Files
Schulcloud-MCP/docs/DEPLOYMENT.md
MechaCat02 bac91303bf Add a setup guide for the Pi, and a compose file its .env selects
docs/PI.md goes from a Pi with Docker to a working claude.ai connector:
configuration, the first token, Caddy, DNS, the VPS forwarding raw TCP,
checks from outside, connecting the clients, the monthly token, updates,
backups and troubleshooting.

docker-compose.override.yml is tracked, so Compose would have merged it on
the Pi as well — publishing ports and switching the crawl timer off. The
Pi's .env sets COMPOSE_FILE to add deploy/docker-compose.pi.yml instead,
which joins the existing Caddy network by name and builds DATABASE_URL, so
nothing tracked needs editing there. Postgres moves to a private network
shared only with the server.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-16 20:19:17 +02:00

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# Deployment
This page explains the moving parts and why each is there. For the steps in
order, on the Pi, follow [PI.md](PI.md).
## The shape of it
```
claude.ai ──HTTPS──┐
├─▶ VPS (public IP) ──tunnel──▶ Pi 5 (home network)
schulcloud CLI ─────┘ └─ Caddy ─▶ schulcloud-mcp:8080
├─ /mcp (Claude)
├─ /api (CLI)
├─ Postgres (index)
├─ mirror (file bytes)
└──▶ schulcloud-thueringen.de
```
Both front ends use the same hostname. `/mcp` speaks MCP; `/api` serves the
CLI's manifest, file bytes, re-crawl requests and token replacement; `/token` is
a page for pasting a fresh Schulcloud token.
Claude's custom connectors call the endpoint from Anthropic's cloud
(`160.79.104.0/21`), so it must be publicly reachable over real TLS — a
localhost tunnel or self-signed cert will not do. The VPS provides the public
address; Caddy on the Pi terminates TLS and obtains the certificate. **Keep the
VPS forwarding raw TCP** rather than terminating TLS itself: then it never sees
a request path, which matters once a path carries a secret (below).
**The Pi must stay up.** More than two hours offline ends the Schulcloud session
however long the token has left — a laptop that sleeps overnight loses it every
night. A replacement token fixes that without a restart (see *Replacing the
Schulcloud token*), but an always-on host is what avoids needing one.
The container publishes no host port. Caddy reaches it over the shared Docker
network, so the only way in from the internet is through Caddy and then through
this server's bearer check.
## First deploy
[PI.md](PI.md) steps 25: clone to `/opt/schulcloud-mcp`, write `.env` (the Pi's
`COMPOSE_FILE`, `CADDY_NETWORK` and `POSTGRES_PASSWORD`, generated secrets, the
first Schulcloud token), then:
```bash
docker compose up -d --build
docker compose logs -f schulcloud-mcp
```
Expect:
```
[schulcloud-mcp] listening on 0.0.0.0:8080 — instance https://… , auth enabled (plus secret MCP path), token from environment, 29 day(s) left, keepalive every 30min, index every 6h
```
`auth DISABLED` there means `MCP_AUTH_TOKEN` is empty — fix it before exposing
the service. A `keepalive: token rejected (401)` line right after startup means
the Schulcloud token is dead and needs replacing (see docs/AUTH.md); the server
will run but every tool will fail.
## Joining the existing Caddy
The Pi already runs Caddy in a container. This server needs no Caddy of its own
— only to sit on the same Docker network, so Caddy reaches it by name and no
host port is published.
That is what `deploy/docker-compose.pi.yml` does, and the Pi's `.env` selects it
with `COMPOSE_FILE=docker-compose.yml:deploy/docker-compose.pi.yml`, so plain
`docker compose` commands pick it up and nothing tracked needs editing. It
declares the Caddy network external under the name in `CADDY_NETWORK`. Setting
`COMPOSE_FILE` also matters for what it leaves out: without it, Compose merges
`docker-compose.override.yml`, which is for local development and publishes
ports.
