Files
Schulcloud-MCP/CLAUDE.md
MechaCat02 a8badc2fd1 Read submitted text and teacher feedback from the homework page
You were right that this data never reaches the browser as an API call.
The legacy front end calls the Feathers API server-side for
submission.comment, submission.grade and submission.gradeComment and
renders them into GET /homework/{taskId}. That Feathers API is not
exposed publicly — /api/v1/* 404s — so the rendered page is the only way
to reach these fields from outside.

core/homework-page.ts parses it, hooked on the data-testid attributes
the project's own e2e tests use rather than incidental markup. The page
authenticates by jwt *cookie*; an Authorization header is ignored and
redirects to the identity provider. Every field is optional and parse
failures return undefined, so a markup change degrades to "not found"
and cannot break get_task. The wording distinguishes the two: absent
feedback is reported as not found, never as none given.

Measured on one course: 4 of 7 graded submissions carry feedback no API
call can return — "vollständig und nachvollziehbar", "Feedback siehe
Zettel", and so on.

This exposed a bug in a shared utility: htmlToText decoded only six
entities, so any named entity passed through raw. German content makes
that routine — "vollständig" would have reached the model verbatim
from boards and task descriptions too, not just here. It now decodes
named, decimal and hex references in one pass, so ä stays
literal instead of decoding twice, and leaves unknown names alone rather
than mangling them.

Also fixes a documented-recovery bug found while restoring the session:
`docker compose restart` does not re-read env_file, so it silently kept
serving the dead token. `up -d` is correct and the docs said the wrong
thing.

78 tests, 38/38 smoke; verified end to end through Claude Code.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-13 13:25:35 +02:00

