
scheme or host. refresh_index and POST /api/refresh write only to the Pi's
own index and mirror — every upstream call they make is still a GET.
Filenames from Schulcloud are untrusted paths. Course titles, card titles
and filenames are all user-supplied upstream, and both the server's mirror and
the CLI's sync turn them into filesystem paths. Everything goes through
core/paths.ts: safeComponent reduces one string to one safe component, and
resolveWithin refuses anything that escapes the root. Do not bypass them with
path.join, and keep the property that no .. survives anywhere in a
component — it is what makes the invariant checkable. The endpoint
is internet-facing by necessity, so "a leaked token cannot act as the user" is
the property that makes that acceptable. Do not add a write tool without the
user explicitly asking for one and understanding this.
Never log or echo secrets. TSC_JWT_COOKIE grants full read access to the
account; MCP_AUTH_TOKEN guards the endpoint. Neither belongs in
logs, error messages, or tool output. .env is git-ignored — keep it that way.
Live behaviour beats upstream source. The clones in vendor/ track main
and may be ahead of what is deployed. When they disagree with the instance, the
instance is right. docs/API.md records which is which.
API gotchas
These cost real time to discover; docs/API.md has the full list with evidence.
- Course contents are at
GET /api/v3/course-rooms/{courseId}/board. There is noGET /api/v3/courses/{id}, and:roomIdthere is the course id. /api/v3/roomsis an unrelated newer feature, not courses. Empty is normal.limitis rejected above 100 though the spec says 99. Page at 99; the client clamps andlistAllCoursespages for you.- There is no
GET /tasks/{id}, and the task lists omitdescription— it only exists on the course page's task element.get_taskdoes that join. - Board file elements carry no file id. Files are found by listing
files-storage with
parentType: 'boardnodes'and the element id asparentId. Same forfileFolderanddrawing. - Files live in a separate service (
/api/v3/file/*, repofile-storage) with its own OpenAPI document. It is not in the maindocs-json. - Legacy lesson responses return ids as
{buffer:{data:[...]}}; usenormalizeObjectId. updatedAton the course-board projection is the request time, not a modification time — two reads seconds apart differ. Never build change detection on it; the store diffs crawl generations by identity instead. The dedicated endpoints (/boards/{id},/cards, file records) are stable.- Many course PDFs are image-only scans with no text layer (3 of 4 sampled),
so extraction legitimately yields nothing.
extract.tsdetects this and says so; do not "fix" it by retrying. exp(30 days) is not the session lifetime. The binding limit is a Valkey whitelist entry with aJWT_TIMEOUT_SECONDSTTL (7200s; live value atGET /api/v3/config/public) that every authenticated request re-sets.src/keepalive.tsholds it open — don't remove it.- A Schulportal tab left open revokes our token. The
jwtcookie is the browser's session token, samejti. The front end runs a client-side timer (reset only on route change, never from the server TTL) and calls/logout?auto-logout=true~2h after login, which issuesPOST /api/v3/logoutand deletes the shared key. No keepalive can prevent it; the fix is to close the tab. This produced two false conclusions before being found — if a token dies ~2h after login, suspect an open tab first.docs/AUTH.mdhas the chain.
Conventions
- Imports use
.tsextensions;rewriteRelativeImportExtensionsmakestscemit.js. This letsnode --watch src/bin/http.tsrun the tree directly. - No TypeScript parameter properties (
constructor(private readonly x: T)). Node's type stripping rejects them, which breaksnpm run devandnpm test. Declare the field and assign it in the constructor body instead. - Tabs for indentation, single quotes, trailing commas.
- Comments explain why — an API quirk, a security property, a trade-off — not what the line does. Several such comments encode findings that are expensive to rediscover; do not strip them.
- Tool failures return
isError: truewith an actionable message viamcp/tools/result.ts.toToolErrorseparates 401 (token expired — the user must act) from 403 (no access) from 404 (bad id) deliberately; keep that split.
Adding a tool
- Add the client method in
core/client.ts(GETonly). - Register the tool in the relevant
mcp/tools/*.ts, with a description that says when to use it and when not to. - Format output as Markdown, keeping ids visible for follow-up calls.
- If it reads the index, handle
context.store === undefinedwith a message saying what is unavailable and what still works. - Add a check to
scripts/smoke.mjsand runnpm run smokeboth ways.
Environment
.env holds TSC_URL, TSC_JWT_COOKIE, MCP_AUTH_TOKEN. See .env.example
for the full set and docs/AUTH.md for refreshing the JWT. npm run probe
reports both clocks: days until hard expiry and seconds of idle budget left.