### Postgres
The index gets its own Postgres container, on a network shared with this server
and nothing else — not with Caddy, and not with whatever else is on Caddy's
network. The Pi file builds `DATABASE_URL` from `POSTGRES_PASSWORD`. Migrations
run at startup; the first creates `pg_trgm`.
An existing Postgres works as well: create a database and a user that owns it
(it must be able to `CREATE EXTENSION`), point `DATABASE_URL` at it, and remove
the `postgres` service and the `depends_on` that names it. Nothing requires
sharing one.
Without `DATABASE_URL` the server still runs: search crawls live on every call
and `/api` returns `503`. The startup log says which mode it is in.
### Caddy
Append `deploy/Caddyfile.snippet` to the Pi's Caddyfile, replacing
`mcp.example.org` with the real hostname, and reload:
```bash
docker exec <caddy-container> caddy reload --config /etc/caddy/Caddyfile
```
Two settings in that snippet matter and are easy to miss:
- **`flush_interval -1`** — MCP's Streamable HTTP transport holds a
server-sent-events channel open. Without this, Caddy buffers it and the
connector hangs with no error.
- **`read_timeout`/`write_timeout` of 300s** — a `search` call walks every
course and can take tens of seconds. Caddy's defaults will cut it off.
- **The `format filter` in `log`** — rewrites `/<secret>/mcp` before an access
log entry is written. Without it every claude.ai request writes the secret to
disk. Verified against Caddy 2.11: the entry reads `"uri":"/<secret>/mcp"`.
## Ports and DNS
- DNS for the hostname points at the **VPS**, not the Pi.
- The VPS forwards 80 and 443 to the Pi's Caddy. Port 80 must work too, or
Caddy cannot complete the ACME HTTP challenge.
- Nothing else needs to be exposed.
## Verifying from outside
```bash
curl -s https://mcp.example.org/healthz
# {"status":"ok","sessions":0}
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' -X POST https://mcp.example.org/mcp \
-H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{}'
# 401 ← the bearer check is live
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' -X POST https://mcp.example.org/$(openssl rand -hex 32)/mcp \
-H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{}'
# 404 ← a wrong path secret looks like any unknown path
```
If `/healthz` answers but `/mcp` returns 401 with a correct token, check that
the token in `.env` matches the one in the connector exactly — no trailing
newline from a copy-paste.
## Connecting Claude
### claude.ai — a secret path, for now
claude.ai's *Add custom connector* dialog takes a name and a URL. Sending a
bearer token needs its "Request headers" section, a beta most accounts do not
have, and the proper answer — OAuth — is not built yet. Until it is, the
server can serve MCP at a path that is itself the secret:
1. Put `MCP_PATH_SECRET=<openssl rand -hex 32>` in `.env` and recreate the
container: `docker compose up -d --force-recreate schulcloud-mcp`. The
startup line then says `(plus secret MCP path)` — never the secret itself.
2. claude.ai → **Customize → Connectors → Add custom connector**. Name it, and
give the URL `https://mcp.example.org/<secret>/mcp`. No sign-in.
3. Enable it in a conversation via **+ → Connectors**.
Ask *"which courses am I in?"* as a first check — that exercises the path, the
Schulcloud token and the API in one call.
**Know what this trades away.** The URL is now the credential, and Anthropic's
connector documentation calls credentials in URLs a security vulnerability,
because URLs end up in logs. This deployment keeps it out of its own: the
server never logs request paths, the Caddy snippet rewrites the segment to
`<secret>` in the access log, and a VPS forwarding raw TCP never sees it.
Caddy's *error* log can still name the path if the container is down while
claude.ai calls, and claude.ai stores the URL in its connector settings. There
is no revocation short of a new secret: change `MCP_PATH_SECRET`, recreate the
container, and add the connector again. Anyone holding the URL can read — never
change — the account. A wrong secret answers 404, like any unknown path.