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# CLAUDE.md
Guidance for Claude Code when working in this repository.
## What this is
Read-only access to a Schulcloud (HPI Schul-Cloud / Schulcloud-Verbund-Software)
account: courses, column boards, lessons, tasks, files with text extraction, and
a Postgres-backed full-text index. TypeScript, Node 22+,
`@modelcontextprotocol/sdk`.
Three entry points over one core:
- `src/bin/http.ts` — Streamable HTTP + `/api`, the deployed form, behind Caddy on a Pi.
- `src/bin/stdio.ts` — stdio, for local Claude Code / Desktop use.
- `src/bin/cli.ts` — the `schulcloud` CLI, which talks to the HTTP server, never
to Schulcloud.
## Commands
```bash
npm run build # tsc → dist/ (also copies store/migrations/*.sql)
npm run dev # watch mode, runs src/ directly via type stripping
npm test # unit tests (node:test), no network
npm run typecheck
npm run probe # verify token + API assumptions against the LIVE instance
npm run smoke # full end-to-end: real server + real MCP client + real data
npm run keepalive-status # is the deployed container holding its session?
npm run session-diagnose # ~2.5h: measure what actually ends the session
```
`docker-compose.override.yml` is local-only and publishes the server on
`127.0.0.1:8080` and Postgres on `127.0.0.1:55432`; see `docs/LOCAL.md`.
`probe` and `smoke` hit the live Schulcloud and need a valid `.env`. Both are
read-only with respect to Schulcloud. Run `smoke` after touching `src/core/`,
`src/mcp/` or `src/http/` — the unit tests cover only pure functions.
Run smoke **both ways**: with `DATABASE_URL` set (34 checks, index-backed) and
without (32 checks, live-only). The degradation path is a supported mode, not a
fallback nobody exercises.
Store tests need a database and skip without one:
`TEST_DATABASE_URL=postgresql://… npm test`. They use a real Postgres on
purpose — the generation/diff semantics are entirely SQL, so a mock would test
nothing. **They `TRUNCATE`**, and refuse to run unless the database name
contains "test"; that guard exists because pointing them at the dev database
once put fixtures into real data.
## Architecture
```
bin/{http,stdio}.ts ─┬─ mcp/server.ts ── mcp/tools/*
└─ http/{server,api,auth}.ts /mcp and /api
│
bin/cli.ts ──HTTP──────────┘ cli/{config,client,sync}.ts
services.ts (process-wide: client, Store, Indexer)
│
indexer/indexer.ts ── store/store.ts ── Postgres
│
core/{client,board,crawl,extract,text,paths,types}
```
- **`core/`** knows nothing of MCP, HTTP or the CLI.
- `client.ts` — every upstream call; `GET`-only except `extendSession`.
- `board.ts` — a column board needs three kinds of call to reconstruct.
- **`crawl.ts`** — the one traversal. Search, the indexer, the what-changed
diff and the file mirror all need it; keep it here, not in a tool.
- `paths.ts` — the security boundary for mirrored filenames. See Invariants.
- **`store/`** — crawl generations, identity diffs, `german` + `pg_trgm` FTS.
`Store.open` returns `undefined` when Postgres is down; callers degrade.
- **`indexer/`** — crawl → persist → mirror bytes → extract text → index.
Coalesces concurrent refreshes; enforces a minimum interval.
- **`mcp/tools/*.ts`** — tool descriptions are prompts: they are how Claude picks
a tool, so they carry the German domain terms (Kurse, Themen, Aufgaben) and say
when *not* to use the tool.
- **`context.ts`** — per-session state. Only `/me` is cached, because the school
id is on every files-storage path and cannot change for a token.
## Invariants
**Everything that touches Schulcloud is read-only.** Every client method is a
`GET` except `extendSession` (the keepalive's `refresh-session` call, which
touches only our own session and is not exposed as a tool, so no model-driven
call can be a POST). `api_get` rejects non-`/api/` paths and anything carrying a
scheme or host. `refresh_index` and `POST /api/refresh` write only to the Pi's
own index and mirror — every upstream call they make is still a GET.
**Filenames from Schulcloud are untrusted paths.** Course titles, card titles
and filenames are all user-supplied upstream, and both the server's mirror and
the CLI's sync turn them into filesystem paths. Everything goes through
`core/paths.ts`: `safeComponent` reduces one string to one safe component, and
`resolveWithin` refuses anything that escapes the root. Do not bypass them with
`path.join`, and keep the property that no `..` survives anywhere in a
component — it is what makes the invariant checkable. The endpoint
is internet-facing by necessity, so "a leaked token cannot act as the user" is
the property that makes that acceptable. Do not add a write tool without the
user explicitly asking for one and understanding this.
**Never log or echo secrets.** `TSC_JWT_COOKIE` grants full read access to the
account; `MCP_AUTH_TOKEN` guards the endpoint. Neither belongs in
logs, error messages, or tool output. `.env` is git-ignored — keep it that way.
**Live behaviour beats upstream source.** The clones in `vendor/` track `main`
and may be ahead of what is deployed. When they disagree with the instance, the
instance is right. `docs/API.md` records which is which.
## API gotchas
These cost real time to discover; `docs/API.md` has the full list with evidence.
- Course contents are at `GET /api/v3/course-rooms/{courseId}/board`. There is
no `GET /api/v3/courses/{id}`, and `:roomId` there is the *course* id.
- `/api/v3/rooms` is an unrelated newer feature, not courses. Empty is normal.
- `limit` is rejected above 100 though the spec says 99. Page at 99; the client
clamps and `listAllCourses` pages for you.
- There is no `GET /tasks/{id}`, and the task lists omit `description` — it
only exists on the course page's task element. `get_task` does that join.
- **`GET /cards?ids=` takes at most 20 ids** (the `qs` `arrayLimit` default), and
fails above that with a validation error that blames the ids rather than their
number. `MAX_IDS_PER_QUERY` in `core/client.ts`. Any board over 20 cards is
affected, which is common.
- **Never swallow a per-item crawl error.** Board failures used to be caught and
dropped, so the index lost whole boards while the crawl reported success —
which is how the 20-id limit went unnoticed. They go into `Snapshot.failures`.
- **Submissions: only `GET /submissions/status/task/{taskId}` exists.** No list,
no fetch-by-id, and the payload has no submitted text, grade comment or
graded-at — `/api/v1`, which had them, is not served here. Don't imply absent
feedback means none was given.
- **Submitted text and grade comments are scraped, not fetched.** No API
exposes them; the legacy page `GET /homework/{taskId}` renders them, and it
authenticates by `jwt` **cookie**, not bearer. `core/homework-page.ts` parses
it on `data-testid` hooks and every field is optional — a markup change must
degrade to "not found", never break `get_task`.
- **files-storage listing ignores the `parentType` path segment** — filter on
each record's own `parentType`, or submission files get reported as grading
files.
- **Board file elements carry no file id.** Files are found by listing
files-storage with `parentType: 'boardnodes'` and the *element* id as
`parentId`. Same for `fileFolder` and `drawing`.
- Files live in a separate service (`/api/v3/file/*`, repo `file-storage`) with
its own OpenAPI document. It is not in the main `docs-json`.
- Legacy lesson responses return ids as `{buffer:{data:[...]}}`; use
`normalizeObjectId`.
- **`updatedAt` on the course-board projection is the request time**, not a
modification time — two reads seconds apart differ. Never build change
detection on it; the store diffs crawl generations by identity instead. The
dedicated endpoints (`/boards/{id}`, `/cards`, file records) are stable.
- Many course PDFs are **image-only scans with no text layer** (3 of 4 sampled),
so extraction legitimately yields nothing. `extract.ts` detects this and says
so; do not "fix" it by retrying.
- **`exp` (30 days) is not the session lifetime.** The binding limit is a Valkey
whitelist entry with a `JWT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS` TTL (7200s; live value at
`GET /api/v3/config/public`) that every authenticated request re-sets.
`src/keepalive.ts` holds it open — don't remove it.
- **A Schulportal tab left open revokes our token.** The `jwt` cookie *is* the
browser's session token, same `jti`. The front end runs a client-side timer
(reset only on route change, never from the server TTL) and calls
`/logout?auto-logout=true` ~2h after login, which issues `POST /api/v3/logout`
and deletes the shared key. No keepalive can prevent it; the fix is to close
the tab. This produced two false conclusions before being found — if a token
dies ~2h after login, suspect an open tab first. `docs/AUTH.md` has the chain.
## Conventions
- Imports use `.ts` extensions; `rewriteRelativeImportExtensions` makes `tsc`
emit `.js`. This lets `node --watch src/bin/http.ts` run the tree directly.
- **No TypeScript parameter properties** (`constructor(private readonly x: T)`).
Node's type stripping rejects them, which breaks `npm run dev` and `npm test`.
Declare the field and assign it in the constructor body instead.
- Tabs for indentation, single quotes, trailing commas.
- Comments explain *why* — an API quirk, a security property, a trade-off — not
what the line does. Several such comments encode findings that are expensive
to rediscover; do not strip them.
- Tool failures return `isError: true` with an actionable message via
`mcp/tools/result.ts`. `toToolError` separates 401 (token expired — the user must
act) from 403 (no access) from 404 (bad id) deliberately; keep that split.
## Adding a tool
1. Add the client method in `core/client.ts` (`GET` only).
2. Register the tool in the relevant `mcp/tools/*.ts`, with a description that
says when to use it *and when not to*.
3. Format output as Markdown, keeping ids visible for follow-up calls.
4. If it reads the index, handle `context.store === undefined` with a message
saying what is unavailable and what still works.
5. Add a check to `scripts/smoke.mjs` and run `npm run smoke` both ways.
## Environment
`.env` holds `TSC_URL`, `TSC_JWT_COOKIE`, `MCP_AUTH_TOKEN`. See `.env.example`
for the full set and `docs/AUTH.md` for refreshing the JWT. `npm run probe`
reports both clocks: days until hard expiry and seconds of idle budget left.