### Claude Code and the CLI — the bearer token
Both can send a header, so they keep using `MCP_AUTH_TOKEN` on the plain `/mcp`
and `/api`:
```bash
claude mcp add --transport http --scope user schulcloud https://mcp.example.org/mcp \
--header "Authorization: Bearer <MCP_AUTH_TOKEN>"
schulcloud login --server https://mcp.example.org --token <MCP_AUTH_TOKEN>
```
## Replacing the Schulcloud token
The token lasts 30 days at most and can only come from a browser login (see
docs/AUTH.md), so this is the monthly chore — but it no longer needs a restart
or an `.env` edit:
1. Log in to Schulcloud in a **private window** and copy the `jwt` cookie's
value (DevTools → Application → Cookies).
2. Either run `schulcloud token set` and paste it, or open
`https://mcp.example.org/token` and paste it together with `MCP_AUTH_TOKEN`.
3. **Close the private window.**
The server checks the token with Schulcloud first — right account, not
expired, not logged out — then swaps it in, restarts the keepalive and saves it
to the `state` volume (`STATE_DIR=/data/state`), so a restart keeps it. At
startup the newer of the saved token and `TSC_JWT_COOKIE` wins, unless the two
are for different accounts: changing `TSC_JWT_COOKIE` is how you switch
accounts. `schulcloud token` shows the days left; from a week before expiry the
log, `whoami` and the CLI warn about it.
## Running it locally instead
For Claude Code or Claude Desktop on your own machine, skip all of the above and
use stdio:
```json
{
"mcpServers": {
"schulcloud": {
"command": "node",
"args": ["/path/to/schulcloud-mcp/dist/bin/stdio.js"],
"env": {
"TSC_URL": "https://schulcloud-thueringen.de",
"TSC_JWT_COOKIE": "…"
}
}
}
}
```
`MCP_AUTH_TOKEN` is irrelevant in stdio mode — there is no network listener.
## Updating
```bash
cd /opt/schulcloud-mcp && git pull
docker compose up -d --build
docker compose exec schulcloud-mcp node -e "1" # sanity
npm run probe # re-verify the API assumptions
```
## Operational notes
- **Restart policy** is `unless-stopped`; the container comes back after a
reboot.
- **Sessions** are in-memory and dropped after 30 minutes idle. A restart
invalidates them; Claude re-initializes transparently.
- **Logs** are capped at 3 × 10 MB. The Authorization header is never logged.
- **The container is read-only** with `cap_drop: ALL` and `no-new-privileges`,
running as the unprivileged `node` user. The writable paths are the mirror
volume at `/data/mirror`, which holds downloaded file bytes, and the state
volume at `/data/state`, which holds a replaced Schulcloud token (mode 0600).
Both belong in no backup that leaves the Pi unencrypted.
- **The mirror grows.** It holds a copy of every course file under
`MIRROR_MAX_BYTES` (64 MiB default). Larger files — videos, mostly — are
indexed as metadata and proxied live on request instead. Budget a few GB.
- **A re-crawl of unchanged content downloads nothing**, because Schulcloud file
records are immutable, so the 6-hourly crawl costs a few hundred cheap GETs in
the steady state.
- **The Schulcloud session has a 2-hour sliding TTL**, so the server calls
`refresh-session` every 30 minutes. Watch for
`keepalive: session extended, 7200s` in the logs, or run
`npm run keepalive-status` for a summary.
- **Never leave a Schulportal tab open on the token you deployed.** It shares
the session and its auto-logout will revoke it ~2h after login. Copy the
cookie in a private window and close it — see docs/AUTH.md.
- **Downtime longer than two hours lapses the session** and restarting does not
recover it: a long power cut means handing the server a fresh token
(`schulcloud token set`), no restart needed.
- **Monthly chore**: replace the token before its 30-day hard expiry — see
*Replacing the Schulcloud token*. `schulcloud token` and `npm run probe`
report the clocks.